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1. Introduction
This study is the result of a long-term research project. Since the early 1980s I
have been interested in the international comparative debate on neo-corporatism
among political scientists and economists. Over the years I have been in the po-
sition to pursue this interest off and on. The Netherlands figures prominently in
this debate. What started me was that researchers could not agree on the Dutch
case. For, on the one hand it offered all the obvious prerequisites for neo-corporatism: 
- a host of institutional arrangements in which the government, trade unions
and employers’ organisations ostensibly have co-ordinated their socio-economic
policies (with incomes policy as a cornerstone);
- consensual trade unions (as indicated by one of the lowest strike records in
the developed world);
- an impressive economic recovery since 1945, after the ravages of World War II.
However, on the other hand, on closer observation, it also became obvious that
since the mid 1960s major changes occurred:
- the institutional arrangements apparently lost part of their function, much co-
ordination appeared to occur ad hoc;
- conflict seemed to become the rule rather than the exception;
- and macroeconomic and policy performance in the 1970s and early 1980s
slowly deteriorated.
At least from the point of view of the preceding period of centrally guided, sta-
tutory incomes policy, the actual process of policy formation and implementation
with respect to incomes policy became quite conflictual since the mid 1960s.
How to reconcile this paradox? After all, neo-corporatism is supposed to offer an
alternative way out of a situation of economic deterioration and societal conflict
as opposed to pluralism. And in the Netherlands both economic difficulties and
societal conflict increased during the 1970s and early 1980s. Notwithstanding
the numerous, annual attempts of the actors involved, especially the government,
to come to some sort of central agreement on incomes policy in the 1970s and
early 1980s, these agreements have been rare. Eventually, the Dutch case even
became a byword for institutional scleroses and political stagnation. The ‘Dutch
Disease’ became a prominent, but negative connotation of Dutch industrial re-
lations and performance during the 1970s and the 1980s.
Since then the picture has again changed profoundly. In the late 1990s, almost
overnight, the Netherlands again became a model. But this time it was a positive
model: the ‘Polder Model’ that produced the ‘Dutch Miracle’ (Visser and Hemer-
ijck 1997; see also Becker 2001a for the origins of this reversal). The Nether-
lands became the envy of its neighbours. The country was diligently (re)studied
by political scientists and economists looking for elements of the model that could
be exported. The Dutch case was even discussed as a possible role model for
European Union policy concertation (see for instance Scharpf 1997; Schmidt
1997; Labohm and Wijnker 2000; the Economist 2002; and Falkner 2003). 
Recent events, however, have shown that despite the ‘Polder Model’, the ‘Dutch
Miracle’was apparently not sustainable. The global contraction of economic growth
in 2002 and 2003 has had its negative impact on the Dutch economy as well. In
2002, economic growth almost came to a halt, and in 2003 it even became negative.
Both unemployment and the budget deficit again increased considerably. The
‘Miracle’ has faded, and so has the attractiveness of the ‘Polder Model’ (see for
instance van der Meer et al 2003). As we say in the Netherlands: ‘het kan ver-
keren’ (Bredero: in van Empel 1997: 5), which in this case may be most aptly
translated as: ‘the times, they are a changing’ (Bob Dylan).
Hence, there is a puzzle to solve. On the one hand, the Dutch case is generally
considered to represent a case of neo-corporatism. On the other hand, this neo-
corporatism has not been able to prevent a negative performance of both Dutch
policy-making and the Dutch economy.
In the past, I have made a few modest contributions to this ongoing debate, both
in the Netherlands and internationally. In the Netherlands, I have contributed to
the debate in politics by assisting a select committee of Members of Parliament.
This select committee, the ‘bijzondere commissie Vraagpunten Adviesorganen’,
issued a report and policy recommendations on advisory bodies to the govern-
ment (Raad op maat 1993; Werkdocument Raad op maat 1993). The committee,
chaired by the Christen Democratisch Appèl (CDA) Member of Parliament De
Jong, was one of a series of committees concerned with administrative and
constitutional reform in the Netherlands in the early 1990s.1
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1. The committees were installed on the recommendation of another select committee of Members of
Parliament, the ‘bijzondere commissie Vraagpunten’. The CDA Member of Parliament Deetman
chaired this committee (Rapport bijzondere commissie Vraagpunten 1990; see also de Ru 1995: 4;
and Sap 1995: 170, 171).
In chronological order, my contributions to the Dutch debate in political science
on neo-corporatism include:
- Het neo-korporatisme als nieuwe politieke strategie. Krisisbeheersing met
beleid en (door) overleg? (1985 - with Hans Keman and Dietmar Braun);
- Neo-korporatisme en de loonpolitiek in Nederland 1965-1982 (1985 - with
van Brakel, Kampf, Keman, Klijn, Simons and Stolk);
- Christen-democratie en neo-corporatisme in Nederland. Het CDA en het
maatschappelijk middenveld (1993);
- Belangenvertegenwoordiging en beleidsadvisering: geniet, maar drink met
mate (1995 - with Jantine Oldersma);
My contributions to the international academic debate on neo-corporatism include:
- Neo-corporatism as a strategy for conflict regulation in the Netherlands 1970 -
1990) (1995);
- Corporatism and socio-economic conflict-regulation (1997a);
- Neo-corporatism and macroeconomic performance (1997b).
These contributions basically cover the Netherlands and other small neo-corporatist
countries in Western Europe during the period 1965-1990. This study builds on
that previous research that has been rechecked, and extended to include the
period 1990-2000 as well. The research has been undertaken from a comparative
perspective. Incomes policy in the Netherlands has been investigated not as a
case sui generis, but with concepts and insights gained from the comparative
debate on neo-corporatism. 
The comparative debate on neo-corporatism has yielded a variety of concepts of
neo-corporatism. Applied to the Netherlands, most of these concepts do not ade-
quately capture changes and developments in Dutch neo-corporatism. Usually
they are focused on two aspects of neo-corporatism: institutions and consensus.
From the institutional point of view the Netherlands is a clear case of neo-cor-
poratism. However, from the point of view of consensus, this is much less so,
especially in the earlier period from 1965 to the mid 1980s. Although strike levels
in the Netherlands remained quite low comparatively speaking, from the Dutch
point of view there were major conflicts. Depending on the aspect most prominent
in their respective concepts, students of neo-corporatism tend to disagree on the
Dutch case. For some it is obviously neo-corporatist, others are not entirely
convinced (Lijphart and Crepaz 1991: 240; Siaroff 1999: 180).
Although institutions are important for understanding neo-corporatism, I never-
theless chose for an actor-oriented approach of neo-corporatism as a government
strategy for conflict regulation. Contrary to other comparative studies, it is not
my intention to determine whether the Netherlands is a neo-corporatist country
as compared to other countries, or to establish some sort of degree or level of neo-
corporatism in the Netherlands in comparison to other countries. Rather, I wish
to unravel the process underlying this type of neo-corporatist politics by exami-
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ning both the central actor’s behaviour within the Dutch institutions organising
industrial relations and the role of government.
The first objective, therefore, is to establish whether the more actor-oriented
approach of neo-corporatism as a government strategy for conflict regulation can
indeed account for Dutch incomes policy between 1965 and 2000 as the outcome
of a process of negotiations between trade unions and employers’ organisations,
and between these ‘social partners’ and the government. This is expressed in the
first research question:
1. Can neo-corporatism, defined as a government strategy for conflict re-
gulation, offer a plausible explanation for the formation and implementation
of Dutch incomes policy between 1965 and 2000?
The next objective of the research is to determine whether Dutch incomes policy
between 1965 and 2000, as the common outcome of negotiations between trade
unions, employers’ organisations and the government, was effective. That is, did
incomes policy deliver what the actors involved set out to achieve. Can the com-
mon outcome be explained in terms of an optimal common outcome that avoided
zero-sum results based on the agendas of the actors involved (see Keman 1999:
261-265)? This is expressed in the second research question:
2. Was Dutch incomes policy between 1965 and 2000 effective in terms of the
agendas of actors involved?
To answer these questions, I will first define the concept of neo-corporatism
used. I will use a definition of neo-corporatism as a government strategy for con-
flict regulation. This conceptualisation differs from other more static conceptuali-
sations of neo-corporatism as a system or a structure. The strategy concept
assumes that governments can opt for various policies. These options range from
following a neo-corporatist strategy of formulating and implementing incomes
policy to imposing policies on employers’ organisations or trade unions, or,
conversely, to abstain from intervention altogether. Equally, trade unions and
employers’ organisations can opt for various modes of behaviour. They can co-
operate or opt for confrontation, with each other or with the government. 
The conceptual relation between neo-corporatism, incomes policy, and the actors
involved - government, trade unions and employers’ organisations - has to be
clarified as well. Interactions are assumed by means of Rational Institutional
theory as developed by Shepsle, Tsebelis, Keman, and Scharpf in particular, who
all share the idea that actors behaving rationally, seek agreement to further their
interests. Chapter 2 is devoted to this exercise.
Chapter 3 elaborates the research design. The research design consists of a com-
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parative single case study. The comparative single case study into the formation,
implementation and effectiveness of Dutch incomes policy between 1965 and
2000 will provide the answers to the research questions. This comparative single
case study can be regarded as a ‘crucial’ case study. That is, it can be used to
establish whether the results of the research into a particular case that is com-
monly accepted to be representative for the phenomenon under investigation
(neo-corporatism), are exemplary for the process that the theory, based on com-
parative analysis, describes (see for instance Lijphart 1971; Yin 1989; and Land-
man 2000).
To that effect, I have devised an instrument of analysis that is based on an ope-
rationalisation of government strategies and styles of decision-making of trade
unions and employers’ organisations. Government strategy is operationalised in
four strategies, and, based on Scharpf and Kuypers, I operationalised three styles
of decision-making.
In chapter 4 a summary overview of research results is presented. The research
provides an affirmative answer to research question 1: neo-corporatism, defined
as a government strategy for conflict regulation, can indeed offer a plausible
explanation for the formation and implementation of Dutch incomes policy be-
tween 1965 and 2000. Neo-corporatism also mattered as it produced less conflict
and more agreement between social partners. However, neo-corporatism varied
considerably over time. It was much more prominent after 1982 than before
1983, but the ‘Wassenaar Agreement’ of December 1982 can not be considered
as a watershed with respect to government strategy. Government strategy was
non-neo-corporatist from 1980 - 1986. Most concluding neo-corporatist govern-
ment strategies after 1982 occurred between 1987 and 2000. 
Less confrontation between social partners did not lead to a significant increase
in the concluding problem-solving style (C: Battle of the Sexes). The main con-
cluding style of decision-making remained the bargaining style (B: Prisoners’
Dilemma), also after 1982. From the point of view of styles of decision-making
as well, the ‘Wassenaar Agreement’ of December 1982 can not be considered as
a watershed.
Dutch neo-corporatism with regard to incomes policy between 1965 and 2000
was typically a combination of the concluding neo-corporatist co-operative govern-
ment strategy (II) and the concluding bargaining style of decision-making (B:
Prisoners’ Dilemma), instead of a ‘Polder Model’ combination of a concluding
neo-corporatist government strategy (co-operative or congruent) and the con-
cluding problem solving style of decision-making (C: Battle of the Sexes).
In chapter 5, the affirmative answer to research question 1 is elaborated and
substantiated. The emergence of a Dutch ‘Polder Model’ either after 1982 or in
the 1990s appears not to be supported by my research findings.
In chapter 6 the effectiveness of a neo-corporatist government strategy is
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discussed in terms of the agendas of the actors involved. The question to be
answered is whether a neo-corporatist government strategy did indeed do a better
job than non-neo-corporatist government strategies in two respects. First, in
reordering the list of preferences that is expressed in each actor’s agenda for in-
comes policy (see Keman 1999: 261-265). That is, were neo-corporatist govern-
ment strategies more effective in bringing the actors involved in incomes policy
to a Central Agreement than non-neo-corporatist government strategies?
Second, were neo-corporatist government strategies more effective in moving
towards the core - establishing a match between preferences of all actors and
actual outcome - than non-neo-corporatist government strategies?
With respect to Central Agreements, the answer to research question 2 must be
that Dutch incomes policy between 1965 and 2000 was more often not effective
than effective in terms of the agendas of the actors involved, especially between
1965 and 1982. Neo-corporatist incomes policies were indeed more often effective
than non-neo-corporatist incomes policies in this respect, especially after 1992. 
I contend, however, that this does not support the emergence of a ‘Polder Model’,
neither starting in 1983, nor in the 1990s. In effect, the ‘Model’ of negotiations on
incomes policy between 1965 and 2000 did not change dramatically over the years. 
The ‘Model’ typically consisted of a concluding neo-corporatist government
strategy (II: co-operative) and the concluding bargaining style of decision-making
(B: Prisoners’ Dilemma).
What did change was the effectiveness of that incomes policy in terms of Central
Agreements. Increased effectiveness of negotiations on incomes policy in terms
of Central Agreements after 1982, however, can be explained in terms of the
actors’ behaviour during the annual negotiations on incomes policy in a context
of institutional change (linkage, delinkage, relinkage - see also Hemerijck 2003:
53 ff.) due to macroeconomic and other externalities (European Monetary Union,
i.e. the Euro).
A neo-corporatist government strategy, combined with a Central Agreement that
was reached through more or less ‘tough’ negotiations between social partners -
an alternation between confrontation (A: Chicken) and bargaining (B: Prisoners’
Dilemma) -, increased actual outcome in terms of approaching the core. To a (much)
lesser extent that was, however, also the case for non-neo-corporatist government
strategies when no Central Agreement could be reached through ‘tough’ ne-
gotiations between social partners.
The macroeconomic context appeared to influence the actors’ potential to
approach a match between their preferences and actual outcome. That was
reflected in how often and how close a core situation could be approached, given
the combination of actors’ behaviour in terms of government strategies, Central
Agreements and ‘tough’ negotiations between social partners.
In chapter 7 the relation between a neo-corporatist strategy of the government
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and the composition of that government is investigated. The questions to be ans-
wered were, firstly, to what extent a neo-corporatist government strategy coincided
with the participation of a social democratic political party in government.
Secondly, what was the effectiveness of these neo-corporatist strategies in terms
of the agendas of the actors involved in incomes policy. 
I have observed, first, that participation of the social democratic Partij van de
Arbeid (PvdA) in coalition governments did indeed make a positive difference
with regard to the occurrence of concluding neo-corporatist government strategies.
Next I have established that participation of social democracy in coalition
governments also made a (positive) difference with regard to the effectiveness of
concluding neo-corporatist government strategies in terms of reordering the
agendas of the actors involved in incomes policy (Central Agreements). Partici-
pation of the PvdA in government as the dominant party that held the office of
Minister of Social Affairs and was primarily responsible for incomes policy after
1994 did not, however, produce a new, nor a more effective ‘Polder Model’ in
terms of more Central Agreements or more often approaching the core.
Exclusion of the PvdA from coalition government did make a (positive) difference
with respect to the effectiveness of non-neo-corporatist government strategies in
terms of Central Agreements, but not in terms of approaching the core.
I have observed that coalition governments of PvdA and CDA before 1994 were
either effective in terms of concluding neo-corporatist government strategies and
Central Agreements, or in approaching the core. Coalition governments of PvdA
and VVD after 1993 were more successful in terms of concluding neo-corporatist
government strategies, but not in terms of either Central Agreements or ap-
proaching the core. 
Social democratic participation in coalition government in the Netherlands be-
tween 1965 and 2000, therefore, appears to have been beneficial for reaching
equilibrium between social partners: either by way of concluding neo-corporatist
government strategies and Central Agreements, or by way of approaching the core.
In chapter 8, Dutch policy performance and Dutch macroeconomic performance
between 1965 and 2000 is discussed. First the Dutch case is investigated from a
comparative point of view. The issue is to what extent Dutch policy performance
and Dutch macroeconomic performance was indeed different or exceptional
when compared to those of other groups of liberal western democracies with
market economies, like the member states of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD); the member states of the European Union
(EU); and other small West-European neo-corporatist democracies like Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.
From the comparative perspective, neither a specifically ‘Dutch’ disease, nor a
specifically ‘Dutch’ miracle in terms of overall performance could be identified.
The specifically ‘Dutch’ disease of low performance between 1978 and 1985
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consisted of a lower average economic growth, negative average employment growth,
and, to a lesser degree, higher average unemployment. The specific ‘Dutch’ miracle
of higher performance between 1995 and 2000 consisted of a (much) higher average
employment and economic growth, and lower average unemployment, combined
with a considerable retrenchment of the welfare state. Especially this last aspect
of the ‘Dutch’ miracle has drawn little attention yet from a comparative point of
view (but see Green-Pedersen et al 2001; Green-Pedersen 2001; Castles 2002,
2004; and Keman 2003).
Next the effectiveness of incomes policy in terms of Central Agreements, and
performance is discussed. The issue is whether the ‘Dutch Disease’ did go to-
gether with less, and with less effective, neo-corporatist government strategies,
and, conversely, the ‘Dutch Miracle’ with more, and more effective, neo-corpora-
tist government strategies. Although that was indeed the case, which may have
contributed to the notion of a positive relation between a Dutch ‘Polder Model’
and the ‘Dutch Miracle’, I argue that it was not the actors’ behaviour that ex-
plained performance, but rather the (macroeconomic and policy) performance
and (the changes in the) institutional context combined, that explained the actors’
behaviour in terms of neo-corporatist government strategies and Central Agree-
ments.
Finally, the effectiveness of incomes policy in terms of approaching the core and
performance is discussed. The issue is whether the ‘Dutch Disease’ did go to-
gether with less, and with less effective, neo-corporatist government strategies,
and, conversely, the ‘Dutch Miracle’ with more, and more effective government
strategies. Although the ‘Dutch Disease’ did indeed go together with less neo-
corporatist government strategies than the ‘Dutch Miracle’, and the core was
indeed less often approached during the ‘Dutch Disease’ than during the ‘Dutch
Miracle’ (which may have contributed to the notion of a positive relation be-
tween a Dutch ‘Polder Model’ and the ‘Dutch Miracle’), I argue that it was not
the actors’ behaviour that explained performance, but rather performance and the
(changes in) the institutional context combined, that explains the actors’ be-
haviour in terms of neo-corporatist and non-neo-corporatist government strate-
gies and approaching the core. That can explain why the core was more often
approached during the period of the pre-‘Polder Model’ (1965 - 1982) than
during the period of the alleged ‘Polder Model’ (1983 - 2000) and the ‘Dutch
Miracle’ (1995 - 2000).
In other words, the behaviour of the actors involved in incomes policy did neither
produce the ‘Dutch Disease’, nor the ‘Dutch Miracle’. It was the (macroeconomic
and policy) performance and exogenous context (EMU) that defined the ‘room
to manoeuvre’ of government and social partners, and induced the actors
(especially the government) to changes in the institutional context (transition
from a government guided incomes policy to a ‘free’ incomes policy, linkage and
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delinkage, and budgetary discipline). That institutional change then induced
especially social partners to change their behaviour. Neo-corporatism does matter,
but apparently as a contingency (Scharpf 1998; see also Woldendorp 1997b). It
was not the driving factor of recovery as identified by, for instance, Visser and
Hemerijck (1997).
In chapter 9 finally, the concept of neo-corporatism as a government strategy is
reviewed. Based on the answers to the two research questions in chapters 4-6,
and on the findings in chapters 7 and 8, the implications for the ‘Polder Model’
and the contribution of the findings to the cross-national literature and general
knowledge on neo-corporatism, incomes policy, and policy performance and
macroeconomic performance, are elaborated. The chapter is concluded with a
discussion of the implications for the ‘Dutch Disease’ and the ‘Dutch Miracle’.
I contend that neither from the perspective of government strategy and style of
decision-making of social partners, nor from the perspective of Central Agree-
ments, approaching the core, or social democratic dominance in government,
there is evidence to support the emergence of a ‘Polder Model’ in the Netherlands.
Not after 1982, nor in the 1990s. My research findings imply that the importance
that other researchers have attached to the ‘Wassenaar Agreement’ of December
1982 is overrated. The ‘Wassenaar Agreement’ can not be considered as a watershed.
My research findings support those researchers that pointed to the flexible
character of Dutch neo-corporatism in combination with a central role for the
government during the period 1965 - 2000 (or indeed during the whole period
after 1945). Neo-corporatism did exist in the Netherlands between 1965 and
2000, but it varied considerably both in occurrence and in effectiveness. That
variation, however, did not constitute a new ‘Model’ after 1982, and neither in
the 1990s. The research findings illustrate that sometimes the ‘Model’ is effective,
and sometimes it is not. That depends on the macroeconomic and exogenous
context (EMU), which drives the actors’ behaviour and may lead to changes in
the institutional context (transition from a government guided to a free incomes
policy, linkage, delinkage, relinkage) effected by the government, which then in
turn influence the actors’ behaviour (especially social partners).
In other words, the process of negotiations on the formation and implementation
of incomes policy in the Netherlands between 1965 and 2000 shows a pattern of
gradual institutional change that changes both the issues and the scope of ne-
gotiations and agreements. This gradual institutional change was usually im-
plemented by the government, if necessary against the preferences of one or both
of the social partners. These actions of the government were driven by the macro-
economic context and exogenous changes like the EMU. Within the adjusted
institutional setting, the actors continued their negotiations on the formation and
implementation of incomes policy. But these negotiations were then based on
changes in both the issues that could be negotiated and the scope of the agree-
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ments that could be concluded.
The implications of my conceptualisation and operationalisation of neo-cor-
poratism as a government strategy for cross-national research are twofold. Firstly,
the instrument of analysis that was used in this research can also be used for a
more dynamic in-depth analysis of the formation and implementation of incomes
policy in other countries and for the comparison of those incomes policies. A
cross-national comparison of incomes policy based on my instrument of analysis
can contribute to alleviating the present methodological trade-off between com-
paring multiple cases and researching a single case, by combining elements of
both research methods: comparing multiple cases based on a ‘thick’ or at least
qualitative description and analysis of these cases.
Secondly, with minor adaptations, that instrument of analysis can also be used to
investigate and compare the formation and implementation of policies in other
policy areas than incomes policy, both in the Netherlands and in other countries.
It is a promising instrument for generating new insights within New Institutionalism.
Both the concept and the indicators that I have used have proven to deliver valid
and meaningful results. Based on the results of my research it is now possible to
elaborate on the Dutch Disease, the Dutch Miracle and the Polder Model and to
distinguish myth from reality.
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2. Neo-corporatism as a government strategy
Two questions were at the heart of comparative neo-corporatist2 research and
debate in the 1970s and 1980s. Firstly, what is the relation between the emer-
gence of neo-corporatism and growing economic problems in developed liberal
democracies during the aftermath of the two oil crises in 1973 and 1979/1980?
Secondly, does neo-corporatism indeed contributes positively to the macro-
economic performance of market economies?
The analysis of the relation between the advance of neo-corporatism and growing
economic problems since the 1970s yields a surprising result. Increasing eco-
nomic problems may threaten social and political stability. But, in contrast to
mainstream pluralist political theories, in some liberal democracies3 the attempts
to overcome these problems appear not to be made solely by political parties,
through parliament and party government, nor by separately organised interests
in the economic arena or their ad-hoc co-operation. Instead, a complex of pheno-
mena dubbed neo-corporatism appears to play an important part as well. In this
context, for all students of neo-corporatism, neo-corporatism means a certain
measure of co-operation4 between party government and the relevant socio-
economic interest groups of employers’ organisations and trade unions. The aim
2. In the literature both the terms corporatism and neo-corporatism are used. I prefer to use neo-corporatism
to indicate that it has no bearing on the historical corporatisms of fascism or Roman Catholicism. 
3. The countries most often mentioned are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Nor-
way, Sweden and Switzerland (Czada 1987; Lehner 1987; Braun 1989; Lijphart and Crepaz 1991;
Siaroff 1999). Recently, Ireland was added to this list as well (Scharpf 1997; Schmidt 1997).
4. In the literature on neo-corporatism various notions are used to express what is generally viewed as
one of its main features, that is the maintenance or restoration of social and political stability. The
notions I refer to are co-operation, compromise, consensus and concerted action. When discussing
other researchers, I will conform to their use of these notions. 
Although these notions are used as almost interchangeable concepts, in my view they are not.
Co-operation is a consequence of congruent agendas or policies. Continued co-operation may even-
tually result in consensus, but not necessarily as co-operation may break down as well (Czada 1998).
of this ‘organised’ co-operation is to redress the economic problems in such a
way that social and political stability is maintained or restored (Schmitter and
Lehmbruch 1979; von Alemann 1981; Lehmbruch and Schmitter 1982).
The second research question is a hotly contested issue. Does neo-corporatism
indeed contribute to a better macroeconomic performance? (See for instance
Therborn 1987; Schmitter 1989; Alvarez et al 1991; Crepaz 1992; Golden 1993;
Woldendorp 1997b; Flanagan 1999; Lane and Ersson 2000; and Kenworthy 2002).
Nevertheless, most empirical research supports the notion that this is the case.
Neo-corporatism contributes positively to the macroeconomic performance of
market economies in liberal democracies in terms of higher economic growth,
lower inflation, and less unemployment. Especially when compared to non-neo-
corporatist democracies (Schmidt 1982; Alvarez et al 1991; Kurzer 1991; Western
1991; Crepaz 1992; Keman 1993; Pennings 1997; Lijphart 1999; Siaroff 1999;
Traxler and Kittel 2000; and Kenworthy 2002).
In the 1990s, the positive macroeconomic performance of smaller neo-corporatist
democracies in Europe - the Netherlands, Denmark, and Ireland - has recently
sparked new research and a new debate. The central issue is whether neo-
corporatism can be exported to other European democracies, as well as to the
European level itself as a means of European wide policy concertation (Scharpf
1997; Schmidt 1997; Labohm and Wijnker 2000; Falkner 2003).5
It is not surprising that in comparative research much attention is focused on the
Netherlands. At first glance, the country has a long and institutionalised tradition
of co-operation between party government and employers’ organisations and
trade unions. Few participants in the debate, however, go beyond this simple
statement of fact. As I will show, this makes it difficult for them to incorporate
historical changes in the Netherlands in their analysis.
The Dutch debate on neo-corporatism in the 1970s and 1980s on the other hand,
has only been marginally influenced by comparative research. Generally, Dutch
researchers have been pre-occupied with the problems of ‘overload’, ‘Unregier-
barkeit’ and ‘overcharging’ of the welfare state: growing government expen-
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Compromises are necessary steps in a continued process of co-operation that may eventually lead to
consensus. However, compromises may be difficult or even impossible to reach, resulting in a break
down of co-operation (Scharpf 1998).
Consensus is a situation in which after continued co-operation and repeated compromises agreement
of opinion among the actors involved is reached. It is the result of a process, and not a policy instru-
ment. And even consensus, although it can be viewed as ‘a broad agreement on fundamental principles’
or policy issues, still allows ‘for disagreement on matters of emphasis or detail’ (Heywood 1997: 403).
Concerted action, lastly, derives from the German ‘Konzertierte Aktion’ and refers to combined
actions or policies of all actors involved. This notion describes a result or outcome of co-operation,
compromises or consensus (Lehmbruch 1979).
5. See Streeck (2004) for a comprehensive history of the development of theoretical notions on interest
groups and neo-corporatism.
diture on social security, pensions, health care and social services, and public
sector wages. In times of reduced or even negative economic growth this leads
to an increasing budget deficit and public debt. The cause of the problem is
located in the so-called ‘iron ring’, or the ‘fourth’ and ‘fifth’ powers (van den
Berg and Molleman 1974; Daudt 1979; de Vries 1989). These are composed of
the civil servants’ bureaucracy and the networks of advisory bodies, which
cluster around all Dutch government ministries (see also Dean 1984; van der
Ploeg 1995; and Sap 1995).
The contention is that within these networks policies are formulated and im-
plemented which put party government and parliament before accomplished
facts and increase the budget deficits. Neo-corporatism becomes a new label for
describing this situation. In other words, neo-corporatism is regarded as the
cause of the problems. The main thrust of the argument is that parliament and
party government, which represent the general, public interest, should regain the
initiative in policy-making and implementation from the diffuse neo-corporatist
networks of interest representatives and civil servants which created the
budgetary and fiscal problems of the government in the first place.
In contrast, other Dutch authors have discussed in great detail the changes in the
Dutch system of industrial relations in the 1960s and 1970s.6 The view which
predominates in the literature is of a development from consensus or harmony in
the 1950s (that is, none or (very) few strikes and other forms of open conflict
between trade unions and employers’ organisations), to conflict and polarisation
in the 1960s and 1970s (that is, more strikes and other forms of open conflict or
disagreement). This development is then labelled as a case of diminishing or dis-
appearing neo-corporatism. In other words, neo-corporatism becomes equal to
the absence of open conflict (consensus) between employers’organisations and trade
unions. Open conflict and disagreement means no consensus. No consensus, no
neo-corporatism.
Since the mid 1990s, political scientists and economists in the Netherlands again
become interested in the concept of neo-corporatism and its explanatory value
for incomes policy, employment policies, welfare reforms and economic develop-
ment in general. After more than a decade of austerity policies and high levels of
unemployment, exacerbated by the economic recession of 1992/93 that followed
the Gulf War of 1991, the Dutch economy finally seemed to be on the path of
recovery again. Although broad unemployment, that is including disability and
other benefits, remained virtually unchanged (SCP 2000: 284; Green-Pedersen
2001: 969; Andeweg and Irwin 2002: 183, 184), an impressive number of new
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6. These authors include: Akkermans and Grootings 1979; Teulings 1980; Akkermans and Nobelen
1983; Arendsen and Geul 1983; Nobelen 1983; Geul et al 1985a, 1985b; Nobelen et al 1985; Ter-
louw 1985; and Albeda and Ten Hove 1986.
jobs had been created. How to explain this transition from ‘disease’ in the 1970s
and the 1980s to ‘miracle’ in the 1990s? 
The answer is mixed. Some researchers favour a neo-corporatist explanation: in
the early 1980s trade unions agree to wage moderation in exchange for a re-
duction in working hours and the prospect of jobs in the future. Others have a
straightforward economic explanation: high levels of unemployment in the early
1980s leads to wage moderation, which in turn enables the creation of new jobs. 
These economic and institutional explanations do have their merits, but they do
not shed much light on what actually happened in terms of the actions and
behaviour of the government, trade unions and employers’ organisations. Nor do
they focus on the effects of these actions and behaviour. From this, it follows that
my angle for research will be neo-corporatism as a government strategy for
conflict regulation (Keman 1985; Katzenstein 1985; Zimmermann 1986; Lehner
1987; Armingeon 1994; Keman and Pennings 1995; Jones 1999; Keman 1999;
and Molina and Rhodes 2002). I will use that interpretation of the concept to shed
light on the formation and implementation of Dutch incomes policy between
1965 and 2000. I will demonstrate that the conceptualisation of neo-corporatism
as a government strategy to forge consensus by means of co-operation and
compromise developed in this study is a rewarding and dynamic analytical tool
that yields more valid results than other conceptualisations. My contention is
that this concept offers the possibility of investigating a much broader spectrum
of phenomena and events in relation to neo-corporatism:
- the composition of party government; 
- different government policies and policy areas; 
- the position and strategies of both unions and employers’ organisations; 
- general economic conditions and developments. 
In addition, neo-corporatism as a government strategy can also explain why it
sometimes does not work or cannot be implemented. 
In order to argue my case, I shall first present the various concepts of neo-cor-
poratism that are used from a comparative point of view. I shall then discuss their
usefulness for the comparatively driven evaluation of post-war Dutch incomes
policy. Next I shall discuss the Dutch views on neo-corporatism and post-war
Dutch incomes policy, and evaluate their contribution to the international debate.
I shall then explain how the use of the concept of neo-corporatism as a govern-
ment strategy differs from the approaches I have discussed. In addition, I shall
elaborate the concept of incomes policy and its relation with neo-corporatism as
a government strategy. Lastly, I will discuss neo-corporatism and pluralism and
argue that neo-corporatism conceptualised as a government strategy is a more
appropriate theoretical framework for research on incomes policy and macro-
economic and socio-economic government policy than pluralism, in the Nether-
lands and also in other small West European democracies.
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2.1 The concept of neo-corporatism
Contributions to the international debate on neo-corporatism come in various
categories. The first distinction is whether the phenomenon is addressed at the
macro- or meso-level. The macro-level is the level of national socio-economic
issues and policies and actions of party government and interest groups. The
meso-level is the level of branch or sectoral socio-economic issues and cor-
responding policies and actions of party government and interest groups.7 The
second distinction is whether neo-corporatism is conceived of as a system, a
structure or a strategy. Here I shall address the phenomenon of neo-corporatism
at the macro-level, that is the level of national socio-economic issues and policies
of party government and interest groups. 
The concept of neo-corporatism as a system implies that it is regarded as a se-
parate system, operating either alongside another system, or superseding or
following an earlier system. It may be regarded as a separate economic system,
differing from systems such as capitalism or socialism (Winkler 1976). Or as a
societal variety of capitalism under specific historical conditions (Jessop 1979).
Or even as a separate system of interest intermediation, differing from systems
such as pluralism or syndicalism (Schmitter 1974 & 1979). The systems ap-
proach of neo-corporatism focuses on the change from one societal system into
another as a result of neo-corporatist developments. It therefore tries to capture
the essence of those systemic developments and the resulting qualities of the new
societal system. This conceptualisation leads to a lack of interest for the relevant
actors, their day-to-day activities and interrelations and the consequences there-
of. It is quite abstract and static and cannot really capture the working and
mechanisms of the actors and the events involved. In sum: the systems approach
lacks explanatory value.
The concept of neo-corporatism as a structure is a less abstract analytical ap-
proach. Neo-corporatism is regarded as a phenomenon that develops within an
existing social, political and economic system: capitalist democracy. Neo-cor-
poratism is not regarded as an explicit and qualitative break with the past and the
existing social order. Neo-corporatist developments are instead viewed as a dy-
namic part of the existing system of capitalist democracy (Panitch 1979, 1981;
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7. For international contributions about neo-corporatism on the meso-level: Schmitter 1982; Wassen-
berg 1982; Cawson 1985; Grant 1985; Streeck and Schmitter 1985; van Waarden 1989; Kleinfeld
1990; and Schmitter 1990. An interesting but unsuccessful example of neo-corporatism on the
meso-level in the Netherlands is the institution in 1977 of the tripartite ‘Policy Committee Ship-
building’ (Beleidscommissie Scheepsbouw) for the restructuring of the shipbuilding branch (Lange
1978). This joint intervention by the government and by the trade unions and employers’ organi-
sations in the shipbuilding sector could not prevent the collapse of that sector. Wassenberg (1983)
describes how this joint intervention, and especially the government subsidies involved, subse-
quently became the subject of an official Parliamentary Enquiry.
Lehmbruch 1979). Neo-corporatism from this perspective is regarded as a de-
velopment or change of capitalist democracy, in that a ‘rival’ structure (to parlia-
ment) emerges, leading to a ‘mixed’ economy. The structural approach is much
more inclined to incorporate the relevant actors, their activities, the balance of
power and the effects of their day-to-day actions in the analysis.
Although there is a clear distinction between the systems and the structure approach
- the change of a whole system as opposed to changes within, or the extension
of an existing system - both tend to focus on the formal, institutional side of the
developing system or structure in order to determine whether or not there is neo-
corporatism. The systems approach tends to focus on the formal change from
one institutional system to another, while the structure approach tends to view
changing institutions as a result of the changing relation between capitalism and
parliamentary democracy. However, the existence or emergence of a system or a
structure in itself cannot offer a dynamic explanation of the (re-) actions of the
actors involved to the growing socio-economic problems, which began to develop
in the 1970s. The neo-corporatist system or structure simply emerges, and in turn
constrains or determines the scope for action by the relevant actors. 
It is this formal institutional bias which the approach of neo-corporatism as a
government strategy tries to remedy. The interaction between institutions and
actors is regarded as a mechanism, rather than a causal relation. It not only en-
tails restraints, but also offers opportunities. The strategy approach views neo-
corporatism as a possible way of resolving conflicts by organising better com-
munications and relations between the relevant actors, through both formal (in-
stitutional) and informal channels. A strategy is dynamic, which is necessary for
combating the socio-economic difficulties. As a strategy, it can be implemented
in various ways, more or less successfully; depending on the specific circum-
stances in the country concerned (Scharpf 1987; Keman 1992). Neo-corporatism
as a political strategy to restore consensus, focuses on the role of party govern-
ment. It is regarded as a government strategy to formulate policies by nego-
tiations and discussions between the government and the relevant socio-eco-
nomic interest groups through formal and informal channels, and to bind the
interest groups and the government to the implementation of those policies.
Essential in this concept of neo-corporatism is the relative autonomy and the
mutual instrumentalisation of the actors involved (Keman 1985; Czada 1986,1988;
see also Lehmbruch 1991; Keman 1999; and Molina and Rhodes 2002). 
Employers’ organisations and unions have the option to co-operate (or not) with
each other and with the government. The government can also opt to follow a
neo-corporatist strategy of policy formation and implementation or to impose
policies on employers’ organisations or unions. At the same time, however, there
is also a degree of mutual dependence of the three actors involved on each other’s
willingness to co-operate. To a certain extent they need each other’s co-operation
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to accomplish their own goals. They tend therefore to make their own co-operation
contingent on policies and concessions of the other actors involved (van Brakel
et al 1985: 3-6; Keman 1985; Czada 1986; Czada 1987; and Scharpf 1987).
The autonomy of the actors is, however, not unlimited. Limitations are set by the
‘rule of law’ and the institutions involved in consultations and negotiations
between the actors. Based on the ‘rule of law’, government, and ultimately par-
liament, must legalise the outcome of consultations and negotiations. The insti-
tutions, or prevalent ‘rules of the game’, also limit the options for actions open
to actors. Thus they allow for (pluri-functional) variations in performance that
cannot be captured by either the systems or structure approach.
For instance, in the Netherlands, Central Agreements (Centrale Accoorden, see
chapter 3, sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.6) between trade unions and employers’ organi-
sations, or between these ‘social partners’ and the government, do not have a ‘legal’
status. Central Agreements are ‘informal’ agreements. However, government (and
thus parliament) ultimately has to sanction these agreements (see also Keman 1998).
2.2 The Netherlands from a comparative point of view
The various concepts used by the students of neo-corporatism differ if one takes
a closer look at the mechanisms that are proposed to analyse the actual working
of corporatist interest intermediation in relation to socio-economic policy-
making. However, they all employ a number of dimensions that appear to be
relevant for the Netherlands.
The first dimension concerns the institutions of centralised bargaining and co-
operation between government, employers’ organisations and trade unions.
Some assume that there is a direct relation between the mere existence of these
institutions and the neo-corporatist character of the Netherlands. Yet it remains
unclear to what extent the process of policy-making by means of mutual con-
sultation and centralised negotiation is indeed conducive to policy formation and
implementation (Schmitter 1979; Czada 1983; Smith 1988; Wilson 1990; Western
1991). A conceptualisation of neo-corporatism as signifying nothing more than
the existence of a certain number of institutions renders the concept static,
allowing for only descriptive, rather than analytical uses (see also Braun 1989;
Vergunst 2004).
The second dimension is the way in which institutions work. If researchers
investigate the actual operation of institutions, they usually do so by employing
a concept of neo-corporatism in which this is virtually equal to consensus on
incomes policy within the institutions, defined by the absence of open conflict
and disagreement.8 Lehmbruch’s (1979) liberal corporatism, for example, is
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8. These authors include Lehmbruch 1979; Panitch 1979; Czada and Dittrich 1980; Armingeon 1983;
Marks 1986; Curtis 1987; Czada 1987; Braun 1989; Cox 1989; Wolinetz 1989; and Kurzer 1991.
particularly characterised by a high degree of co-operation between interest
groups themselves. This co-operation is voluntary and takes place within the
legal framework of the liberal state. Panitch (1979), like Lehmbruch, relates the
existence of ‘corporatist structures and practices’ to incomes policy. This policy
aims at slowing down the upward pressure on wages by the union federations.
For the Netherlands, this was the case during the period of centralised, statutory
incomes policy after World War II (1945-1963). 
In a comparative study by Armingeon (1983) a definition of neo-corporatism is
used in which voluntariness is a central dimension of both negotiations and im-
plementation of incomes policy. Institutionalisation is perceived as less important
for the occurrence of neo-corporatism. During the period of the centralised,
statutory incomes policy in the Netherlands (1945-1963) this voluntariness is
located especially in the process of negotiations, not in the implementation of
incomes policy. 
For Marks (1986) neo-corporatism equals consensus, especially about incomes
policy “in the context of a comprehensive macroeconomic program” (253).
Between 1950 and 1980, the Netherlands “have had consensual incomes policy
for about a third of the period” (259). Consensus in the institutions, based on
subordination of the unions to macroeconomic aims is Curtis’ (1987) definition
of corporatism. Wolinetz (1989: 79) describes Dutch post-war history in terms
of an ‘eroding partnership’ between unions, employers’ organisations and govern-
ment. According to Kurzer (1991: 10) corporatism in the Netherlands diminished
during the 1970s because “no consensus could be forged and state officials
intervened with statutory income policies”. Cox (1989: 191) describes the changes
in Dutch corporatism during the 1960s and 1970s as a development from cor-
poratism proper (focused on producer groups) to “a pattern of organised pluralism”
(also including medical and social professionals and their organisations, private
charities et cetera) and the concomitant growing number of conflicts over public
revenues.
Putting neo-corporatism on a par with consensus, defined as the absence of open
conflict, generally leads these authors to the conclusion that with the demise of
centrally guided, statutory incomes policy there has been a tendency towards
declining neo-corporatism in the Netherlands since the mid-1960s. This is an
example of circular reasoning. Although the very existence of tripartism and
centralised bargaining to gain policy agreement may well be important features
of neo-corporatism, these vary over time and are therefore in themselves in-
sufficient for understanding the outcomes of the process.
A third dimension regards trade unions and unionisation. There are different,
often conflicting appraisals of the role of trade unions and unionisation with
respect to neo-corporatism. In some cases the importance of a co-operative atti-
tude of unions as a necessary precondition for the occurrence of neo-corporatism
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is emphasised, often leading to a circular argument: without co-operative unions,
usually equated with consensus in the institutions, which in turn is indicated by
a low level of industrial conflict, no neo-corporatism (Curtis 1987; Wolinetz
1989, 1990). 
Other authors state that for corporatism to be effective in the field of incomes
policy, a high degree of independence of union functionaries from their rank and
file is necessary (Czada and Dittrich 1980). Or they find that a high degree of
union centralisation is a prerequisite for neo-corporatism (Panitch 1979;
Katzenstein 1985; Marks 1986; Czada 1987). Both aspects express the im-
portance attached to centralised bargaining between unions and employers’
organisations and between these ‘social partners’ and the government as a
measure of neo-corporatism. The higher the degree of independence of union
functionaries from their rank-and-file and the more responsibilities and power
rest at the central (con)federate level, the easier it apparently is for trade union
(con)federations to reach agreement with both the employers’ associations and
the government (see also Berger 1981; Goldthorpe 1984). 
Finally, some argue that neo-corporatism is linked to strong unions or a high
degree of unionisation (Wilson 1990; Kurzer 1991).9
In the case of the Netherlands, these linkages between unions and neo-cor-
poratism are problematic. If a co-operative attitude of unions is indicated by
consensus in the institutions, or a co-operative attitude is regarded as a precon-
dition to arrive at consensus, every independent policy or action by unions must
be defined as an example of diminishing neo-corporatism. Only if unions agree
to government and employers’ policies without a fight, there apparently is neo-
corporatism. Furthermore, if union centralisation is a measure for neo-cor-
poratism, every tendency towards a more independent policy by affiliated branch
unions also has to be defined as an indication of diminishing neo-corporatism.
Lastly, if neo-corporatism and strong unions or a high degree of unionisation go
together, the Netherlands certainly is a deviant case. Unionisation has always
been rather low, and has actually declined further since the 1970s, and unions
have always been divided, both along religious lines and along lines of class and
status (blue collar versus white collar) (see for instance Visser 1989). 
It is interesting to note that the various concepts of neo-corporatism do not seem
to have any bearing whatsoever on the employers’ organisations, except by
default. That is, if, from the absence of strikes and other (labour) conflicts, we
may indeed deduce that employers’ organisations are co-operating with trade
unions and the government. Lehmbruch (1984: 75) is among the few that note
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9. For an extensive discussion of changes in union density, union coverage, union concentration and
the authority of the various levels within trade unions and employers’ organisations in twelve liberal
democracies between 1950 and 1990: see Golden et al (1999).
that because the linkages between employers’ organisations and “bourgeois”
parties are much looser than between trade unions and social democratic parties,
it is much easier for employers’ organisations to step out of neo-corporatist ar-
rangements than it is for trade unions.10 In effect, a concept of neo-corporatism
in which employers’ organisations are not included, runs the risk of being nothing
more than “a system of institutional wage restraint in which labour, acting
‘responsibly’, voluntarily participates in and legitimises the transfer of income
from labour to capital” (Cameron 1984: 146; see also Bruno and Sachs 1985).
Opinions on the role of party government in the Netherlands differ as well.
Panitch (1979) and Armingeon (1983) agree that during the period of centra-
lised, statutory incomes policy between 1945 and 1965 (which is the period
which the majority of the authors mentioned regard as neo-corporatist) this role
was prominent. They also agree that it has become even more prominent since
the demise of this policy in the mid 1960s. In their view this has had no negative
bearing on the neo-corporatist character of the country. In the same vein, how-
ever, for Curtis (1987), Cox (1989), Wolinetz (1989, 1990) and Kurzer (1991),
the more prominent role of the government in incomes policy (and welfare
policy) in the 1970s and 1980s is linked to declining neo-corporatism. Ap-
parently, the level of government intervention can be both unrelated (or at least
not negatively related) to neo-corporatism, or can be judged as a sign of declining
neo-corporatism, depending on the specific concept used by the researcher.
A great number of students of neo-corporatism have emphasised the political
composition and the ideological colouring of party government as a prerequisite
for neo-corporatism. But they have different views on the relation between the
composition of party government and neo-corporatism. Some presume the
existence of a direct linkage between neo-corporatism and the representation of
social democratic parties in government. According to this view neo-corporatism
equals consensus, in the sense of consensual, non-conflictual industrial relations.
This is indicated by a low level of industrial conflict, that is, by co-operative
trade unions. This co-operative attitude of trade unions is in turn brought about
by the presence of social democracy in government. Marks (1986) links the
existence of a consensual incomes policy in the Netherlands to “socialist parties
(which) have participated as entrenched coalition partners, usually in some form
of consociational arrangement” (260; see also 256, 269). This is a clear case of
overdetermination (Przeworski 1983). Marks’ analytical model simply equates
neo-corporatism with the Dutch centrally guided, statutory incomes policy in the
1950s and is not able to address the subsequent changes since the 1960s, other
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10. In studies about neo-corporatism on the meso-level, more attention is given to employers’ organi-
sations and their role and actions within neo-corporatist arrangements (Cawson 1985; van Waarden
1989; see also Crouch 1985; Marin 1985; Streeck and Schmitter 1985; Coleman and Jacek 1989).
than simply concluding that consensus about incomes policy usually seems to be
lacking and, consequently, there is no (or much less) neo-corporatism. 
Zimmermann (1986) and Curtis (1987) also find a linkage between social
democracy and neo-corporatism. Zimmermann argues that neo-corporatism is a
form of social democratisation of capitalist society, based on the co-operation of
the working class with capitalist objectives of profitable production. He defines
social democracy rather broadly: apart from social democracy proper, it also
includes the workers’ segments of the christian democratic parties and the chris-
tian trade unions. Neo-corporatism, according to Zimmermann, is the subject of
political and ideological conflicts about state intervention aimed at social demo-
cratisation of society. Similarly, Curtis finds that although the social democratic
- christian democratic Den Uyl coalition Government (1973-1977) tried to
implement a corporatist strategy (as opposed to the corporatist system which,
according to Curtis, had collapsed in the 1960s), the employers’ organisations
refused to co-operate. The christian democratic - liberal Van Agt coalition
Government (1977-1981), on the other hand, chose to ignore the demands of the
unions in favour of those of the employers’ organisations. 
Governments dominated by social democracy explain corporatism, argues
Western (1991). Wilson (1990) and Kurzer (1991) go even further. Both state
that empirically neo-corporatism is linked to, among other things, social demo-
cratic rule. Crepaz (1992) also produces a circular argument to explain the cor-
poratist character of the Netherlands. Firstly, he concludes that there was social
democratic dominance in the Netherlands during the 1970s. Then he finds a
statistical significant relation between corporatism and social democratic govern-
ment or even social democratic dominance or hegemony in his cross-national
comparison. In turn, this is related to a high level of government spending (in
percentage of GDP), or, in other words, the welfare state. Hence, the Netherlands
is corporatist, because they also have a high level of government spending,
combined with social democratic dominance in the 1970s. At this point in the
analysis it becomes increasingly difficult to make any conceptual distinction
between neo-corporatism and social democratic government (see also Esping-
Andersen and van Kersbergen 1992).
This conceptual confusion of neo-corporatism and social democracy can be
empirically disputed. For the case of the Netherlands, the link between neo-
corporatism and social democratic rule, dominance or hegemony is more com-
plex. There has never been a dominance, let alone rule or hegemony, of social
democracy in the Netherlands, not even in the period 1945-1963, which most
authors would regard as neo-corporatist. Rather, it is christian democracy that
has been the dominant political partner in all coalition governments between
1917 and 1994. Smith (1988), Cox (1989) and Kurzer (1991) go back in Dutch
history to find an explanation of the peculiar features of Dutch neo-corporatism.
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They regard the Dutch variety of neo-corporatism as a result of the power struggle
between Roman Catholics and Socialists since the early twenties. In their view,
pillarisation in politics and society determines the peculiar shape of neo-
corporatism in the Netherlands (see also van Waarden 2003). 
Lijphart and Crepaz (1991) come to the same conclusion. Pillarisation, or con-
sensus democracy, is the explanatory variable for the degree of corporatism in
the case of the Netherlands. Corporatism is part and parcel of consensus demo-
cracy (235). Although their test shows that corporatism is comparatively related
to social democracy participating in government, they find that in the Nether-
lands the degree of corporatism is higher than would be expected “on the basis
of the degree of left-wing influence in (...) government” (243).11
Keman (1984) and Paloheimo (1984) offer an additional explanation for co-
operative policy-making in liberal democracies that are labelled neo-corporatist,
but do not have experienced social democratic dominance in government. These
democracies all have in common a system of proportional representation. A
system of proportional representation usually yields no majority party. Con-
sequently, there is a necessity of forming coalition governments. This in turn
leads to a practice of co-operative policy-making, regardless of the composition
of the (coalition) government of the day, that spills over to industrial relations
and the economy as well. In a sense, in these democracies compromise is the
only game to play, both in ‘politics’ and in ‘economics’.
The last dimension of the concept of neo-corporatism concerns the size of the
country and its world market dependence. Again, there is no consensus among
students of neo-corporatism about the relation between the size of a country and
its neo-corporatist character. Some argue that the small size of a country in terms
of its population and internal market - which means they have open and vulnera-
ble economies that are heavily dependent on world market developments - leads
these liberal democracies to adopt corporatist structures, institutions or mecha-
nisms to cope with conflict as a consequence of change, by incorporating interest
groups in socio-economic policy-making (Czada 1983; Katzenstein 1985; Western
1991; Crepaz 1992). Other researchers conclude that neither population size nor
economic openness is a significant explanatory factor for neo-corporatism (Lijp-
hart and Crepaz 1991).
Czada (1983) and Katzenstein (1985) find that the incorporation of interest
groups is independent of the political persuasion of governments. For Western
(1991) and Crepaz (1992) there is a strong relation with social democratic
parties dominating in government.
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11. See also Crepaz and Lijphart 1995; Keman and Pennings 1995; van Kersbergen 1995; Anderson
2001; Pennings and Vergunst 2001; Armingeon 2002 on the relations between neo-corporatism,
consensus democracy, social democracy and christian democracy.
In other words, according to most researchers, the aim of neo-corporatism is to
cope with the fluctuations of the world market. Essential to this arrangement is
some sort of exchange between government and trade unions, that involves
government expenditure on social security (including unemployment) in return
for a policy of low wages by the unions. No concept of neo-corporatism seems
to have any bearing on employers’ organisations, except by default. That is, if from
the absence of strikes or other industrial conflicts we may deduce that employers’
organisations are also co-operating with trade unions and the government.
In the Netherlands, the period of the centrally guided, statutory incomes policy
between 1945 and (approximately) 1963 was an era of fixed low wages and there
seemed to be consensus in the institutions. The unions apparently agreed to this
exchange, because the level of industrial conflict was very low. Therefore, most
authors label this period neo-corporatist. However, from their contributions it
remains unclear whether and how a trade-off between wages and transfer pay-
ments actually occurred in this period. Social security policy was formulated in
parliament, outside of the process of negotiations about wages and other terms
of employment between unions, employers’ organisations and the government
(Fernhout 1980; Teulings 1980; Nobelen 1983; Visser and Hemerijck 1997, 1998).
Moreover, the Dutch welfare state only reached its zenith in the early 1970s, in
terms of the (legal) framework covering workers’ and citizens’ rights. And only
after the mid 1970s did the corresponding transfer payments began to reach a
significant volume at all (Cox 1989; Andeweg and Irwin 2002: 188, 189).12
Rising wages and inflation in the 1960s and 1970s, increasing economic
difficulties in the 1980s as a result of the two oil crises in 1973 and 1979/1980,
and a process of polarisation and politicisation13, that is, increasing conflicts
between unions, employers’ organisations and the government, lead most
researchers to conclude that neo-corporatism in the Netherlands is declining
rapidly since the mid 1960s. However, this is precisely a period in which one
would expect neo-corporatism to gain prominence as a possible way out of both
macroeconomic problems and societal conflicts. Nevertheless, most researchers
still consider the country to be more or less neo-corporatist, albeit not of a
particular successful variety.
On the contrary, by the end of the 1980s, the Dutch case had become known in-
ternationally as the ‘Dutch Disease’, a model of institutional sclerosis and po-
litical stagnation, resulting in high levels of unemployment, massive transfer
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12. In Daalder (2003) it becomes clear that the original idea with respect to social security insurance
was that it ought to be developed as a ‘means tested’ system of benefits, instead of as a fixed ‘flat
rate’ or as depending on previous income. That only came about in the 1960s and 1970s.
13. Politicisation can be described as a process by which ‘emphasis on the genuinely specific rights of
separate groups and organisations (...) generated more (and new) expectations, wants and demands,
which eventually had to be converted into policy terms’(Foppen 1989: 92).
payments and a growing budget deficit (see Stokman 2000: 75; Andeweg and
Irwin 2002: 186-189). Comparative research, however, still shows that as a neo-
corporatist country the Netherlands perhaps did not do as well as other neo-
corporatist democracies like in Scandinavia, but also not much worse than non-
neo-corporatist democracies. And of course, since the mid 1990s the Dutch case
is again a positive model, even for European Union policy concertation.
Essentially, when applied to the Netherlands, it turns out that the concept of neo-
corporatism remains fuzzy and often defined in either circular or mechanistic
ways. This leads to circular reasoning instead of an explanation as to how and
why neo-corporatism in the Netherlands works (or not). The conclusion, there-
fore, must be that there is need for an in-depth analysis of the Dutch case within
the general framework of neo-corporatism in order to disentangle the relation-
ship between process and actors involved, as well as the related outcomes.
2.3 The Netherlands from a Dutch point of view
In the 1970s and 1980s two more or less separate debates on neo-corporatism
were going on in the Netherlands. One focused on the problems of ‘govern-
mental overload’, ‘Unregierbarkeit’ (Offe 1979) and ‘overburdening’ of the
welfare state. The other on the many changes in the Dutch system of industrial
relations during the 1960s and 1970s and their consequence for socio-economic
government policy-making. Since the mid 1990s, political scientists and eco-
nomists again became interested in the concept of neo-corporatism and its
explanatory value for incomes policy, employment policies, welfare reforms and
economic development in general. After more than a decade of austerity policies
and high levels of unemployment, exacerbated by the economic recession of
1992/93 that followed the Gulf War in 1991, the Dutch economy finally seemed
to be on the path of recovery again. How to explain this transition from ‘disease’
to ‘miracle’ is the contemporary subject of this renewed debate.
Increasing government expenditure on social security, pensions, health care and
rising wages in the public sector, leading to ever-growing budget deficits in the
1970s and 1980s, are the central focus of research for a number of Dutch
students of neo-corporatism. Within the networks of advisory bodies and civil
servant bureaucracies of the various governmental departments, policies are
formulated and subsequently implemented which put party government and
parliament before accomplished facts and thus produce the budget deficits. Neo-
corporatism becomes the new label to describe this situation (de Wolff 1979;
Visser 1980; Wassenberg 1980; van Doorn 1981; Andeweg 1986; Sap 1995; see
also van der Ploeg 1995). 
The solution is almost self-evident: parliament and party government, which
represent the general, public interest, should regain the initiative in policy for-
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mation and implementation from these diffuse neo-corporatist networks of in-
terest representatives and civil servants which are responsible for the budgetary
and fiscal problems of the government (Uitermark 1979; de Wolff 1979; de Beus
and van den Doel 1980). They analyse the efficiency and efficacy with which
government subsequently indeed tries to cut costs to reduce the deficit (de Wolff
1984a, 1984b; Janssen and van der Made 1988; see also van der Ploeg 1999).
In this debate, neo-corporatism also refers to consensus, but this consensus
among interest representatives and civil servants is not something desirable. It is
rather something to be dreaded because it leads to the uncontrollable expenditure
of public funds. In effect, this angle of research is a continuation of the Olsonian
debate (1982) which focuses on the potentially damaging effects of strong
interest groups on the attempts of party government to implement policies aimed
at economic growth and full employment (see also Visser 1989). However, this
line of argumentation can hardly be considered as a contribution to the inter-
national debate on neo-corporatism. The results do not add to or criticise the com-
parative views on neo-corporatism in the Netherlands, nor do they contribute to
the development of the general concept (see also Dean 1984). It is a mere
description of inertia, incrementalism and closed shops, conducive to inadequate
policy-making (Kooiman and van Vliet 1993; Keman 1993a).
Other Dutch authors14 have discussed in great detail the changes in the Dutch
system of industrial relations and centralised bargaining in the 1960s and 1970s
in terms of a development from consensus and harmony between social partners
in the 1950s, to conflict, polarisation and politicisation in the 1960s and 1970s.
This demise of consensus has been labelled diminishing or disappearing neo-
corporatism: no consensus, no neo-corporatism. In this respect, they tend to have
the same outlook on Dutch developments as many of the comparative research-
ers. However, the characteristic feature of a crisis is the fact that consensus di-
minishes or even vanishes completely. The issue, therefore, is not so much
whether neo-corporatism equals consensus in the institutions, but whether or not
it is possible to restore the consensus, which has faded away, by neo-corporatist
forms of conflict regulation. And whether this restored consensus eventually
contributes to the solving of macroeconomic problems.
The remarkable transition from ‘disease’ in the 1970s and 1980s to ‘miracle’ in
the 1990s is the subject of a renewed debate in the Netherlands on neo-cor-
poratism since the mid 1990s. The first thing to establish is what the miracle is
exactly about. Researchers generally agree that the miracle is about jobs. The
Dutch Miracle is the Dutch ‘job machine’ (de Beer 1997; Visser and Hemerijck
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14. These include: Akkermans and Grootings 1979; Teulings 1980; Akkermans and Nobelen 1983;
Arendsen and Geul 1983; Nobelen 1983; Geul et al 1985a, 1985b; Nobelen et al 1985; Terlouw
1985; and Albeda and Ten Hove 1986.
1997; Hazeu 1998; Kleinknecht 1998; Hartog 1999; Delsen 2000; SCP 2000;
Hemerijck and Visser 2000; Hogenboom and van Vliet 2000: 2; van Sinderen
2000: 21, 22). 
Researchers, however, disagree as to the actual extent of the miracle. Some re-
searchers point out that most of these jobs are part time jobs, occupied mainly
by young people and by married women (Salverda 1999; WRR 2000: 45-49;
Hemerijck et al 2000; Becker 2001; Hemerijck 2003: 35-37; Keman 2003).
Other researchers argue that this is the reason why total employment in the
Netherlands has not significantly increased in the 1990s and, conversely, ‘broad
unemployment’15 has not significantly decreased in the 1990s (see also Green-
Pedersen 2001: 969 and Hemerijck 2003: 39). 
For instance, Hoogenboom and van Vliet (2000: 3), and Keese (2000: 55-57)
show that when compared to other European nations, total employment at the
end of the 1990s was only slightly above the European average, where it used to
be in the bottom rungs. In that sense, they view the Dutch ‘job machine’ in the
1990s more as a process of normalisation (that is, regressing to the European
average). Total employment in the Netherlands finally caught up with that in
other European nations. And, compared over time in the Netherlands, Scharpf
(2001: 66) shows that total employment of 61.8% in 1998 was only slightly
above total employment of 61.6% in 1970, after reaching an all time low of
50.9% in 1985. What has changed however, is the composition of the workforce.
Men above 55 years of age have largely stopped working. They have been
replaced by mainly part time working young people and (married) women (WRR
2000: 45-49; Hemerijck et al 2000; Becker 2001; Hemerijck 2003: 35-37; and
Keman 2003).
With regard to ‘broad unemployment’, research by the SCP (2000: 284) shows
that that was still 19.1% in 1999, compared to 18.6% in 1979 and 21.9% in 1992
(see also: Hogenboom and van Vliet 2000: 16/17, 21/22; Keese 2000: 57-59; van
Sinderen 2000: 24; Andeweg and Irwin 2002: 183, 184; the Economist 2002: 7;
and Hemerijck 2003: 39). Hence, the ‘miracle’ tends to be a catching-up effect
(comparatively) and a shift of labour to ‘new’ segments on the labour market
(Keman 2003).
The explanations for the miracle vary as well. Some researchers favour the
explanation that the job machine is due to the Central Agreement concluded
between unions and employers’ organisations in December 1982. In this ‘Wasse-
naar Agreement’, wage moderation was exchanged for a reduction in working
hours, increased profitability of companies, and, in the long term, jobs (Visser
and Hemerijck 1997; Hazeu 1998; Hemerijck and Visser 2000). By adhering to
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15. Broad unemployment is the proportion of the labour force claiming unemployment benefits, dis-
ability benefits and welfare benefits.
the terms of this agreement, unions and employers’ organisations lay the basis
for the job machine of the 1990s. In other words, the job machine is a success
due to the flexible character of Dutch neo-corporatism (Hazeu 1998; see also
Hartog 1999). Others, however, point out that this wage moderation during the
1980s can be simply explained by the level of unemployment (de Beer 1997;
Delsen 2000; SCP 2000; Hogenboom and van Vliet 2000: 7-10; van Ewijk 2000:
47, 48). This means that the Dutch ‘job machine’ may even carry the seeds of its
own destruction. Wage moderation hampers technological and other innovation.
This may result in extra heavy losses of employment in future economic
downturns (Kleinknecht 1998; Jones 1999).
Visser and Hemerijck (1997) and Hemerijck and Visser (2000) combine both
arguments. In their view it is the (policy) learning capacity of the trade unions,
albeit under pressure of steeply rising unemployment in the late 1970s and early
1980s, that made the exchange possible. Visser and Hemerijck, Hazeu and
Hartog come to view the period between roughly 1970 and 1982 as the exception
in Dutch neo-corporatism, the period in which neo- corporatism did not function
properly. Conversely, the periods 1945 to about 1970 and from 1982, in their
view, should be considered as periods in which Dutch neo-corporatism does its
proper job: achieving a balance between wages, jobs and social security. This
view suggests at least the possibility of a cyclical tendency in Dutch neo-
corporatism in which recurrent employment and deficit crises may lead to the
necessity of recurrent agreements to counter these crises. From that perspective
we may expect that periods in which neo-corporatism apparently functions
effectively alternate with periods in which neo-corporatism does not function
effectively (see below).
The apparent success of Dutch neo-corporatism since the mid 1990s also leads
to a reappraisal of neo-corporatism in economic theory. Teulings (1995, 1996,
1997) and Teulings and Hartog (1998) show that the conventional economic
wisdom that neo-corporatism stands for inflexibility of wages, because unions
protect the workers inside from the unemployed workers outside, is not correct
comparatively. On the contrary, neo-corporatism, by virtue of centralised co-
operation between unions and employers’ organisations, can cope very well with
unemployment by introducing wage flexibility. Not only in the Netherlands, but
also in other neo-corporatist democracies. It turns out that it is especially in those
liberal democracies were labour relations are most decentralised, like for
instance in the USA, that wage flexibility is lowest.16
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16. Not only is wage flexibility markedly higher in neo-corporatist liberal democracies with centralised
co-operation between trade unions and employers’ organisations, the degree of wage inequality is
also much lower in these countries (Wallerstein 1999: 676; see also Cameron 1978: 1258; Minnich
2003; Teulings 2003; and Wallerstein and Moene 2003).
Cörvers and van Veen (1992) and Keuzenkamp (1996) concur with this positive
reappraisal of neo-corporatism, but point to its inherent weakness. The level of
centralised bargaining determines the impact neo-corporatism can have. The
more centralised bargaining is, the more effective neo-corporatism works. But
bargaining becomes more and more decentralised in the aftermath of the ‘Wasse-
naar Agreement’ of 1982. Therefore they question whether neo-corporatism
should be continued at all (Keuzenkamp), or can maintain its function as a me-
chanism for policy co-ordination under unfavourable conditions (Cörvers and
van Veen).
Teulings, Hartog, Keuzenkamp, Cörvers and van Veen do not consider this Dutch
corporatism in the 1990s to be a new (‘Polder’) model. Neither do other research-
ers, like for instance van Empel (1997), Visser and Hemerijck (1997), Hazeu
(1998), Hartog (1999), and van Waarden (2002) (see also Andeweg and Irwin
2002: 145, 147, 148, 182, 213). The expression ‘Polder Model’ came in use in
the late 1990s as a popular Dutch and international catch phrase in the public and
political debate to describe the then apparently successful Dutch neo-corpora-
tism that had produced the ‘Dutch Miracle’. The expression ‘Polder Model’ was
also used to distinguish this successful Dutch neo-corporatism from the much
less successful Dutch neo-corporatism of the 1970s and 1980s that had produced
the ‘Dutch Disease’ (see Becker 2001a; Andeweg and Irwin 2002: 186-192).
Hartog (1999: 484), stresses that there is no special Dutch (polder) model. It is
simply the peculiar brand of Dutch corporatism “with consultation, co-ordina-
tion and bargaining over all important issues of socio-economic policy between
union federations, employer federations and the government”. Dutch cor-
poratism is highly flexible and capable of adjustment to changing circumstances.
Van Waarden (2002: 44, 50, 63, 64) agrees with this view. Corporatism in the
Netherlands is more than wage bargaining on the macro-level. The Dutch
economy is a co-ordinated, concerted economy in which social partners and the
government co-operate in many policy areas and on all levels: micro, meso and
macro. It is precisely this broad co-ordination and concertation that has positively
contributed to the country’s economic performance in the 1990s. 
Hogenboom and van Vliet (2000: 4, 12, 30/31), economists working at the Ministry
of Economic Affairs, have a slightly different appraisal of the ‘Dutch Miracle’
and the ‘Polder Model’ that produced the miracle. In their view it is government
policy that is at the heart of the success of the ‘Polder Model’. The ‘Polder
Model’ consists of a combination of five policy instruments and goals. From the
early 1980s, government policy consistently aimed at deficit reduction, reduction
of the costs of the system of social security, wage moderation, more competition
and a stable currency. Eventually that produced the economic recovery and job
growth that constitutes the ‘Dutch Miracle’ (see also van Sinderen 2000: 22; and
Stokman 2000: 75). And many of those policies were implemented against heavy
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opposition from sections of society, including trade unions and employers’
organisations (see also Gelauff 2000: 36; Delsen 2000: 172).
Keman (2003) discusses and investigates another body of literature concerning
the ‘Polder Model’. That literature concerns the question whether the ‘Polder
Model’ may be interpreted as a Dutch variety of the social democratic ‘Third
Way’ with regard to active labour market policies. The Dutch ‘Polder Model’
appeared to be based on the new social democratic - liberal governments from
1994 and was considered to be responsible for the ensuing ‘Dutch Miracle’ in
terms of employment. Keman’s conclusion is that this ‘Polder Model’ in terms of
institutional co-operation and active labour market policies indeed produces
more jobs. However, these are mainly part-time jobs for young people and
women, and that job growth does not result in either more total employment or
less ‘broad’ unemployment, comparatively speaking.
In other words, since the mid 1990s neo-corporatism in the Netherlands, or
colloquially, the ‘Polder Model’ as it was now generally referred to (Andeweg and
Irwin 2002: 145, 147, 148, 182, 213), is again considered a viable mechanism for
policy co-ordination between especially trade unions and employers’ organi-
sations as it had apparently now produced a ‘Dutch Miracle’, after the ‘Dutch
Disease’ of the 1970s and 1980s. Teulings and Hartog (1998), Hartog (1999), van
Sinderen (2000), Stokman (2000), Hogenboom and van Vliet (2000), and van
Waarden (2002) stress the role of the government as a third (and quite often do-
minant) party involved in macroeconomic policy co-ordination. 
Depending on the researcher, either the ‘Wassenaar Agreement’ of 1982, or high
levels of unemployment, or the flexible adjustment of Dutch corporatism, or govern-
ment policy eventually pays off in terms of (part-time) jobs after the mid 1990s.
It is evident that the time factor is crucial in the Dutch debates on neo-cor-
poratism. In the early debates in the 1970s and 1980s neo-corporatism is either
the cause of all problems, or on the wane due to declining consensus and growing
macroeconomic problems. In the recent debate since the mid 1990s neo-cor-
poratism is again considered as a possible explanation for restored consensus,
economic growth and jobs.
In effect, this application of the concept of neo-corporatism runs the risk of
becoming merely a label for a description of historical events in the Netherlands.
Events which show that the Dutch system of industrial relations and
macroeconomic policy formation sometimes works effectively (neo-corporatism
producing a ‘Dutch Miracle’), and sometimes not (none or less neo-corporatism
producing a ‘Dutch Disease’), depending on the circumstances. Hence the con-
cept is not used as an analytical tool, but only as a descriptive framework without
much explanatory value.
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2.4 Neo-corporatism as a government strategy
My main objections against most of the conceptualisations of neo-corporatism
in the earlier debate in the 1970s and 1980s is that they are rather static and of a
dichotomous character. For example, the often exclusive focus on the formal,
institutional aspects, instead of on the way in which these institutions work. If
there are industrial relations’ institutions, there is neo-corporatism. If there are
no institutions, or only a few, there is (less or) no neo-corporatism. When re-
searchers investigate the way in which institutions work with regard to neo-
corporatism, their main attention is focused on consensus, expressed by a low
level of strikes, voluntary incomes policy and the like. If there are few strikes and
a voluntary incomes policy, there is consensus and thus neo-corporatism. If there
is a high level of industrial conflict and no voluntary incomes policy there is no
consensus and consequently (less or) no neo-corporatism. However, these are
merely descriptive relationships, no causal arguments, but rather post hoc obser-
vations.
When researchers investigate the activities of the relevant actors within the
institutions, there is often a rather one-sided attention for unions: co-operative
behaviour, structural characteristics like centralisation, whether or not there is a
single, unified trade union organisation, and density. Employers’ organisations
are ignored or taken for granted.
Researchers’ attention for government action is usually limited to the question
whether or not government interferes in the process of collective bargaining with
statutory policies. If it does, there is (less or) no neo-corporatism. 
Lastly, when researchers investigate (the composition of) party government, their
attention is almost exclusively focused on social democracy. Social democracy
in government and neo-corporatism sometimes appear to be interchangeable
concepts: when there is no social democracy in government, apparently there can
be no neo-corporatism (but see Wilensky 1981). 
Essentially, there is no allowance for change, for the possibility that neo-cor-
poratism may change and vary over time, and that it may also be more, or less,
successful as well (but see recently Siaroff 1999; Kenworthy 2001, 2003; Pen-
nings and Vergunst 2001; Molina and Rhodes 2002; Traxler 2004; and Vergunst
2004).
The Dutch debates in the 1970s and 1980s on the other hand, do not contribute
much to the comparative views on neo-corporatism in the Netherlands, or to the
development of the general concept. The recent Dutch debate of the 1990s is on
the one hand a continuation of the debate on changing industrial relations and
centralised bargaining in the Netherlands. Historical events have shown a return
to both consensus in the institutions since 1982 and a better macroeconomic
performance in the 1990s. Although the research clearly shows that neo-cor-
poratism can change and vary over time, it is essentially a historical description
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of the working of a (either unstable or on the contrary very flexible) mechanism
for policy co-ordination between trade unions and employers’ organisations. 
On the other hand, however, this renewed debate on neo-corporatism does take
into account some of the objections raised above. Especially with regard to the
conceptualisation, much is owed to Katzenstein (1985). Katzenstein proposes a
conceptualisation of neo-corporatism as a political mechanism to cope with
conflict as a consequence of change, by incorporating both political parties and
government, and organised interest groups in the formation and implementation
of incomes policy. In particular the dependence of a country on the world market
(‘economic openness’) is a condition for corporatism. Dependence on the world
market particularly affects liberal democracies with a small market economy, in
terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which in turn may explain the develop-
ment of corporatist strategies in these democracies (see also Cameron 1978,
198417). In addition, Katzenstein stresses that this occurs foremost in those
political systems that are characterised by a high degree of party fragmentation,
proportional representation and strong linkages between political parties and
organised interests, which is the case in smaller West European democracies,
including the Netherlands (Katzenstein 1985: 94-104). Despite all the changes,
and the resulting conflicts and problems in the Netherlands during the 1960s and
1970s, the country has managed to cope with these, and therefore it is still a case
of democratic, liberal corporatism. Because that is what corporatism is all about:
a political mechanism to cope with conflict as a consequence of change.
Jones’ (1999) view on the ‘new’ or ‘competitive’ corporatism in the Netherlands
in the age of ‘globalisation’ also uses Katzenstein’s conceptualisation as a point
of departure. The Dutch ‘Polder Model’ is neither new, nor unique. It is essentially
a mechanism to facilitate adjustment to the demands of ‘globalisation’: a flexible
labour market (part time jobs) and a leaner welfare state, by trilateral bargaining
(see also Hartog 1999).
Keman (1985: 22-24) proposes a conceptualisation of neo-corporatism as a
political strategy of the government for policy formation and implementation
which operates parallel to parliament, but within the framework of parliamentary
democracy. The relevant actors - party government, trade unions and employers’
organisations - their actions and the balance of power, are all part of the analysis.
This conceptualisation does not imply that neo-corporatism supersedes
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17. Cameron develops a similar argument. A high dependence on the world market induces liberal
democracies to use the ‘public economy’ (1978), or ‘social wage’ (1984) as a defensive measure
against international competition. Wage restraint is exchanged for compensating incomes or em-
ployment policies in order to maintain competitiveness. This exchange is possible because
democracies with a high dependence on the world market usually have relatively well organised
trade unions and employers’ organisations. That, in turn, is conducive to a nation-wide scope of
collective bargaining that makes the above exchange possible.
parliament. Parliament and party government share co-responsibility for the
results of a neo-corporatist strategy. Both as an actor (government) and as the
ultimate authority that sanctions the outcome of the strategy (parliament). As a
strategy, neo-corporatism can be effective as a mode of conflict regulation be-
tween the relevant actors, if and when it contributes to a government policy that
fosters economic growth and maintains or restores consensus. As the economic
crisis deepens in the 1980s, this becomes more difficult (see also Braun and
Keman 1986).
Zimmermann (1986) is another example of explicitly using the strategy concept
to analyse the occurrence and development of neo-corporatism over time. In his
view, neo-corporatism is a political strategy to counter the economic crisis by
means of package deals as a policy instrument. In exchange for wage moderation
by the trade unions, the government provides compensatory transfer payments to
achieve the shared goal of economic growth. Policy formation is conceived as
both the subject and result of political conflicts arising from worsening economic
circumstances. However, if the circumstances do not improve, this type of pro-
blem solving by means of exchange becomes increasingly difficult. Therefore,
he regards the politics of problem solving by means of a neo-corporatist strategy
to bring about policy agreement among the socio-economic actors as only
temporarily useful. Flexible adjustment policy-making by the government has its
limits. As the economic problems become more severe, this exchange becomes
increasingly difficult. In the 1980s, according to Zimmermann, the Dutch
government therefore effectively ended this strategy. 
For Lehner (1987: 58, 60-61, 65), the Netherlands between 1960 and 1980 is a
clear case of strong neo-corporatism. Neo-corporatism is a government strategy
aimed at tripartite concertation on a broad scope of issues and an encompassing
co-ordination of incomes policy. This strategy is effective with respect to the
avoidance of labour conflicts and reducing unemployment, but at the cost of
expansion of the public sector. And, as we shall see in the next chapters, from the
late 1970s the growing size of the public sector became the major policy issue
for Dutch government until the late 1990s.
Armingeon (1994: 19) and Keman and Pennings (1995: 273) also represent the
strategic point of view. Neo-corporatism is about collective decision-making
between party government, trade unions and employers’ organisations. Under the
assumption of all actors involved that another strategy may result in sub-optimal
results (see also Molina and Rhodes 2002: 316-318). It is this use of the concept
of neo-corporatism as a government strategy that makes it, in my view, superior
as an analytical, rather than simply a descriptive tool as is the case with much of
the concepts discussed above. It is the combination of behaviour and in-
stitutionalised action that is exemplified in the term ‘neo-corporatism as a
strategy’.
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Applied to the Netherlands, Czada (1987: 31-2, 43) clearly shows that the actual
strategy adopted by Dutch governments to cope with the economic problems in
the 1980s can only be fully understood by taking into account the specific
economical, political and societal features of the Netherlands. Firstly, as the
country’s dependence on the world market is so high, one can expect the effecti-
veness of any interventionist national socio-economic policy to be limited. This
means that there are virtually no effective alternative policies to maintain com-
petitiveness on the world market, let alone to cope with the economic recession,
than compensatory social policies in exchange for wage restraint (see also
Cameron 1978, 1984). 
This state of affairs is reinforced by, secondly, christian democratic dominance
in coalition governments. Christian democracy favours compensatory social
policies of income maintenance and other subsidies above other possible socio-
economic policies (see also Braun 1989 and van Kersbergen 1995). 
Thirdly, christian democratic emphasis on income maintenance in turn leads to
a sectoral emphasis on incomes policy as the main instrument to achieve overall
socio-economic preferences. Active labour market and industrial policies are not
pursued as they are in social democratic oriented neo-corporatist democracies.
The exceptionally high unemployment in the Netherlands in the 1980s was
matched with equally high compensatory transfer payments. And that was
precisely the problem for Dutch governments. Unemployment could only be
solved by a combination of wage moderation and market forces; the unemployed
had to be compensated by transfer payments; but the government increasingly
lacked the funds to execute that policy. Hence the growing budget deficits (see
also Zimmerman 1986 and Braun 1989).
Essential to this strategic conceptualisation of neo-corporatism is the relative
autonomy (institutions) and the mutual instrumentalisation (game) of the actors
involved. The rules of the game ensure both the relative autonomy of the actors,
and the possibility (not the necessity or inevitability) for mutual instrumentali-
sation, that is, the possibility to come to joint or interdependent action. Em-
ployers’ organisations and unions have the option to co-operate or not with each
other and with the government. The government can also opt to follow a neo-
corporatist strategy of policy formation and implementation or rather choose to
impose policies on employers’ organisations or unions. The interactions between
the relevant actors are by and large the result of the extant ‘rules of the game’
(institutions) and the perceived need to co-operate in order to achieve optimal
outcomes for all (mutual instrumentalisation) (see Keman 1992).
This elaboration of neo-corporatism as a government strategy also makes clear
that this type of political interaction is different from the parliamentary ‘game’
of policy formation and problem solving. The ‘rules of the corporatist game’ are
much more fluid and flexible and consequently more vulnerable. Stalemates may
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emerge, and one or more of the actors may ‘defect’. In contrast, liberal demo-
cratic practice is strongly influenced by the constitutional institutionalisation of
its decision-making process. Although these rules can certainly be abused, or
may induce perverse behaviour, they nevertheless define to a large extent the
possible room to manoeuvre (Tsebelis 1990; Laver and Shepsle 1995; and
Keman 1997). Therefore, it is vital to incorporate into the concept - however
vague it may appear - the degree of mutual dependence of the three actors in-
volved on each other’s willingness to co-operate. To a large extent they need each
other’s co-operation to accomplish their own goals. Each actor therefore tends to
make its own co-operation to create a policy choice that is acceptable for each
and everyone contingent on the policy options available and on the concessions
of the other actors involved (van Brakel et al 1985: 3-6; Keman 1985; Scharpf
1987, 1998: 53-57). 
The autonomy of the actors is, however, not unlimited. Both the formal ‘rule of
law’ and the more informal institutional setting of consultation and negotiation
between the societal actors set constraints. Based on the formal ‘rule of law’,
ultimately the outcome of the neo-corporatist strategy has to be sanctioned by
parliament. That is, the context in which societal actors operate is determined by
the ‘rule of law’. Theoretically, therefore, constitutional government can make
the rules of the game. On the other hand, there are the informal rules and prac-
tices that societal actors have to develop as they go, to be able to ‘play the game’.
These informal rules can only function if actors keep to them and that may be
dependent on power relations in terms of veto points and sanctions (Olsen 1998).
Nevertheless, within a setting of co-operative policy-making, be it between po-
litical parties in a system of proportional representation, or between party
government and interest groups in a neo-corporatist setting, the options of open
conflict or outright ‘defection’ are much less accessible than within more pluralist
settings.
This interdependence of actors can be best understood by combining a Rational
Choice-approach with some of the insights gained from the New Institutio-
nalism-approach: Rational Institutionalism (Keman 1992, 1999; see also Shepsle
1997; Scharpf 1987, 1998; and Braun 1999). According to the Rational Choice-
approach, each actor will act according to its perceived self-interest, that is, each
actor will make a cost - benefit calculation of the goals pursued, in relation to the
goals pursued by other actors. This calculation takes into account that, in order
to avoid sub-optimal outcomes, policy agreements need to be encompassing and
to avoid zero-sum outcomes. A neo-corporatist government strategy can facili-
tate such a solution by providing public goods, for example the redistribution of
economic welfare by means of social security benefits, that are binding for all
involved, in exchange for co-operation to achieve macroeconomic stability by
means of wage restraint, that will be beneficial for all (Mueller 1989; van den
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Doel and van Velthoven 1989).
The New Institutionalism-approach on the other hand, points to the constraints
on the actions of the different actors within the institutions. The feasibility of
their actions motivated by self-interest is limited or defined by their room to
manoeuvre. Each actor’s feasible self-interest is translated into a set of options
(Elster 1979, 1985), aimed at attaining an optimal solution within the specific
socio-political situation (Keman 1992, 1999). The room to manoeuvre is heavily
dependent on the styles of decision-making within the institutions (Scharpf
1987, 1998). Therefore, institutions can be seen as intermediating variables in
which a trade-off or even a pay-off of intentions and feasible options can take
place, in such a way that zero-sum games are the exception rather than the rule.
A positive-sum game is feasible, given the knowledge and information each
actor has about needs and interests of themselves and of each of the other
participating actors, which translate into a feasible set of options for each actor,
and the institutional constraints that limit each actor’s ability to ‘defect’. In turn,
through the recurrent process of consultation and negotiation, this stimulates the
occurrence of a ‘logic of accommodation’, instead of a ‘logic of conflict’. In this
sense, societal conflict, as part of the process of consultation and negotiation, is
the basis for consensus building by co-operation and compromise (Keman 1992,
1996; see also Tsebelis 1990; Czada 1998; and Molina and Rhodes 2002).
Government plays a vital part in this process. As Keman (1999: 263-265) shows,
in the neo-corporatist arena all actors usually have comparable lists of needs and
interests. But almost by definition these needs and interests differ in importance
attached to them by the actors involved. And usually trade unions and employers’
organisations have quite conflicting ranking orders. This implies that govern-
ment has to mediate and to encourage the occurrence of viable agreements (com-
promises). At the same time, the government itself is also an actor with a com-
parable list of interests in a certain ranking order. To reach agreement between
all three actors, it will be necessary to try and reorder each actor’s list of interests
on the basis of potentially shared interests. In the process of consultation and
negotiation, with all corresponding conflicts, it becomes clear whether or not
this reordering may occur and an agreement (compromise) can be reached,
sanctioned by parliament (see also Delsen 2000: 172; Molina and Rhodes 2002:
316-318). This agreement is what Shepsle (1997: 283, 284) defines as a ‘struc-
ture induced equilibrium’. An important aspect of this type of Rational Institu-
tionalism is that ‘preferences’ are not assumed to be given but can be altered
during negotiations and, thereby, can produce an ‘equilibrium’ in the end. Such
an agreement is then viewed as the stepping stone towards the ‘preferred’ out-
come of all actors involved. This ‘preferred’ outcome is then the ‘core’, that is
the agreement that is preferred by both actors above all other alternatives (see
chapter 3, section 3.2.6 and chapter 6).
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Relative autonomy and mutual instrumentalisation of the actors involved, there-
fore, do not suggest that there is a symmetrical relation of power between the
actors. There is not only a clear distinction in the sources of power between public
corporations like trade unions and employers’ associations on the one hand and
the government on the other hand, but the sources of power which employers and
unions can command differ too. The government, based on a majority in parlia-
ment, can legally impose a specific policy on employers or unions, that is, force
one or both of them to adopt a certain pattern of behaviour (formal rules).
Employers on the other hand, by exercising their rights of control, can to a large
extent determine the limits, which are set to government policy and union in-
fluence (export of capital, relocation of production18). Lastly, the unions’ source
of power is basically their level of organisation and the measure of their
incorporation in the party system. Both government policy and the employers’
right of control set limits to their power. Nevertheless, to a certain extent the
three actors depend on each other’s co-operation and conflicts can be very costly
to all participants, or at least lead to sub-optimal outcomes or a generally dimi-
nishing economic performance (informal rules). Therefore, the nexus between
neo-corporatism as a strategy and considering the resulting agreement as a re-
presentation of an equilibrium that induces the core, is a crucial element in this
thesis.
The concept of neo-corporatism as a political strategy of the government to obtain
policy agreement or to restore consensus by continued co-operation and compro-
mise under the conditions of relative autonomy and mutual instrumentalisation
of the actors involved, implies that its occurrence is a typical phenomenon of
West European politics and society after 1945. Neo-corporatism as a government
strategy is a correlate of economic developments in terms of growth, stagnation
and even ‘crisis’. In particular in the Netherlands and the other small liberal
democracies under review here, with their open economies and high dependence
on the world market, the perception of the performance of the national economy
by the actors involved is an important factor in the development and occurrence
of neo-corporatism. Whether the societal actors will opt for co-operation will be
influenced by their perception of the general economic situation, as well as by
the position and role of party government.
The extent to which the economic situation is perceived as being troublesome or
worrying is relevant for the role of the government as well. Both the composition
of governments and existing patterns of socio-economic policy are factors in this
process. Therefore, party government and (the composition of) parliament may
have a strong impact on the type and extent of socio-economic policy-making.
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18. But see Kleinknecht (1998: 5-7): even in this era of globalisation, companies are much less ‘foot-
loose’ than often assumed by globalisation theorists.
The extent to which a neo-corporatist strategy of socio-economic policy-making
is feasible and can be successful at the end of the day, depends on all these
factors, which are only to a limited extent open to manipulation (Keman 1993).
Recently, the notion of ’policy concertation’ as an alternative term to corpora-
tism and its varying notions of co-operation between social partners and
government was introduced (Compston 2003). Policy concertation, defined as
“making policy by means of agreements struck between government officials
and representatives of employer associations and trade unions” (Compston 2003:
787) closely resembles the concept of neo-corporatism as a government strategy
for conflict regulation that I have developed here, except for one important as-
pect: the role of the government. In the concept of neo-corporatism as a govern-
ment strategy for conflict regulation, the government is the actor that mediates
viable agreements between social partners, the actor that has its own ranking of
interests, and the actor that, through parliament, has to sanction the outcome of
the negotiations. Whereas in the concept of policy concertation, government is
an actor on the same footing as social partners, and policy concertation between
these three actors is simply a function of varying configurations of three variables:
“perceived problems, the degree of shared economic understanding among the
participants and the perceived implementation capacity of the participants”
(Compston 2003: 787).
To sum up the argument so far: the concept of neo-corporatism as a government
strategy allows us to overcome the usually rather static and dichotomous concep-
tualisations of neo-corporatism in the system and structure approach. By taking
the time factor into account, we can incorporate economic change and variations
in institutionalisation of political and societal actors in the analysis. Defining
neo-corporatism as a government strategy enables us to understand variations in
both behaviour and performance. The Rational Institutional approach constitutes
an analytical instrument that is capable to explain change and variation: change
and variation in government strategy, in style of decision-making, and in
macroeconomic performance.
2.5 Neo-corporatism as a government strategy and incomes policy
As we have seen, in the international debate on neo-corporatism it is more often
than not defined as a certain measure of co-operation or consensus between
party government and employers’ organisations and trade unions to manage the
economy without endangering social and political stability. The aim is to keep
(the rise of) labour costs in check, inflation low, and, as a consequence, compe-
titiveness on the world market and employment up, in exchange for expenditure
on social security and employment measures. The key policy instrument for this
co-operation is incomes policy (see sections 2.2 and 2.4). In my conceptua-
lisation of neo-corporatism as a government strategy, the strategies of the actors
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involved in the formation and implementation of incomes policy in the Nether-
lands will be the starting point of the investigation. In this section I shall elaborate
the concept of incomes policy and its relation with the concept of neo-corporatism
as a strategy.
Generally, incomes policy is defined as a government policy aiming at wage
moderation to keep inflation down and employment up (Bannock et al 1977;
Braun 1986; Armingeon 1992; McLean 1996). The assumption underlying this
policy is that higher wages lead to higher unit labour costs. Higher unit labour
costs lead to higher prices. Higher prices have two effects. Firstly they spur new
claims for higher wages and that may lead to spiralling wages and prices.
Secondly, they may lead to a loss of market share on the world market. That in
turn can lead to a lower level of economic activity, and in the end to increased
unemployment.
And even if inflationary influences come from another source, for instance from
abruptly rising oil prices during the two oil crises in 1973 and 1979/1980, an
incomes policy aimed at wage moderation can contribute to a reduction in cost
increases for employers. That may protect competitiveness on the world market,
and, ultimately, keep unemployment in check.
Therefore, all actors involved, party government, trade unions and employers’
organisations, have a vested, and sometimes conflicting, interest in the formation
and implementation of incomes policy. For all actors, however, the bottom line
is competitiveness (on the world market) and employment: work and profit. 
The actual measures used in incomes policies may vary considerably (Braun
1986: 4-6). They range from short-term wage ‘freezes’ to a “co-ordinated system
of wage and salary determination”, from ‘voluntary’ to ‘mandatory guidelines’,
from efforts to influence public opinion “to promote the argument for mo-
deration of pay claims” to “tax-based incomes policies”.
The key role of incomes policy in neo-corporatist arrangements of socio-econo-
mic policy-making comes to the fore in both the international and Dutch studies.
In the international studies, Armingeon (1983) identifies cross-nationally two
types of neo-corporatist incomes policies. The first is a consultative incomes
policy in which the government, trade unions and employers’ organisations co-
ordinate wage and price policies on an informal basis. The second is a packaged
incomes policy in which the three actors strike a broad policy agreement that
also includes wages (see also Armingeon 1992).
Panitch (1979) identifies incomes policy, defined as setting wage norms, as being
the very heart of neo-corporatism cross-nationally. Co-operation on incomes policy
involves the three actors in consultations on other macroeconomic policies as
well. Lehmbruch (1979) concurs with this finding. Cross-nationally, neo-cor-
poratism is characterised by close co-operation between the government, trade
unions and employers’ organisations in the formation and implementation of
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economic policy in the broadest sense. Incomes policy, defined as wage and
price restraint, is its core domain. 
Marks (1986: 253) identifies neo-corporatism as consensus on incomes policy
as part of a comprehensive macroeconomic program. Cameron (1978, 1984),
Czada (1983), Katzenstein (1985), Western (1991) and Crepaz (1992) likewise
find that, cross-nationally, world market dependence leads liberal democracies to
incorporate trade unions and employers’ organisations in socio-economic policy-
making in which incomes policy is the key policy area and instrument.
Recently, Siaroff (1999: 177) concludes after reviewing the vast body of cross-
national neo-corporatist research that the main features of neo-corporatism can
be summarised as “the co-ordinated, co-operative, and systematic management
of the national economy by state, centralised unions and employers”. Key to that
management are highly centralised wage bargaining, leading to a voluntary in-
comes policy; a key role for trade unions and employers organisations in the
implementation of other social programs and policies; and the institutionalised
co-operation of these actors in the formation and implementation of government
policies. That is, co-operation on the issue of wages is embedded in co-operation
on wider issues regarding incomes and macroeconomic performance in general
(see also Molina and Rhodes 2002: 316-318).
In the Netherlands various expressions are used to describe what is generally
referred to as incomes policy. For instance, ‘loonbeleid’ or ‘loonpolitiek’, which
can be translated literally as wage policy. Or more encompassing ‘loon- en
inkomensbeleid’, which translates literally as wage and incomes policy. The key
role for incomes policy in management of the economy is reflected in the issues
involved in incomes policy. In the Netherlands incomes policy not only can
include price restraint policies, but also policies with respect to social security
premiums and benefits, old age pensions, the statutory minimum wage, statutory
holiday allowances, price indexation or compensation of wages or benefits,
blocked savings accounts with special tax exemptions, and so on. In general, it
refers to all policies that affect incomes and earnings of the great majority of the
population (wage earners, and people on benefits and pensions) and that have a
bearing on the wider macroeconomic objectives like inflation, economic growth
and (un)employment. These policies can be the subject of co-ordination (or
negotiations) between the government, trade unions and employers’ organisa-
tions (see also Braun 1986: 4-6). 
Incomes policy in the market sector in the Netherlands may be government
directed (until 1987), or the result of either co-ordination of government policies
with those of trade unions and employers’ organisations, or negotiations between
these actors. 
Incomes policy always remains one of the government’s main macroeconomic
responsibilities as it is considered to be the cornerstone of macroeconomic
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government policy. Traditionally macroeconomic policy in the Netherlands has
several objectives that have to be balanced against each other. The main ob-
jectives are firstly a balanced labour market, that is full or nearly full employ-
ment. Secondly, a balanced level of economic growth, that is avoiding boom and
bust cycles. And thirdly, stable prices, meaning low inflation. Secondary objec-
tives are a fair distribution of incomes and a positive balance of payments
(Beishuizen et al 1976; see also Albeda et al 1998: 263). 
A balance can be achieved by the formation and implementation of incomes
policy. The central element in incomes policy is wage costs. Incomes policy aims
at controlling wage costs. Wage costs are made up by wages proper, including
the legal minimum wage, and by premiums for social security benefits and
pensions, and taxes. Wage costs can therefore be affected by both wage rises and
by taxes and social security premiums. Incomes policy in the Netherlands
therefore always involves trade unions and employers’ organisations, as well as
the government, as all three actors can affect part of the combined objectives.
Although since 1987, the Dutch government has relinquished its legal rights to
intervene directly in wage formation in the market sector with binding measures,
the government is still very much involved in wage formation by setting the level
of the legal minimum wage and holiday allowance, the level of social security
benefits and pensions, and the level of taxes. The government also retains the
legal right to refuse the extension of a collective agreement between trade unions
and employers’ organisations on the branch level to a whole industry (see chapter
3, section 3.2.2). Finally, the government also retains the legal right to intervene
directly in wage formation in the (semi-) public sector (Albeda et al 1998: 264,
265).
Both in the Dutch literature and practice, and in the international research on
neo-corporatism, incomes policy as part of a broader macroeconomic program-
me, is identified as the key policy instrument for co-operative management of
the economy by party government, trade unions and employers’ organisations.
Co-operative macroeconomic management is seen as induced by world market
dependence, particularly in most small neo-corporatist West European demo-
cracies. The objective of this macroeconomic management is to keep competitive-
ness on the world market up by controlling inflation to secure economic growth,
employment, and balanced public expenditure. For the purpose of my research I
will also use the term incomes policy. 
From the conceptualisation of neo-corporatism as a government strategy, the
research into Dutch incomes policy will focus on the interactions between party
government, trade unions and employers’ organisations during the annual nego-
tiations on wages and related issues between 1965 and 2000. Both interactions
and the related outcomes depend on the strategies employed by the actors
involved. Actors are autonomous, but at the same time each needs the other’s co-
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operation to reach their own goals. So there is an incentive for co-operative
strategies, but also a certain room to manoeuvre since they are interdependent in
the end. To some extent, employers’ organisations and trade unions have the
option to co-operate or not with each other and with the government. Likewise,
the government can opt to follow a neo-corporatist strategy of policy formation
and implementation, or not. However, although the actors’ agendas may deter-
mine their interactions, their agendas cannot determine the outcomes. The in-
vestigation will establish all three actors’ interactions and their (joint) outcomes
on an annual basis between 1965 and 2000 (see Appendix, and chapters 4 and 5).
Next I will establish whether these (joint) policy outcomes were indeed effective
in terms of the agendas of the actors involved (see chapter 6).
Then I will investigate the relation between a neo-corporatist government strategy
and the composition of the government in terms of participation of social de-
mocracy (see chapter 7).
Lastly, I will discuss Dutch policy performance and macroeconomic perfor-
mance in comparison with the policy performance and macroeconomic per-
formance of other (groups of) liberal democracies (see chapter 8).
2.6 Neo-corporatism, co-operative politics and pluralism
Above I have argued that neo-corporatism, co-operative politics, and a high
dependence on the world market go together (see Lijphart 1999; Siaroff 1999;
van Ewijk 2000: 48-50; Pennings and Vergunst 2001; Vergunst 2004). A high
dependence on the world market may well promote neo-corporatism, that is,
some form of co-operation between trade unions and employers’ organisations,
and between these interest groups and the government, regardless of political
persuasion (Cameron 1978; Czada 1983; Katzenstein 1985; Czada 1987). 
The political system of most, if not all neo-corporatist liberal democracies is
characterised by proportional representation. A system of proportional represen-
tation usually yields no majority party, with the notable exception of the social
democratic party of Austria between 1970 and 1983 (Woldendorp et al 2000: 114).
In some neo-corporatist democracies like Austria, Denmark, Norway and Sweden,
the social democratic party can be characterised as the dominant party in par-
liament (see Budge and Keman 1990: 66, 67; Woldendorp et al 2000). However,
that does not necessarily mean that social democratic parties in these countries
are also always represented in government as well. For shorter or longer periods,
social democratic parties in these democracies have been excluded from govern-
ment. In other neo-corporatist democracies like Belgium and the Netherlands
until recently, the christian democratic party (and its precursors) has been the
dominant party in parliament and government. In a country like Switzerland, the
four main political parties, including the social democratic party, have been con-
tinuously represented in government according to the ‘magic formula’ (Steiner
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1986: 124-126), except for the period 1952-1959 when the social democratic
party was excluded (Woldendorp et al 2000: 513).
As there usually is no majority party in neo-corporatist liberal democracies, there
is a necessity to form coalition governments. This in turn leads to a practice of
co-operative policy-making (Keman 1984; Paloheimo 1984; Budge and Keman
1990).
Therefore, both ‘economics’ and ‘politics’ are conducive to co-operative policy-
making, aimed at maintaining competitiveness on the world market. Compen-
satory social policies are exchanged for wage restraint (Cameron 1978, 1984;
Katzenstein 1985; Zimmermann 1986; Lehner 1987; Czada 1987; Braun 1989).
Essentially, both in ‘economics’ and in ‘politics’ the various elites representing
interest groups and political parties closely co-operate together over long(er)
periods of time (see also Armingeon 2002; van Waarden 2002).
Neo-corporatist co-operation and co-operative politics are the opposite of pluralism.
Pluralism goes together with a fragmented system of interest representation in
‘economics’ and a system of majoritarian or plurality representation in ‘politics’
based on competition (Lijphart 1999: 76/77, 162, 177). From a pluralist point of
view (cf. Lijphart [1968] 1990; see also Dahl 1961), organised interest groups
and their elites should be competing both in ‘economics’ and in ‘politics’, to try
and influence policy formation and implementation. Often, such a pluralist
setting in ‘economics’ goes together with a very limited number of political parties
in ‘politics’, that contest government power in elections based on majority or
plurality systems in order to form a majority government. No specific elites or
their organisations are expected to be able to assert their influence over a broad
spectrum of issues over extended periods of time. Success with regard to in-
fluencing policy formation and implementation is expected to vary over different
interest groups, over different policy areas, and over time. Government power is
expected to alternate between the two or three relevant political parties. Pluralist
liberal democracies are mainly to be found in the Anglo-Saxon world, and in-
clude countries like the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Canada,
Australia, and (until 1995) New Zealand (see also Lijphart 1999).
That is clearly a quite different setting of ‘economics’ and ‘politics’ than in neo-
corporatist democracies. Therefore, pluralism as a theoretical point of view for
empirical investigation of socio-economic policy-making in these democracies
has to be rejected (see also Keman 1999).
Consensus by means of co-operation in socio-economic policy-making may take
different forms. The Dutch case has been made famous by Lijphart ([1968]
1990) as an example of pillarisation between the early 1900s and the mid 1960s,
a specific variety of consensus democracy, the category to which all the above
liberal democracies belong (Lijphart 1999: 243-257). The politics of accommo-
dation in the Netherlands was characterised by a number of ‘rules of the game’
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(Lijphart [1968] 1990: 116-130):
- politics as ‘business’;
- pragmatic tolerance;
- frequent high level elite meetings;
- proportionality, in representation, in mandates and the like;
- depoliticisation of issues;
- secrecy of negotiations;
- the government governs, that is, parliament rather monitors than directs
government policy.
Daalder (1964) has pointed to other and comparable ‘rules of the game’ that go
back even to the Dutch Republic of the United Provinces in the 17th and 18th
century. For instance, the ‘politics of accommodation’, the longstanding tradi-
tion and capability of Dutch elites to incorporate newcomers. Or the scepticism
and passivity of the Dutch public with regard to politics and the concomitant
‘right to govern’ acquired by the elites. And the divided marches of the emanci-
pation movements of Liberals, Roman Catholics, Protestants and Socialists
(Lijphart’s pillars) in the 19th century and the resulting gap between parliament
and government (Lijphart’s ‘the government governs’). As a consequence, po-
litical responsibility is diffuse and accountability low. Lastly, political decision-
making is quite centralised, making for a depoliticisation of issues (Lijphart’s
‘politics as business’ and ‘depoliticisation’; see also van der Ploeg 1995; and van
Waarden 2003).
In the mid 1960s a process of depillarisation becomes visible in the Netherlands.
The role of (socialist) ideology and religion in politics and society declined.
Church attendance went down, as did the proportion of votes for the political
parties representing the pillars. Formerly pillarised organisations depillarised
and merged with other (depillarised) organisations. The cohesion within the
pillars diminished, formal organisational ties between the political party and
other organisations in the pillar were broken up. Lastly, pillarisation also fell out
of fashion with the formerly pillarised elites (Andeweg and Irwin 1993: 44, 45;
2002: 34-38; see also de Ru 1995).
Notwithstanding these major changes, much of the above ‘rules of the game’
have remained remarkably stable, albeit not anymore in a pillarised environment
(Lijphart 1989; Andeweg and Irwin 1993: 48, 49; 2002: 41, 42, 146-148, 207-
209). The country remains highly dependent on the world market. Trade unions
and employers’ organisations still co-operate with each other and with the coa-
lition government of the day to keep up competitiveness on the world market.
Still no political party is anywhere near a parliamentary majority, therefore
coalitions have to be forged, and to that effect co-operative politics remain in
force. Depillarisation in the Netherlands in the 1960s and 1970s, therefore, does
not equal a development towards a more pluralist setting in either ‘economics’
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or ‘politics’. Both ‘economics’ and ‘politics’ remain conducive to co-operative
policy-making (see van Waarden 2002, 2003). In other words, sociologically
Dutch patterns may well have changed, yet politically, so it seems, the actors
have reorganised, but institutionally the rules of the game more or less remained
the same. That also applies to other neo-corporatist democracies (Lijphart 1999:
243-257; Siaroff 1999: 184, 185, 190-193; Pennings and Vergunst 2001). So the
structuration may change, yet the institutionalised practices more or less remain
the same.
2.7 Concluding remarks
The first research question is about what neo-corporatism is and how it works.
Can both the actions of the actors involved and the outcomes of their interactions
be explained in terms of the strategies they have employed? In other words: 
Can neo-corporatism, defined as a government strategy for conflict regu-
lation, offer a plausible explanation for the formation and implementation of
Dutch incomes policy between 1965 and 2000?
If that is indeed the case, the next research question arises. This is the question
about the effectiveness of incomes policy resulting from the strategies employed
by the actors involved: 
Was Dutch incomes policy between 1965 and 2000 effective in terms of the
agendas of actors involved?
Neo-corporatist strategies and outcomes are expected to be more effective in
terms of decision-making (Central Agreements) and outcome (core) than non-
neo-corporatist strategies and outcomes from the perspective of the respective
agendas of the actors involved.
Neo-corporatism conceptualised as a government strategy has to be studied on
the basis of interactions between government, trade unions and employers’ or-
ganisations on the macro level of national socio-economic issues and policies. In
this institutional setting, incomes policy is the key policy area and policy in-
strument.
Based on this conceptualisation of neo-corporatism as a government strategy, I
expect to find a dynamic pattern of behaviour. Both in relation to the extant rules
and practices, and in relation to socio-economic developments. In particular in a
country with a small open economy like the Netherlands. I therefore contend that
the Netherlands can be considered as a ’crucial’ case. That is, a case that is exem-
plary for the process that the theory of neo-corporatism as a government strategy
describes. By using the Rational Institutional approach to analyse the behaviour
and actions of the actors within the ‘rules’ of the game, it is not only possible to
understand what neo-corporatism is, and why it occurs or not, but also to explain
how it performs, and why it is effective or not.
In this chapter I have elaborated the concept of neo-corporatism as a government
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strategy. I have shown the usefulness of the strategy concept for the investigation
of incomes policy in the Netherlands. I have argued that the concept of neo-
corporatism as a government strategy allows us to overcome the static and for-
mal conceptualisations of neo-corporatism in much of the literature. I have
identified incomes policy as a key policy area and policy instrument within a
broader programme of co-operative macroeconomic management by party
government, employers’ organisations and trade unions. Lastly, I have argued
how neo-corporatism and co-operative policy-making differ from pluralism, and
that the pluralistic point of view to guide empirical research into incomes policy
in neo-corporatist liberal democracies has to be rejected. In the next chapter, the
research design will be developed and the concepts used in this chapter will be
operationalised. 
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3. Research design, operationalisation 
and mode of analysis
In this chapter the research design will be elaborated and the concepts referred
to in the research questions discussed and operationalised. Below I will explain
how this research design is relevant for providing answers to the research
questions. The comparative single case study into the formation, implementation
and effectiveness of Dutch incomes policy between 1965 and 2000 will provide
the answers to the research questions. This comparative single case study can be
regarded as a ‘crucial’ case study. First I will discuss the research design in terms
of case studies and the logic of comparative analysis. Next I will develop and
operationalise the concepts regarding the Dutch case. I will end with an ela-
boration of my mode of analysis of the process of negotiations on the formation
and implementation of Dutch incomes policy between the relevant actors.
3.1 The comparative method and the use of a ‘crucial’ case study
Case studies and comparative politics have a somewhat uneasy relationship.
Especially the single comparative case study generates a specific problem: the
generalizability of the findings to other cases (Lijphart 1971, 1975; see also
Przeworski and Teune 1970). Nevertheless, I will argue that the chosen research
design is a valid and correct means to investigate the two research questions
under review.
Single case studies are usually undertaken for their explanatory value. They can
provide answers to ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions (Yin 1989). Single case studies
can also be used to develop, expand or generate concepts and theories (Landman
2000; Yin 1989). Conversely, by means of a crucial or critical case study, the
applicability of theories or theoretical propositions to other cases can be con-
firmed (crucial) or disproved (critical) (Landman 2000; Pennings et al 1999;
Peters 1998; Yin 1989; Lijphart 1971).
Although the single case study still is often used within comparative politics
(Peters 1998), it is not without controversy. Landman (2000) considers a single
case study to be comparative if the concepts used are explicitly comparative, that
is, applicable to other cases as well (see also Dogan and Pelassy 1990). Peters on
the other hand is much more critical. In his view the greatest drawback of the
single case study is that it is not really comparative at all. Usually it is no more
than “an explanation of politics ‘someplace else’” (1998: 11; see also Keman
1993b), but in that sense it may have its use as a source of information for a ‘real’
comparison (Peters 1998; see also Lijphart 1971). For instance, if benchmarking
is used for assessing comparative purposes, then a single case study can be
functional as point of reference (Pennings et al 1999: chapter 1).
Basically, within comparative politics there exists a (methodological) trade-off
between comparing multiple cases and researching a single case. And that is the
trade-off between external and internal validity, between generalisation and
complexity, between statistical explanation and ‘thick’ description (Landman 2000;
Peters 1998; Ragin 1987). Both methods have their merits and drawbacks. A
comparison of many cases allows for statistical control, reduces selection bias,
has an extensive comparative scope that generates empirical support for general
theory, and identifies deviant cases as a basis for further research. This kind of
research induces parsimonious models of explanatory factors, allows for great
variance in variables and can rule out rival hypotheses by including control
variables. On the downside there is often need for substantial stretching of
concepts to be able to fit all cases, and it is often not clear what the substantive
importance of the findings exactly is (Peters 1998; see also Sartori 1970).
Single cases on the other hand allow for ‘thick’, that is, detailed descriptions that
range across many political and institutional variables and involve in-depth
understanding of the specifics of the broader context of the case. On the down-
side it is usually quite difficult to make generalisations above the case itself. It
may also be difficult to convey the specificity of the case to other researchers.
And the research may involve implicit comparisons that are only understandable
from the (national) context in which the case is developed (Dogan and Pelassy
1990; see also Lijphart 1971; Castles 1989).
However, the ‘crucial’ case study design is a research design that can be used to
show that the results of the research into a particular case that is commonly
accepted to be representative for the phenomenon under investigation (as is the
case for neo-corporatism in the Netherlands), are indeed exemplary for the pro-
cess that the theory, based on comparative analysis, describes (Lijphart 1971; Yin
1989; Dogan and Pelassy 1990; Hague et al 1998; Landman 2000). Therefore,
the research design will be a crucial case study into the formation, implemen-
tation and effectiveness of Dutch incomes policy between 1965 and 2000, based
on the comparative theoretical approach of neo-corporatism as a government
strategy that has been developed in chapter 2. 
This crucial case study is an inter-temporal study that focuses on change over
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time between 1965 and 2000. In effect, it consists of a time series of 36 con-
secutive cases with respect to incomes policy and effectiveness per year. This
sequence of 36 cases within the case study both enhances internal validity of the
research (Peters 1998) and shows possible variations over time (Pennings et al
1999). Using the same indicators for 36 cross-sectional analyses within one
fixed context to some extent enhances the external validity as well.
The units of variation or dependent variables are:
- formation and implementation of incomes policy in terms of neo-corporatism
as a government strategy (research question 1),
- effectiveness of incomes policy in terms of the agendas of the actors involved
(research question 2).
The units of observation are the annual negotiations between trade unions and em-
ployers’ organisations on wages and other terms of employment, and between these
‘social partners’ and the government on incomes policy. The units of measurement
are the values scored on the indicators for neo-corporatism (cf. Pennings et al 1999).
A central aspect of comparative politics is the need to control the context to
make sure that the observed variation is indeed caused by the factor(s) specified
by the theory, and not by other (unknown) factors (Pennings et al 1999). This
matter of concern is also known as the need for ‘controlling for extraneous
variance’ (Peters 1998) or the problem of ‘spuriousness’of research outcomes (Land-
man 2000). Although perfect control in comparative politics cannot be achieved,
the research design should at least aim at reducing the likelihood of the occur-
rence of this phenomenon as thoroughly as possible. 
In this crucial case study of the Netherlands I aim to achieve that goal by in-
vestigating incomes policy in a specific period, 1965-2000. The focus of my
research will be the formation and implementation of incomes policy in the
market sector. Until wages (and also benefits and pensions) in the (semi-) public
sector became directly linked to those in the market sector in the 1970s, through
legal mechanisms like the statutory minimum wage and the practice to increase
them with the average increase obtained in the market sector, wages and benefits
in the (semi-) public sector were directed by government. They became govern-
ment directed again during the long-term efforts of Dutch governments in the
1980s and 1990s to reduce the deficit by reducing government expenditure. In
the 1990s, they have been linked on and off to developments in the market sector,
but only on an ad-hoc basis (see also Albeda et al 1998: 85).
This choice of both period and the arena to be investigated is based on my
theoretical approach of neo-corporatism as a government strategy. By defining
both period and arena, I avoid an inter-temporal comparison between incomes
policy formulated and implemented under a system of statutory guided incomes
policy that was embedded in a pillarised political system between 1945 and
1965, with incomes policy formulated and implemented under a different system
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of legally ‘free’ wage bargaining (that is, free from government intervention) that
is embedded in a depillarised political system between 1965 and 2000 (Lijphart
[1968] 1990; Windmuller et al 1983). By focusing on the more recent period we
may assume that it is indeed the combination of the actions of social partners and
the government that result in a neo-corporatist incomes policy, or not (research
question 1). Likewise we may deduce whether a neo-corporatist incomes policy
is indeed more effective than a non-neo-corporatist incomes policy (research
question 2). A positive side effect of controlling the context is that it also in-
creases internal validity (Pennings et al 1999). 
These considerations lead to a research design in which the crucial case study is
embedded in a general approach and comparable concepts. Following Peters
(1998: 26), the research design should specify
- what has to be explained (dependent variable)?
- what is the cause (independent variable)?
- what evidence is needed to establish a relation between cause and effect?
Based on the research questions I will employ the following two research designs
in my crucial case study (see also Pennings et al 1999). 
The first research design refers to research question 1:
Can neo-corporatism, defined as a government strategy for conflict regu-
lation, offer a plausible explanation for the formation and implementation of
Dutch incomes policy between 1965 and 2000?
In this research design the dependent variable is (the formation and imple-
mentation of) Dutch incomes policy between 1965 and 2000. First it must be
determined to what extent actual incomes policy is neo-corporatist. Then it has
to be explained why incomes policy is neo-corporatist or not. 
The independent variables that are expected to explain why incomes policy is
neo-corporatist or not, are the strategies of government, employers’ organisa-
tions and trade unions, and their interactions given the formal and informal
‘rules of the game’. 
The evidence needed to establish a relation between cause and effect, that is,
between strategies of actors and resulting incomes policy, is to determine firstly,
to what extent actors did pursue a neo-corporatist strategy, and secondly, to what
extent the combined effect of those strategies did result in a neo-corporatist
incomes policy (see chapter 4 and chapter 5).
The second research design refers to research question 2:
Was Dutch incomes policy between 1965 and 2000 effective in terms of the
agendas of actors involved?
In this research design the dependent variable is the effectiveness of Dutch
incomes policy between 1965 and 2000. The effectiveness of incomes policy is
defined in terms of the agendas of the actors involved: government, employers’
organisations and trade unions. 
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The independent variable that is expected to explain the effectiveness of incomes
policy is the type of incomes policy. A neo-corporatist incomes policy is expected
to be more effective than a non-neo-corporatist incomes policy (co-operation in
stead of conflict).
The evidence needed to establish a relation between cause and effect, that is,
between incomes policy and effectiveness, is to determine whether a neo-cor-
poratist incomes policy does indeed imply that the common outcome that actors
achieved can be explained in terms of an optimal outcome based on what they
wanted (agenda) (see chapter 6).
In both research designs the focus of the research will be on the national level of
consultations and negotiations on wages and other terms of employment, and
related incomes policy between 1965 and 2000. The actors involved are the peak
organisations of trade unions and employers’ organisations, and the (coalition)
government of the day. 
This formal description of the research design represents the general lay-out of
the study. In section 3.2 below, the actual operationalisation of the central
variables will be elaborated.
3.2 Elaborating the research design for the Dutch case: institutions, actors and
the process of negotiations
In this section I will first introduce the institutions and the actors involved in the
formation and implementation of Dutch incomes policy between 1965 and 2000.
Next I will elaborate the process of negotiations on incomes policy. For a better
understanding it is useful to give a brief overview of the post war institutional
framework that shaped both the process and the central actors for my period of
investigation.
3.2.1 The institutions involved in incomes policy
The relevant formal institutions in the area of socio-economic policy-making are
the Stichting van de Arbeid (Foundation of Labour - STAR), the Sociaal-Econo-
mische Raad (Social-Economic Council - SER) and other Publiekrechtelijke
Bedrijfsorganisaties (PBO-bodies), the Centraal Planbureau (Central Planning
Bureau - CPB), and the College van Rijksbemiddelaars (Board of Government
Mediators - CvR) (Windmuller and De Galan 1977; Teulings 1980; Fase 1980;
Dercksen et al 1982; Windmuller et al 1983).
The Foundation of Labour was created after top-level negotiations between
unions and employers’ organisations during World War II. The unions relinquish-
ed their claims to affect the management of individual companies “in exchange
for ample representation in official bodies to advise the government” (Wind-
muller and De Galan 1977, Vol. 1: 94 - translation jjw). The STAR - a private
corporation - consists of representatives of employers’ organisations, trade
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unions, small businesses in the retail sector and farmers. Based on the BBA 1945
(Extra-ordinary Order on Labour Relations 1945), the STAR was given the legal
status of advisory body to the Minister of Social Affairs in the area of social
policy. The STAR covered a wide area. Most of its activities were taken over by
the SER in 1950. The STAR retained an advisory capacity for “technical
problems... regarding the implementation of wage regulations” (Windmuller and
De Galan 1977, Vol. 2: 23 - translation jjw). The STAR is also the organisation
in which the annual central negotiations on wages and other terms of employ-
ment between trade unions and employers’ organisations are held.
The Board of Government Mediators was a government agency of four 'indepen-
dent' experts, appointed by the Minister of Social Affairs to supervise incomes
policy. The Board had some measure of independence. Based on the BBA 1945,
the Board was to consult the STAR before issuing recommendations or making
decisions with regard to incomes policy. This body was abolished in 1970 after
passing the Wet op de Loonvorming (Law on Wage Formation - 1968/70).
The Central Planning Bureau is also a government agency, but, similar to the
Central Bank, to a large extent independent from the government of the day.
Originally Hein Vos, social democratic Minister of Trade and Industry, designed
the CPB in the first post-war cabinet, Schermerhorn/Drees. It was meant to
function as a guiding planning agency for the government's social and economic
policies. Vos' successors in the cabinets Beel (1946-1948) and Drees/Van Schaik
(1948-1951/52), the Roman Catholic Ministers Huysmans and Van den Brink,
quickly changed its function to a bureau providing the government with econo-
mic forecasts. These forecasts, the Macro-Economische Verkenningen (MEV)
are crucial inputs (and constraints) for the annual discussions and negotiations
about incomes policy (Fernhout 1980: 146-148; Fortuyn 1981: 173-178, 317-
325; de Liagre Böhl et al 1981: 62 ff.).
The Social Economic Council was instituted by law in 1950. Of its members, at
least two-thirds are nominated by ‘recognised’ organisations of workers and
employers. The government appoints the remainder. These so-called ‘crown
members’ are called ‘independent experts’, but reflect to a certain extent the
major political parties. By virtue of their offices, the directors of the CPB and
the Dutch Central Bank are also ‘crown members’.
The statutory powers of the Council are limited. Its most important task is to
advise the government. Until 1995 the government was legally obliged to ask for
a recommendation about all important socio-economic policy measures it might
contemplate. In 1995, a majority in parliament abolished this obligation. Never-
theless, the then new ‘purple’ government coalition of social democrats, social
and conservative liberals19 promised to continue the practice of asking the
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19. Social democrats: PvdA (Partij van de Arbeid - Labour Party). Social liberals: D66 (Democraten 66 - 
Council’s recommendation on all major proposals for socio-economic policies.
The Council's recommendation is not binding. Especially in the 1960s and
1970s, during the transition from statutory incomes policy to a free incomes
policy, consultations in the SER played a part in the annual round of negotiations
on wages and other terms of employment (Fernhout 1980: 151-153, 155;
Windmuller and De Galan 1977: 2, 26-27; Dercksen et al 1982: 122-126; de
Liagre Böhl et al 1981: 106-109; Fortuyn 1981: 325-329, 373-424; van Ruysse-
veldt and Visser 1996: 211-214; see also van Waarden 2003).
The legal institutional setting that regulates collective contracts, the outcome of
the annual process of negotiations on wages and other terms of employment,
consists of two laws dating from 1927 and 1937 respectively (van Ruysseveldt
and Visser 1996: 235-242; Albeda et al 1998: 120-122; Teulings and Hartog
1998: 267, 288; Visser 1999: 301-302).20 The combined effect of these two laws
is that the great majority of the workforce in the market sector is covered by
collective contracts between trade unions and employers’ organisations. Actual
figures vary from between 70 and 80% (Teulings and Hartog 1998: 267) to 86%
(van den Toren 1996: 60). 
Contractual negotiations are conducted within the framework of the Law on
Wage Formation of 1970/1986. The passing of this law marks the transition from
a government guided incomes policy to free negotiations between trade unions
and employers’ organisations. However, government reserved the authority to
intervene in these negotiations. Based on clause 8, government could still inter-
vene directly in individual collective contracts, as opposed to not declaring them
binding. And clause 10 gave government the authority to impose binding general
measures. Due to stiff opposition by the trade unions, clause 8 was in effect
‘frozen’, that is, successive governments promised not to make use of this clause.
Clause 10 was amended in 1986. From then on, only a “national emergency,
52
Democrats 66). Conservative liberals: VVD (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie - Peoples
Party for Freedom and Democracy). ‘Purple’ refers to the mix of the colour red (PvdA) with the
colour blue (VVD).
20. The 1927 Wet op de Collectieve Arbeidsovereenkomst (CAO - Law on the Collective Contract)
makes an agreement between an employer and one or more unions binding for all workers in that
firm, whether they are union members or not. The 1937 Wet op het (on)verbindend verklaren van
Collectieve Arbeidsovereenkomsten (Law on the mandatory (un)extension of Collective Contracts)
extends the working of an agreement between trade unions and employers’ organisations to a whole
branch or industry if a substantial majority of workers in that branch or industry are employed by
employers that are directly bound to the agreement. The extension has to be requested by at least one
of the parties involved in the agreement, and, as a ‘rule of thumb’, the agreement should affect at
least 55% of the workforce in that branch or industry. Extension is habitually granted, but in theory
can be denied. Sometimes the government uses this threat to try and dissuade the contracting parties
from concluding unwanted agreements.
caused by ‘external’ factors’ “could serve as a legitimate cause for government
intervention with general binding measures in the formation and implementation
of incomes policy (van Drimmelen and van Hulst 1987: 34-35; Korver 1993:
394; Albeda et al 1998: 79/80, 264). In other words, until 1986 the government
could formally intervene in the process of negotiations on incomes policy be-
tween social partners with binding measures on both the central and the decen-
tral level. But informally the government agreed to limit such interventions to
the central level. As of 1987, the government can formally intervene only in ex-
ceptional circumstances and only on the central level. Nevertheless government
remained involved in the annual process of negotiations on incomes policy to a
considerable extent by means of ample instruments to influence bargaining and
outcomes of incomes policy through taxes, social security premiums, the legal
minimum wage, benefit eligibility criteria, and benefit levels (see also van
Sinderen 2000: 27).
In effect, the government does not only determine to a substantial extent the
substance of the annual negotiations by its budget proposals, it is also able and
willing to intervene in the annual process of negotiations between trade unions
and employers’ organisations to try and get them to conclude agreements, and in
the end government sanctions the outcome of these negotiations. The govern-
ment is both the leading actor in the game and guarantor of the outcome of the
game. To quote Teulings and Hartog (1998: 297): “corporatism requires political
management” (their emphasis). Keman (1999: 265) makes an even stronger
statement: “in the case of corporatism, the room to manoeuvre (of trade unions
and employers’ organisations - jjw) is by and large defined by party-govern-
ment” (see also Hogenboom and van Vliet 2000: 30, 31; and Molina and Rhodes
2002: 316-318).
This implies that the mutual instrumentalisation of trade unions, employers’
organisations and the government is apparent. Notwithstanding the government’s
‘leading’ role, all three actors are mutually dependent on each other’s willingness
to co-operate to achieve their own goals.
3.2.2 The actors involved in incomes policy
The actors involved in the cycle of annual central negotiations on wages and other
terms of employment are party government and ‘peak’organisations of trade unions
and employers’ organisations (Lipschits 1977: 72-76; Windmuller et al 1983:
298-354; Andeweg and Irwin 1993: 50-107; Daalder 1995: 222-223; Keman
1996a; van Empel 1997; Albeda et al 1998: 39-43, 47-50, 54-59; Teulings and
Hartog 1998: 265-298; SCP 1998: 161-162; Woldendorp et al 2000: 395;
Crooijmans and Windt 2001; Andeweg and Irwin 2002: 43-68, 140-142; Keman
2002; den Butter and Mosch 2003; van Waarden 2003; and Mosch 2004). 
53
3.2.2.1 Parties and party government
The government is the coalition government of the day. In the annual nego-
tiations with and between trade unions and employers’ organisations ministers
represent the government. At the very least, the Minister of Social Affairs is
involved. Depending on the issues at stake, the general economic situation and
the atmosphere between the actors involved, the government can be represented
by a delegation of ministers, including the Prime Minister. In such a delegation,
apart from the Minister of Social Affairs, also the other ministers of the so-called
‘socio-economic triangle’ may be included: the Ministers of Economic Affairs
and Finance. Furthermore, the Minister of Internal Affairs (responsible for
incomes policy in the public sector), and the Prime Minister may be included as
well, depending on the issues at stake. Sometimes junior ministers, primarily of
Social or Economic Affairs are also included in the delegation.21
Between 1965 and 2000, with the exception of the short-lived government Van
Agt II (1981/1982), in coalitions dominated by christian democrats, the Minister
of Social Affairs was a christian democrat. In the ‘purple’ coalitions governing
since 1994, the Minister of Social Affairs was a social democrat (see Table 3.1).
Between 1965 and 2000 the relevant political parties in government include:
- the Katholieke Volkspartij (KVP - 1975/1980), originally the political repre-
sentative of the Roman Catholic pillar;
- the Anti-Revolutionaire Partij (ARP - 1975/1980), originally one of the two
main political representatives of the Protestant pillar, catering especially for the
break-away churches of the Dutch Reformed Church, the Gereformeerden;
- the Christelijk-Historische Unie (CHU - 1975/1980), the other main repre-
sentative of the Protestant pillar, catering especially for the conservative parts
of the Dutch Reformed Church, the Hervormden;
- the Christen Democratisch Appèl (CDA - 1975/1980 - ), the merger of KVP,
ARP and CHU. From 1975 they contested elections with one party list, from
1980, the until then separate party organisations were merged as well (ten
Napel 1992);
- the Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA), originally the political representative of the
social democratic movement;
- the Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD), originally the
conservative political representative of the Liberal segment of the population;
- Democraten 66 (D66), a social liberal political party founded in 1966 with
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21. Civil servants play a supportive role in this process. They support the delegation of ministers with
their expertise on political and technical ramifications of the proposals discussed. Or their expertise
is used in thrashing out the more technical details of the agreements reached, in tri-partite working
parties with officials of the trade unions and the employers’ organisations (see also van Ruysseveldt
and Visser 1996: 208-218).
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the express purpose of breaking confessional, respectively christian demo-
cratic dominance in Dutch politics.
As a consequence of secularisation and depillarisation, the combined election
results for the confessional political parties went down substantially in the 1960s
and early 1970s. These losses were an important incentive to form the CDA. The
formation of the CDA at first only slowed down the decline of christian demo-
cracy. But in 1986 and 1989, the CDA managed to enlarge its share of the vote.
However, the elections in the 1990s again showed a substantial downturn.
Despite its diminishing share of the vote, the CDA (and its predecessors) re-
mained the largest party in parliament between 1965 and 1994. Only between
1977 and 1981, and between 1982 and 1986, they lost that position to the PvdA.
In 1994 the CDA again became the second largest party. In 1998 the CDA lost
again, and then ranked as the third largest party, after the VVD.
The PvdA also has had its share of ups and downs in the elections in this period.
Between 1965 and 1994, with the exception of 1977 to 1981 and 1982 to 1986, the
PvdA was the second largest party in parliament. Between 1977 and 1981, 1982
and 1986, and from 1994 to 2000, despite a substantial loss from which the party
had not yet recovered in 1998, the PvdA was the largest party in parliament.
Although the election results of the VVD vary, from 1965 to 1998 it was the third
largest party in parliament. In 1998, it became the second largest party. 
Despite its quite volatile election results, from 1977 D66 has always remained
the fourth largest party in parliament.
No single party can deliver a majority in parliament. If we take the CDA and its
three predecessors as one party, in the period under investigation at least two
parties are needed to form a majority coalition. With the exception of 1973-
1977, the CDA was the dominant party in government between 1965 and 1994.
Although the PvdA became the largest party in parliament in 1977, and again in
1982, in both cases the CDA and VVD succeeded in forging a majority coalition
as second and third largest parties.
The 1994 elections changed the political landscape in the Netherlands con-
siderably. PvdA and CDA both suffered severe losses, but the PvdA became the
largest party in parliament. The VVD and D66 both made considerable gains, but
remained third and fourth largest parties. As the largest party in parliament it fell
upon the PvdA to form a new coalition. Neither with the CDA, nor with either
the VVD or D66 a majority could be achieved. So it had to be a three party
coalition. As the CDA was in severe disarray, the only viable combination left
was what became the ‘purple’ coalition of PvdA, D66 and VVD. 
The 1998 election resulted in gains for the PvdA and the VVD, who became first
and second largest party in parliament, together commanding a majority in par-
liament. However, the ‘purple’ coalition with the three parties was continued as 
Based on the electoral results and subsequent government formation between
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1965 and 2000, a transition can be observed from christian democratic dominance
in government between 1965 and 1994 (with a brief exception in the mid-1970s)
to social democratic dominance in government from 1994 to 2000 (see also
Visser 1999: 287).
3.2.2.2 Trade unions
The main trade union organisations involved between 1965 and 2000 include the
following:
- the Nederlands Verbond van Vakverenigingen (NVV), a peak organisation of mainly
branch trade unions that originated in the social democratic movement;
- the Nederlands Katholiek Vakverbond (NKV), a peak organisation of mainly
branch trade unions that originated in the Roman Catholic pillar;
- the Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging (FNV), a merger between NVV and
NKV as of January 1st, 197622;
- the Christelijk Nationaal Vakverbond (CNV), a peak organisation of mainly
branch trade unions that originated in the Protestant pillar;
- the Vakcentrale voor Middelbaar en Hoger Personeel (MHP), a peak organi-
sation of white collar and professional organisations, since 1968 member of
the STAR, and as of 1976 also represented in the SER. It has no origin in one
of the Dutch pillars.
With regard to organisational strength of the trade union federations, union
density has never been high in the Netherlands. And between 1965 and 2000 it
decreased dramatically from a peak of about 43% in 1975 (Windmuller et al
1983: 299) to about 24% at the end of the 1990s (Teulings and Hartog 1998:
268). In January 2001 it has gone up slightly to 27% (den Butter and Mosch
2003: 387; see also Mosch 2004: 103). This lack of organisational strength is
partly due to the institutional setting of the negotiations between trade unions,
employers’ organisations and the government. The laws of 1927 and 1937 governing
collective contracts make negotiated contracts binding for all employees within
a firm or industry, whether they are union members or not. Therefore, employees
do not have to be a member of a union to benefit from their efforts. The trade
unions’ institutional strength at the same time produces a collective action pro-
blem of ‘free riders’ that may in turn have a negative bearing on their institutional
strength (see also van Ruysseveldt and Visser 1996: 222-234; Visser 1999: 294-
299; and Hemerijck et al 2000).
22. The CNV decided not to join the prospective federation of all three peak organisations. Some
dissatisfied trade unions affiliated with the NKV later joined the CNV. The CNV changed its
character from a Protestant trade union federation to an organisation with a more general christian
identity.
Of the trade union federations, the FNV (NVV+NKV) is the leading actor. The
FNV represents a cross-section of the workforce, but its main strongholds are the
blue-collar workers in the (declining) manufacturing industry and (growing)
services sector, and employees in the public sector (civil servants, teachers,
health workers, public transport employees). Unionisation is particularly low in
the ICT sector, in wholesale and retail, in the entertainment and catering industry,
and in financial services. All in all, two out of three of the members of the FNV
work in the market sector. The CNV also represents a cross-section of the work-
force, but has a more prominent following in the (semi-) public sector. Two out
of three members of the CNV are employed in that sector (Korver 1993: 398). 
In general, the two (or three) organisations try to co-operate, or at least to co-
ordinate their policies, to find a common position vis-à-vis the employers’ or-
ganisations. The main difference between the two organisations is that the CNV
is quite reluctant to revert to open confrontation with employers. Its main ways
and means to achieve its goals are (by) negotiations.
The MHP has been formed more recently, and has its constituency under or-
ganisations of middle and higher-ranking white-collar workers and professionals
in the market sector. Co-operation or co-ordination with the FNV and the CNV
is limited. The MHP is, however, quite close to the CNV in its emphasis on
negotiations as opposed to open confrontation, to achieve its goals.
The general proportions of strength in terms of size between FNV, CNV, and
MHP are roughly 5.8 to 1.7 to 1 (den Butter and Mosch 2003: 369; see also Mosch
2004: 103). As the FNV, and its predecessors, the NVV and the NKV, generally
is ‘leader’ or ‘trend-setter’ in the process of negotiations from the union side, it
will be the main focus of the research. Special attention will be given to the CNV
and MHP if and when they significantly differ in their demands and actions from
the NVV+NKV=FNV.
3.2.2.3 Employers’ organisations
The main employers’ organisations between 1965 and 2000 include:
- the Verbond van Nederlandse Ondernemingen (VNO - 1968), a peak organi-
sation of both individual companies and branch or industry organisations of
companies. The VNO was a merger between the Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers
Verbond (CSWV) and the Verbond van Nederlandse Werkgevers (VNW). The
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CSWV focused on industrial relations and social policy and the VNW on
economic policy. Both organisations originated from the Dutch liberal
movement23;
- the Nederlands Christelijk Werkgevers Verbond (NCW - 1970), a merger
between the Roman Catholic and Protestant peak organisations of companies
and branch organisations. The NCW is dominated by the Roman Catholic
employers’ organisation. Both organisations originated from their respective
pillars24;
- VNO and NCW merged into VNO NCW on December 31st, 1996.
The VNO and NCW will be the main focus of research. In contrast to declining
trade unions density, employers in the Netherlands have always been highly
organised. VNO NCW organises some 90% of the larger firms in the market
sector. These firms employ some 90% of the labour force in the market sector.
VNO and NCW have always acted more than less as a unified actor due to their
overlapping membership (see note 6 to this chapter; see also van Ruysseveldt
and Visser 1996: 218-222; Visser 1999: 299-300; and Hemerijck et al 2000).
3.2.2.4 Conclusion regarding the crucial actors within the ‘game’
Various types of actors with varying positions are involved in the annual nego-
tiations on incomes policy. The composition of the coalition government depends
on the position of political parties in parliament. To command a majority in par-
liament, the largest party in parliament usually, but not always, forms a
government with either the second or the third largest party. The employers are
highly organised. Their organisation(s) represent the overwhelming majority of
companies in the market sector, and have managed to form a unified organi-
sation at the end of the period under investigation. Trade union density is quite
low and trade unions are separated in three organisations (although the largest
organisation, the FNV, is the ‘trend-setter’). Despite this ‘weakness’, compared
to the employers (and government), trade unions have had a quite ‘secure’ position
within the annual process of negotiations, due to the institutional setting of these
negotiations. First, there are the laws from 1927 and 1937 governing collective
contracts, which secure their position as negotiators for collective contracts on
the level of branches, industries and companies. Secondly, the legal status of the
STAR as an advisory body to the Minister of Social Affairs secures their nego-
tiating position on the national level. As does, thirdly, the ‘recognition’ by the
government that secures them their seats in the SER. Hence, all actors are ‘peak’
organisations that are institutionalised as the ‘crucial’ players of the Dutch ‘game’
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23. Liberal in the Dutch sense, that is in favour of both political and economic freedom for individuals.
24. Quite a few members of both the Protestant and Roman Catholic employers’ organisations were also
members of the VNO.
of formation and implementation of incomes policy and thus confirm to what is
generally seen as a necessary pre-condition for neo-corporatism.
3.2.3 The process of negotiations on incomes policy
Limitations to the room to manoeuvre for trade unions and employers’ organi-
sations are set firstly by general economic conditions as indicated by the CPB,
and secondly by the government’s agenda (budget). The government’s room to
manoeuvre is conditioned firstly by the effects that the outcome of negotiations
between trade unions and employers’ organisations may have on its agenda (budget),
and secondly by general economic conditions as indicated by the CPB and how
these are perceived by the governing majority.
The annual presentation of the government’s budget is the starting point for the
cycle of central (national) negotiations on wages and other terms of employment.
These negotiations involve the government, and the peak organisations of trade
unions and employers’ organisations. Chronologically, four stages in this process
can be distinguished (van Drimmelen and van Hulst 1987: 34-35):
- each year, at the end of September, the government presents the budget for
the coming year, based on the Macro-Economische Verkenningen of that year
(MEV = Macroeconomic Forecasts) issued by the CPB. Both the prognoses of
economic developments by the CPB and the government’s proposed policies
based on those forecasts are important inputs and constraints for the
negotiations;
- in October or November the trade unions publish their programmes for the
coming year, based on extensive internal discussions. The programmes usually
consist of a number of very specific, concrete demands, combined with a
number of rather more flexible demands. These programmes can be considered
as a general ‘framework’ for negotiations, both on the central and on the
decentral level.
Either in response, or simultaneously, employers’ organisations also publish
their programmes for the coming year in those months;
- when the programmes of trade unions and employers’ organisations have
been issued in October or November, the negotiations start in the STAR.
Especially in the first half of the period under investigation here, there may
be simultaneous consultations going on in the SER that have a bearing on
these negotiations. Usually, in some way or other, the government gets
involved as well. These central negotiations may or may not result in some
sort of Central Agreement;
- regardless of the outcome of the central negotiations - a Central Agreement,
no Central Agreement or government intervention - between December and
June decentral negotiations on collective contracts on the branch and company
level take place. In the absence of a Central Agreement or government inter-
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vention, they are based on the programmes issued in October or November.
Whatever the starting point, these negotiations eventually result in collective
contracts, covering any period between one and two-and-a-half years.
Hence the cycle observed in this study concerns some nine months of con-
sultation and negotiation. Both process and outcome are studied forward. So, if
a specific year is mentioned, say 1976, the information supplied covers the period
between, broadly, September 1975 and June 1976.
However, from 1984, the system has been somewhat refined. From that date on,
apart from the cycle of negotiations identified above, government and trade
unions and employers’ organisations also meet for consultation each Spring
(Voorjaarsoverleg - Spring Consultation) and each Autumn (Najaarsoverleg -
Autumn Consultation). The Spring Consultation may take place any time be-
tween the end of January and the end of July of any given year; the Autumn
Consultation after announcing the budget for the next year. The main purpose of
the Spring Consultation is to give the government the opportunity to sound out
the reactions of trade unions and employers’ organisations to possible govern-
ment policies that may be proposed in next year’s budget in September. The main
purpose of the Autumn Consultation is to try and persuade trade unions and
employers’ organisations to come to terms, based on the budget announced for
next year. The substance of these consultations may vary from a very brief ex-
change of points of view to protracted negotiations, which may or may not result
in a Central Agreement.
The substantive description of this annual cycle of negotiations between 1965
and 2000 provides the necessary empirical information needed to answer the
research questions. Research question 1 refers to the explanation of the formation
and implementation of Dutch incomes policy in terms of neo-corporatist govern-
ment strategies. To establish whether or not actual incomes policy is the result of
neo-corporatist government strategies, or not, the annual strategies of the govern-
ment have to be categorised, as well as those of trade unions and employers’
organisations. These strategies can be derived from their behaviour and actions
during the annual cycle of negotiations. The possible strategies of the actors are
elaborated and categorised in section 3.3.
Research question 2 refers to the effectiveness of Dutch incomes policy between
1965 and 2000. Effectiveness is derived from the agendas of the actors involved.
The agendas of trade unions and employers’ organisations are their respective pro-
grammes for incomes policy with which they enter the annual cycle of negotiations.
The agenda of the government is the annual budget and related policy proposals
that have a bearing on incomes policy and that mark the start of this annual cycle.
The substance of the eventual outcome of the negotiations in terms of (de)central
agreements or government intervention is the empirical information needed to
establish the effectiveness of the actual annual incomes policy arrived at.
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3.3 Mode of analysis of the process of negotiations on incomes policy
In this section I shall elaborate in detail how the negotiations between the relevant
actors can be meaningfully categorised. These categorisations are intended to
relate the process outcomes with the ideas developed in the Rational Institutional
approach, as well as with the policy ideas that were developed by Gijs Kuypers
(1970, 1980a, 1980b). In this way the relationship between institutions and actors
and between process and outcome can be investigated and analysed.
3.3.1 Strategy of the government
The strategy of the government in incomes policy involves two stages: the pro-
cess of negotiations between trade unions and employers’ organisations, and the
implementation of the (non)agreements eventually reached. In both stages govern-
ment may intervene, or not, depending on the goals the government has set itself
in its annual budget (agenda). Logically and empirically, four types of govern-
ment strategy can be observed (cf. van Brakel et al 1985):
I = Passive strategy The government remains passive and abstains from
any intervention in the negotiations between trade
unions and employers’ organisations (formation).
The government does not intervene in the outcome
of the negotiations (implementation).
II = Co-operative strategy The government restricts its interventions to the fa-
cilitation of negotiations between trade unions and
employers’ organisations (formation).
Government either does not intervene in the out-
come of the negotiations, or the intervention does
not go against the trend of the outcome of those
negotiations (implementation).
III = Congruent strategy The government actively intervenes with its own
policy proposals in the negotiations between trade
unions and employers’ organisations. The govern-
ment’s interventions are aimed at facilitating agree-
ment between all three actors involved by formula-
ting a policy package that can potentially accom-
modate all (formation).
The government may intervene in the outcome of
the negotiations with its own policy proposals with
respect to wages, taxes and social security premiums
and benefits, but without going against the outcome
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of the negotiations between government, trade unions
and employers’ organisations (implementation).
IV = Guiding strategy The government puts its own agenda first. Trade
unions and employers’ organisations are compelled
to accept the government’s agenda as the basis for
incomes policy. The government basically imple-
ments its own policy with respect to wages, taxes
and social security premiums and benefits without
much regard for agendas of the 'social partners' or
the outcomes of the negotiations (formation and
implementation).
I regard type II and III as representative for typically neo-corporatist strategies.
In both types, the government intends to get the process of negotiations between
trade unions and employers’ organisations started. The difference between type
II and III is that in type II the government tries to facilitate negotiations but
leaves formation and implementation of incomes policy largely to trade unions
and employers’ organisations. In type III the government actively intervenes in
the formation of incomes policy with its own (joint) policy proposals, and may
actively intervene in the outcome of the negotiations as well (implementation). 
From this it follows that I consider types I and IV to be non-neo-corporatist
strategies. In Type I, government refrains from any intervention at all. In type IV,
government seeks to implement its own agenda as the basis for incomes policy,
without much regard for either trade unions’ or employers’ organisations’ agendas.
As already stated in chapter 2, in all types of government strategy, the actions of
government ultimately have to be sanctioned by a majority in parliament.
Usually that is the governing majority. In the Netherlands, government policy
and the approval of the governing majority are based on the government’s policy
agreement (the Regeeraccoord).
3.3.2 Strategy of trade unions and employers’organisations: styles of decision-making
The essence of a strategy of an actor is that it combines goals with the way in
which these goals may be reached (in other words, there is a means-end rela-
tionship). This combination of goals and ways can be defined as a plan or a
policy. These terms are derived from Kuypers (1973, 1980a, 1980b)25 and
Scharpf (1987, 1998). Kuypers will be utilised to explain plans and goals, and
Scharpf to elaborate on the possible ways to achieve those goals.
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25. I will refrain from a discussion of the pros and cons of Kuypers’ causal-finalistic method. See de
Bruin (1991) for an extensive overview and a further development of Kuypers’ ideas.
For Kuypers (1973: 17-19, 28-41, 208-226; 1980a: 9, 19, 20, 44-52, 87), a policy
or a plan involves a goal, that is a situation which a given actor wants to achieve
on a given point of time in the future. A policy or plan also includes the means,
that is the activities of that actor, to achieve that goal. Therefore, a policy or plan
of any actor always involves:
- one or more goals (or ends);
- the way and means with which to achieve these goals, and;
- the points in time on which either the goals should be achieved, or the ways
and means should be deployed to try and achieve the goals that were set.
Kuypers’ ‘finalistic method’ of research (1973: 245-264; 1980a: 54, 57-87) is to
establish the goals that each actor sets and then from those goals to derive the
ways and means each actor can realistically deploy to arrive at that goal.
Applied to Dutch incomes policy, we must establish for each year we have under con-
sideration, the goals of each of the parties involved. Trade unions and employers’
organisations usually publish annual policy papers with respect to these nego-
tiations. Based on these policy papers, and on the final outcome of the negotia-
tions, their goals can be established. This information is necessary to decide
whether or not the policies of the actors were effective in terms of their own
goals, either individually or in combination.26
If there is more than one actor involved, as is the case with neo-corporatism
where we are dealing with at least trade unions and employers’ organisations,
negotiations are required to arrive at either a common policy or plan, or an ex-
change of policies or plans (Kuypers 1973: 68 ff.). For Kuypers, these nego-
tiations take place in a largely co-operative setting, based on a common interest
that is directly derived from each actor’s particular interest. Each actor’s particu-
lar interest is anything that contributes to their own separate goals. Their com-
mon interest is anything that contributes to the goals of individual participating
actors. Private interests can, however, only add up to a common interest, or result
in an exchange of policies, if based on co-operative negotiations.
Summing up Kuypers’ model:
- both trade unions and employers’ organisations have their ‘own’ plan or
policy that include goals that have to be achieved on a certain point in time;
- both trade unions and employers’ organisations have a plan or policy that
includes ways and means to arrive at those goals on those points of time;
- both the goals and the ways and means, that is the policy or plan of trade
unions and employers’ organisations, also depend on those of the other;
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26. This definition of effectiveness may or may not include ‘material’ effectiveness in terms of perfor-
mance with respect to indicators like strikes, economic growth, unemployment, inflation, and
budget deficits. That depends on the question whether or not these goals are included in the goals
of the actor(s) involved. 
- co-ordination or exchange of goals, that is of policy or plan of trade unions
and employers’ organisations, requires co-operative negotiation.
Central in Kuypers’ view is that a policy or plan involves a goal and that goals
can be co-ordinated with other actors through co-operative negotiation. His
theory is essentially actor centred and takes the Dutch institutional context,
which seems to be directed at co-operative decision-making, largely for granted
(but see Kuypers 1967). Scharpf (1998) on the other hand, shows that a co-ordi-
nation of goals may indeed involve co-operative negotiation in the institutions,
but not necessarily. The given institutional position of actors cannot fully explain
their choice of policies (goals and ways and means). It may limit the set of
feasible options, but the choice of policies is also influenced by the styles of
decision-making practised in those institutions. Scharpf (1998: 50) distinguishes
three different styles: confrontation, bargaining, and problem solving. Confron-
tation “refers to interactions in which winning, or the defeat of the other side,
has become the paramount goal, and which are often decided by superior force”.
Bargaining refers to interactions in which “participants are exclusively motivated
by their own egotistic self-interest and the typical outcome is a compromise”.
Lastly, problem solving “implies the pursuit of common goals and the common
search for an optimal solution”.
However, in real life actors have both common and conflicting interests. There-
fore, actors will be ambivalent; will be drawn to co-operation and to conflict at
the same time. This ambivalence, however, also creates the possibility that
interests and issues may be redefined. Or, as Kuypers would put it, that goals,
and ways and means, i.e. policies or plans, may change, that is, add up to a com-
mon interest, or result in an exchange. Either during co-operative negotiations
(Kuypers), or through conflict, bargaining and problem solving (Scharpf).
Kuypers’ co-ordination or exchange of policies can be located in both the bar-
gaining and the problem solving styles. In the bargaining style when we look at
the composition of what is defined as the common interest, that is, anything that
contributes to the particular interests of actors involved. And in the problem
solving style when we look at the ways in which the common interest is created
or policies are co-ordinated through co-operative negotiations. The possibility
that no agreement at all can be reached, or that, through confrontation, one party
may try to impose an agreement on the other party, Kuypers would have at-
tributed to the fact that actors ‘did it wrong’, that is that actors followed rules that
made it difficult if not impossible to make a plan that would ‘work’, that is, result
in some sort of shared agreement. For Kuypers the obvious solution was to
change the formal ‘rules of the game’ to ensure that a shared solution would
become possible again (Kuypers 1967). 
In Scharpf’s three styles of decision-making these possibilities can, however, be
accounted for. They are therefore more suited for empirical research of decision-
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making. Kuypers’ insistence on the other hand that policies involve goals and the
ways and means to arrive at those goals can be used to explain why in a given
situation actors may opt for one of the three possible styles of decision-making. 
In this sense, depending on the style of decision-making chosen, societal conflict
can indeed be the basis for consensus building (Keman 1992; 1999). However, it
is important to remember that in any given situation it can work both ways:
towards co-operation but also towards conflict. On the one hand, the ability to
co-operate generates important benefits for the actors involved (cf. Kuypers). On
the other hand co-operation may be jeopardised by conflicts over either the
choice of the possible co-operative solutions, or over the distribution of costs and
benefits resulting from the chosen co-operative solution (Scharpf 1998: 53, 56).
Therefore, fluctuations between conflict, bargaining and co-operation may be
expected, especially if the outcomes tend to be consistently unequal and there is
no possibility (or offer) for ‘taking it in turns’.
When we apply the underlying logic of the three styles of decision-making to
trade unions and employers’ organisations in the Netherlands, my assumption is
not so much that unanimous decision-making is required, but that in the end both
parties are interested in an agreement, albeit as much as possible on their own
terms. And for an agreement or contract, both parties are required. So we may
expect that in general the bargaining style will be the starting point in the annual
negotiations on wages and other terms of employment. Given the actual situation,
recent history, and perceptions of the future (Scharpf 1987), we then may expect
the actual negotiations to develop in various directions, depending on the style
of decision-making for which both parties involved may opt. These in turn may
be influenced by past experiences. We may therefore also expect that negotiations
can result in different outcomes (Scharpf 1998: 54-57):
- Confrontation, that is a situation in which parties opt for winning in com-
parison to the other and parties are not interested in compromises which may
be mutually beneficial. Parties behave individualistically, ‘go at it alone’,
rather than to seek some sort of understanding for which they have to give in
to the other party. This can be the consequence of intra-organisational dyna-
mics or of the earlier behaviour of the other parties involved. This situation
will be rare in real life as an outcome but not as a ‘first move’ in the game.
However, where negotiations on wages and other terms of employment are
concerned, a contract must be concluded. In game theory, the game that is
most often associated with this configuration and outcome is Chicken;27
- Bargaining, that is a situation in which parties do not want to go at it alone,
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27. The chicken game is derived from a game played by youth gangs in the USA in the 1950s. Two car
drivers drove their cars at each other. The first to divert his car was the ‘chicken’. If no driver
diverted, the game could result in serious injury or even death. The possible outcomes of this game 
but rather want to reach an understanding. However, they are only prepared
to compromise on their own terms. In this situation, negotiations may result in
stagnation caused by endless disagreements, because parties behave compe-
titively. Outcomes tend to be short-lived and non-consensual. In game theory,
the game that is usually associated with this configuration and outcome is the
Prisoners’ Dilemma;28
- Problem solving, that is a situation in which parties are prepared to seek
“alternatives that afford the highest joint outcome” (McClintock 1972: 447,
as cited by Scharpf 1998: 55). The danger here is that in time the co-operative
definition of their mutual interest may be jeopardised if the outcomes of the
negotiations are consistently unevenly distributed and the party which is in a
weaker position bears most of the costs, while there is no provision for some form
of ‘taking it in turns’ or compensation by other means. In game theory, the
game associated with this configuration and outcome is Battle of the Sexes.29
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are: one actor wins, the other actor loses; the game ends in a draw (both actors divert or collide)
(Braun 1999: 199; see also Tsebelis 1990; Scharpf 1998).
In terms of negotiations on incomes policy the outcomes are:
social partners clash and both lose (that is, both are not able to realise their agendas);
one of the social partners changes style of decision-making so the other is able to dictate terms (that
is, can realise their agenda);
the government intervenes and manages to stop the game (that is, either imposes a binding measure
on both, or succeeds in having both partners to change their style of decision-making).
28. The Prisoners’ Dilemma describes the situation in which two prisoners are faced with the choice to
speak out or to remain silent. To remain silent is the best option for both actors. Usually, both will
probably speak, the second best option. The worst option for them is to remain silent while the other
speaks (Braun 1999: 49 ff., 189 ff.; see also Tsebelis 1990; Scharpf 1998).
In terms of negotiations on incomes policy the Prisoners’ Dilemma means that individually the
preferred option for each partner is to hold on to their own agenda as long as possible. But as that
may lead to protracted negotiations and costly deadlocks, social partners usually will settle for the
second best option: compromise. From the point of view of minimising losses, this is actually the
best option. The government may be instrumental in getting social partners to this option by either
forcing or enticing them to compromise.
29. Battle of the Sexes describes a game in which two actors do want to engage in a common activity
together, but they want different activities. Scharpf (1998) uses the example of a couple that would
like to go out together for the evening. But he wants to go to a ball game and she wants to go to the opera
(see also Tsebelis 1990). Assuming they care for each other, the possible outcomes of this game are:
- they go out separately (least preferred option for both);
- they go to the other’s choice (one preferred option, one second best option);
- they go out to each preferred option in turn (repeated co-operative game).
In terms of negotiations on incomes policy the outcomes are:
- no agreement is reached, partners go their separate ways (least preferred option);
- an agreement is reached favouring either one of the partners (one preferred, one second best option);
- partners agree to ‘take it in turns’ (repeated co-operative game).
The government may be instrumental in getting social partners to conclude an agreement, either
favouring one, or in the form of taking it in turns. 
Hence the expectation that in real life negotiation processes we may find an
alternation between competition (confrontation or bargaining) and co-operation
(problem solving). Or, to put it in terms of the games described above, we may
expect to find alternations between Chicken, the Prisoners’ Dilemma and Battle
of the Sexes, both during the annual negotiations and over time.30
The following three ideal types of styles of decision-making can be opera-
tionalised:
A = Confrontation The agendas of trade unions and employers’ or-
ganisations differ substantially. There is hardly any
common ground to reach agreement. Negotiations
may be characterised by defection (from nego-
tiations) and open conflicts (like strikes, lockouts
and the like) between trade unions and employers’
organisations. Fundamentally both actors put their
own (self)interest first.
B = Bargaining The agendas of trade unions and employers’ or-
ganisations feature the same issues and concerns,
but with differing emphases with regard to desired
solutions and policies. Negotiations may be pro-
tracted, quite conflictual, and result in deadlocks.
Parties may threaten to defect, but will avoid actual
defection. Fundamentally both actors’ rational in-
terests make it difficult to come to an agreement.
C = Problem solving The agendas of trade unions and employers’ orga-
nisations feature the same issues and concerns and
share enough common ground with regard to
desired solutions and policies that there is a basis
for exchange and compromise. Negotiations may
nevertheless be characterised by temporary dead-
locks or even long duration, but parties will con-
tinue to strive for the best joint optimal outcome.
Fundamentally both actors have one or more shared
interests that induce them to come to an agreement.
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30. The games mentioned above will not be used for a game-theoretical explanation of the behaviour of
social partners in term of their strategies. My aim is use these games to describe the interactions of
social partners (based on their strategies) and the results of these interactions (see chapters 4, 5, and 6).
Above I have argued that a strategy (or policy) involves goals (Kuypers) and
ways to reach those goals: confrontation, bargaining or problem-solving (Scharpf).
The goals of trade unions and employers’ organisation can be found in their re-
spective agendas for the annual negotiations on wages and other terms of em-
ployment. The way they want to reach their goal can be discerned from the styles
of decision-making they choose. However, Scharpf has shown that in fact during
annual negotiations all three styles of decision-making may occur, depending on
the situation, recent history and perceptions of the future (Scharpf 1987; 1998).
Although both trade unions and employers’ organisations need an agreement to
reach their goals, this agreement can in practice be reached in various ways. This
agreement is what Shepsle (1997: 283, 284) defines as a ‘structure induced equi-
librium’. Whether that Central Agreement is also the ‘core’, that is the agree-
ment that is preferred by both actors above all other alternatives, depends on the
measure of correspondence between the preferences of the social partners as
included in their respective agendas, and the effects of that agreement in terms
of actual outcome (see chapter 6).
In other words, the strategy of the trade unions and the employers’ organisations
is derived from their respective agendas. This strategy in turn determines the
chosen style of decision-making. Following Scharpf (1987, 1998), the three
styles of decision-making can be taken as a rank order of strategies that ranges
from open confrontation, through bargaining, to problem solving. During nego-
tiations, trade unions and employers’ organisations may employ different strate-
gies, resulting in different styles of decision-making. If that is the case, a number
of combinations are possible.
When both parties opt for the same style of decision-making, the resulting style
of decision-making poses no problem. However, a combination of styles in
which one of the parties opts for confrontation (A) and the other for either bar-
gaining (B) or problem solving (C) will always result in a situation of confron-
tation, because one of the parties puts its (self) interest first and refuses to co-
operate. The party that opts for confrontation (A) is in a better position than the
party that opts for bargaining (B) or problem solving (C) to influence the terms
of the final agreement, if an agreement is reached at all.
A combination of styles in which one of the parties opts for problem solving (C)
and the other for bargaining (B) will always result in a situation of bargaining,
because one of the parties is intent upon resolving the differences between
parties, and the other party is not bent on confrontation. The party that opts for
bargaining (B) is in a better position than the party that opts for problem solving
(C) to influence the terms of the final agreement (see Table 3.4 and Appendix).
3.3.3 Government strategy and styles of decision-making: process and outcome
Government, and trade unions and employers’ organisations, have various strate-
70
gies and styles of decision-making at their disposal with which to conduct the
annual negotiations on incomes policy. They may also change their strategy and
style of decision-making during the annual bargaining process on incomes policy.
In other words, it is a dynamic process until concluded in some form or other.
This means that in every cycle of negotiations 4x3 options are available and that
any possible combination thereof can be accounted for, based on the (changes in)
strategy and style of decision-making employed by the actors involved. But not
only changes in strategy and style of decision-making can be accounted for, the
same goes also for consistent government strategies and styles of decision-
making. As an instrument of analysis it is therefore suitable both for investi-
gating variation during the process of negotiations on incomes policy across time
and across systems. The Appendix lists the annual process and outcomes of ne-
gotiations on incomes policy in the Netherlands between 1965 and 2000 in terms
of combinations of government strategies and styles of decision-making of trade
unions and employers’ organisations. Table 3.4 shows the possible combinations.
Government strategies II (co-operative) and III (congruent) represent a neo-
corporatist government incomes policy. Styles of decision-making may range
from confrontation to problem solving. 
Cells IIA and IIIA represent steps in the bargaining process or outcomes in which
government pursues a neo-corporatist strategy, but trade unions and employers’
organisations opt for confrontation. Notwithstanding the government’s neo-
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corporatist strategy, the outcome in terms of concluding an agreement on in-
comes policy is not successful (see below).
Cells IIB and IIIB represent steps in the bargaining process or outcomes in
which the government pursues a neo-corporatist strategy and trade unions and
employers’ organisations are willing to bargain. Although the government’s
strategy is neo-corporatist, the outcomes in terms of concluding an agreement on
incomes policy may not always be successful (see below).
Cells IIC and IIIC represent steps in the bargaining process or outcomes in which
the government pursues a neo-corporatist strategy, and trade unions and em-
ployers’ organisations are most co-operative. In this situation, the outcome in
terms of concluding an agreement on incomes policy is usually successful (see
below). In other words, in case of a neo-corporatist government strategy, the out-
come in terms of an agreement on incomes policy is determined by the style of
decision-making of trade unions and employers’ organisations.
Government strategies I and IV, the passive and the guiding strategy respectively,
are not neo-corporatist. Cells IA, IB and IC cover those situations in which the
government remains passive in the bargaining process or in the outcome,
regardless of the chosen style of decision-making by trade unions and em-
ployers’ organisations. Cell IC may seem to signify a neo-corporatist incomes
policy from the perspective of styles of decision-making. Trade unions and
employers’ organisations display a high degree of co-operation with each other
(see for instance Lehmbruch 1979; and also Armingeon 1983; Curtis 1987;
Braun 1989; Cox 1989; Wolinetz 1989; and Kurzer 1991). However, from the
perspective of neo-corporatism as a government strategy it is not a neo-corpo-
ratist incomes policy. This cell represents steps in the bargaining process or
outcomes that can both also occur in a pluralist setting. It is ‘quasi neo-cor-
poratist’. The main point is that the government does not have any neo-cor-
poratist intention. The government, who is the necessary third party for a neo-
corporatist incomes policy31, leaves incomes policy completely to trade unions
and employers’ organisations. And trade unions and employers’ organisations
happen to co-operate with each other and come to an agreement.
Cells IVA, IVB, and IVC cover the situations in which the government imposes
its own incomes policy package in bargaining process or outcome, regardless of
the style of decision-making employed by trade unions and employers’ organi-
sations. Cell IVC represents an example of what may be called ‘corporativism’,
otherwise also known as ‘state led’ or ‘authoritarian corporatism’ (Schmitter
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31. See chapter 2, section 2.4 and for instance Katzenstein 1985; Keman 1985; Czada 1987; Lehner
1987; Armingeon 1994; Keman and Pennings 1995; Teulings and Hartog 1998; Hartog 1999; Jones
1999; Keman 1999; Hoogenboom and van Vliet 2000; Molina and Rhodes 2002; and van Waarden
2002.
1979, 1997). The main point is again that the government does not have any neo-
corporatist intention. The government imposes its own incomes policy on trade
unions and employers’ organisations. And trade unions and employers’ organi-
sations happen to agree on that policy, or to comply with that policy without any
resistance.
Based on this discussion of Table 3.4 I contend that a ‘Polder Model’ that em-
phasises co-operation between social partners (see chapter 2, section 2.3) is located
in the problem solving style of decision-making (C). In addition, the government
strategy must be of the neo-corporatist variety - co-operative (II) or congruent
(III) -, as it is supposed to support or facilitate this co-operation in order to
enhance performance. As explained above, the main point used in the definition
of the behaviour of the actors in terms of strategies is their intention. The
behaviour of the actors involved is not defined in terms of the outcome of that
behaviour, that is in terms of whether or not they arrived at an agreement or not.
Therefore, when I discuss the ‘Polder Model’ in this study, I specifically refer to
outcomes represented by cells IIC and IIIC.
As an instrument of analysis, four possible government strategies and three
possible styles of decision-making that can be employed by trade unions and
employers’ organisations have been identified. Research question 1, referring to
Dutch incomes policy as the outcome of neo-corporatist government strategies,
can be answered with this tool. The agendas of government, trade unions and
employers’ organisations have been established. These agendas, combined with
the institutional setting and sequence of the annual bargaining process on in-
comes policy, determine their strategies and styles of decision-making. Govern-
ment strategy, style of decision-making and their interaction determine the out-
come of the annual process of negotiations on incomes policy in terms of a neo-
corporatist outcome or not. 
The neo-corporatist outcomes may be defined as the outcomes in which the
government seeks to facilitate trade unions and employers’ organisations to find
a ‘structure induced equilibrium’ or Central Agreement that also represents the
‘core’ “in the sense that no other alternative, allowed by the rules of procedure,
is preferred by” the participating three actors (Shepsle 1997: 283, 284). The sub-
stance of the outcome can be explained in terms of a reordering of the lists of
needs of each actor that is expressed in their respective agendas. The government
is the pivotal actor in this neo-corporatist process of reordering (Keman 1999:
262, 264-265; see also Molina and Rhodes 2002: 316-318). Whether the Central
Agreement representing the ‘structure induced equilibrium’ is also conducive to
approaching the ‘core’, will be derived from the measure of congruence between
the preferences of the actors involved and the actual outcome (see chapter 6).
That is not to say that neo-corporatist outcomes in terms of government strategy
are necessarily successful in terms of agreements on incomes policy. It may turn
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out to be impossible to arrive at an agreement, despite all efforts made by the
government. In terms of agreements on incomes policy, there are only four
outcomes feasible. The first outcome is a bipartite Central Agreement between
trade unions and employers’ organisations. The second outcome is a tripartite
Central Agreement between the government, trade unions and employers’ or-
ganisations. The third outcome is no Central Agreement. And the last outcome
is a government directed or imposed incomes policy. 
That means that as a typology Table 3.4 is exhaustive; all possible combinations
across time (and systems) can be accounted for. However, unlike a typology, the
various categories are empirically not mutually exclusive. The four outcomes in
terms of agreements on incomes policy may be reached through a variety of
stages and outcomes of the bargaining process, thereby showing both the process
and variation over time (see Appendix). 
A bipartite Central Agreement between trade unions and employers’ organisa-
tions can be the outcome of various combinations of government strategies and
styles of decision-making of trade unions and employers’ organisations.
• IB and IC: the government remains passive in the bargaining process or
outcome, and trade unions and employers’ organisations succeed in reaching
a Central Agreement;
• IIB and IIC: in the bargaining process the government facilitates negotiations
between trade unions and employers’ organisations who then come to a
Central Agreement; an outcome that is supported by the government.
A tripartite Central Agreement between the government and trade unions and
employers’ organisations can also be the outcome of various combinations of
government strategies and styles of decision-making.
• IIIB and IIIC: the government is actively involved as a third party in nego-
tiations on incomes policy (bargaining process) and succeeds in formulating
a policy package that accommodates all three actors involved (outcome).
It is also possible that in the end no Central Agreement on incomes policy can
be reached.
• IA and IB: the government remains passive in the bargaining process or out-
come and trade unions and employers’ organisations are bent on confron-
tation (A), or negotiations bog down in a deadlock (B);
• IIA and IIIA: in the bargaining process the government tries to facilitate ne-
gotiations between trade unions and employers’ organisations (II), or the
government is actively involved in negotiations as a third party (III); but
despite these efforts, trade unions and employers’ organisations are bent on
confrontation (A) and the outcome is that no Central Agreement is reached;
• IIB and IIIB: in the bargaining process the government tries to facilitate ne-
gotiations between trade unions and employers’ organisations (II), or the
government is actively involved in negotiations as a third party (III); but
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despite these efforts, negotiations between trade unions and employers’ orga-
nisations bog down in a deadlock and the outcome is that no Central Agree-
ment is reached.
Finally, a government directed or imposed incomes policy (IV), can also be the
outcome of various combinations of government strategies and styles of
decision-making.
• IVA, IVB, and IVC: regardless of the style of decision-making of trade unions
and employers’ organisations, the government imposes its own policy package
during the bargaining process and on the outcome.
Nevertheless, with this instrument of analysis, that is used to research the re-
spective agendas, the annual negotiations (process) and the outcomes, research
question 1 can be answered, as all possible stages in the process of negotiations
and all possible outcomes can be accounted for, be they neo-corporatist or not
(see Appendix). With this instrument neo-corporatist government strategies that
fail in terms of Central Agreements can be detected as well. The same goes for
co-operative styles of decision-making of trade unions and employers’ organi-
sations that can go together with non-neo-corporatist government strategies.
Lastly, with this instrument, it is also possible to avoid ‘Dutch-centrist’ explana-
tions of Dutch incomes policy and to compare the formation and implementation
of Dutch incomes policy to that of other countries. That makes this tool also an
eminently suitable instrument of analysis for investigating processes of nego-
tiations on incomes policy across time and across countries.
Research question 2 refers to the effectiveness of Dutch incomes policy in terms
of the agendas of the actors involved and will be treated in chapter 6. The annual
outcomes of the process of negotiations on incomes policy in terms of Central
Agreements provide the answer to this research question. The effectiveness of
Dutch incomes policy is first analysed in terms of Central Agreements. The issue
is, first, whether or not a neo-corporatist incomes policy (research question 1)
does indeed show a better performance in terms of Central Agreements (‘structure
induced equilibrium’) than a non-neo-corporatist incomes policy. The second
issue is whether or not a Central Agreement also leads to a higher measure of
congruence between the actors’ preferences and actual performance (approach-
ing the ‘core’).
3.4 Concluding remarks
In this chapter I have elaborated the research design in terms of cases and the
logic of comparison. The Dutch case is operationalised with regard to the con-
cepts developed, the period investigated, the institutions and actors involved, and
the data available. 
In Table 3.4 I have developed an analytical framework based on my previous
research (van Brakel et al 1985; see also Keman et al 1985), and on Kuypers’
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(1973, 1980a, 1980b) and Scharpf’s approaches (1987, 1998), with which it is
possible to chart both the annual process and the outcome of negotiations on
incomes policy between government, trade unions and employers’ organisations.
The framework lists the possible combinations of strategies and styles of
decision-making that can be employed by the actors involved. Thus the frame-
work can account for the essential intentions of government, trade unions and
employers’ organisations with regard to neo-corporatist practices within the
given rule system of annual negotiations on Dutch incomes policy. However, the
flexibility of the analytical framework makes it also eminently suited for inves-
tigating the process of negotiations on incomes policy in other countries. I have
therefore argued that the research approach chosen is both a valid and an in-
teresting way to investigate the research questions. 
In the next chapter I will present the main research findings of the Dutch case
study on the basis of this research design. These findings will provide an answer
to the first research question. In chapter 5 the research findings will be further
elaborated in order to substantiate the answer on research question 1 provided in
chapter 4.
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4. Main research findings of the Dutch case
In this chapter the main research findings of the Dutch case are presented. These
findings are based on the research of the strategies and styles of decision-making
of the actors involved in the annual process of negotiations on the formation and
implementation of incomes policy in the market sector as set out in chapter 3.
Both government strategies and styles of decision-making of trade unions and
employers’ organisations have been analysed by means of ‘thick’ description of the
annual process of negotiations on incomes policy between 1965 and 2000. The data,
that is, the description of process and outcome can be found in the Appendix.
The findings provide the information needed to answer the first research question:
Can neo-corporatism, defined as a government strategy for conflict regu-
lation, offer a plausible explanation for the formation and implementation of
Dutch incomes policy between 1965 and 2000?
I shall first discuss the opening government strategies and styles of decision-
making of trade unions and employers’ organisations. Next I shall discuss the
concluding government strategies and styles of decision-making. Lastly I shall
discuss the sequence of changes in both government strategy and style of de-
cision-making of trade unions and employers’ organisations. This discussion across
time and across cases will provide the answer to the first research question. 
The main research findings show that the answer to the first research question is
affirmative. Neo-corporatism as a government strategy for conflict regulation
does offer a plausible explanation of Dutch incomes policy between 1965 and
2000. But neo-corporatism varied over time and was dependent on external
circumstances that influenced the government’s room to manoeuvre (see chapter
5 for a discussion of these external circumstances).
Neo-corporatism as a government strategy for conflict regulation also matters as
it diminished conflict between social partners. Less conflict between social part-
ners, however, did not necessarily result in more agreements. Although the
‘structure induced’ social partners to less conflict, this did not result in more
‘equilibria’ or Central Agreements (see Shepsle 1997: 283, 284 and chapter 3).
Whether these Central Agreements also approached the ‘core’, that is, came close
to the alternative that is preferred by all three actors above all other alternatives,
will be discussed in chapter 6.
As stated, the government strategies II (co-operative) and III (congruent) are con-
sidered to be neo-corporatist government strategies. The government strategies I
(passive) and IV (guiding) are considered to be non-neo-corporatist strategies
(see chapter 3, sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.3). The style of decision-making of trade
unions and employers’ organisations may range from confrontation (A: Chicken),
via bargaining (B: Prisoners’Dilemma), to problem solving (C: Battle of the Sexes),
or vice versa. In the case of a neo-corporatist government strategy, the style of
decision-making determines the outcome, in terms of co-operation between so-
cial partners and of concluding a Central Agreement on incomes policy.
The non-neo-corporatist government strategies I (passive) and IV (guiding) can-
not produce a neo-corporatist incomes policy, regardless of the style of decision-
making. There are, however, two combinations of strategy and style that merit
some further elaboration (see also chapter 3, Table 3.4 in section 3.3.3). Firstly,
the combination of the passive government strategy (I) and the problem solving
style of decision-making (C). This may seem to signify a neo-corporatist in-
comes policy from the point of view of styles of decision-making. But from the
point of view of neo-corporatism as a government strategy it is not. It is either
part of a sequence of strategies and styles within the annual process of negotia-
tions on incomes policy, or an outcome of that process, that can both also occur
in a pluralist setting. The main point is that the government does not have neo-
corporatist intentions, but leaves incomes policy completely to social partners,
who happen to come to an agreement.
The same holds true for the other combination: the guiding government strategy
(IV) and the problem solving style of decision-making (C). This combination
may be labelled as a variety of ‘corporativism’, ‘state led corporatism’, or ‘autho-
ritarian corporatism’ (Schmitter 1979, 1997), but it is not considered as a neo-
corporatist incomes policy. Again, the main point is that the government does not
have a neo-corporatist intention, but imposes its own incomes policy on social
partners, who happen to agree on that policy, or comply with that policy.
4.1 Opening government strategies and styles of decision-making
The annual process of negotiations on the formation and implementation of
incomes policy starts with the actors producing their agendas and taking a stand
with respect to strategy and style of decision-making to start the process of
negotiations. Below I shall first discuss the government strategies with which the
annual process of negotiations on incomes policy was started. Then I shall
discuss the styles of decision-making. 
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Table 4.1 lists the opening strategies and styles of decision-making during the
annual process of negotiations on incomes policy between 1965 and 2000. Figures
4.1 and 4.2 show the frequencies of opening strategy and style of decision-making.
From Table 4.1 and Figures 4.1 and 4.2, it is clear that in a majority of the years,
the government’s opening strategy was neo-corporatist (II+III). In 23 of the 36
years, or in 63.8% of the cases, the government’s opening strategy was either co-
operative (II: 44.4%) or congruent (III: 19.4%). However, in 13 years (36.2%)
the government’s opening strategy was non-neo-corporatist (I+IV). In five years
(13.9%) it was the passive strategy (I), and in eight years (22.2%) it was the
guiding strategy (IV). Hence, in 31 years (86.1%) the government was actively
seeking and suggesting solutions (for incomes policy) at the start of the
negotiations on incomes policy (II+III+IV). 
With respect to the style of decision-making it is striking that in 33 of the 36
years (91.6%) the opening style was of the competitive variety (Scharpf 1998):
confrontation (A: 15 years - 41.7%) or bargaining (B: 18 years - 50.0%). In only
three years (8.3%) the opening style was of the co-operative variety: problem
solving (C). Whether or not symbolic (Klamer 1991), this implies that conflict
rather than consensus is the point of departure for social partners in putting
forward their preferences, since only three times consensus was the start of
negotiations. 
Apparently, the fact that there is tri-partite consultation does not imply that the
existence of institutions of centralised bargaining on incomes policy between
government, trade unions and employers’ organisations in itself is a sufficient con-
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Table 4.1: Crosstabulation opening government strategy and style of decision-making of trade
unions and employers’ organisations 1965 – 2000
Opening  government strategyOpening style of
decision-making I:
Passive
II:
Co-operative
III:
Congruent
IV:
Guiding
Total
A:
Confrontation
2
5.6%
6
16.7%
3
8.3%
4
11.1%
15
41.7%
B:
Bargaining
2
5.6%
9
25.0%
3
8.3%
4
11.1%
18
50.0%
C:
Problem solving
1
2.8%
1
2.8%
1
2.8%
0
0%
3
8.3%
Total 5
13.9%
16
44.4%
7
19.4%
8
22.2%
36
100%
Note: Chi-Square is 2.336. This shows that there is no statistically significant relationship between opening
government strategy and opening style of decision-making.  Percentages represent proportion of total N=36.
Numbers relate to the number of years.
Source: Appendix I.
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Figure 4.2: Frequency opening style of decision-making of trade unions and employers’
organisations 1965 – 2000
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Figure 4.1: Frequency opening government strategy 1965 - 2000
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dition for neo-corporatism, as some researchers have claimed (see for instance
Schmitter 1979; Wilson 1990; Western 1991). The research also shows that in-
stitutionalisation of industrial relations is not a sufficient condition for con-
sensus or co-operation between social partners either, at least not at the start of
the process of negotiations on incomes policy (as for instance Lehmbruch 1979;
Marks 1986; Wolinetz 1989; and Kurzer 1991 assumed). Conversely, active govern-
ment involvement at the start of negotiations on incomes policy in itself cannot
be taken as an indication for declining neo-corporatism (as for instance Curtis
1987; Wolinetz 1990; and Kurzer 1991 did).
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 and Figures 4.3 and 4.4 also show that at least as far as the opening
government strategy is concerned, active government involvement is an important
feature of negotiations on Dutch incomes policy throughout the whole period.
And these tables and figures show that in a majority of the years the government
starts its involvement with a neo-corporatist strategy. This supports the view of
those researchers who regard the government to be a crucial partner in Dutch
macroeconomic policy co-ordination (see for instance Teulings and Hartog 1998;
Keman 1999, 2000; Siaroff 1999; van Sinderen 2000; van Waarden 2002; Molina
and Rhodes 2002 - see also chapter 2 and chapter 3) as well as my own contention.
The observed lack of co-operation between social partners at the start of nego-
tiations on incomes policy during the whole period 1965 and 2000 is in agree-
ment with the findings of Dutch researchers that discussed the changes in the
Dutch system of industrial relations and centralised bargaining in the 1960s and
1970s in terms of a development from consensus or harmony in the 1950s to
conflict and polarisation in the 1960s and 1970s (see for instance Akkermans and
Grootings 1979; Nobelen 1983; Arendsen and Geul 1983; Albeda and ten Hove
1986). Figures 4.5 and 4.6 show that conflict and polarisation, at least at the start
of negotiations on incomes policy, continued in the 1980s and 1990s as well. 
However, a confrontational style of decision-making (A: Chicken)) between social
partners at the start of negotiations on incomes policy is only part of the story on
changes in Dutch industrial relations. The important question is whether in the
institutionalised process of negotiations on incomes policy confrontation can be
reduced and consensus can be achieved. Or, to put it in other words, whether
social partners can reach an ‘equilibrium’, that is, an agreement (see chapter 3
and chapter 6).
The lack of co-operation between social partners at the start of negotiations on
incomes policy was not limited to the 1960s and 1970s; it continued in the 1980s
and 1990s. This is a remarkable result. Above I have shown that in a majority of
the years, both before 1983 and after 1982, the government started its involve-
ment in negotiations on incomes policy with a neo-corporatist strategy. Social
partners on the other hand started their involvement with a competitive style of
decision-making (confrontation (A: Chicken)) or bargaining (B: Prisoners’Dilemma)).
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Table 4.2: Annual opening government strategy and style of decision-making of trade unions
and employers’ organisations 1965 – 2000
Opening government strategy Opening style of decision-making
Year I:
Passive
II:
Co-
operative
III:
Congruent
IV:
Guiding
A:
Confrontation
B:
Bargaining
C:
Problem
solving
Strategy
plus
style
1965 III A IIIA
1966 I B IB
1967 IV B IVB
1968 IV B IVB
1969 IV A IVA
1970 II C IIC
1971 IV B IVB
1972 II A IIA
1973 II B IIB
1974 II A IIA
1975 II B IIB
1976 II A IIA
1977 II B IIB
1978 II A IIA
1979 IV A IVA
1980 II B IIB
1981 III A IIIA
1982 I B IB
1983 III A IIIA
1984 I C IC
1985 IV B IVB
1986 I A IA
1987 III B IIIB
1988 II A IIA
1989 II B IIB
1990 III C IIIC
1991 IV A IVA
1992 I A IA
1993 III B IIIB
1994 IV A IVA
1995 II A IIA
1996 II B IIB
1997 II B IIB
1998 II B IIB
1999 III B IIIB
2000 II B IIB
Total 5 16 7 8 15 18 3 36
Source: Appendix I.
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Figure 4.3: Frequency opening government strategy 1965 – 1982
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Figure 4.4: Frequency opening government strategy 1983 - 2000
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Figure 4.5: Frequency opening style of decision-making of trade unions and employers’
organisations 1965 – 1982
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Figure 4.6: Frequency opening style of decision-making of trade unions and employers’
organisations 1983 – 2000
SDMSTART
SDMSTART
CBA
F
re
q
u
e
n
c
y
10
8
6
4
2
0
Apparently, social partners have to find an ‘equilibrium’ between them first,
before negotiations and consultations with the government can effectively begin.
The argument, therefore, that the Dutch ‘Miracle’ is due to the ‘Wassenaar Agree-
ment’ (1983) between trade unions and employers’ organisations that was adhered
to during the 1980s and 1990s (Visser and Hemerijck 1997; Hemerijck and Visser
2000), is not supported by the opening styles of decision-making of trade unions
and employers’ organisations in that period. In seven years between 1983 and
2000, the opening style of decision-making was the confrontational style (A:
Chicken)), in nine years it was the bargaining style (B: Prisoners’ Dilemma), and
in only two years (1984, 1990)32 it was the problem solving style (C: Battle of
the Sexes). Notwithstanding the ‘Wassenaar Agreement’, social partners were
apparently prepared for some tough negotiations on incomes policy in the fol-
lowing years. They did not rule out confrontation from the start. This can be
understood as a kind of ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’: social partners apparently need in-
formation or guidance (by government intervention) to be able to transform into
a more co-operative style (Scharpf 1998: 54-57).
To sum up, Tables 4.1 and 4.2, and Figures 4.1 - 4.6, show that the conceptuali-
sation and subsequent operationalisation of government strategies and styles of
decision-making that is used in this research are indeed capable of detecting changes
and variations in neo-corporatism over time in terms of opening government
strategies and styles of decision-making in negotiations on incomes policy. More-
over, they show that an operationalisation of neo-corporatism as merely the existence
of formal institutions of centralised bargaining cannot sufficiently account for the
actions of the actors within those institutions (see for example Schmitter 1979;
Wilson 1990; Western 1991). The research shows that even within ‘neo-corpo-
ratist’ institutions, government, trade unions and employers’ organisations can and
do employ non-neo-corporatist strategies and competitive styles of decision-ma-
king. In particular, the research shows that assumed outcomes of neo-corpora-
tism in terms of consensus and co-operation between trade unions and em-
ployers’ organisations in the formal institutions does not adequately capture the
actual behaviour of social partners at the start of the annual process of nego-
tiations on incomes policy (see also Siaroff 1999; Molina and Rhodes 2002). The
opening game that is actually played is a ‘nested’ one (Tsebelis 1990): in a ma-
jority of the years the government’s opening game is a re-iterative one (neo-cor-
poratism); however, within this repeated game, the social partners often open
with a one-shot-game of Chicken or Prisoners’ Dilemma (competition: A and B).
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32. In 1984, incomes policy in the market sector was still covered by the bipartite ‘Wassenaar Agree-
ment’ of 1983. The agreement involved an exchange of the price indexation for a reduction in
working hours. In 1990, immediately at the start of negotiations on incomes policy, parties agreed
to a tripartite Central Agreement, the ‘Joint Policy Framework’ (Gemeenschappelijk Beleidskader).
This is an important observation. It shows an interaction between government
strategy and style of decision-making of trade unions and employers’ organi-
sations. It also shows that government apparently defines the room to manoeuvre
for social partners. And it shows that trade unions and employers’ organisations
rather play a game by waiting and ‘hiding’ their preferences. As a repeated game
it seems institutionalised, as a one-shot game it looks driven by short term in-
terests. How can this be transformed into a consensual game? This is the object
of the analysis of concluding government strategies and styles of decision-
making in this study.
4.2 Concluding government strategies and styles of decision-making
During the annual process of negotiations on the formation and implementation
of incomes policy, both government and trade unions and employers’ organisa-
tions can and sometimes do change their strategy. This outcome of the process is
represented by a final combination of government strategy and style of decision-
making of trade unions and employers’ organisations. Below I shall first discuss
the outcomes of the annual process of negotiations on the formation and implemen-
tation of incomes policy in terms of the concluding government strategy. Then I
shall discuss the outcomes in terms of the concluding style of decision-making
of trade unions and employers’ organisations. I will conclude with a discussion
of the outcomes in terms of the specific combination of government strategy and
style of decision-making of trade unions and employers’ organisations in view of
my conceptualisation of neo-corporatism.
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Table 4.3: Crosstabulation concluding government strategy and style of decision-making of
trade unions and employers’ organisations 1965 – 2000
Concluding  government strategyConcluding
style of
decision-making
I:
Passive
II:
Co-operative
III:
Congruent
IV:
Guiding
Total
A:
Confrontation
4
11.1%
4
11.1%
0
0%
2
5.6%
10
27.8%
B:
Bargaining
2
5.6%
9
25.0%
4
11.1%
6
16.7%
21
58.3%
C:
Problem solving
2
5.6%
1
2.8%
1
2.8%
1
2.8%
5
13.9%
Total 8
22.2%
14
38.9%
5
13.9%
9
25.0%
36
100%
Note: Chi-Square is 6.387. This shows that there is no statistically significant relationship between concluding
government strategy and concluding style of decision-making. Percentages represent proportion of total N=36.
Numbers relate to the number of years.
Source: Appendix I.
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Table 4.3 lists the concluding government strategies and styles of decision-ma-
king of the annual process of negotiations on incomes policy between 1965 and
2000. Figures 4.7 and 4.8 show the frequencies of concluding government strate-
gies and styles of decision-making.
Table 4.3 and Figure 4.7 show that during the whole period, in only eight years
(I: 22.2%), the process of negotiations on the formation and implementation of
incomes policy ended in an outcome in which the government finally refrained
from any further intervention in incomes policy. In 28 years, the government
remained actively involved in the process of negotiations on incomes policy one
way or the other until the very end (II+III+IV: 77.8%).
In 19 of the 36 years between 1965 and 2000, that is, in 52.8% of the cases, the
process of negotiations on incomes policy ended with the government pursuing
a neo-corporatist strategy (II + III). In 14 years that was a co-operative strategy
(II: 38.9%), and in five years a congruent strategy (III: 13.9%).
In 17 of the 36 years, however, that is, in 47.2% of the cases, the process of nego-
tiations on the formation and implementation on incomes policy ended with the
government pursuing a non-neo-corporatist strategy (I and IV). In eight years that
was a passive strategy (I: 22.2%). In nine years that was a guiding strategy (IV:
25%).
Table 4.3 and Figure 4.8 show the concluding styles of decision-making between
1965 and 2000. It is striking that in 10 years the process of negotiations on in-
comes policy still ended with the confrontational style of decision-making (A or
Chicken: 27.8%). In 21 years the process ended with the bargaining style of
decision-making (B or Prisoners’ Dilemma: 58.3%). And in five years with the pro-
blem solving style (C or Battle of the Sexes: 13.9%).
As with opening government strategies and styles of decision-making, tri-partite
consultation with respect to concluding government strategies and styles of de-
cision-making does not imply that the existence of formal institutions of centra-
lised bargaining on incomes policy between government, trade unions and em-
ployers’ organisations is a sufficient condition for neo-corporatism (as Schmitter
1979; Wilson 1990; and Western 1991 assumed). The research also shows that for-
mal institutionalisation is not a sufficient condition for consensus or co-opera-
tion between social partners either; not at the start, nor at the conclusion of the
process of negotiations on incomes policy (as for instance Lehmbruch 1979;
Marks 1986; Wolinetz 1989; and Kurzer 1991 assumed). In addition, an active
government involvement at the end of negotiations on incomes policy is no more
an indication for declining neo-corporatism as it is at the start (as for instance
Curtis 1987; Wolinetz 1990; and Kurzer 1991 stated).
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 also show that at least as far as the concluding government
strategy is concerned, active government involvement remained an important
feature of negotiations on Dutch incomes policy throughout the whole period.
Figure 4.7: Frequency concluding government strategy 1965 – 2000
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Figure 4.8: Frequency concluding style of decision-making of trade unions and employers’
organisations 1965 – 2000
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Table 4.4: Annual concluding government strategy and style of decision-making of trade
unions and employers’ organisations 1965 - 2000
Concluding government strategy Concluding style of decision-
making
Year I:
Passive
II:
Co-
operative
III:
Congruent
IV:
Guiding
A:
Confrontation
B:
Bargaining
C:
Problem
solving
Strategy
plus
style
1965 III B IIIB
1966 IV B IVB
1967 IV B IVB
1968 I B IB
1969 IV A IVA
1970 IV C IVC
1971 I A IA
1972 I A IA
1973 II A IIA
1974 IV B IVB
1975 II B IIB
1976 IV B IVB
1977 II B IIB
1978 II B IIB
1979 II A IIA
1980 IV B IVB
1981 IV A IVA
1982 IV B IVB
1983 I C IC
1984 I C IC
1985 I B IB
1986 I A IA
1987 III B IIIB
1988 II A IIA
1989 II B IIB
1990 III B IIIB
1991 II B IIB
1992 I A IA
1993 III B IIIB
1994 II C IIC
1995 II A IIA
1996 II B IIB
1997 II B IIB
1998 II B IIB
1999 III C IIIC
2000 II B IIB
Total 8 14 5 9 10 21 5 36
Source: Appendix I.
And in a majority of the years the government ended its involvement with a neo-
corporatist strategy. This again supports the view of those researchers who re-
gard the government to be a crucial partner in Dutch macroeconomic policy co-or-
dination (see for instance Teulings and Hartog 1998; Keman 1999, 2000; Siaroff
1999; van Sinderen 2000; van Waarden 2002; Molina and Rhodes 2002 - see
also chapter 2 and chapter 3) as well as my own contention.
Table 4.4 lists the concluding government strategy and style of decision-making
over time. Obviously, the distribution of the annual outcomes as a concluding re-
sult shows that strategies and styles of decision-making do vary considerably across
time. The concluding non-neo-corporatist guiding (IV) government strategy pre-
dominated before 1983. The bargaining (B: Prisoners’ Dilemma) style of decision-
making remained dominant during the whole period. The combination of the
non-neo-corporatist guiding (IV) strategy with the bargaining (B) style of deci-
sion-making was clearly the dominant game before 1983. The combination of the
neo-corporatist co-operative (II) government strategy with the bargaining (B)
style of decision-making apparently became the dominant game after 1982.
In the mid 1970s, the aim of the government’s neo-corporatist strategies was to
bring trade unions and employers’ organisations to conclude Central Agreements
in order to overcome the effects of the oil crisis of 1973. When these attempts
proved unsuccessful, the government took over incomes policy with the non-
neo-corporatist guiding (IV) strategy. After 1986, the aim of neo-corporatist
government intervention in the annual process of negotiations on incomes policy
was again to bring trade unions and employers’ organisations to conclude Central
Agreements. 
After 1986, governments did not revert to the non-neo-corporatist guiding (IV)
strategy when agreement proved difficult, because in 1986, the Law on Wage
Formation was amended. From 1987 onwards, government intervention in in-
comes policy in the market sector was only allowed in case of a national emer-
gency caused by external factors (see chapter 3, section 3.2.3). Trade unions and
employers’ organisations now had ample room to manoeuvre to pursue their in-
terests in the market sector. However, because the market sector was effectively
severed from the (semi-) public sector by the Lubbers I government since 1983
and only relinked ad hoc and on a partial basis in the 1990s (see Appendix), dis-
agreement between social partners in the market sector did not have the same
detrimental effects on the government’s expenditure and resulting budget deficit
as it had in the early 1980s. Even if the government’s neo-corporatist strategy
was not successful in bringing social partners to an agreement in the market sector,
there was no need for the government to intervene in incomes policy with binding
policy measures to prevent a negative spill-over to the (semi-) public sector. Hence
the government’s preference for a concluding neo-corporatist strategy.
In the 1960s and the early 1970s the search is on for a new system and procedure
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of free33 central negotiations on incomes policy. The concluding non-neo-cor-
poratist government strategy goes back and forth between the guiding strategy
(IV) and the passive strategy (I). Trade unions and employers’ organisations have
some difficulties to adjust to the new situation after the demise of the centrally
guided incomes policy. Their inability to reach agreements reinforced the habi-
tual tendency of governments of all persuasions to take over again the determi-
nation of incomes policy as they were used and authorised to do from 1945 until
1965. The government retained that authority in the new Law on Wage Formation
of 1968/70 as well. Only reluctantly, governments refrained from intervention in
the formation and implementation of incomes policy to give trade unions and
employers’ organisations a chance to come to an agreement.
In the first half of the 1980s, the concluding government strategy was the guiding
strategy (IV) in the period 1980 - 1982, and the passive strategy (I) in the period
1983 - 1986. In the period 1980 - 1982, the economic situation gradually worsened,
especially after the second oil crisis of 1979/80. Incomes policy from 1980 to
1982 was determined by the Van Agt I government’s policy programme Bestek
81 (Direction 81) that determined the framework for (de)central negotiations.
The programme aimed at a reduction of the rapidly increasing budget deficit. To
that effect, incomes policy in the market sector had to result in moderation.
Because of all the linking mechanisms between the market sector and the (semi-
) public sector, a moderate incomes policy in the market sector made it more
feasible to achieve moderation in the (semi-) public sector as well. This in turn
would contribute to a reduction of (the rate of increase of) the deficit. During the
whole period 1980 - 1982, trade unions and employers’ organisations were not
able to reach any central agreement, although they came quite close in 1980. The
main obstacle was their widely differing views on how to tackle the economic
problems that resulted in ever growing budget deficits. Neither party was pre-
pared to give an inch on the issue of incomes, despite efforts by the government.
In terms of game theory, social partners opted for either Chicken or the Prisoners’
Dilemma. Consequently, to reach its objective of a reduction of (the rate of in-
crease of) the deficit, government largely took over responsibility for incomes
policy in these years and in that way resolved the game.
From 1983, based on the bipartite ‘Wassenaar Agreement’ of 1982 in the market
sector, the Lubbers I government had effectively severed all linking mechanisms
between the market sector and the (semi-) public sector. Both sectors were only
relinked partially and on an ad-hoc basis in the 1990s. Consequently, the incen-
tive for the government to intervene with binding policy measures in the process
or outcome of negotiations on incomes policy in the market sector was greatly
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33. Meaning free from the government interference that was customary in the era of the centrally guided
incomes policy between 1945 and 1965 (see Appendix).
reduced after 1983. The government’s main preoccupation in those years was the
reduction of government expenditure and the budget deficit by reducing the (semi-)
public sector. Incomes policy in the market sector was largely left to social
partners (see also Hemerijck 2003: 53 ff.).
To sum up, Tables 4.3 and 4.4 and Figures 4.7 and 4.8, show that the conceptuali-
sation and subsequent operationalisation of government strategies and styles of
decision-making that is used in this research are indeed capable of detecting
changes and variations in neo-corporatism over time in terms of concluding govern-
ment strategies and styles of decision-making in negotiations on incomes policy
as well. As with opening strategies and styles, these tables and figures show that
an operationalisation of neo-corporatism as merely the existence of formal
institutions of centralised bargaining cannot sufficiently account for the actions
of the actors within these institutions. The research shows that even within for-
mal ‘neo-corporatist’ institutions, the relevant actors can and do end their inter-
actions with non-neo-corporatist government strategies and competitive styles of
decision-making, depending on external circumstances that had an impact on the
government’s room to manoeuvre and social partners’ ability to come to an agree-
ment, that is, to find an ‘equilibrium’. Assumed outcomes of neo-corporatism in
terms of consensus or co-operation between social partners in the formal insti-
tutions, therefore, cannot adequately capture their actual behaviour with which
the annual process of negotiations on incomes policy is concluded (see also chapter
5 and chapter 6).
4.3 Comparison of opening and concluding strategies and styles of decision-making
A comparison between opening and concluding strategies and styles of decision-
making - Tables 4.1 - 4.4 - shows the following results. Firstly, the difference
between opening and concluding government strategies is rather limited. In only
eight years (22.2%), the concluding government strategy differs from the opening
strategy. Secondly, the difference between opening and concluding government
strategies constitutes a change from neo-corporatist (II+III) to non-neo-corporatist
(I+IV) strategies: from an opening neo-corporatist strategy in 23 years (63.8%)
to a concluding neo-corporatist strategy in 19 years (52.8%). Non-neo-cor-
poratist government strategies increased from 13 opening strategies (36.2%) to
17 concluding (47.2%). And thirdly, this change is mainly due to the increase in
the concluding passive government strategy (I) in 1968, 1971, 1972, 1983 and
1985 (see Tables 4.4 and 4.5). That is, the process of negotiations on incomes
policy became less tri-partite and more bi-partite between 1965 and 2000. Never-
theless, as stated above, the difference between opening and concluding govern-
ment strategies is relatively small.
In the search for a new system and procedure for negotiations on incomes policy,
with great reluctance, governments sometimes refrained from intervention in the
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formation and implementation of incomes policy to give trade unions and em-
ployers’ organisations a chance to come to an agreement amongst themselves.
This was the case in 1968, 1971 and 1972. In 1983 and 1985 it was the effect of
the ‘Wassenaar Agreement’ on the exchange of the price indexation for a reduc-
tion of working hours that determined incomes policy in the market sector. The
agreement removed the pressure on the government to intervene in incomes policy
in the market sector with binding measures in order to achieve a moderation of
incomes policy. The agreement made it possible for the government to continue
its efforts to reduce government expenditure and the budget deficit by delinking
the (semi-) public sector from the market sector and subsequently cutting
expenditure in the (semi-) public sector.
With respect to the styles of decision-making, the outcome is different. In 15
years (41.7%) the opening style of decision-making was confrontational (A:
Chicken), whereas the concluding style of decision-making was confrontational
(A) in 10 years (27.8%). In 18 years (50.0%) the opening style of decision-
making was bargaining (B: Prisoners’ Dilemma), whereas the concluding style
of decision-making was bargaining (B) in 21 years (58.3%). Lastly, in only three
years (8.3%) the opening style of decision-making was problem solving (C:
Battle of the Sexes), while in five years (13.9%) the concluding style of decision-
making was of the problem solving (C) variety. During the process of nego-
tiations on incomes policy social partners became less confrontational and more
co-operative (see Table 4.6), whereas government strategy became less neo-
corporatist, due to an increase in the number of concluding passive (I)
government strategies (see Table 4.5).
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Table 4.5: Opening and concluding government strategy 1965 – 2000
Government strategy
I: Passive II: Co-operative III: Congruent IV: Guiding
Total
Opening 13.9% 44.4% 19.4% 22.2% 100%
Concluding 22.2% 38.9% 13.9% 25.0% 100%
Difference 8.3% 5.6% 5.6% 2.8%
Source: Appendix I.
Table 4.6: Opening and concluding styles of decision-making of trade unions and employers’
organisations 1965 – 2000
Style of decision-making
A: Confrontation B: Bargaining C: Problem solving
Total
Opening 41.7% 50.0%  8.3% 100%
Concluding 27.8% 58.3% 13.9% 100%
Difference 13.9% 8.3% 5.6%
Source: Appendix I.
This is an important observation. It seems to suggest that the more social part-
ners co-operate, the less governments feel compelled to intervene in the process
of negotiations on incomes policy. Or, conversely, the more confrontational
social partners behave, the more governments feel compelled to intervene in the
process of negotiations on incomes policy, be it with neo-corporatist strategies
(II+III) or with the non-neo-corporatist guiding strategy (IV). One conclusion
must be that co-operation between social partners does not necessarily lead to
more neo-corporatist government strategies and, hence, to more neo-corporatism,
as some researchers claim (cf. Lehmbruch 1979; Marks 1986; Wolinetz 1989;
Kurzer 1991). Another conclusion must be that active government involvement
in negotiations on incomes policy is not an indication of less neo-corporatism as
these and other researchers state as well (cf. Curtis 1987; Wolinetz 1990; Kurzer
1991). The main conclusion, therefore, must be that government is indeed a cru-
cial partner in neo-corporatist Dutch macroeconomic policy co-ordination (cf.
Siaroff 1999; Keman 2000; Hoogenboom and van Vliet 2000; van Waarden 2002;
Molina and Rhodes 2002) and this supports my own contention. 
After 1982, social partners became slightly more co-operative. This was visible
in, firstly, an increased number of opening and concluding problem solving
styles of decision-making (C: Battle of the Sexes). Secondly, in a lower number
of opening confrontational styles of decision-making (A: Chicken) that was sub-
sequently reduced to an even lower number of concluding confrontational styles
of decision-making as well (see Table 4.7 and Figures 4.5, 4.6, 4.9 and 4.10).
This shows that institutional behaviour appears to matter. The three actors in-
volved do interact and this interaction produces (behavioural) change. The
change in behaviour tends to go in the direction of less conflict between social
partners. This direction in change is noticeable both before 1983 and after 1982.
In chapter 6 I will investigate whether less conflict between social partners made
it easier for them to find both an ‘equilibrium’ and approach the ‘core’.
The two opening problem solving styles of decision-making (C or Battle of the
Sexes: 11.1%) after 1982 were increased to four concluding problem solving
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Table 4.7: Opening and concluding style of decision-making before 1983 and after 1982
1965 - 1982 1983 - 2000
Style of decision-
making
Opening Concluding Opening Concluding
A: Confrontation 44.4% 33.3% 38.9% 22.2%
B: Bargaining 50.0% 61.1% 50.0% 55.6%
C: Problem solving 5.6%   5.6% 11.1% 22.2%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: Appendix I.
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Figure 4.9: Frequency concluding style of decision-making of trade unions and employers’
organisations 1965 – 1982
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Figure 4.10: Frequency concluding style of decision-making of trade unions and employers’
organisations 1983 – 2000
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styles of decision-making (C: 22.2%). Before 1983, the one opening problem
solving style of decision-making (C: 5.6%) remained the one concluding pro-
blem solving style of decision-making as well (C: 5.6%).
After 1982, the number of opening confrontational styles of decision-making
(A: Chicken) was slightly lower than before 1983. The seven opening confron-
tational styles of decision-making (A: 38.9%) after 1982 were reduced to four
concluding confrontational styles of decision-making (A: 22.2%). The eight
opening confrontational styles of decision-making (A: 44.4%) before 1983 were
reduced to six concluding confrontational styles of decision-making (A: 33.3%).
Before 1983, the reduction of the concluding confrontational style (A) was
completely matched by the increase in the concluding bargaining style of
decision-making (B: Prisoners’ Dilemma). After 1982, that reduction was largely
matched by the increase in the concluding problem solving style of decision-
making (C: Battle of the Sexes).
This research finding implies that the argument that the Dutch ‘Miracle’ is due
to the ‘Wassenaar Agreement’ (1983) between trade unions and employers’ or-
ganisations and to their adherence to that agreement in the 1980s and 1990s at
first sight receives more support by the final, concluding styles of decision-
making than by the opening styles (Visser and Hemerijck 1997; Hemerijck and
Visser 2000). That the ‘Wassenaar Agreement’ did not necessarily imply complete
consensus at all times between social partners is borne out by both the seven
opening and the four concluding confrontational styles of decision-making (A:
Chicken) after 1982 (see also Visser and Hemerijck 1997: 103-108).
Less confrontation and more co-operation between social partners after 1982
also supports the argument made in chapter 2 with respect to Dutch researchers
that discussed the changes in the Dutch system of industrial relations and cen-
tralised bargaining in the 1960s and 1970s. These changes were discussed in
terms of a development from consensus or harmony in the 1950s to conflict and
polarisation in the 1960s and 1970s (see for instance Akkermans and Grootings
1979; Nobelen 1983; Arendsen and Geul 1983; Albeda and ten Hove 1986).
Although they were right with regard to the opening styles of decision-making,
even in the 1980s and 1990s, they were wrong with respect to the concluding
styles of decision-making, especially after 1982. In my view, they missed the
point by labelling this development as diminishing or disappearing neo-cor-
poratism: no consensus, no neo-corporatism. The issue, of course, is whether it
was possible to reduce that confrontation and create that consensus by a neo-cor-
poratist government strategy in the 1980s and 1990s. Both the research by Visser
and Hemerijck and this research show that that was indeed possible, although
that did not rule out all confrontations between social partners. Yet unlike Visser
and Hemerijck (1997), I claim that instead of the policy learning capacity of
trade unions it was mainly government intervention in incomes policy that re-
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duced confrontation and produced more co-operation between social partners in
the market sector. 
The linkage between market sector and (semi-) public sector induced the govern-
ment to repeated intervention in incomes policy in the early 1980s to achieve
(wage) moderation. Wage moderation in the market sector was necessary to con-
trol government expenditure in the (semi-) public sector. Both trade unions and
employers’ organisations wanted to get rid of government intervention in the
market sector. Under pressure of steeply rising mass-unemployment and the threat
of the new Lubbers I government (1982) of yet another binding intervention,
trade unions reluctantly agreed to the offer of the employers’ organisations to
exchange the price indexation for a reduction in working hours: the ‘Wassenaar
Agreement’. The agreement in the market sector gave the Lubbers I government
the opportunity to put all linking mechanism between market sector and (semi-)
public sector on hold (1983) and then to cut wages, benefits and pensions (1984)
against heavy opposition of the trade unions. Less confrontation and more co-
operation between trade unions and employers’ organisations in the market sector
did not imply the same for the relations between trade unions and the govern-
ment in the (semi-) public sector (see also Hemerijck 2003: 53 ff.).
Government strategy, unlike styles of decision-making, became less neo-cor-
poratist when we compare opening government strategies with concluding govern-
ment strategies. But concluding non-neo-corporatist government strategies are
especially prominent between 1965 and 1982. All nine concluding guiding govern-
ment strategies (IV: 50%) and three of the eight concluding passive government
strategies (I: 16.7%) occur in this period. Together, these 12 cases account for
66.7% of the concluding non-neo-corporatist government strategies. In contrast,
between 1965 and 1982, the opening government strategy was non-neo-corporatist
(I+IV) in only seven years (38.9%). The five concluding non-neo-corporatist
government strategies after 1982 are all of the passive variety (I: 27.8%).
With respect to neo-corporatist government strategies (II+III), the situation is
reversed. Both before 1983 and after 1982, the opening government strategy was
neo-corporatist in a majority of the cases. However, before 1983 the 11 (61.1%)
opening neo-corporatist government strategies were reduced to six (33.3%) con-
cluding neo-corporatist strategies. The 12 (66.7%) opening neo-corporatist govern-
ment strategies after 1982 were increased to 13 (72.2%) concluding neo-corpo-
ratist government strategies (see Table 4.8 and Figures 4.11 and 4.12). This demon-
strates that change indeed occurred and that there is a marked difference in out-
comes before 1983 and after 1982 with respect to concluding government strategies.
These findings support both researchers in the late 1980s and early 1990s that
relate a guiding (IV) role of the government in incomes policy in the 1960s and
1970s to less neo-corporatism (see for instance Curtis 1987; Wolinetz 1990;
Kurzer 1991), as well as researchers in the late 1990s that stress the importance
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of the government as a crucial partner in Dutch neo-corporatism (II+III: Teulings
and Hartog 1998; Keman 1999; Siaroff 1999; Hoogenboom and van Vliet 2000;
Molina and Rhodes 2002). My research suggests that it is indeed the (sequence
of the) government’s strategy of intervention that determines neo-corporatism, and
that that (sequence of) government strategy may vary over time between neo-
corporatist and non-neo-corporatist strategies.
This is especially highlighted by the non-neo-corporatist government strategies
from 1980 tot 1986 and the neo-corporatist government strategies from 1987 to
2000. From 1980 - 1982, governments tried to control growing government
expenditure and budget deficit by implementing binding incomes policies aimed
at moderation in the market sector. The government’s strategy was guiding (IV).
As incomes in the (semi-) public sector were directly linked to incomes in the
market sector, the only way to control government expenditure and the budget
deficit was to ensure a moderate incomes policy in the market sector. However,
this policy was only marginally successful due to the rapid increase in govern-
ment expenditure for unemployment and other social security benefits.
The new Lubbers I government threatened to continue this policy in 1983 if trade
unions and employers’ organisations did not voluntary come to a (bipartite) agree-
ment on moderation in the market sector. The result was that social partners con-
cluded the ‘Wassenaar Agreement’. Although the agreement was not sufficient
to reduce government expenditure and the budget deficit, it did make it possible
for the government to put all linking mechanisms between the market sector first
on hold (1983) and next to cut incomes, benefits and pensions in the (semi-)
public sector (1984). The confrontation between trade unions and the govern-
ment on this austerity policy in the (semi-) public sector could not spill over to
the market sector. From 1983 to 1986, the government basically left incomes policy
in the market sector to trade unions and employers’ organisations and concen-
trated its efforts on a reduction of government expenditure and the budget deficit
by reducing the (semi-) public sector. Based on the ‘Wassenaar Agreement’, the
exchange in the market sector was continued in these years. The government’s
strategy was passive (I).
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Table 4.8: Opening and concluding government strategy before 1983 and after 1982
1965 - 1982 1983 - 2000
Government
strategy
Opening Concluding Opening Concluding
I: Passive 11.1% 16.7% 16.7% 27.8%
II: Co-operative 50.0% 27.8% 38.9% 50.0%
III: Congruent 11.1%   5.6% 27.8% 22.2%
IV: Guiding 27.8% 50.0% 16.7% 0.0%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: Appendix I.
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Figure 4.11: Frequency concluding government strategy 1965 – 1982
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Figure 4.12: Frequency concluding government strategy 1983 – 2000
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Conversely, after 1987 the offer for a partial and ad-hoc linkage between the market
sector and the (semi-) public sector could be used again by the government in the
process of negotiations on incomes policy. The government’s neo-corporatist
strategy was either co-operative (II) or congruent (III).
To sum up, this comparison of the opening and concluding government strategies
and styles of decision-making during the annual process of negotiations on in-
comes policy shows yet again that the conceptualisation and subsequent opera-
tionalisation of government strategies and styles of decision-making of trade
unions and employers’ organisations that is used in this research can adequately
detect changes and variations in neo-corporatism over time. The research shows
that negotiations on incomes policy between the government, trade unions and
employers’ organisations did result in less confrontation and more co-operation
between social partners. At the same time, more co-operation between social
partners at the end of the process of negotiations on incomes policy did go to-
gether with less concluding neo-corporatist government strategies.
This shows that indeed the existence of an institutionalised process of centralised
bargaining between government, trade unions and employers’ organisations is no
sufficient condition for neo-corporatism (as for instance Schmitter 1979; Czada
1983; Smith 1988; Wilson 1990; and Western 1991 assumed). On the contrary, the
research shows that concluding government strategies were less often neo-cor-
poratist than opening government strategies, especially before 1983. The con-
ceptualisation and subsequent operationalisation of government strategies and
styles of decision-making that is used in this research shows that the government
is indeed a crucial partner in incomes policy formation (Hartog 1999; Keman
1999; Hoogenboom and van Vliet 2000; van Sinderen 2000; Gelauff 2000; van
Waarden 2002; Molina and Rhodes 2002). The research also shows that the
government’s strategy varies over time. Formal ‘neo-corporatist’ institutions for
centralised bargaining on incomes policy do not necessarily always produce neo-
corporatist government strategies. They do so if and when governments feel that
neo-corporatist strategies facilitate the achievement of their goals with respect to
incomes policy. In other words, in Dutch neo-corporatism, government is the prime
mover (see also Hoogenboom and van Vliet 2000 and chapters 2, 5, and 6).
On the other hand, centralised bargaining on incomes policy in the Netherlands
did bring social partners to more co-operation in the end. Between 1965 and
2000 confrontation (A) decreased from 15 (41.7%) to 10 years (27.8%), and
problem solving (C) increased from three (8.3%) to five years (13.9%). This
trend is especially noticeable after 1982 when confrontation (A) decreased from
seven (38.9%) to four years (22.2%) and problem solving (C) increased from two
(11.1%) to four years (22.2%). In other words, centralised bargaining reduced
the occurrence of Chicken (A) and increased the occurrence of Battle of the
Sexes (C).
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Centralised bargaining did, however, not prevent all confrontation. Complete con-
sensus was not achieved. But in a sense, societal conflict indeed appeared to be
the basis for consensus building by co-operation and compromise in at least a
number of years (Keman 1992; Molina and Rhodes 2002).
Putting neo-corporatism on a par with consensus in the institutions, defined as the
absence of open conflict (see for instance Akkermans and Grootings 1979;
Armingeon 1983; Akkermans and Nobelen 1983; Albeda and ten Hove 1986;
Cox 1989), does not allow for any variation in neo-corporatism over time or in
intensity. 
My conceptualisation and subsequent operationalisation of government strate-
gies and styles of decision-making that is used in this research do allow for this
conclusion and, therefore, is an adequate descriptive and analytical tool for re-
search. As a research tool, it not only can detect the change of behaviour of actors
within the framework but also that the change is toward consensus, especially
after 1982, and that this change appears to correlate with the process of negotiations
on incomes policy. And that is what I have conceptualised with neo-corporatism
as a strategy (see chapters 2 and 3).
The Appendix shows that the concluding passive government strategy (I) is ap-
parently the style for a period of transformation. The concluding guiding govern-
ment strategy (IV) occurs before 1983 and is typically used to settle a deadlock
between social partners with a binding intervention. With one exception in 1965,
the concluding neo-corporatist congruent government strategy (III) occurs after
1982. Finally, the concluding co-operative government strategy (II) appears to be
the most typical for Dutch neo-corporatism: indirect government intervention in
order to facilitate trade unions and employers’organisations to hammer out an agree-
ment. However, that does not always work. Social partners may end up in con-
frontation (A: Chicken) or a deadlock (B: Prisoners’ Dilemma) making an agree-
ment either unfeasible (A: Chicken) or not always possible (B: Prisoners’ Dilemma).
4.4 The process of negotiations on incomes policy: sequence of government strate-
gies and styles of decision-making
From the comparison between opening and concluding government strategies
and styles of decision-making it has become clear that during the annual process
of negotiations on the formation and implementation on incomes policy both govern-
ment and trade unions and employers’ organisations are able to change their
strategy or style of decision-making. Table 4.9 shows the sequence of govern-
ment strategies and styles of decision-making during the annual negotiations on
incomes policy for the whole period between 1965 and 2000 from opening
strategy and style to the concluding strategy and style. The starting point of the
analysis is the concluding government strategy and style of decision-making of
trade unions and employers’ organisations.
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Table 4.9: Sequence of government strategy and style of decision-making of trade unions and
employers’ organisations 1965 – 2000
Year Opening  strategy
and style of
decison-making
Changes in strategy and style of
decision-making
Concluding strategy
and style of
decision-making
1965 IIIA IIIB
1966 IB IIIB IVB
1967 IVB IVB
1968 IVB IB - IVB IB
1969 IVA IA IVA
1970 IIC IVC
1971 IVB IIB - IVA IA
1972 IIB IA
1973 IIB IIA
1974 IIA IIB - IIA – IVB - IIB IVB
1975 IIB IIB
1976 IIA IVA - IIB IVB
1977 IIB IIA IIB
1978 IIA IIB
1979 IVA IIA - IVA IIA
1980 IIB IIIB – IVB - IIB IVB
1981 IIIA IVA
1982 IB IIB IVB
1983 IIIA IVB – IC - IVB IC
1984 IC IC
1985 IVB IIIB – IA - IVA IB
1986 IA IA
1987 IIB IIIB
1988 IIA IIC IIA
1989 IIB IIB
1990 IIIC IIIA IIIB
1991 IVA IIIC - IVB IIB
1992 IA IA
1993 IIIB IVB IIIB
1994 IVA IIC
1995 IIA IIB IIA
1996 IIB IIC IIB
1997 IIB IIC IIB
1998 IIB IIC IIB
1999 IIIB IIIC
2000 IIB IIB
Source: Appendix I.
First I will discuss the observed changes in government strategy, than the ob-
served changes in styles of decision-making.
Above I have shown that between 1965 and 2000 the concluding government strate-
gy was more often non-neo-corporatist than the opening government strategy.
That was mainly an effect of the large increase in non-neo-corporatist concluding
government strategies before 1983. After 1982, both opening and concluding
government strategies were neo-corporatist in a large majority of the cases (see
Table 4.8).
Table 4.9 shows that the observed sequence of strategies in the non-neo-cor-
poratist outcomes I (passive) and IV (guiding) differs considerably from the sequence
of strategies in the neo-corporatist outcomes II (co-operative) and III (congruent).
Non-neo-corporatist outcomes usually represented the end of a process of nego-
tiations on incomes policy in which the government quite frequently changed its
strategy. Neo-corporatist outcomes, on the other hand, appear to represent the
end of a process in which there was much less incentive for the government to
change its strategy.
The sequences of strategies that end with the non-neo-corporatist strategy I
(passive) show a frequent use of the non-neo-corporatist strategy IV (guiding -
6) as well, and less so of the neo-corporatist strategies II (co-operative - 2) and
III (congruent - 2). Apart from doing nothing, in these cases the government
apparently preferred to use a combination of stick and carrot to get trade unions
and employers’ organisations to conclude an agreement. However, in the end the
government decided to refrain from any further involvement in incomes policy.
Incomes policy was left to social partners. Three of the eight concluding passive
government strategies occurred before 1983; five after 1982 (see Table 4.8). 
Before 1983 the concluding passive government strategy (I) outcomes occurred
in 1968, 1971 and 1972. In those years, governments went back and forth be-
tween various strategies. In the end they opted for the passive strategy in order
not to alienate trade unions any further and to give the new system of free nego-
tiations on incomes policy a fair chance.
After 1982, the concluding passive government strategy (I) occurred in the years
1983 - 1987 and in 1992. Between 1983 and 1987, in the aftermath of the ‘Wasse-
naar Agreement’ and the delinkage of the market sector and the (semi-) public
sector, the government was focused on the (semi-) public sector. Incomes policy
in the market sector was left to social partners, as it did not longer affect the
(semi-) public sector directly. In 1992, there were no central negotiations on in-
comes policy. All parties went their separate ways. Trade unions clashed with the
government on its policy with regard to the levels of disability and sickness bene-
fits. In decentral negotiations with employers’organisations, trade unions managed
to repair the government’s policy with respect to the levels of sickness and disa-
bility benefits.
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The sequences of strategies that end with the guiding strategy (IV), on the other
hand, show a frequent use of both neo-corporatist strategies II (co-operative - 6)
and III (congruent - 3), and less so of the other non-neo-corporatist strategy I
(passive - 3). Apparently, in these cases the government felt that wielding the
stick only might be insufficient to get trade unions and employers’ organisations
to conclude an agreement, but that doing nothing was out of the question, and
that therefore a combination of stick and carrot was needed as well. However, in
the end the government decided that it could not do without the stick and that
incomes policy had to be imposed on social partners. All nine concluding guiding
government strategies occurred before 1983 (see Table 4.8).
In the late 1960s, after the demise of the centrally, government guided incomes
policy, the search was on for a new system and procedure of central negotiations
on incomes policy. The aim was to find a system that left negotiations between
trade unions and employers’ organisations free from government intervention,
but at the same time produced a moderate incomes policy. When social partners
failed to reach agreement the habitual reaction of governments of all persuasion
was to take over again the determination of incomes policy as they were used and
authorised to do from 1945 until 1965. This authority was also retained in the
new Law on Wage Formation of 1968/70.
Incomes policy of the Van Agt I government from 1980 to 1982 was aimed at a
reduction of the rapidly increasing budget deficit. To that effect, incomes policy
in the market sector had to result in moderation. Because of all the linking me-
chanisms between the market sector and the (semi-) public sector, a moderate in-
comes policy in the market sector made it more feasible to achieve moderation
in the (semi-) public sector as well. This in turn would contribute to a reduction
of (the rate of increase of) the deficit. However, trade unions and employers’
organisations were not able to reach any central agreement, although they came
quite close in 1980. The main obstacle was their widely differing views on how
to tackle the economic problems that resulted in ever growing budget deficits.
Neither party was prepared to give an inch on the issue of incomes, despite efforts
by the government. Consequently, government largely took over responsibility
for incomes policy in these years.
The sequence of strategies that end in the neo-corporatist strategies II (co-
operative) and III (congruent) is much less varied than that in the non-neo-cor-
poratist categories. In category II, the government stuck to its original neo-cor-
poratist strategy in 11 out of 14 cases, and in category III in four out of five
cases. In category II, the government reverted to the non-neo-corporatist strategy
IV (guiding) four times and to the other neo-corporatist strategy III (congruent)
once. In category III, the government only once changed its strategy, to the non-
neo-corporatist strategy IV (guiding). In both categories, the government did not
employ the other non-neo-corporatist strategy I (passive). Although the govern-
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ment to a large extent preferred to use the carrot above the stick in these cases,
if there was a change in government strategy, it was a change towards the stick.
However, in the end the government decided not to use the stick after all, but to
return to its neo-corporatist strategy. 
This is interesting, since others argue that any active government involvement in
the process of negotiations on incomes policy should be taken as an indication
of declining neo-corporatism. The conceptualisation and subsequent operationali-
sation of government strategies and styles of decision-making used in this re-
search shows that the government is indeed a crucial partner in neo-corporatist
Dutch incomes policy formation and implementation. It also shows it can account
for changes in government strategy during the annual process of negotiations on
incomes policy as well.
With respect to government strategy, there is a striking difference between the
periods before 1983 and after 1982. Before 1983, the government started nego-
tiations on incomes policy in a clear majority of the years with a neo-corporatist
strategy (II+III: 61.1%). However, the government ended negotiations on in-
comes policy in a clear majority of the years with a non-neo-corporatist govern-
ment strategy (I+IV: 66.7%). After 1982, the government started and ended the
process of negotiations on incomes policy with a neo-corporatist strategy in an
increasing majority of the years (II+III: from 66.7% to 72.2% - see Table 4.8).
Two observations with respect to the sequence of government strategies can be
made. Firstly, a more or less frequent alternation between various government
strategies was an important feature of the annual process of negotiations on in-
comes policy. Especially in those cases in which the government finally decided
to conclude negotiations with a non-neo-corporatist strategy. Secondly, institutional
change affects government strategies during negotiations on incomes policy.
Before 1983, the government was much more inclined to end negotiations on in-
comes policy with a non-neo-corporatist government strategy (I+IV). After 1982,
the government was much more inclined to end negotiations on incomes policy
with a neo-corporatist government strategy (II+III), due to the delinking of the
market sector and the (semi-) public sector (see also Hemerijck 2003: 53 ff.). 
These findings also show that the conceptualisation and subsequent opera-
tionalisation of government strategies that is used in this research is adequately
able to capture the crucial role of the government in incomes policy formation.
Again these findings also show that the government’s strategy can and does vary.
The government’s strategy can vary both within the annual process of negotiations
on incomes policy, and it can vary over time. Lastly, these findings also show
that institutions for centralised bargaining on incomes policy do not necessarily
also produce neo-corporatist government strategies in the end. Nor do these
institutions produce consistent neo-corporatist government behaviour during the
annual process of negotiations on incomes policy.
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Clearly, the operationalisation of the four government strategies used in this
research is better able to account for the actual behaviour of governments within
the institutions of centralised bargaining on incomes policy, than operationali-
sations that can only differentiate between imposed and voluntary incomes po-
licies, or operationalisations that make no distinction at all with respect to govern-
ment strategy. Their conclusions with regard to the neo-corporatist character of
Dutch incomes policy are, therefore, less adequate than conclusions based on the
operationalisation of the four government strategies that is used in this research.
Between 1965 and 2000 the concluding styles of decision-making were less con-
frontational and more co-operative than the opening styles of decision-making.
That is due to less confrontation (A: Chicken) and more problem solving (C:
Battle of the Sexes) after 1982 (see Table 4.7 and Figures 4.9 and 4.10). Out-
comes in the bargaining (B: Prisoners’ Dilemma) and problem solving (C) styles
of decision-making were more often the result of changes in styles of decision-
making than outcomes in the confrontational category (A). Table 4.9 shows the
details of the changes in styles of decision-making.
The observed sequence of styles of decision-making that ended with the con-
cluding bargaining style (B) occur more often in combination with the confron-
tational style A (9) than in combination with the problem solving style of de-
cision-making C (5). The observed sequence of styles of decision-making that
ended with the concluding problem solving style C occur almost as often in
combination with the confrontational style A (3) as with the bargaining style B
(2). Clearly, the alternation between the confrontational style (A) and either the
bargaining style (B), or the problem solving style (C) between trade unions and
employers’ organisations, was the dominant feature of the annual process of
negotiations on incomes policy between 1965 and 2000. This alternation can be
observed 14 times. An alternation between the bargaining (B) and problem
solving (C) styles does occur, but was a rarer phenomenon. This alternation can
be observed seven times. These findings support the expected alternation
between competition (confrontation and bargaining) and co-operation (problem
solving) between trade unions and employers’ organisations during negotiations
on incomes policy that was discussed in chapter 3, section 3.3.2. That expected
alternation was based on Scharpf’s (1998) definition of the three styles of
decision-making that is used in this research. This operationalisation of the three
styles of decision-making is clearly better able to account for the actual be-
haviour of trade unions and employers’ organisations within the institutions of
centralised bargaining on incomes policy, than operationalisations that put neo-
corporatism on a par with consensus between social partners in the institutions
(see for instance Akkermans and Grootings; Armingeon 1983; Akkermans and
Nobelen 1983; Cox 1989; Kurzer 1991).
The actual behaviour of trade unions and employers’ organisations in terms of
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their styles of decision-making explains the success of government strategies.
Success in terms of less confrontation and more co-operation, and success in
terms of (central) agreements on incomes policy and approaching the core. The
actual behaviour of trade unions and employers’ organisations was in turn in-
fluenced by government strategies aimed at transforming the game that social
partners played from a often rather short term, (self-) interest driven game (A:
confrontation (Chicken) and B: bargaining (Prisoners’ Dilemma), to a more long
term, institution driven game of less confrontation and more co-operation (from
A: confrontation (Chicken) to B: bargaining (Prisoners’ Dilemma); and from B:
bargaining (Prisoners’ Dilemma) to C: problem solving (Battle of the Sexes).
That is important information to answer research question 1 (Dutch incomes
policy as the outcome of neo-corporatist government strategies) and research
question 2 (the effectiveness of Dutch incomes policy in terms of the agendas of
the actors involved - see chapter 6).
4.5 Concluding remarks
In chapter 2, sections 2.4 and 2.6, I have put forward that in the concept of neo-
corporatism as a strategy, the government plays a crucial part in getting the
actors involved in the formation and implementation of incomes policy to con-
clude an agreement (see also Keman 1999: 261-265; and Molina and Rhodes
2002: 316-318). The government is both actor and mediator in the annual pro-
cess of negotiations on incomes policy. The extent to which the government is
able to bring all parties to an agreement on incomes policy depends both on their
respective agendas, and on their strategies (see also chapter 3). 
In chapter 3, section 3.3.1, I have operationalised the four possible government
strategies: passive (I), co-operative (II), congruent (III), and guiding (IV). The
passive and guiding strategies are considered as non-neo-corporatist government
strategies (I+IV). The co-operative and congruent strategies are considered as
neo-corporatist government strategies (II+III).
The research findings based on this operationalisation show that governments in
the Netherlands between 1965 and 2000 were indeed almost always actively in-
volved in the start of the annual process of negotiations on the formation and
implementation of incomes policy. That was the case in 31 of the 36 years
(86.1%). I have also observed that in a majority of cases the government was
actively involved in the outcome of the process of negotiations on incomes
policy as well. That was the case in 28 of the 36 years (77.8%). 
The research also shows that the opening strategy of governments was neo-
corporatist (II+III) in a majority of the years (63.8%). However, when we com-
pare opening government strategies with concluding government strategies, it
turns out that government strategy became less neo-corporatist (52.8%).
Concluding non-neo-corporatist government strategies (I+IV) were especially
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prominent before 1983 (66.7%). Concluding neo-corporatist government strate-
gies (II+III) were especially prominent after 1982 (72.2%). Hence, Dutch in-
comes policy is basically neo-corporatist; however, as a process neo-corporatism
is dynamic and patterned over time. Essentially, neo-corporatism depends on the
external circumstances that determine the room to manoeuvre of the government
(see also chapter 5). In the 1960s, these were the transition from a government
directed incomes policy to a formally free incomes policy. In the 1970s and early
1980s these were the linkage between the market sector and the (semi-) public
sector that seriously exacerbated the macroeconomic effects of the two oil shocks
of 1973 and 1979/80. Finally, these were first the delinkage of both sectors in the
1980s and secondly the ad-hoc relinkage of both sectors in the context of a strict
budgetary discipline (EMU: Maastricht Treaty 1991) as part of the annual pro-
cess of negotiations on incomes policy in the 1990s. The ‘Wassenaar Agreement’
in itself can not be considered as a ‘watershed’ with respect to government strategy:
government strategy was non-neo-corporatist from 1980 - 1986. From 1980 -
1982 it was the guiding strategy (IV), and from 1983 - 1986 it was the passive
strategy (I).
The operationalisation of government strategies that is used in this research is
also adequately able to capture the alternation of government strategies during
the annual negotiations on incomes policy. An alternation between stick and
carrot was especially prominent in the 17 years that the government decided to
end its involvement in negotiations on incomes policy with a non-neo-corpora-
tist strategy (I+IV: 47.2%). In the 19 years that the government ended its involve-
ment in negotiations on incomes policy with a neo-corporatist strategy (II+III:
52.8%), there was minimal alternation in government strategies. The majority of
the concluding neo-corporatist government strategies occurred from 1987. In
these years, social partners were indeed quite often able to come to an agreement
(see chapter 6).
In chapter 3, section 3.3.2, I have operationalised the three styles of decision-
making: confrontation (A: Chicken), bargaining (B: Prisoners’ Dilemma), and
problem solving (C: Battle of the Sexes) based on Scharpf (1998). The research
findings based on this operationalisation show that the opening style of decision-
making was confrontational (A) in 15 years (41.7%), bargaining (B) in 18 years
(50.0%), and problem solving (C) in three years (8.3%). However, social
partners were less confrontational and more co-operative in their concluding
style of decision-making, both before 1983 and more in particular after 1982.
This means that neo-corporatism matters with respect to the behaviour of social
partners. However, less confrontation and more co-operation did not lead to a
significant increase in the concluding problem-solving style. The main con-
cluding style of decision-making remained the bargaining style (B), also after
1982. That social partners were able to come to an agreement, especially after
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1987 was not due to an increase in the ‘Battle of the Sexes’ problem solving style
of decision-making (C) (Scharpf 1998 - see also chapter 3, section 3.3.3 and
chapters 5 and 6).
The operationalisation of the three styles of decision-making that is used in this
research is also adequately able to capture the alternation of styles of decision-
making during the annual negotiations of incomes policy in the whole period
between 1965 and 2000. The alternation between the confrontational style (A:
Chicken) and the bargaining style (B: Prisoners’ Dilemma) was the dominant
feature of the annual process of negotiations on incomes policy between trade
unions and employers’ organisations. However, as concluding styles of decision-
making were less confrontational and more co-operative than opening styles of
decision-making, these annual alternations were apparently necessary to test
each other’s strengths and legitimise any agreements reached (see also chapter 5
and chapter 6).
Finally, the operationalisation of government strategies and styles of decision-
making of trade unions and employers’ organisations combined (see Table 3.4 in
chapter 3) has shown to be able to account for all possible stages in the annual
process of negotiations on incomes policy between 1965 and 2000, and for all
outcomes as well (see Appendix and above). The results show that institutions
matter. The three actors involved interact. This interaction produces behavioural
change that is reflected in the outcomes (concluding strategies and styles of
decision-making):
- less concluding than opening neo-corporatist strategies before 1983;
- more concluding than opening neo-corporatist strategies after 1982;
- less confrontation between social partners, both before 1983, and more pro-
minently after 1982.
The research findings discussed above provide the answer to research question 1:
Can neo-corporatism, defined as a government strategy for conflict regu-
lation, offer a plausible explanation for the formation and implementation of
Dutch incomes policy between 1965 and 2000?
The answer to research question 1 is affirmative. Yes, neo-corporatism, defined
as a government strategy for conflict regulation, can offer a plausible explanation
for the formation and implementation of Dutch incomes policy in a majority of
the 36 years between 1965 and 2000. However, neo-corporatism varies con-
siderably over time. It has been much more prominent after 1982 than before
1983. Before 1983, the government was more inclined to wield the stick; after
1982 the carrot was preferred. Neo-corporatism also matters as it produces less
conflict and more agreement between social partners.
Therefore, neo-corporatism matters with respect to the formation and implemen-
tation of Dutch incomes policy. Dutch neo-corporatism with regard to incomes
policy is typically a combination of the co-operative government strategy (II)
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and the bargaining style of decision-making (B). Dutch neo-corporatism has
changed its mode of operation. Before 1983, the government much less often
concluded its involvement in the formation and implementation of incomes
policy with a neo-corporatist strategy than after 1982. This implies that although
government plays a crucial part in Dutch neo-corporatism, the direction of its in-
volvement apparently depends on external circumstances (see chapter 5). Lastly,
social partners hardly ever play ‘Battle of the Sexes’ (Scharpf 1998), that is, use
the problem solving style (C). 
The slight change in that direction after 1982 does not constitute a new Dutch
‘Polder Model’ of neo-corporatism. This research finding supports the views of
the Dutch students of neo-corporatism reviewed in chapter 2, section 2.3, that do
not consider Dutch neo-corporatism in the 1990s to constitute a new model (see
for instance Teulings 1995, 1996, 1997; van Empel 1997; Visser and Hemerijck
1997; Teulings and Hartog 1998; Hazeu 1998; Hartog 1999; and van Waarden
2002).
The combinations, and the changes in the combinations of government strategies
and styles of decision-making of trade unions and employers’ organisations ob-
served over the period suggest that the government and social partners displayed
both ‘rational’ and variable behaviour. Their behaviour was rational as it led to
less confrontation. Their behaviour was also variable as it did not necessarily led
to more neo-corporatist government strategies (or to more effective neo-cor-
poratist government strategies - see chapter 6), or to more co-operation between
social partners. Social partners hardly played Battle of the Sexes (C: problem
solving), although that is, according to Scharpf (1998), the ‘best’ game to reach
agreement and approach the core. Apparently, in the Netherlands that game was
less suited to arrive at agreement and approach the core than more or less ‘tough’
negotiations based on the bargaining style (B: Prisoners’ Dilemma - see also
chapter 6).
In chapter 5, I will discuss in more substantive detail government strategy and
style of decision-making of trade unions and employers’ organisations during the
annual process of negotiations on incomes policy. That will substantiate and
elaborate the affirmative answer to research question 1 given in this chapter.
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5. Neo-corporatism as a government strategy
in the Netherlands 1965 - 2000
In this chapter I shall elaborate the main research findings that were discussed
in chapter 4. This elaboration will substantiate the affirmative answer to research
question 1:
Can neo-corporatism, defined as a government strategy for conflict regu-
lation, offer a plausible explanation for the formation and implementation of
Dutch incomes policy between 1965 and 2000?
The main point that will elaborated in this chapter is the almost equal distri-
bution of concluding neo-corporatist and non-neo-corporatist government strate-
gies compared to the almost 2:1 distribution of opening neo-corporatist and non-
neo-corporatist government strategies (see chapter 4 and Appendix). For that ela-
boration, I will utilise the Rational Institutionalist strategy approach developed
in chapters 2 and 3. 
In this case and following my conceptualisation this approach assumes firstly,
that government is the leading actor in negotiations on incomes policy and
guarantor of the outcome of the negotiations. Secondly, that although the actors
are autonomous (they have the option to co-operate with each other or not), their
mutual instrumentalisation is quite high (actors depend on each other’s willing-
ness to co-operate to reach their own goals). Thirdly, that the room to manoeuvre
for all actors is limited by general economic conditions, and by the government’s
budget (social partners) or the outcome of negotiations on incomes policy
between social partners (government).
Government strategy and style of decision-making will be discussed in shorter
and more coherent sub-periods. These sub-periods are based on a combination
of political and institutional developments, combined with external, global eco-
nomic shocks and watersheds, which provide the context in terms of economic
conditions, political developments and institutional changes in which the govern-
ment and social partners have to operate and that influences their behaviour.
The main institutional development in politics can be characterised by the de-
velopment from a pillarised accommodation democracy to a ‘normal’ consensus
democracy between the mid 1960s and the early 1970s. Pillarisation declined
rapidly, but most of the ‘rules of the game’ remained intact (Lijphart 1989;
Andeweg and Irwin 1993, 2002; Mair 1994; see also chapter 2, section 2.6;
chapter 3, section 3.2.2.1).
Political developments concern the nature of the coalition governments in terms
of the political complexion of government and parliament (Woldendorp et al 2000;
see also Daalder 1995; Andeweg and Irwin 1993, 2002; chapter 3, section 3.2.2.1;
chapter 7; and Tables 3.1, 3.2, and 7.1). The main development is a transition
from christian democratic dominance in government (and parliament) between
1965 and 1994 - with a brief exception in de mid 1970s (the government Den
Uyl) - to a social democratic - liberal government coalition between 1994 and
2000 (see Tables 3.1 and 3.2).
External, global economic shocks and watersheds are derived from Goldthorpe
(1984), Scharpf (1991), Keman (1993), Castles (1998), and Kitschelt et al (1999).
These include the oil crises of 1973, 1979/80, and 1992; the world recessions of
1981 - 1983 and 1992 - 1994; and the preparations for the European Monetary
Union (EMU) in 1999 that started in 1991 (Maastricht Treaty). 
Finally, institutional developments with regard to incomes policy include: 
- the transition from a government directed, guided incomes policy to an in-
comes policy based on ‘free’ negotiations between trade unions and employ-
ers’ organisations in the late 1960s; 
- the linkage of incomes in the market sector and the (semi-) public sector in
the 1970s; 
- the delinkage of incomes in both sectors in the 1980s; 
- and the ad hoc and partial relinkage of these sectors as a negotiable issue
during the annual negotiations on incomes policy in the 1990s (see also
chapter 3, section 3.2; chapter 4; and Appendix).
The combination of political and institutional developments and external shocks
and watersheds amounts to a division of the period 1965 to 2000 in four sub-
periods of roughly equal length: 1965 - 1973; 1974 - 1982; 1983 - 1992; and
1993 - 2000.
In each period, the opening government strategies and styles of decision-making
of trade unions and employers’ organisations in the annual process of negotiations
on incomes policy will be compared to the concluding government strategies and
styles of decision-making. The Appendix, as well as chapter 4, provide the
necessary information for the choice of (changes in) strategy by the government,
as well as for (changes in) the style of decision-making. 
In my view, this division in periods will be helpful to understand the patterned
variation of neo-corporatist government strategies in the Netherlands as a crucial
case of neo-corporatism in Europe. It will show how context, in terms of eco-
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nomic conditions, political developments and institutional changes, shapes the
room to manoeuvre for both government and social partners. This periodisation
will also show how variations in the room to manoeuvre lead to a patterned
variation of neo-corporatist government strategies (see chapter 3, section 3.3 and
Table 3.4). Essentially, the strategy approach enables me to capture change and
variation in government strategy over time. Depending on the room to manoeuvre,
government may change from a neo-corporatist to a non-neo-corporatist strate-
gy, or vice versa. The strategy approach also enables me to analyse more or less
successful outcomes in terms of agreements between the actors involved by
means of Rational Institutionalism.
This is a refinement overlooked by many international and Dutch researchers of
neo-corporatism who were primarily interested in classifying the country on static
scales of neo-corporatism (see chapter 2, sections 2.2 and 2.3). But not by all,
for instance, Compston (1994, 1995), Visser and Hemerijck (1997), Siaroff (1999),
Pennings and Vergunst (2001), Kenworthy (2001), Molina and Rhodes (2002),
Traxler (2004), and Vergunst (2004) have all shown that indeed neo-corporatism
may change and vary over time. These researchers have also shown that neo-
corporatism can also be more or less successful in terms of agreements.
Hence, my idea is that economic conditions, political developments and institu-
tional changes, shape the room to manoeuvre for both government and social
partners and influence the strategies and styles of decision-making employed. There-
fore, based on my instrument of analysis, I can show variations in neo-corpo-
ratism across time in the Netherlands. This in turn indicates how and why neo-
corporatism may work in general.
5.1 1965 - 1973: economic prosperity and increasing confrontation
Political developments in this period of nine years included the fragmentation of
the established, pillarised party system and the emergence of a parliamentary
stalemate at the end of the period. The election results of the confessional parties
KVP, ARP, and CHU declined steadily from a combined 49.2% of the votes in
1963 to 31.3% in 1972. At the same time, new political parties emerged that did
not belong to one of the established pillars, and whose expressed aim it was to
undermine the system of pillarisation. These parties included D66, the PPR34,
DS7035 and the Boerenpartij (Farmers Party).
The PvdA started its ‘polarisation’ strategy against the KVP and the VVD (see
Andeweg and Irwin 2002: 40-42), believing that the decline of the confessional
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34. Politieke Partij Radicalen (1968 - 1990) - Political Party Radicals (left-wing breakaway faction of
the KVP).
35. Democratisch Socialisten 70 (1970 - 1983) - Democratic Socialists 70 (a right-wing breakaway
faction of the PvdA). 
parties in the end would result in a realignment of the party system that would
profit both the PvdA (left) and the VVD (right). 
During this whole period, the confessional parties chose to govern with the VVD.
But at the end of the period, the confessional parties and the VVD lost their
combined majority in parliament. However, the PvdA together with the other
centre and left parties could not command a majority either (Andeweg and Irwin
2002: 98; see also Tables 3.1, 3.2 and 7.1 for an overview of government com-
position and election results between 1965 and 2000).
External shocks and watersheds in this period included the abolishment in 1971
by the USA of the gold standard for the US Dollar (the end of Bretton Woods)
and the first oil crisis of 1973. The oil crisis in 1973 hit the Netherlands par-
ticularly hard. The country not only had to contend with the increased price of
oil in the wake of the Israeli-Arab war in 1973, it was also boycotted by Arab oil
producing nations for its perceived pro-Israel stance in the United Nations
(Andeweg and Irwin 1993: 224).
Clearly, this period scored quite low on neo-corporatist government strategies
during the annual process of negotiations on incomes policy. Neo-corporatist
government strategies decreased from four opening strategies to only two
concluding government strategies. The period also scored low on co-operation
(problem solving or C: Battle of the Sexes) between trade unions and employers’
organisations. Competition (confrontation or A: Chicken, and bargaining or B:
Prisoners’ Dilemma) between social partners prevailed over co-operation, and
confrontation increased, despite all government efforts. Lasting Central Agree-
ments proved to be difficult to reach. In the end, government either took over in-
comes policy, or left it to social partners. Concluding neo-corporatist govern-
ment strategies were rare and only marginally successful. Nevertheless, social partners
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managed to come to a bipartite Central Agreement in 1970 (notwithstanding the
turmoil - see below), and to a tripartite Central Agreement with the government
in 1965.
5.1.1 Government strategy
Government strategy in this period has to be understood within the context of the
transition from a centrally guided government incomes policy to a free incomes
policy. After the demise of the centrally, government guided incomes policy of
the period 1945 - 1965, the search was on for a new system and procedure of
central negotiations on incomes policy. The aim was to find a system that left
negotiations between trade unions and employers’ organisations free from con-
tinuous binding government intervention, but at the same time produced a moderate
incomes policy. Responsibility for overseeing and, if necessary, enforcing a mo-
derate incomes policy was transferred from the Board of Government Mediators,
a government agency, to the STAR, in effect, to trade unions and employers’ or-
ganisations themselves.
In 1970, the system of ‘free’ negotiations on incomes policy between trade unions
and employers’ organisations was formalised in the Law on Wage Formation. How-
ever, government reserved the authority to intervene in these negotiations. Based
on clause 8, government could still intervene directly in individual collective con-
tracts, as opposed to not declaring them binding. And clause 10 gave government
the authority to impose binding general measures. Due to stiff opposition by the
trade unions, clause 8 was in effect ‘frozen’, that is to say, successive govern-
ments promised not to make use of this clause (see also chapter 3, section 3.2.3).
Trade unions and employers’ organisations had some difficulties to adjust to the
new situation after the demise of the centrally guided incomes policy. Their
continued inability to reach agreement reinforced the habitual tendency of govern-
ments of all persuasion to take over again the determination of incomes policy
as they were used to do from 1945 until 1965. This was the case in 1966, 1967,
1969, and 1970 when the government concluded its involvement in the nego-
tiations on incomes policy with the non-neo-corporatist guiding strategy (IV).
In 1966 and 1967, trade unions and employers’ organisations could not reach
agreement amongst themselves. In 1966, the STAR, therefore, favoured govern-
ment intervention to break the deadlock. In 1967, however, despite their inability
to reach agreement, trade unions and employers’ organisations both rejected the
government’s intervention to break the deadlock. In both years, the governments
Cals (KVP, ARP, PvdA) and Zijlstra (KVP, ARP) transferred the responsibility
for overseeing the implementation of its policies from the STAR back to the
Board of Government Mediators again. In 1969, it was the government De Jong
(KVP, ARP, CHU, VVD) that made it very clear from the start that it wanted to
determine the limits for incomes policy. As the results of decentral negotiations
115
widely exceeded the government’s proclaimed limits, the government repeatedly
intervened in collective contracts. 1970 is a special case. In 1970, negotiations
on incomes policy were easily concluded with a bipartite Central Agreement be-
tween trade unions and employers’ organisations, based on the 14th bi-annual
report of the SER. The conflict between trade unions and the government on
clause 8 of the Law on Wage Formation resulted in trade unions and employers’
organisations refusing to participate in further and future co-operation with the
government on incomes policy. In retaliation, the government De Jong (KVP,
ARP, CHU, VVD) unilaterally intervened in the agreement on price indexation.
In 1968, 1971, and 1972, on the other hand, the government concluded its in-
volvement in negotiations on incomes policy with the non-neo-corporatist
passive strategy (I). In 1968, the government, with great difficulty, finally suc-
ceeded in leaving the formation and implementation of incomes policy to trade
unions and employers’ organisations. 
In 1971, employers’ organisations refused to negotiate and asked the outgoing
government De Jong (KVP, ARP, CHU, VVD) to intervene. The government
intervened with a policy package that included a binding wage measure. Trade
unions resented this intervention and redressed its effects after expiration. The
incoming government Biesheuvel I (KVP, ARP, CHU, VVD, DS70) wanted to
patch-up relations with the trade unions and to give a new procedure for nego-
tiations on incomes policy devised by the SER, a fair chance. Consequently, the
previous government’s binding policy package was retroactively abolished.
In 1972, the search for a new system of formulating and implementing incomes
policy was still on. The SER proposed a new system. In order to give that system
a fair change, government refrained from any intervention.
In 1965 and 1973, the government’s opening and concluding strategies were neo-
corporatist. In 1965 the concluding government strategy was the congruent
strategy (III); in 1973 it was the co-operative strategy (II).
In 1965, the government was consistently involved as a third party in the annual
process of negotiations on incomes policy. The government tried to broker at
least a bipartite, but preferably a tripartite (Central) Agreement between trade
unions, employers’ organisations and the government. The government Marijnen
(KVP, ARP, CHU, VVD) actively intervened in the negotiations and tried to
facilitate agreement by offering a choice of various policy packages on incomes
policy to trade unions and employers’ organisations. When negotiations bogged
down in a deadlock, it was the government that resolved the deadlock with a new
proposal that was grudgingly accepted by both parties.
In 1973, the government consistently tried to get trade unions and employers’ or-
ganisations to conclude a bipartite (Central) Agreement by offering social part-
ners facilitating policies or policy packages. Although the outgoing Biesheuvel
II (KVP, ARP, CHU, VVD) government’s policy had significantly facilitated the
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bipartite Central Agreement concluded between trade unions and employers’
organisations at the national level, implementation led to conflicts between trade
unions and employers on the branch and company levels.
5.1.2 Style of decision-making
The style of decision-making of trade unions and employers’ organisations has
also to be understood within the context of the transition from a centrally, govern-
ment guided incomes policy to a free incomes policy. Their greater room to ma-
noeuvre at first led to more confrontation (A: Chicken). Confrontation increased
from three opening styles of decision-making to four concluding styles of de-
cision-making: 1969, and 1971 - 1973.
The confrontational style of decision-making (A) did not necessarily induce the
government to impose its incomes policy on social partners. This was only the
case in 1969. In 1971 and 1972 the government finally gave up any attempt to
get trade unions and employers’ organisations to conclude an agreement and
ended negotiations with the non-neo-corporatist passive government strategy (I).
In 1973 the government ended its involvement in negotiations on incomes policy
with the co-operative neo-corporatist strategy (II). Implementation of the
bipartite Central Agreement, however, led to conflicts between social partners on
the decentral levels. To sum up, in not a single year in which social partners
pursued a confrontational style of decision-making (A: Chicken), did the govern-
ment succeed in getting trade unions and employers’ organisations to come to a
(lasting) agreement. This implies that whether or not a government is successful
in getting social partners to come to an agreement largely depends on their style
of decision-making.
In 1969, negotiations on incomes policy were conducted on the decentral level.
Trade unions took a tougher stand than in the previous year. Employers’ organi-
sations kept fairly quiet. Trade unions got their way and collective contracts widely
exceeded the government’s preferred limits. Therefore, the government De Jong
(KVP, ARP, CHU, VVD) intervened.
Incomes policy in 1971 was completely determined by the effects of the so-
called ‘400 guilders wave’ of the second half of 1970. This ‘wave’ resulted from
a number of originally ‘wild-cat strikes’ that started in the ports of Rotterdam.
These were eventually taken over by the trade unions. The government started
with taking a firm stand on wages. The government then retracted its proposed
package to give trade unions and employers’ organisations a chance to come to
an agreement. To facilitate central negotiations, the government ‘froze’ clause 8
of the Law on Wage Formation. However, central negotiations broke down. Then
the government broke the deadlock with its own (binding) policy package.
Employers’ organisations supported the wage measure in that package. Trade
unions announced they would try to redress the government’s binding wage measure
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after expiration. And in that they succeeded. The new government refrained from
intervention.
In 1972, trade unions and employers’ organisations came to an agreement in the
SER to introduce a new system of formulating and implementing incomes policy.
Based on a discussion of an annual report on economic prospects prepared by
independent ‘crown-members’ of the SER, employers’ organisations and trade
unions will formulate their respective points of view on incomes policy in the
STAR. The government should refrain from intervention, as negotiations should
be free. The Biesheuvel I (KVP, ARP, CHU, VVD, DS70) government agreed to
this plan and retroactively abolished the binding wage measure for 1971 by the
previous government. Nevertheless, central negotiations broke down before they
had even properly started. Employers’ organisations refused to negotiate a Cen-
tral Agreement. Negotiations continued on the decentral level, accompanied by
strikes. 
In 1973, the need to combat inflation led the government Biesheuvel II (KVP,
ARP, CHU, VVD) to urge trade unions and employers’ organisations to conclude
a Central Agreement. In return, the government was prepared to implement a com-
prehensive policy for incomes and prices. Within the SER, trade unions and em-
ployers’ organisations also recommended in favour of a social contract between
the government and ‘social partners’. 
However, views on how to combat inflation differed fundamentally. Trade unions
demanded an expansion of the (semi-) public sector and a more levelled distri-
bution of incomes from the government. From employers’ organisations they de-
manded a commitment to comprehensive Central Agreements as a policy instru-
ment, support for their demands from government, and facilities for unions on
the plant level. Employers’ organisations had a quite different programme. They
demanded a reduction in the growth of both (semi-) public and private expen-
diture by reducing wage and price rises. Their paramount goal was to regain
competitiveness on the world market. Hence, the preferences of trade unions and
employers’ organisations were almost mutually exclusive (Chicken).
The outgoing government succeeded in getting the parties to reach a bipartite
Central Agreement by making major concessions to both. However, on the branch
and company level, the implementation of the agreement led to conflicts. 
The bargaining style of decision-making (B: Prisoners’ Dilemma) decreased
from five opening styles of decision-making to four concluding styles of de-
cision-making in the years 1965-1968. Bargaining, however, did not lead to more
agreement between social partners.
In 1965, 1966, and 1967, negotiations on incomes policy bogged down in a dead-
lock that was resolved by intervention of the government of the day: Marijnen
(KVP, ARP, CHU, VVD), Cals, (KVP, ARP, PvdA), and Zijlstra (KVP, ARP). In
1965, the government finally managed to formulate an incomes policy package
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on which social partners could agree. In 1966 and 1967 it was the government that
broke the deadlock with its binding incomes policy package.
Finally, in 1968, (de)central negotiations resulted in compromises that widely
exceeded the government’s preferred limits. Intervention by the government De
Jong (KVP, ARP, CHU, VVD) was, however, eventually rescinded.
Problem solving (C) between trade unions and employers’ organisations remained
constant at one year. In 1970, negotiations on incomes policy proceeded smoothly;
differences between the parties were minimal. Trade unions, however, were in
conflict with the government De Jong (KVP, ARP, CHU, VVD) on the new Law
on Wage Formation. That conflict eventually spilled over to incomes policy as
well and induced the government to end its involvement in negotiations on
incomes policy with binding interventions.
5.1.3 Conclusion
In this period, it was the combination of institutional changes in the annual pro-
cess of negotiation and implementation of incomes policy and the behaviour of
the actors involved that determined the outcome of that process. Both in terms
of government strategies and styles of decision-making; and in terms of Central
Agreements.
Opening government strategies were aimed at bringing social partners to a Cen-
tral Agreement, either by force (non-neo-corporatist guiding strategy IV) or by
persuasion and negotiation (neo-corporatist strategies II and III).
Social partners opted for bargaining (B: Prisoners’ Dilemma) over confrontation
(A: Chicken) or problem solving (C: Battle of the Sexes) to start the process of
negotiations on incomes policy. But due to their different preferences, during the
process of negotiations confrontation (A) increased and bargaining (B) fre-
quently led to deadlocks, making Central Agreements not feasible. The few attempts
at neo-corporatist strategies by the government were only marginally successful
in resolving the deadlocks or reducing the confrontations and producing a Cen-
tral Agreement (1965 and 1970). There was, apparently, little ‘trust’ (Mosch 2004)
and communication between actors. Each played their own game, instead of
trying to come to an agreement and to approach the core.
The government, therefore, in the end was left with two options. Either to take
over incomes policy to end the confrontations and deadlocks between social
partners with the non-neo-corporatist guiding strategy (IV), or to leave social
partners to their own devices with the non-neo-corporatist passive strategy (I). In
the first part of the period the government usually opted for the guiding strategy
(IV). As of 1970, with the introduction of the new Law on Wage Formation, the
government opted for the passive strategy (I) in an effort to give the new system
of negotiations on incomes policy a fair chance. 
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5.2 1974 - 1982: economic deterioration and deadlocks
Political developments in this period of nine years were characterised by coa-
lition governments that went back and forth between centre-left coalitions of
CDA36 and PvdA (Den Uyl, van Agt II) and centre-right coalitions of CDA and
VVD (van Agt I, Lubbers I). Whenever possible, based on the number of seats in
parliament, the CDA opted for a centre-right coalition with the VVD, as the
PvdA continued its strategy of ‘polarisation’ against KVP and VVD. Therefore,
coalition governments with the PvdA (and other centre or left parties) were only
reluctantly concluded when CDA and VVD together could not command a ma-
jority in parliament (see also Daudt 1982; chapter 3, section3.2.2.1; and Tables
3.1, 3.2 and 7.1).
The external shocks and watersheds in this period included the macroeconomic
effects of the first oil crisis of 1973, the second oil crisis of 1979/1980 and the
subsequent world recession of 1981 - 1983.
This period showed a clear majority of opening neo-corporatist government stra-
tegies at the start of the annual process of negotiations on incomes policy. How-
ever, finally, at the end of negotiations on incomes policy, concluding govern-
ment strategies were non-neo-corporatist in a majority of the years. Competition
(confrontation and bargaining) between social partners prevailed, both at the start
and at the end of the annual process of negotiations on incomes policy. Although
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36. From 1975, the confessional parties KVP, ARP, and CHU contested elections with one party list,
CDA. In 1980, the separate party organisations merged as well (see chapter 3, section 3.2.2.1). 
confrontation (A: Chicken) between social partners decreased considerably during
negotiations on incomes policy, no co-operation (problem solving (C: Battle of
the Sexes)) between them could be identified. 
Although confrontation between social partners diminished, the increase in the
bargaining style of decision-making (B: Prisoners’ Dilemma) did not lead to
more Central Agreements on incomes policy. On the contrary, negotiations
usually bogged down in deadlocks. In other words, Battle of the Sexes cannot be
played by one actor, whereas Chicken or Prisoner’s Dilemma both depend on the
relative strength of each player.
Government consistently tried to bring social partners to an agreement, either by
neo-corporatist or by non-neo-corporatist guiding strategies, but those efforts
failed in most years. In the smallest possible majority of the years, the govern-
ment took over responsibility for incomes policy. In the remaining years, the govern-
ment stuck to its original neo-corporatist strategy. With great difficulty, only one
lasting Central Agreement could be reached (1977). 
5.2.1 Government strategy
Government strategy in this period has to be understood within the context of the
effects of the two oil crises in 1973 and 1979/80 on economic developments in
general and on incomes policy in particular (stagflation: low economic growth
and high inflation). In this period, incomes in the market sector and in the (semi-
) public sector became firmly linked.
In a majority of the years, the government’s opening strategy was neo-corporatist.
As social partners found it difficult, if not impossible, to reach agreements, the
concluding government strategy was the non-neo-corporatist guiding strategy
(IV) in a majority of the years: 1974, 1976, and 1980 - 1982. In 1974 and 1976,
incomes policy was about the effects of the first oil crisis in 1973. In 1980 -
1982, incomes policy was about the effects of the second oil crisis of 1979/80
and the ensuing global recession of 1981 - 1983. Hence, neo-corporatist strate-
gies did not work.
In 1974, after the rank-and-file of the employers’ organisations rejected the
provisional bipartite Central Agreement that was brokered by the government,
the oil crisis broke out. The government Den Uyl (PvdA, KVP, ARP, D66,
PPR)37 reacted with special emergency legislation that gave it extraordinary
powers to enforce temporary macroeconomic policies to combat the effects of
the oil crisis. Social partners subsequently again failed to reach any agreement.
The emergency legislation was then expanded with a binding wage measure that,
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37. The Den Uyl government was widely considered to be quite left of centre and therefore its rapport
with especially the employers’ organisations was quite low (see for instance Becker 1994: 247-267;
van den Broek 2002).
as with the earlier package, took into account the agendas of both trade unions
and employers’ organisations.
In 1976 all attempts by the government Den Uyl to get parties to conclude a
Central Agreement failed. Trade unions and employers’ organisations were not
willing to come to an agreement. This forced the government to take over re-
sponsibility for incomes policy. 
In the period 1980 - 1982, the economic situation gradually worsened, as an
effect of the second oil crisis in 1979/80. Incomes policy from 1980 to 1982 was
determined by the Van Agt I (CDA, VVD) government’s policy programme
Bestek 81 (Direction 81) that provided the framework for (de)central nego-
tiations. The programme aimed at a reduction of the rapidly increasing budget
deficit. To that effect, incomes policy in the market sector had to result in mode-
ration. Because of all the linking mechanisms between the market sector and the
(semi-) public sector, a moderate incomes policy in the market sector made it
more feasible to achieve moderation in the (semi-) public sector as well. This in
turn would contribute to a reduction of (the rate of increase of) the deficit. 
During the whole period 1980 - 1982, trade unions and employers’ organisations
were unable to reach any Central Agreement, although they came quite close in
1980. The main obstacle was their widely differing views on how to tackle the
economic problems that resulted in ever growing budget deficits. Neither party
was prepared to give an inch on the issue of incomes. Consequently, to reach its
objective of a reduction of (the rate of increase of) the deficit, government largely
took over responsibility for incomes policy in these years. 
In 1975, and 1977 - 1979, the government stuck to a neo-corporatist opening and
concluding government strategy. These were all of the co-operative variety (II).
In 1979, during the process of negotiations on incomes policy, the government
also put pressure on trade unions and employers’ organisations to get them to
conclude an agreement before concluding the negotiations with the co-operative
strategy. In these four years, the government consistently tried to get trade unions
and employers’ organisations to conclude bipartite (Central) Agreements by offering
social partners facilitating policies or policy packages. However, only in 1977
did the government, with great difficulty, finally succeeded in getting social
partners to conclude a lasting Central Agreement.
In 1975, the government Den Uyl’s (PvdA, KVP, ARP, D66, PPR) policy pack-
age first served as an attempt to get trade unions and employers’ organisations to
conclude a Central Agreement. Negotiations, however, bogged down in a dead-
lock. The subsequently enlarged government’s policy package was nevertheless
implemented and served as the bottom line for decentral negotiations in which
the government did not intervene.
In 1977, the government Den Uyl (PvdA, KVP, ARP, D66, PPR) facilitated
central negotiations between trade unions and employers’ organisations. How-
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ever, central negotiations broke down. Negotiations on the decentral level were
marked by conflicts over the automatic price compensation. These conflicts were
eventually resolved by a Central Agreement between trade unions and em-
ployers’ organisations, that was mediated by the government.
In 1978, both the outgoing government Den Uyl (PvdA, KVP, ARP, D66, PPR)
and the incoming government Van Agt I (CDA, VVD) tried to facilitate nego-
tiations between trade unions and employers’ organisations by offering compen-
sating policies. But social partners agreed that the government’s package was not
sufficient to conclude a bipartite Central Agreement. Both governments refrained
from intervention in (the outcome of) decentral negotiations.
Negotiations on incomes policy in 1979 were largely determined by the Van Agt
I (CDA, VVD) government’s policy programme Bestek 81 (Direction 81). Due
to the steadily worsening economic situation, the government planned to cut
(semi-) public sector spending. The aim was to reduce the rapidly growing
budget deficit, and to increase profitability of companies in the market sector. At
the same time, the government’s policy package to facilitate negotiations did
include incentives for especially the trade unions to entice them to conclude a
Central Agreement. These incentives, however, fell far short of the unions’
demands. The subsequently enlarged government’s policy package with extra pu-
blic expenditure equally failed to bring trade unions and employers’ organi-
sations to a Central Agreement. The enlarged policy package was the framework
in which decentral negotiations took place. Government did not intervene in the
outcome of these negotiations.
5.2.2 Style of decision-making
Styles of decision-making of trade unions and employers’ organisations have to
be understood within the context of the two oil crises in 1973 and 1979/80, and
the linkage of incomes in the market sector and the (semi-) public sector as well.
Their widely differing views on how to tackle the economic problems that re-
sulted from the oil crises and the linkage are reflected in the five years in which
the opening style of decision-making was confrontational (A: Chicken). How-
ever, the concluding styles of decision-making were confrontational in only two
years: 1979 and 1981. In 1979, trade unions refused to conclude a Central Agree-
ment based on the Van Agt I (CDA, VVD) government’s policy programme
Bestek 81 (Direction 81). In decentral negotiations on incomes policy, trade
unions succeeded in getting compensation for price rises, plus a modest wage
rise on top of that for about half of the workforce. Nevertheless, the government
ended its involvement in negotiations on incomes policy with the co-operative
neo-corporatist strategy (II).
In 1981, negotiations broke down. Trade unions rejected the government’s offer
of a policy package of public expenditure in exchange for a Central Agreement.
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In response, employers’ organisations refused to negotiate. Consequently, the
government Van Agt I (CDA, VVD) imposed its own policy package on trade
unions and employers’ organisations. 
The bargaining style of decision-making (B: Prisoners’ Dilemma) increased
from four opening styles to seven concluding styles: 1974-1978, 1980, and 1982.
This did not, however, lead to more agreements between social partners. In 1974,
the rank and file of the employers’ organisations rejected the provisional bi-
partite Central Agreement (see note 4). The oil crisis induced the government
Den Uyl (PvdA, KVP, ARP, D66, PPR) to implement its own policy package.
This package was carefully designed, based on the original agendas of trade
unions and employers’ organisations, and the narrowly failed agreement. 
Negotiations on incomes policy between social partners again bogged down in
deadlocks and came to a halt in 1975 and 1976. The government Den Uyl
(PvdA, KVP, ARP, D66, PPR) resolved these deadlocks. In 1975 and 1976, the
government introduced a policy package of extra public expenditure to boost the
economy. In 1976 this package included a ‘wage freeze’ as well.
In 1977, with great difficulty, the government Den Uyl (PvdA, KVP, ARP, D66,
PPR) finally succeeded in getting trade unions and employers’ organisations to
set aside their differences on the automatic price compensation and to conclude
a bipartite Central Agreement. 
In 1978, neither the outgoing government Den Uyl (PvdA, KVP, ARP, D66,
VVD), nor the incoming government Van Agt I (CDA, VVD), succeeded in
getting trade unions and employers’ organisations to conclude a Central Agree-
ment, despite the offer of compensatory policy packages. The central issue in
decentral negotiations on incomes policy was the preservation of jobs, in return
for wage moderation.
In 1980 and 1982, negotiations between social partners again bogged down in a
deadlock and came to a halt. The deadlocks were eventually broken by the
government Van Agt I (CDA, VVD), which imposed its own policy package. 
5.2.3 Conclusion
In this period it was a combination of institutional changes in the annual process
of negotiation and implementation of incomes policy through the linkage of
incomes in the market sector and the (semi-) public sector within the context of
a steadily worsening economic performance after two oil crises (stagflation) and
the behaviour of the actors involved that determined the outcome of that process.
Both in terms of government strategies and styles of decision-making; and in
terms of Central Agreements.
Opening government strategies were largely neo-corporatist and were aimed at
bringing social partners to a Central Agreement to counter the detrimental macro-
economic effects of both oil crises and the linkage of incomes in the market
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sector and the (semi-) public sector.
Social partners on the other hand opted for confrontation (A: Chicken) over
bargaining (B: Prisoners’ Dilemma) at the start of negotiations due to their
widely differing views on how to tackle the economic problems that resulted
from the oil crises and the linkage of incomes in the market sector and the (semi-
) public sector. But during the process of negotiations confrontation decreased
considerably while bargaining increased in the same measure. However, due to
differing preferences more bargaining led to more deadlocks during negotia-
tions. The government’s neo-corporatist strategies were not able to bridge these
differing preferences and, therefore, largely failed to resolve these deadlocks,
making Central Agreements unfeasible. Given the steadily worsening macro-
economic performance and the linkage of incomes in the market sector and the
(semi-) public sector governments were basically left with two options. The first
option was to dictate an agreement by following a non-neo-corporatist guiding
strategy (IV). Both the government Den Uyl and the government Van Agt I used
these guiding government strategies in the years directly following the two oil
crises.
The second option was to try and overcome the deadlocks between social partners
by inducing them to come to a Central Agreement by using neo-corporatist
government strategies. Both governments used neo-corporatist strategies in the
years between the two oil crises. But in only one case were these strategies
effective in bringing social partners to a Central Agreement (1977).
The potential third option, the non-neo-corporatist passive strategy (I) was no
real option in this period given the combined effects of the two oil crises and the
linkage on macroeconomic performance and the government’s budget.
5.3 1983 - 1992: from economic crisis to tentative recovery and from forced
agreements to negotiated agreements
During this period of 10 years, in politics, both centre-left and centre-right coali-
tions were possible based on the number of seats in parliament for each coalition
government. The CDA was the dominant party in parliament and government
and determined whether it was to be a centre-right coalition with the VVD
(Lubbers I & II), or a centre-left coalition with the PvdA (Lubbers III). As the
PvdA had discontinued its ‘polarisation’ strategy after the failed Van Agt II
(CDA, PvdA, D66) government of 1981 - 1982 (see for instance Becker 1994:
283-295), the CDA (re)considered the party as a potential coalition partner,
although CDA and VVD together commanded a majority in parliament during
this whole period (see also Tables 3.1, 3.2 and 7.1).
External shocks and watersheds in this period included first the end of the world
recession of 1981 - 1983 at the start of the period. Second, at the end of the
period, the announcement in Maastricht in 1991 of the preparation for a Euro-
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pean Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999. Third, the third oil crisis of 1992 and the
subsequent start of the world recession of 1992 - 1994 in the wake of the Gulf
War for the liberation of Kuwait from an Iraqi invasion.
In this period neo-corporatist and non-neo-corporatist government strategies
were in balance, both at the start as well as at the end of the annual process of
negotiations on incomes policy. Concluding non-neo-corporatist government
strategies were all of the passive category (I).
Competition (confrontation (A: Chicken) and bargaining (B: prisoners’ Dilemma))
between trade unions and employers’ organisations still prevailed over co-ope-
ration (problem solving (C)). But confrontation (A: Chicken) again decreased
during the annual negotiation process while the problem solving style of de-
cision-making (C: Battle of the Sexes) remained at two.
Less confrontation (A: Chicken) between social partners, more bargaining (B:
Prisoners’ Dilemma) and some problem solving (C: Battle of the Sexes) in this
period led to more Central Agreements than in the previous period: five as
opposed to one (1983, 1984, 1987, 1990, 1991). Government strategy in the first
part of the period was the non-neo-corporatist passive strategy (I). Government
could leave incomes policy in the market sector to social partners and concen-
trate its efforts on reducing the budget deficit for the following reasons. Firstly,
the government had forced social partners to come to a Central Agreement on
wage moderation in the market sector (‘Wassenaar’: 1983, 1984). Secondly, the
government had subsequently delinked incomes in the market sector from in-
comes in the (semi-) public sector. Incomes policy in the (semi-) public sector
was completely government directed and aimed at reducing (government) ex-
penditure in that sector in order to reduce the budget deficit.
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Government strategy with respect to incomes policy in the market sector in the
second part of the period was neo-corporatist in an effort to further Central
Agreements on (un)employment between social partners (1987, 1990, 1991).
Central Agreements in this period remained firmly based on the bargaining style
of decision-making (B: Prisoners’ Dilemma). These agreements were not an
expression of a significant change towards the problem solving style (C: ‘Battle
of the Sexes (Scharpf 1998 - see also chapter 3, section 3.3.2 and chapter 4,
section 4.5)). Rather they were an expression of the removal of the main source
of the widely differing views between trade unions, employers’ organisations,
and the government that largely determined incomes policy: the linkage between
incomes in the market sector and in the (semi-) public sector. In addition, during
half the period, the concluding government strategy was non-neo-corporatist as
well. Therefore, in the context of severe macroeconomic problems, combined
with the delinkage of the market sector and the (semi-) public sector, bargaining
between social partners in this period did at least lead to agreements in the
market sector, whereas in the previous periods it usually led to deadlocks.
5.3.1 Government strategy
Government strategy in this period has to be understood within the context of the
delinking of the (semi-) public sector from the market sector between 1983 and
1989, and the government’s policy aim of reducing the budget deficit by re-
ducing the (semi-) public sector. The linkage between the market sector and the
(semi-) public sector was restored only partially and on an ad hoc basis in the
years 1990 - 1992 (see also Hemerijck 2003: 53 ff.). 
The government’s opening and concluding strategies were non-neo-corporatist
in half the period and neo-corporatist in the other half. Concluding non-neo-
corporatist government strategies were all of the passive variety (I): 1983 - 1986,
and 1992. Concluding neo-corporatist government strategies in the years 1987 -
1991 were of the co-operative variety (II) in 1988, 1989, and 1991, and of the
congruent variety (III) in 1987 and 1990.
With respect to the concluding non-neo-corporatist passive strategy (I), it was
the effect of the ‘Wassenaar’-agreement that determined incomes policy in the
market sector in 1983, 1984, 1985, and 1986. The ‘Wassenaar’-agreement was
struck between trade unions and employers’ organisations under strong pressure
by the incoming government Lubbers I (CDA, VVD). The agreement effected an
exchange between price compensation and working hours. This exchange re-
sulted in wage moderation in the market sector. Through all linking mechanisms
this moderation extended to the (semi-) public sector as well. That gave the
Lubbers I government some breathing space to develop a new policy package for
the (semi-) public sector. First, in 1983, all linking mechanisms between the mar-
ket sector and the (semi-) public sector were put on hold. Next, in 1984, a cut in
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real terms of wages, pensions and benefits was implemented. On the issue of
incomes policy, negotiations in the market sector were minimal as most col-
lective contracts struck in 1983, covered 1984 as well. The government, there-
fore, did not intervene in incomes policy in the market sector.
In 1985, the Lubbers I (CDA, VVD) government continued its programme of
cuts in the (semi-) public sector. Some of these cuts affected the market sector as
well. Collective contracts were a compromise: government cuts in social security
were repaired, but at the cost of the trade unions’ demands for a 36-hour working
week. Although trade unions managed to redress the effect of the government’s
policy package, and costs for employers went up, the net result remained wage
moderation, which was the government’s aim. The little money available in the
market sector had to be used to redress the government’s austerity measures,
instead of for higher wages (see also 1992). And, with all linking mechanisms
between market sector and (semi-) public sector put on hold, there was no danger
of a ‘spill-over’. Consequently, the government did not intervene in incomes
policy in the market sector.
In 1986, negotiations on incomes policy were conducted on the decentral level.
Trade unions did not succeed in a collective reduction of the working week.
Instead, they had to agree to the continuation of other forms of reducing the
working week, like early retirement, part time jobs, more holidays, and the like.
Wage rises were no real issue, quite a few collective contracts struck in 1985
covered two years instead of one. On the central level, the government succeeded
in getting trade unions and employers’ organisations to come to an agreement
amongst themselves and with the government on the reduction of unemploy-
ment. All linking mechanisms between the market sector and the (semi-) public
sector were still on hold. Consequently, the government did not need to intervene
in incomes policy in the market sector.
Finally, in 1992, all three parties went their separate ways. Central negotiations
did not take place. Decentral negotiations resulted in compromises between trade
unions and employers’ organisations (see also 1985). As the Lubbers III (CDA,
PvdA) government’s policies with regard to the (semi-) public sector were not in
jeopardy - the linkage between the market sector and the (semi-) public sector
was only partially restored -, the government did not need to intervene in incomes
policy in the market sector. To sum up, in 1984, 1986, and 1992 the government
refrained from any involvement in the annual process of negotiations on incomes
policy. In 1983 and 1985, the government’s concluding passive strategy (I) is
preceded by the neo-corporatist congruent strategy (III) and the other non-neo-
corporatist guiding strategy (IV).
With respect to the concluding neo-corporatist government strategies (II+III) in
the years 1987-1991, except for 1991, the government consistently tried to get trade
unions and employers’ organisations to conclude bipartite or tripartite (Central)
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Agreements by offering social partners facilitating policies or policy packages.
In 1991, during the process of negotiations on incomes policy, the government also
put pressure on trade unions and employers’ organisations to get them to conclude
an agreement before concluding the negotiations with a co-operative strategy (II).
With some difficulty, the Lubbers II (CDA, VVD) government succeeded in
1987 in getting trade unions and employers’ organisations to participate in a tri-
partite Central Agreement. The agreement was that parties renewed their com-
mitment to previous bipartite and tripartite agreements on employment policies.
Decentral negotiations on incomes policy progressed with difficulty. Employers’
organisations determined the outcome with respect to working hours, while trade
unions succeeded in countering the government’s reduction of the level of social
security benefits from 80 to 70% of last earnings.
In 1988, trade unions and employers’ organisations did not succeed in con-
cluding a Central Agreement. The four bi- and tripartite working parties on em-
ployment policies that were installed as a result of the 1986 negotiations con-
tinued their work and issued their reports thanks to intervention by the Lubbers
II (CDA, VVD) government. These reports served as a basis for decentral nego-
tiations. Decentral collective contracts were largely determined by employers
and only marginally featured aspects of employment policies recommended by
the working parties. The government, however, refrained from intervention in
these contracts.
Despite attempts and offers by the Lubbers II (CDA, VVD) government, central
negotiations on employment policies did not result in a Central Agreement in
1989. On the issue of sick leave and disability a tripartite working group was
started. Decentral negotiations on incomes policy showed some effect of the re-
commendations of the previous working parties on employment.
In 1990, tripartite negotiations between trade unions, employers’ organisations
and the Lubbers III (CDA, PvdA) government resulted in a tripartite Central
Agreement, the ‘Joint Policy Framework’. The aims were to institute an ‘acti-
vating’ labour market policy, to reinstate the linkage between wages and benefits
in the (semi-) public sector and wages in the market sector, and to sustain com-
petitiveness of companies. Decentral negotiations on incomes policy were
characterised by strikes and other conflicts and ended in comprises, based on
employment policies recommended by earlier working parties.
Finally, in 1991, under pressure from the Lubbers III (CDA, PvdA) government,
trade unions and employers’ organisations came to an agreement amongst them-
selves and with the government on sick leave and disability, and on employment
for ethnic minorities. Decentral negotiations on incomes policy resulted in a
higher wage rise than originally stipulated by the government. In the end the
government refrained from intervention, despite earlier threats. The linkage be-
tween the market sector and the (semi-) public sector remained in tact. 
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5.3.2 Style of decision-making
Styles of decision-making of trade unions and employers’ organisations have al-
so got to be understood within the context of delinking the (semi-) public sector
from the market sector between 1983 and 1989, and the government’s policy aim
of reducing the budget deficit by reducing the (semi-) public sector.
Confrontation (A: Chicken) in the market sector was reduced from five opening
to three concluding styles of decision-making in 1986, 1988, and 1992. A con-
frontational style of decision-making did not necessarily lead the government to
impose its incomes policy on social partners. In two years the government finally
gave up any attempt to get trade unions and employers’ organisations to come to
an agreement and concluded negotiations with the non-neo-corporatist passive
government strategy (I): 1986 and 1992. In 1988, the government opened and
ended its involvement in negotiations on incomes policy with attempts to fa-
cilitate negotiations with the co-operative neo-corporatist strategy (II). In none
of these cases the government succeeded in getting trade unions and employers’
organisations to come to a (lasting) agreement.
Negotiations on incomes policy in the market sector in 1986 took place on the
decentral level. The main issue was further wage moderation in exchange for a
36-hour working week. Despite strikes and conflicts, trade unions did not suc-
ceed in getting a significant reduction of the working week. In 1992, all parties
went their separate ways. Central negotiations did not take place. In decentral
negotiations on incomes policy trade unions managed to get their way to a large
extent.
In 1988, trade unions and employers’ organisations could not come to a Central
Agreement due to the large differences between their agendas. Trade unions
wanted a reduction of unemployment, equal treatment of workers in the market
and the (semi-) public sector, extra money for the lowest incomes, and (massive)
government investment in infrastructure and the environment to create jobs. On
top of that, the FNV also wanted an increase in real buying power of all em-
ployees. The CNV on the other hand, was still prepared to exercise wage mo-
deration.
The Lubbers II (CDA, VVD) government, however, planned to considerably
increase budget cuts, which included a continuation of differential treatment of
employees in the (semi-) public sector, and no extra government investments for
jobs. As a concession to trade unions, the government was prepared to up child
and holiday allowances, to give the lowest paid an extra one-off payment, and to
lower taxes and social security premiums to prop up buying power.
Employers’ organisations agreed to the aim of the government’s budget: a con-
tinuation of reducing the budget deficit, even at the expense of extra budget cuts,
and a continuation of the reduction of wage costs and other costs. They rejected
any Central Agreement as that would only serve as a minimum, and thus create
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an upward effect on wage costs. For employers, differentiation was the key word.
They criticised the government’s budget for not going far enough in reducing
costs and expenditure. The increase in child and holiday allowances offered by
the government, for instance, had to be paid by employers and thus would in-
crease their wage costs. 
Central negotiations on incomes policy broke down. Decentral negotiations re-
garded some 60% of the workforce in the market sector. The outcome was
largely determined by the employers: a minimal wage rise, no further collective
reduction of working hours, no expansion of early retirement schemes, and the
introduction of flexible wage systems in a few contracts.
The bargaining style of decision-making (B: Prisoners’ Dilemma) increased
from three opening to five concluding styles in 1985, 1987, 1989, 1990, and
1991. The reduction of confrontation (A) and the increase in bargaining (B) did
lead to more Central Agreements in this period, as opposed to the two previous
periods 1965 - 1973 and 1974 - 1982 (see also the problem solving style of de-
cision making (C) below).
In 1985, central negotiations did not result in any bipartite or tripartite agree-
ment. Decentral negotiations were characterised by conflicts in which trade
unions tried to redress at least part of the government’s Lubbers I (CDA, VVD)
policy package. The government did not intervene in these negotiations although
trade unions were partially successful. On the issue of working hours, however,
employers were able to withstand unions’ demand for a 36-hour week.
With some difficulty the Lubbers II (CDA, VVD) government succeeded in
getting employers’ organisations and trade unions to conclude a tripartite Central
Agreement with the government in 1987. The agreement was that all parties re-
newed their commitment to previous agreements on employment policies. Decentral
negotiations on incomes policy progressed with difficulty. Employers’ organi-
sations determined the outcome with respect to working hours, whilst trade unions
succeeded in countering the legal reduction of social security benefit levels from
80% to 70% of last earnings. Employers agreed to top up these percentages. 
In 1989, negotiations on incomes policy were conducted on the decentral level.
Wages rose moderately, no further reduction in working hours was achieved and
early retirement schemes were not expanded. Despite attempts and offers by the
Lubbers II (CDA, VVD) government, central negotiations on employment poli-
cies did not result in an agreement. 
In 1990, tripartite negotiations between the incoming Lubbers III (CDA, PvdA)
government and trade unions and employers’ organisations resulted in a tripartite
Central Agreement: the ‘Joint Policy Framework’. The agreement aimed at an
‘activating’ labour market policy, reinstating the linkage between wages in the
market sector and wages and benefits in the (semi-) public sector, and sustaining
competitiveness of companies. 
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In 1991, under pressure from the government Lubbers III (CDA, PvdA), trade
unions and employers’ organisations came to an agreement on sick leave and dis-
ability, and on employment for ethnic minorities. Decentral negotiations on in-
comes policy resulted in a higher wage rise than originally stipulated by the govern-
ment. The government, however, refrained from intervention. Most collective
contracts included clauses on sick leave and disability, and on employment for
ethnic minorities.
The problem solving style of decision-making (C: Battle of the Sexes) remained
stable at two opening and two concluding styles. The concluding styles occurred
in 1983 and 1984 in connection with the Central ‘Wassenaar’ Agreement.
Under strong pressure from the incoming government Lubbers I (CDA, VVD),
which threatened to continue the previous governments’ policy to impose binding
incomes policy measures on social partners, trade unions and employers’ organi-
sations succeeded in concluding a bipartite Central Agreement in 1983. The
‘Wassenaar Agreement’ was an exchange of the automatic price compensation
for a reduction in working hours and the creation of part time jobs. The aim was
to keep the government out of incomes policy in the market sector. Incomes policy
in the market sector in 1984 was also determined by the bipartite ‘Wassenaar
Agreement’and ensuing collective contracts struck in 1983 that covered 1984 as well.
5.3.3 Conclusion
It was a combination of institutional changes in the annual process of negotiation
and implementation of incomes policy through the delinkage of incomes in the
market sector and the (semi-) public sector in an effort to reduce the govern-
ment’s budget deficit, within the context of the aftermath of the deepest reces-
sion after World War II, and the behaviour of the actors involved in the process
of negotiations on incomes policy, that determined the outcome of that process.
Both in terms of government strategies and styles of decision-making; and in
terms of Central Agreements.
Opening government strategies where non-neo-corporatist in the early and latter
part of the period and neo-corporatist in between. All the time, the government’s
aim was to get social partners to come to a Central Agreement. 
Even after ‘Wassenaar’, social partners still opted for confrontation (A: Chicken)
over bargaining (B: Prisoners’ Dilemma) or problem solving (C: Battle of the
Sexes) at the start of negotiations on incomes policy, due to their still widely
differing views on how to tackle the macroeconomic problems (especially un-
employment) resulting from the oil crises. However, during the process of nego-
tiations confrontation again decreased whereas bargaining increased. Due to the
macroeconomic context and the delinkage of the market sector and the (semi-)
public sector, increased bargaining in the market sector in this period did not lead
to more deadlocks as it did in the previous period, when bargaining was based
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on the linkage of the market sector and the (semi-) public sector in the macro-
economic context of the aftermath of the worst recession after 1945.
Right at the start of the period, the government Lubbers I managed to force social
partners to come to a Central Agreement on incomes policy in the market sector
(‘Wassenaar’: 1983, 1984). That agreement enabled the government to delink the
market sector and the (semi-) public sector and leave incomes policy in the market
sector to social partners. The government’s concluding strategy in the first part
of the period was the non-neo-corporatist passive strategy (I). 
In the latter part of the period, the government actively intervened in the annual
negotiations on incomes policy in the market sector by neo-corporatist govern-
ment strategies that induced social partners to come to a Central Agreement on
employment issues in 1987, 1990, and 1991.
5.4 1993 - 2000: economic recovery, EMU, and more negotiated agreements
Political developments in this period of eight years included a major change in
coalition government. Both CDA and PvdA lost heavily in the 1994 elections
that followed the Lubbers III (CDA, PvdA) government. However, the CDA lost
more seats than the PvdA who became the largest party in parliament. The
centre-left coalition of CDA and PvdA that was dominated by the CDA (Lubbers
III) was replaced by the ‘purple’ coalition in which PvdA (left - ‘red’) and VVD
(right - ‘blue’) co-operated (Kok I & II). For the first time since 1917, christian
democracy (or one or more of its forebears) was not in government. And for the
first time since 1951, PvdA and VVD were together in government again.
The first ‘purple’ coalition (Kok I) of 1994 was a minimal winning coalition of
PvdA+D66+VVD, which was forced by D66, which refused to consider a centre-
right coalition government with the CDA and the VVD that was also a possibility
based on the number of seats in parliament. The second ‘purple’ coalition of
1998 (Kok II) was an oversized coalition of PvdA+D66+VVD, PvdA and VVD
together commanded a majority in parliament (see also Tables 3.1, 3.2 and 7.1).
The external shocks and watersheds in this period included the end of the world
recession of 1992 - 1994 that led to economic recovery and the continued pre-
paration for the European Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999 that was agreed upon
in Maastricht in 1991. This induced a strict budgetary discipline on participating
governments.
In this period neo-corporatist strategies dominated government strategy, both at
the start and particularly at the end of the annual process of negotiations on in-
comes policy. The government’s main neo-corporatist strategy was the co-opera-
tive strategy (II).
Competition (confrontation (A: Chicken) and bargaining (B: Prisoners’ Dilemma))
between trade unions and employers’ organisations still prevailed over co-opera-
tion (problem solving (C)). Nevertheless, confrontation (A: Chicken) again de-
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creased during the annual process of negotiations on incomes policy, and in the
end in two years the problem solving style of decision-making (C: Battle of the
Sexes) could be identified.
Confrontation between social partners was minimal. Bargaining (B: Prisoners’
Dilemma) also decreased slightly. However, problem solving increased. Less
confrontation and bargaining and more problem solving led to six Central
Agreements (1993, 1994, 1996 - 1999). Contrary to the previous period, govern-
ment strategy was (almost) consistently neo-corporatist from the start of the
annual negotiations on incomes policy to their conclusion, in an effort to further
these agreements.
But again, as in the previous period, Central Agreements in this period also re-
mained firmly based on the concluding bargaining style of decision-making (B).
Central Agreements were not the result of a significant change towards the
problem solving style of decision-making (C: Battle of the Sexes (Scharpf 1998)
- see also chapter 3, section 3.3.2 and chapter 4, section 4.5). What was different
compared to the previous period was that government strategy was now almost
consistently neo-corporatist from opening to concluding the annual process of
negotiations on incomes policy. 
5.4.1 Government strategy
Government strategy in this period can be understood within the context of the
preparation for the EMU in 1999, and economic recovery after 1994, and their
respective effects on incomes policy. Preparation for the EMU38 meant that the
government’s policy continued to aim at a reduction of the budget deficit by a re-
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38. EMU criteria included a public debt of not more than 60% of GDP; an annual budget deficit of not
more than 3% of GDP; and an inflation rate on or very near the European average.
duction of the (semi-) public sector. Economic recovery at the same time ensured
the continuation of a partial and ad hoc relinking of the market sector and the
(semi-) public sector in all but two years during this period (1994, 1995).
Opening government strategies were neo-corporatist in the great majority of the
years in this period, whereas concluding government strategies were neo-cor-
poratist in all years. The concluding government strategy was co-operative (II) in
1994 - 1998, and in 2000. The concluding government strategy was congruent
(III) in 1993 and 1999.
In the years 1994 - 1998, and in 2000, the government consistently tried to get trade
unions and employers’ organisations to conclude bipartite (Central) Agreements
by offering social partners facilitating policies or policy packages. In 1994,
during the process of negotiations on incomes policy, the government also put
pressure on trade unions and employers’ organisations to get them to conclude
an agreement before finally concluding its involvement in negotiations with the
co-operative strategy (II).
In 1994, pressure by the government Lubbers III (CDA, PvdA), combined with
economic difficulties, induced trade unions and employers’ organisations to
conclude a bipartite Central Agreement: ‘A new direction’. The agreement set
the agenda for decentral negotiations on incomes policy in 1994 and the following
years. Employers’ organisations gave up their resistance to collective reductions
in working hours, trade unions agreed to further decentralisation, differentiation
and flexibilisation of the terms of employment. Both parties also agreed in the
SER that the minimum wage and benefits should remain ‘frozen’ in 1994. De-
central negotiations on incomes policy proceeded on the basis of this agreement.
Wage rises in the market sector were minimal, but most contracts contained
clauses on blocked, tax-free savings accounts that were introduced by the govern-
ment to make wage moderation more feasible.
In 1995, central negotiations on (un)employment and wage moderation did not
lead to a Central Agreement, but parties agreed to a joint investigation how to
create more jobs as an input for negotiations in 1996. Government policy of the
government Kok I (PvdA, D66, VVD) was directed by the EMU criteria. To that
effect, the market sector and the (semi-) public sector were delinked again, but
taxes, social security premiums and other levies were lowered to prop up buying
power. Besides, government subsidised 40,000 ‘additional’ jobs in the (semi-)
public sector. Finally, the government announced that disability and sick leave
benefits would be completely overhauled. Decentral negotiations on incomes
policy were characterised by conflicts and a long duration. Trade unions realised
their wage demands but had to accept re-financing of early retirement schemes.
Central negotiations in 1996 were about the long-term unemployment of ethnic
minorities. The 1991 bipartite agreement was extended for another year. In
exchange, the government ceased its policy of making collective contracts only
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provisionally binding for the whole industry or economic sector. With respect to
incomes policy, the government Kok I (PvdA, D66, VVD) reinstated the linkage
between the market sector and the (semi-) public sector. Decentral bargaining on
incomes policy resulted in compromises. Wage rises were on or very near the
target trade unions had set. But no significant reduction in working hours was
achieved.
In 1997, the Kok I (PvdA, D66, VVD) government’s policy package included the
continued linkage between the market sector and the (semi-) public sector, plus
a tax reduction targeted especially at lower incomes derived from paid work.
This tax reduction was meant to further employment in low paid jobs and to
increase the financial difference between incomes derived from low paid jobs
and incomes derived from social security benefits. Trade unions and employers’
organisations re-affirmed their commitment to the 1994 bipartite Central Agree-
ment ‘A new direction’, and the 1991 and 1996 bipartite Central Agreements
aimed at getting the long term unemployed ethnic minorities a job. Decentral
collective contracts were concluded without much difficulty. Nevertheless, trade
unions were only marginally successful in pressing their demands.
The Kok I (PvdA, VVD, D66) government’s agenda for 1998 included a hefty
increase in government spending and at the same time a further reduction of the
deficit to 1.7%. The government claimed that in general the policy of reducing
(labour) costs to further wage moderation had proved to be successful in the past
years. Trade unions and employers’organisations agreed on a new bipartite ‘Agenda
2002’ for contractual negotiations in the coming years, based on the 1994 bi-
partite agreement ‘A new direction’. Decentral negotiations on incomes policy
resulted in contracts that were a trade-off between wages and re-financing of
early retirement schemes.
Finally, in 2000, contacts between the Kok II (PvdA, D66, VVD) government,
trade unions and employers’ organisations on the central level involved an ex-
change of points of view. With regard to incomes policy, government stated that
it trusted trade unions and employers’ organisations to agree to a ‘responsible’ in-
comes policy, and refrained from making its customary appeal for moderation.
The government also pledged to continue its policy of lowering taxes and other
(labour) costs to further a moderate incomes policy. Negotiations took place on
the decentral level and proceeded without much difficulty, as the economy was
booming and government policy gave buying power of the lower paid an extra
boost. Contracts already concluded for 2000 in 1999 showed an average wage
rise of some 3%. Average wage rises in new contracts for 2000 neared the 4%,
with an inflation of 2%. Government concluded, however, that these wage rises
were still within reasonable limits.
In 1993 and 1999, the government was consistently involved as a third party in
the annual process of negotiations on incomes policy with the neo-corporatist con-
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gruent strategy (III). The government tried to broker at least a bipartite, but pre-
ferably a tripartite (Central) Agreement between trade unions, employers’ orga-
nisations and the government. Only in 1993, did the government also put pres-
sure on trade unions and employers’ organisations to get them to agree to a wage
pause. As this succeeded, the government then ended its involvement in ne-
gotiations with the congruent strategy (III). 
Faced with deteriorating economic prospects, in 1993, with great difficulty the
government Lubbers III (CDA, PvdA) succeeded in getting trade unions and
employers’ organisations to agree to a bipartite Central Agreement on a wage
pause. The wage pause was made possible by the government’s policy to prop up
buying power of employees, and by a partial linkage between the market sector
and the (semi-) public sector. Decentral collective contracts involved a trade-off
between wage rises and reparation of the effects of the government’s policy with
regard to sick leave and disability (instead of 80% of last earnings, new cases
would only get 70%).
Lastly, in 1999, the new government’s Kok II (PvdA, D66, VVD) agenda for in-
comes policy aimed at more jobs and a continuation of the linkage of the market
sector and the (semi-) public sector. During central negotiations, trade unions
and employers’ organisations concluded a series of Central Agreements with
each other and with the government. These were both a re-affirmation of previous
bipartite and tripartite agreements, and the adoption of new policy issues like child-
care. Decentral negotiations on incomes policy proceeded on the basis of these
agreements, and resulted in compromises with which both parties were satisfied.
5.4.2 Style of decision-making
Styles of decision-making of trade unions and employers’ organisations also
have to be understood within the context of the preparation for the EMU in 1999,
the economic recovery after 1994, and their combined effects on incomes policy.
Preparation for the EMU meant that the government’s policy continued to aim at
a reduction of the budget deficit by a reduction of the (semi-) public sector.
Economic recovery at the same time ensured the continuation of a partial and ad
hoc relinking of the market sector and the (semi-) public sector in all but two
years of this period (1994, 1995).
Confrontation (A: Chicken) in the market sector was reduced from two opening
to one concluding style of decision-making in 1995. In 1995, the government opened
and ended its involvement in negotiations on incomes policy with attempts to
facilitate negotiations with the co-operative neo-corporatist strategy (II). The
government did not succeed in getting trade unions and employers’ organisations
to come to a (lasting) agreement on incomes policy in that year.
Central negotiations on incomes policy in 1995 did not lead to a Central Agree-
ment, despite efforts from the purple government Kok I (PvdA, D66, VVD)
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whose motto was ‘jobs, jobs, jobs’. Especially the government’s delinking of wages
and benefits in the market sector and the (semi-) public sector was rejected by
the trade unions. However, parties agreed to a joint investigation how to create
more jobs as the input for the 1996 negotiations. Decentral negotiations on in-
comes policy were characterised by strikes, other conflicts and a long duration.
Trade unions realised their wage demands but had to accept the re-financing of
early retirement schemes.
Bargaining styles of decision-making (B: Prisoners’ Dilemma) were reduced as
well. From six opening styles to five concluding styles in 1993, 1996 - 1998, and
2000. Although bargaining decreased slightly, as in the previous period it did
lead to more Central Agreements in the market sector in this period as well, as
opposed to bargaining in the periods 1965 - 1973 and 1974 - 1982 that quite
often led to deadlocks.
Faced with deteriorating economic prospects, in 1993, the Lubbers III (CDA,
PvdA) government finally succeeded in getting trade unions and employers’ or-
ganisations to agree to a bipartite Central Agreement on a wage pause. Decentral
contracts featured a trade-off between wage rises and reparation of the effects of
the government’s policy package with regard to sick leave and disability.
In 1996, central negotiations were on the long-term unemployment of the ethnic
minorities. The 1991 bipartite agreement was extended for another year. The
Kok I (PvdA, D66, VVD) government also restored the linkage between wages
in the market sector and wages and benefits in the (semi-) public sector. De-
central negotiations on incomes policy resulted in compromises. Wage rises were
modest, no significant reduction in working hours was achieved, but neither was
a reduction in special allowances for working ‘odd’ hours that employers wanted. 
In 1997, trade unions and employers’ organisations on the central level re-af-
firmed their commitment to the 1994 bipartite Central Agreement ‘A new direction’
and to the 1991 and 1996 bipartite Central Agreements aimed at getting the long-
term unemployed ethnic minorities a job. Decentral collective contracts were
concluded without much problem. Wage rises were minimal, no significant re-
duction in working hours per week was achieved, and collective schemes for
early retirement started to give way to more flexible and individual schemes for
which the costs are more and more transferred from employers to workers. Most
collective contracts included clauses referring to ‘additional’ jobs, which were
subsidised by the Kok I (PvdA, D66, VVD) government as part of their employ-
ment policy programme. Besides, the government continued the linkage between
the market sector and the (semi-) public sector and reduced taxes for especially
the lower incomes.
In 1998, trade unions and employers’organisations agreed on the bipartite ‘Agenda
2002’, a new agenda for contractual negotiations over the coming years. The
1994 bipartite Central Agreement ‘A new direction’ was vindicated, but a new
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central issue was added: continuous investment in both the adaptability of com-
panies and of employees. The Agreement aimed at further differentiation and
decentralisation of wages and other terms of employment in which the economic
profitability of branches, companies and industries would be the point of re-
ference, combined with a moderate general incomes policy. Decentral collective
contracts featured a trade-off between wages and re-financing of early retirement
schemes. This moderate incomes policy was underpinned by massive public
expenditure by the Kok I (PvdA, D66, VVD) government, which was combined
with a decreasing budget deficit. Wages, pensions and benefits in the (semi-)
public sector remained linked to wages in the market sector.
Finally, in 2000, on the central level, contacts between the government and trade
unions and employers’ organisations could be characterised as consultations in
which points of view were exchanged. Negotiations on incomes policy took
place on the decentral level and proceeded without much difficulty as the economy
was booming. Negotiations were underpinned by the Kok II (PvdA, D66, VVD)
government’s policy programme that included lower taxes, higher child allowances,
an increase in the legal minimum wage and the continuation of the linkage be-
tween wages, pensions and benefits in the (semi-) public sector and wages in the
market sector. The government also pledged to continue its policy of lowering
taxes and other (labour) costs to further a moderate incomes policy.
The problem solving style of decision-making (C: Battle of the Sexes) increased
from zero opening styles to two concluding styles in 1994 and 1999. In both years,
Central Agreements were struck.
In 1994, pressure by the Lubbers III (CDA, PvdA) government, combined with
economic difficulties, induced trade unions and employers’ organisations to con-
clude a bipartite Central Agreement: ‘A new direction’. This agreement set the
agenda for decentral negotiations in 1994 and the following years. The aim was
to restore profitability of businesses and to increase employment. The room for
actual wage rises would be dependent on the situation in branches, industries,
and companies, and should preferably be used to increase employment. Em-
ployers’ organisations gave up their resistance to collective reductions in working
hours, while trade unions agreed to further decentralisation, differentiation and
flexibilisation of the terms of employment. In the SER both parties agreed to
‘freeze’ the minimum wage and benefits as well.
Trade unions and employers’ organisations concluded a series of agreements in
1999, both with each other and with the new Kok II (PvdA, D66, VVD) govern-
ment. These agreements were both a re-affirmation of previous bipartite and tri-
partite agreements and the adoption of new policy issues like childcare. Decen-
tral negotiations on incomes policy proceeded without much difficulty on the
basis of these agreements. Wages, pensions and benefits in the (semi-) public
sector remained linked to wages in the market sector.
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5.4.3 Conclusion
In this period it was the combination of institutional changes in the annual pro-
cess of negotiation and implementation of incomes policy through the partial
and ad hoc relinkage of incomes in the market sector and incomes in the (semi-
)public sector, together with a strict budgetary discipline enforced by the EMU
criteria, in the context of an economic recovery after 1995, that had an impact on
the behaviour of the actors involved. In the end, that determined the outcome of
that process. Both in terms of government strategies and styles of decision-
making; and in terms of Central Agreements.
Opening government strategies were almost exclusively neo-corporatist and were
aimed at bringing social partners to a Central Agreement by persuasion and inducement.
The opening styles of decision-making of social partners were largely of the bar-
gaining variety (B: Prisoners’ Dilemma). During the process of negotiations on
incomes policy, bargaining (and confrontation (A: Chicken)) decreased slightly
in favour of some problem solving (C: Battle of the Sexes). Bargaining and pro-
blem solving led to even more Central Agreements than in the previous period
(6: 1993, 1994, 1996 - 1999). The agreements were facilitated by the govern-
ment’s neo-corporatist strategies that included the partial and ad hoc relinkage of
incomes in the market sector and the (semi-) public sector together with a strict
budgetary discipline within the context of an economic recovery. Non-neo-cor-
poratist government strategies were no option. The passive government strategy
(I) was no option given the requirements of the EMU that demanded active govern-
ment intervention in a relinked incomes policy in the market and the (semi-)
public sector. The guiding government strategy (IV) was no option given the
conditional character of the relinkage and an economic recovery that precluded
binding government interventions in incomes policy (amended Law on Wage
Formation 1987). The government’s concluding strategies were therefore all neo-
corporatist.
5.5 Concluding remarks
In this chapter I have elaborated the main research findings discussed in chapter
4. The elaboration was based on a substantive discussion of opening and con-
cluding government strategies and styles of decision-making of trade unions and
employers’ organisations in four sub-periods: 1965 - 1973; 1974 - 1982; 1983 -
1992; and 1993 - 2000. The four sub-periods were based on a combination of
political developments and external economic shocks and watersheds (see also
chapter 3, section 3.2.2.1; chapter 7; and Tables 3.1, 3.2 and 7.1).
The research finding that required further elaboration was the almost 50:50 dis-
tribution of concluding neo-corporatist and non-neo-corporatist government strate-
gies compared to the almost 2:1 distribution of opening neo-corporatist and non-
neo-corporatist government strategies.
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Based on the above substantive discussion of government strategies and styles of
decision-making the following conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, the observed
decrease from opening to concluding neo-corporatist government strategies oc-
curred mainly in the period 1965 - 1982. This was due to an increase in con-
frontation (A) between social partners in the period 1965 - 1973 based on their
differing agendas that made it difficult for them to come to Central Agreements.
And although confrontation (A: Chicken) decreased in the period 1974 - 1982,
the concomitant increase in bargaining (B: Prisoners’ Dilemma) did not result in
more Central Agreements, but rather in more deadlocks during negotiations.
Whether this lack of agreement also resulted in less movement towards the core
will be investigated in chapter 6.
In the period 1965 - 1973, before 1970 the lack of agreement between social
partners reinforced the habitual tendency of governments to take over again the
determination of incomes policy with a guiding government strategy (IV) as
governments were used to do in the previous period of the centrally, government
guided incomes policy between 1945 and 1965. After the introduction of the new
Law on Wage Formation in 1970, concluding non-neo-corporatist government
strategies were of the passive variety (I) in an effort to give the new system of
‘free’ negotiations on incomes policy between social partners a fair chance.
The few attempts at neo-corporatist strategies by the government were only
marginally successful in resolving the deadlocks or reducing the confrontations
and to produce a Central Agreement (1965 and 1970).
In the period 1974 - 1982, the continued lack of agreement between social part-
ners left the government but two options to redress the combined macroeco-
nomic and budgetary effects of the two oil crises in 1973 and 1979/80 and the
linkage between the market sector and the (semi-) public sector. Either to try to
resolve the deadlocks between social partners by a neo-corporatist strategy
(II+III); or to take over responsibility for incomes policy with a non-neo-cor-
poratist guiding strategy (IV) in order to reach their policy target of a moderate
incomes policy in the market sector. 
The potential third option, the non-neo-corporatist passive strategy (I) was no
real option in this period given the combined effects of both oil crises and linkage
on macroeconomic performance and the government’s budget.
The government tended to open with a neo-corporatist strategy. But in a majority
of the years, just after both oil crises, the government opted for the concluding
guiding strategy (IV). In the remaining years between both oil crises, the govern-
ment opted for a concluding neo-corporatist strategy (II). But in only one case
these neo-corporatist strategies were effective in bringing social partners to a
Central Agreement (1977).
Secondly, this means that the 17 concluding non-neo-corporatist government
strategies (I+IV) also occurred mainly in the same two periods 1965 - 1973 and
141
1974 - 1982. The nine concluding non-neo-corporatist guiding government
strategies (IV) all occurred exclusively in these periods, as did three of the eight
concluding non-neo-corporatist passive government strategies (I). The remaining
five concluding passive government strategies (I) all occurred in the third period
1983 - 1992, in the years directly following the ‘Wassenaar’ Agreement (1983 -
1987). Therefore, the ‘Wassenaar’ Agreement was no watershed with respect to
government strategy.
Right at the start of that period, the government Lubbers I managed to force so-
cial partners to come to this Central Agreement on incomes policy in the market
sector that covered 1983 and 1984. This Central Agreement enabled the govern-
ment to delink the market sector and the (semi-) public sector and leave incomes
policy in the market sector to social partners. The government’s concluding strategy
in the first part of the period was the non-neo-corporatist passive strategy (I).
These passive government strategies reflect the effects of the delinkage of the
market sector from the (semi-) public sector that was effected from 1983 - 1989.
This situation was formalised with the new Wage Law of 1987 that stated that
binding government intervention in incomes policy was only admissible in case
of externally induced economic emergencies.
In the latter part of this period, the government actively intervened in the annual
negotiations on incomes policy in the market sector by neo-corporatist govern-
ment strategies that induced social partners to come to a Central Agreement on
employment issues in 1987, 1990, and 1991.
Finally, in the period 1993 - 2000, the ad hoc relinkage of incomes in the market
sector and in the (semi-) public sector and the budgetary discipline forced by the
EMU (1999) in a context of an economic recovery after 1995 meant that non-
neo-corporatist government strategies were not an option. Consequently, govern-
ment strategy was neo-corporatist and that facilitated even more agreements
between social partners (and between social partners and the government) than
in the previous period (6: 1993, 1994, 1996 - 1997).
The Central Agreements after 1982 were both usually based on the bargaining
style of decision-making (B: Prisoners’ Dilemma), instead of on the problem
solving style (C: ‘Battle of the Sexes’, see chapter 3, section 3.3.2 and chapter 4,
section 4.5), and not always the result of neo-corporatist government strategies
as well. Therefore, there is no empirical evidence to support the emergence of a
new Dutch ‘Polder Model’ of neo-corporatism (see also chapter 4 and chapter 2,
section 2.3).
In this chapter I have argued that the conceptualisation of neo-corporatism as a
strategy (see chapter 2) and the subsequent operationalisation of government
strategy and style of decision-making of trade unions and employers’ organi-
sations that was elaborated in chapter 3 (section 3.3 and Table 3.4), can indeed
account for all variations and changes in government strategies and styles of
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decision-making in the four sub-periods between 1965 and 2000. I have also
argued how and why neo-corporatist government strategies change and vary over
the four sub-periods. 
This substantiates the affirmative answer given to research question 1 in chapter
4, and elucidates why governments in a number of years chose not to pursue, con-
tinue or implement a neo-corporatist strategy. The final, elaborated answer to re-
search question 1 therefore confirms the affirmative answer given in chapter 4.
Can neo-corporatism, defined as a government strategy for conflict regu-
lation, offer a plausible explanation for the formation and implementation of
Dutch incomes policy between 1965 and 2000?
The answer is: yes, neo-corporatism, defined as a government strategy for co-
nflict regulation, can offer a plausible explanation for the formation and imple-
mentation of Dutch incomes policy between 1965 and 2000. It also shows that
the emergence of a new Dutch ‘Polder Model’, either after 1982 or in the 1990s,
is not supported by the research findings.
Now research question 1 has been answered affirmatively, I will move on to re-
search question 2.
Was Dutch incomes policy between 1965 and 2000 effective in terms of the
agendas of actors involved?
In chapter 6, the effectiveness of incomes policy will be discussed in terms of the
agendas of the actors involved in the formation and implementation of incomes
policy: government, trade unions, and employers’ organisations. 
143
6. Neo-corporatism and the effectiveness 
of incomes policy39
In this chapter I will provide the answer to research question 2:
Was Dutch incomes policy between 1965 and 2000 effective in terms of the
agendas of actors involved?
The effectiveness of incomes policy is discussed in terms of the agendas of the
actors involved in the formation and implementation of incomes policy:
government, trade unions, and employers’ organisations. The aim is to determine
whether neo-corporatist government strategies did a better job than non-neo-
corporatist government strategies in two related respects. First, in reordering the
list of preferences that is expressed in each actor’s agenda for incomes policy
(see Keman 1999: 261-265). To put it differently, the question here is: are neo-
corporatist government strategies indeed facilitating in the development towards
a ‘structure induced equilibrium’ (Shepsle 1997: 283, 284); that is, more effective
in bringing the actors involved in incomes policy to an agreement than non-neo-
corporatist government strategies.
Secondly, in moving closer towards the ‘core’ (Shepsle 1997: 283, 284) of in-
comes policy in a given year on the basis of this ‘structure induced equilibrium’
or agreement on incomes policy. The ‘core’ represents the agreement that is pre-
ferred by all actors involved in incomes policy above all other alternatives and
that cannot be improved by any other alternative (Shepsle 1997: 261-265). This
‘core’ represents a virtual and not an empirical agreement. In this chapter, ap-
proaching the core will be empirically investigated in terms of a movement to-
wards a closer match between the preferences expressed in each actor’s agenda
39. I would like to thank the participants in the workshop on ‘spelregels en (veranderende) machtsver-
houdingen in het Belgische en Nederlandse corporatisme in historisch en vergelijkend perspectief ’
during the annual conference of the Dutch and Flemish Political Science Associations in Antwerp
on 27 and 28 May 2004 for their constructive criticism on a draft version of this chapter. The
workshop was chaired by Uwe Becker and Carl Devos.
for incomes policy and the actual outcome in terms of these preferences (see
section 6.3).
As discussed in chapter 3 (section 3.3), the government is considered to be the
pivotal actor in this process of reordering (see also Molina and Rhodes 2002:
316-318). Based on chapter 2, section 2.2, chapter 3, section 3.3, as well as
chapters 4 and 5, I expect a neo-corporatist incomes policy to be more effective
than a non-neo-corporatist incomes policy in both respects. In other words, I
expect a neo-corporatist government strategy to be more effective than a non-
neo-corporatist strategy in terms of (the number of) agreements struck and also
in terms of moving towards a match between preferences and actual outcome,
based on these agreements. 
A neo-corporatist incomes policy is an incomes policy that results from a neo-
corporatist government strategy outcome: co-operative (II) or congruent (III). A
non-neo-corporatist incomes policy is an incomes policy that results from a non-
neo-corporatist government strategy outcome: passive (I) or guiding (IV).
6.1 Agendas, preferences and effectiveness of incomes policy
The agendas of the government, trade unions, and employers’ organisations
featured a number of related issues that may differ in salience between actors and
for actors over time. Based on my research (see Appendix), I argue that the main
issues on the actors’ agendas for incomes policy between 1965 and 2000 include:
• Terms of employment
- wages
- automatic price compensation or indexation
- working hours
• Social policy
- social security40
- (un)employment
• Macroeconomic policy
- inflation
- budget deficit
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40. Based on my research, I use the term social security when referring to a number of different but
related issues:
- levels of benefits for unemployment, sick leave, and disability in percentages of last earned
wages that are set by the government;
- premiums for the various benefits and their distribution over employers and employees that -
are both set by the government;
- the level of the statutory minimum wage that is set by the government;
- and finally, the linkage between wages, benefits and pensions in the (semi-) public sector to
wages in the market sector that is also controlled by government legislation.
Table 6.1 shows how the issues on the agendas of the three actors can be ordered
according to the salience of the issue for each actor. The rank order in Table 6.1
shows two things. On the one hand, the difficulties that actors may have to come
to an agreement. But on the other hand, also the possibilities - reordering of
preferences - which actors may have to overcome these difficulties and to come
to an agreement (see also Keman 1999: 262-263).
The terms of employment refer to preferences that are contested between trade
unions and employers’ organisations. Social policy refers to preferences that are
contested between trade unions and the government. Macroeconomic policy
refers to preferences that are mainly a government concern. Whereas neo-cor-
poratist government strategies are expected to be more conducive for reaching
an ‘equilibrium’, the ultimate question is - given these contested preferences -
whether such ‘equilibria’ indeed move close towards the core as well (and thus
show that institutions matter).
First, wages, automatic price compensation, and working hours were issues
directly related to the terms of employment. For trade unions, the terms of em-
ployment represented an urgent preference. Depending on the actual situation,
during negotiations with employers’ organisations the emphasis might shift from
one issue to another within this set of issues. For employers’ organisations the
terms of employment were also an urgent preference. 
However, actors did differ fundamentally with respect to the substance of the is-
sues involved in the terms of employment. To trade unions it was their core
business to continually try to improve these terms. Preferably, to succeed in ne-
gotiating arrangements that had both an automatic character, that is, did not need
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to be renegotiated annually, as well as were applied across the board. Employers’
organisations on the other hand were not opposed to any improvement of the terms
of employment as such, but they were very much opposed to any system of auto-
matic improvements across the board. For employers’ organisations, the improve-
ment of the terms of employment was conditional on other issues and, therefore,
these were issues for regular (re-)negotiation. That means that trade unions and
employers’ organisations had to come to an agreement on these issues among them-
selves. But social partners differed fundamentally with respect to the substance
of the issues involved and that made it quite difficult to reach an agreement.
As the terms of employment were relevant for the government mainly in its capacity
of employer, governments were able to have a mediating influence on social
partners during negotiations on incomes policy with the offer of policies per-
taining to the issues representing either social government policy (social security
and (un)employment) or macroeconomic government policy (inflation and
budget deficit). In terms of game theory (see chapter 3, section 3.3) negotiations
between trade unions and employers’ organisations on these issues can be de-
scribed in terms of a one-shot Chicken game, or a Prisoners’ Dilemma, that can
be resolved by government intervention. Either by using a neo-corporatist govern-
ment strategy to entice social partners to come to an agreement or by using the
non-neo-corporatist guiding government strategy to impose a solution on social
partners (see also chapters 4 and 5).
Second, the issues of social security and (un)employment. These issues were
clearly more important to trade unions and the government than to employers’
organisations. As such they can be classified as elements of a social government
policy. However, depending on the situation, trade unions and governments might
differ fundamentally with respect to the substance of both issues. In general,
trade unions were in favour of high levels of benefits, low premiums for em-
ployees, a high level of the statutory minimum wage, a continued linkage of
wages in the market sector and wages and benefits in the (semi-) public sector,
and (un)employment policies. For governments these issues were conditional on
other policy issues and the macroeconomic context. 
For employers’ organisations these issues were important mainly in terms of
costs. That means that during negotiations on incomes policy governments were
able to use government policies pertaining to these issues to facilitate agreement
on the terms of employment between trade unions and employers’ organisations.
In terms of game theory (see chapter 3, section 3.3) negotiations on these issues
were primarily between trade unions and the government and these can be de-
scribed in terms of a (super) Prisoner’s Dilemma on the basis of exchange, where-
as for employers’ organisations these issues were negotiable, depending on other
issues and the macroeconomic context (Battle of the Sexes).
Third, inflation and the budget deficit were issues that represented an urgent
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preference of government. As such they represented elements of a macroecono-
mic government policy. For employers’ organisations, inflation and the budget
deficit were important, but did not represent an urgent preference. For trade
unions these issues were of least importance. Therefore, these issues also
represent government policies that could be used by governments during nego-
tiations on incomes policy - possibly in combination with social policy issues -
to mediate or enforce an agreement between trade unions and employers’ or-
ganisations on the terms of employment or social security issues. In terms of
game theory (see chapter 3, section 3.3) negotiations on these issues can be
described as government directed, whereas for employers’ organisations and trade
unions these issues were negotiable based on exchange (employers: Prisoners’
Dilemma) or depended on other issues and on the macroeconomic context (trade
unions: Battle of the Sexes).
Coming back to the effectiveness of incomes policy in terms of reordering the
preferences on the agendas of the actors involved in incomes policy (see Table
6.1), I contend that a successful reordering of these preferences results in an
agreement that reflects a ‘structure induced equilibrium’. Either a bipartite agree-
ment between trade unions and employers’ organisations (supported or facilitated
- or not - by the government), or a tripartite agreement between social partners
and the government (see chapter 3, Table 3.4, and chapters 4 and 5). An effective
incomes policy in terms of agreements is therefore, first, an incomes policy that
is based on a bipartite or tripartite agreement on the central level, in effect a
Central Agreement. And second, an effective incomes policy in terms of agree-
ments is also a Central Agreement on the central level that is not challenged or
rejected by the rank and file of either social partner on the decentral levels. I
expect neo-corporatist government strategies to do a better job in this respect
than non-neo-corporatist government strategies (see section 6.2).
The effectiveness of incomes policy in terms of the ‘core’, that is, in terms of a
match between preferences and outcome, will be inferred from the measure of
congruence between the preferences on the agendas of the actors involved in
incomes policy (see Table 6.1) and the actual outcome of these preferences (see
Tables 6.4 and 6.5). The measure of congruence between preferences and out-
come is established by comparing whether the preferences of the actors involved
correspond with the actual outcome. This comparison will not be based on
statistical correspondence, nor will it assume direct causal relations between the
outcome of the process of negotiations on the formation and implementation of
incomes policy in terms of neo-corporatist government strategies, styles of de-
cision-making, and Central Agreements on the one hand, and actual outcome on
the other. Rather, the comparison will discuss congruence between preferences
and outcome in terms of the likelihood that the core was achieved (degree of
association).
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The measure of congruence between preferences and outcome in a given year is
important information for each actor deciding on their strategy or style of decision-
making in the next round of negotiations on the formation and implementation
of incomes policy. I assume that actors act retrospectively, that is, adjust their
behaviour based on past outcome and the measure of congruence between that
outcome and their respective preferences.
In terms of a match between preferences and outcome, I contend that the like-
lihood that the core was indeed achieved is represented by an outcome that
shows that all actors were able to achieve more or less the same measure of their
preferences. I expect neo-corporatist government strategies to do a better job in
this respect than non-neo-corporatist government strategies, based on the facili-
tation of ‘structure induced equilibria’ or agreements by these government strate-
gies (see section 6.3).
6.2 Effectiveness of incomes policy in terms of Central Agreements
Tables 6.2 and 6.3 present an overview of effective and ineffective incomes
policies in terms of agendas for the whole period 1965 - 2000.
Neo-corporatist government strategies between 1965 and 2000 were indeed
almost four times as successful in reordering actors’ preferences as non-neo-cor-
poratist government strategies (11 - 3). And neo-corporatist government strate-
gies were also more often successful than not in reordering actors’ preferences
(11 - 8). Lastly, non-neo-corporatist government strategies were more often not
successful in reordering actors’ preferences (14 - 3).
Nevertheless, although in a majority of the years between 1965 and 2000 govern-
ment strategy was neo-corporatist (19 of 36), incomes policy was only effective
in terms of Central Agreements in a minority of the years (14 of 36). In addition,
in three of these 14 years, incomes policy was of the non-neo-corporatist variety.
Therefore, the provisional answer to research question 2 must be: Dutch incomes
policy in terms of the agendas of the actors involved as represented by Central
Agreements appears as having been effective in a minority of 14 (38.9%) of the
36 years between 1965 and 2000, and conversely, as not effective in a majority
of 22 (61.1%) of the 36 years in this period. Nevertheless, a neo-corporatist
incomes policy was indeed more often effective than ineffective in this respect,
and also almost four times as effective as a non-neo-corporatist incomes policy. 
6.2.1 Effective government strategies
The distribution of effective incomes policies of both varieties - neo-corporatist
and non-neo-corporatist - over the four periods identified in chapter 5 is rather
skewed across time:
- 1965 - 1973 two Central Agreements (1965, 1970)
- 1974 - 1982 one Central Agreement (1977)
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- 1983 - 1992 five Central Agreements (1983, 1984, 1987, 1990, 1991)
- 1993 - 2000 six Central Agreements (1993, 1994, 1996 - 1999)
In the period 1965 - 1973, Dutch incomes policy was both largely of the non-
neo-corporatist variety and in a majority of the years not effective in bringing
trade unions and employers’ organisations to an agreement. The general picture
with regard to incomes policy in this period is that confrontation between trade
unions and employers’ organisations on the issues related to the terms of employ-
ment increased. In a majority of the cases, the efforts by the government to me-
diate between social partners with issues pertaining to social and macroecono-
mic policy failed to produce a reordering of the list of preferences of these actors.
Governments responded to this failure by either enforcing a reorder of those lists
of preferences on social partners through a non-neo-corporatist guiding (IV)
incomes policy, or by giving up on attempts to reorder and reverting to the non-
neo-corporatist passive (I) incomes policy (see also chapter 5, section 5.1).
This clearly shows the three main dimensions of the concept of neo-corporatism
as a government strategy that was developed in chapter 2. These are the relative
autonomy of the actors involved, their mutual instrumentalisation, and the pivotal
role of the government. Actors’ relative autonomy is reflected in the fact that in
the end they can indeed opt for co-operation or not.41 Their mutual instrumenta-
lisation is shown by their willingness to co-operate, that is, in their willingness
to negotiate. That, however, did not imply that negotiations were successful as
well (see also chapter 3, section 3.3.3 and Table 3.4). Lastly, the pivotal role of
the government is shown both by their neo-corporatist strategies to get social
partners to reach an agreement during the process of negotiations on incomes
policy, and their frequent choice to end their involvement in incomes policy with
the non-neo-corporatist guiding strategy (IV).
In the period 1974 - 1982, Dutch incomes policy was singularly ineffective in
bringing trade unions and employers’ organisations to an agreement, despite an
increase in neo-corporatist incomes policies. Although confrontation between
trade unions and employers’ organisations on issues related to the terms of em-
ployment decreased in this period, that did not lead to an increase in agreements
on incomes policy. On the contrary, negotiations between social partners fre-
quently bogged down in deadlocks. Governments consistently tried to mediate
between social partners with social and macroeconomic policy packages. These
efforts failed to produce a reordering of the lists of preferences of social partners
in all but one year. Governments responded to this failure by either enforcing a
reorder of those lists of preferences on social partners through a non-neo-cor-
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41. Non-co-operation by social partners meant no Central Agreement was reached. Non-co-operation
by the government could either take the form of the non-neo-corporatist passive strategy (I), or, on
the contrary, the non-neo-corporatist guiding strategy (IV).
poratist guiding (IV) government strategy in the years directly following on the
two oil crises, or by continuing their neo-corporatist attempts to reorder in the
years between (see also chapter 5, section 5.2).
Again, this clearly shows the usefulness of the dimensions of the concept of neo-
corporatism as a government strategy developed in chapter 2 and the subsequent
operationalisation in chapter 3. It also shows that neo-corporatism as a govern-
ment strategy, based on relative autonomy, mutual instrumentalisation, and a pi-
votal role for the government is no guarantee for success in terms of agendas.
That was dependent on the actors’ behaviour in the context of a deteriorating
macroeconomic outcome.
In the period 1983 - 1992, Dutch incomes policy was evenly split between neo-
corporatist incomes policies and non-neo-corporatist incomes policies. Con-
frontation between trade unions and employers’ organisations on issues related
to the terms of employment decreased further in this period. In contrast to the
previous period, less confrontation between social partners on issues related to
the terms of employment did lead to more agreements on incomes policy. These
agreements were only partly the result of the government’s efforts to produce a
reorder of the list of preferences of social partners by a neo-corporatist govern-
ment strategy. Two of the agreements on incomes policy in this period were
struck while the government pursued a non-neo-corporatist strategy. But neo-
corporatist incomes policies in this period were more effective in this respect
than non-neo-corporatist incomes policies. In half the years in this period,
incomes policy was therefore effective (see also chapter 5, section 5.3).
The increase in the number of Central Agreements in this period, starting with
the ‘Wassenaar Agreement’ of December 1982 that covered 1983 and 1984, may
seem to signify the emergence of a more effective variety of neo-corporatist
government strategies, or even a ‘Polder Model’, when compared to the previous
periods. However, the ‘Wassenaar’ Agreement that covered two of the five Cen-
tral Agreements in this period was struck while the government pursued a non-
neo-corporatist strategy. And in chapters 4, section 4.5, and 5, sections 5.3 and
5.4, I have already established that a new Dutch ‘Polder Model’ can not be
identified. Firstly, social partners very seldom used the problem solving style of
decision-making (C: Battle of the Sexes). Central Agreements were usually
based on the bargaining style of decision-making (B: (repeated) Prisoners Di-
lemma). Secondly, Central Agreements were not always the result of a neo-
corporatist government strategy.
This research finding supports the researchers discussed in chapter 2, section
2.3, that do not consider Dutch neo-corporatism in the 1980s or 1990s to
constitute a new model (see for instance Teulings 1995, 1996, 1997; Van Empel
1997; Visser and Hemerijck 1997; Teulings and Hartog 1998; Hazeu 1998; and
Van Waarden 2002), but rather to be more (or less) effective, depending on
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changes in the institutional setting of negotiations on incomes policy, the be-
haviour of the actors’ involved and the macroeconomic context.
In the last period 1993 - 2000, Dutch incomes policy was neo-corporatist in all
years. And in all but two years that neo-corporatist incomes policy was effective
in bringing trade unions and employers’ organisations to an agreement as well.
Confrontation between trade unions and employers’ organisations on issues
related to the terms of employment was minimal in this period. As in the previous
period, less confrontation did not lead to more deadlocks but to more agreement
on incomes policy. In a majority of the years in this period, incomes policy was
effective in reordering the list of preferences of social partners. In contrast to the
previous periods, incomes policy was of the neo-corporatist varieties in all years
of this period (see also chapter 5, section 5.4 and Appendix).
The continuation of Central Agreements in this period, combined with a com-
pletely neo-corporatist incomes policy by the government, may suggest that a
‘Polder Model’ had come to maturity. However, that does not explain why in the
previous period a non-neo-corporatist incomes policy was almost as effective in
this respect, nor does it explain why in two cases in this period (1995 and 2000)
a neo-corporatist incomes policy was not effective. If a ‘Polder Model’ had
indeed come to maturity in this period, it was a rather vulnerable ‘Model’. The
‘Model’ was apparently dependent on two factors at least. Firstly, the co-opera-
tion of both social partners, and secondly, macroeconomic conditions. If either
one of the social partners refused to co-operate, or the economy boomed, the
‘Model’ did not produce a Central Agreement. That does not constitute a signi-
ficant change compared to the institutionalised process of negotiations on in-
comes policy in previous periods. This supports my contention that the effective-
ness of Dutch neo-corporatism in terms of the agendas of the actors involved is
indeed largely dependent on the behaviour of these actors. And that behaviour is
strongly influenced by the institutional changes induced by the macroeconomic
context (delinkage in the 1980s in the aftermath of the worst recession after 1945
and ad hoc relinkage in the 1990s in the context of strict budgetary discipline
(EMU) and an economic recovery from 1995). The behaviour of the actors in-
volved can be empirically categorised and analysed with my instrument of analy-
sis developed in chapter 3, Table 3.4.
Two findings, however, remain to be explained. First, why a neo-corporatist govern-
ment strategy was not effective in reordering the actors’ preferences in eight of
the years. Second, why a non-neo-corporatist government strategy was effective
in reordering the actors’ preferences on three occasions. 
6.2.2 Ineffective neo-corporatist government strategies
Concluding neo-corporatist government strategies were not effective in terms of
the agendas of the actors involved in negotiations on incomes policy in eight
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years between 1965 and 2000: 1973, 1975, 1978, 1979, 1988, 1989, 1995, and 2000.
With great difficulty and by making major concessions to both trade unions and
employers’ organisations, the government Biesheuvel II (KVP, ARP, CHU, VVD)
succeeded in 1973 to get social partners to conclude a bipartite Central Agree-
ment on incomes policy at the central level. It was a classical case of reordering
or compensating preferences based on each actor’s agenda, at least at the central,
national level (see also chapter 5, section 5.1 and Appendix).
However, implementation of the agreement on the decentral level led to conflicts
and a number of strikes. The conflicts were both between trade unions and em-
ployers’ organisations and between the general trade unions and the unions for
higher paid employees. The main bone of contention was wage rises in set amounts
instead of in percentages. More and more, the general trade unions used this device
to get the lower paid employees a higher raise than the higher paid employees.
The explanation for the failed Central Agreement in this year is that the success-
ful reordering at the national level ran into difficulties with the rank and file of
the national organisations during implementation. Although social partners at the
national level had agreed to a reordering of preferences, arranged by the govern-
ment’s neo-corporatist strategy, they could not deliver at the decentral level.
In 1975, the policy package of the government Den Uyl (PvdA, KVP, ARP, D66,
PPR) was meant to entice social partners to conclude a Central Agreement.
Negotiations, however, came to a halt in a deadlock. When negotiations broke down,
social partners left the decision on incomes policy to government and parlia-
ment. A subsequent enlarged government policy package was approved by parlia-
ment and served as the bottom line for further negotiations on the branch and
company level. Despite gradually worsening economic conditions, government
did not intervene in these negotiations. It did not want to jeopardise its relations
with social partners any further after the application of the Machtigingswet in
1974 (see also chapter 5, section 5.2 and Appendix).
The explanation for the failed Central Agreement in this year is that despite all
efforts by the government, a reorder of preferences proved to be impossible. Social
partners were simply not willing to compromise on the issues involved in incomes
policy. That government did not revert to a non-neo-corporatist government strategy
was due to its efforts to patch up relations with social partners after its non-neo-
corporatist guiding (IV) intervention in 1974 in the aftermath of the 1973 oil crisis.
The same more or less goes for 1978. Both the outgoing government Den Uyl
(PvdA, KVP, ARP, D66, PPR) and the incoming government Van Agt I (CDA,
VVD) tried in vain to bring social partners to a Central Agreement by offering
compensating policy packages. However, neither the trade unions, nor the em-
ployers’ organisations were satisfied with what was on offer. Consequently, both
refused to conclude a Central Agreement. When central negotiations broke down,
negotiations devolved to decentral levels. Both governments’ policy packages
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served as the bottom line for these negotiations in which neither government in-
tervened (see also chapter 5, section 5.2 and Appendix).
Again, social partners were not willing to compromise on the basis of the govern-
ments’ compensatory policies. That governments did not revert to a non-neo-
corporatist guiding government strategy (IV) was most likely due to their status.
The one government was on its way out, the other on its way in. The non-neo-
corporatist passive government strategy (I) was no option given the combined
detrimental effects of the oil crisis and the linkage on macroeconomic perfor-
mance and the government’s budget.
In 1979 social partners again refused to conclude a Central Agreement based on
the government’s policy package. This time, the main opposition came from the
trade unions. Employers’ organisations agreed with the government’s policy
package. A subsequently enlarged policy package again failed to bring social
partners to a Central Agreement because of continued opposition by the trade
unions. Nevertheless, the enlarged policy package then served as a framework
for decentral negotiations in which the government did not intervene (see also
chapter 5, section 5.2 and Appendix).
This time it was the trade unions that were unwilling to compromise on the basis
of the government’s policy packages. Nevertheless, the government stuck to its
neo-corporatist strategy. Most likely it did not want to sour its relations with
especially the trade unions any further so soon after it had come to power.
In 1988, employers’ organisations rejected any Central Agreement. Their agenda
differed fundamentally from that of the trade unions. Government policy of the
Lubbers I (CDA, VVD) government could not bridge the gap between these
agendas, although it included compensatory measures for both. Therefore, cen-
tral negotiations on incomes policy broke down. Nevertheless, based on the
government’s policy package, a number of joint working parties on employment
issues continued their work. Their reports served as a basis for decentral nego-
tiations. Decentral contracts were, however, largely determined by employers
(see also chapter 5, section 5.3 and Appendix).
The explanation for the failed Central Agreement in this year is that employers’
organisations flatly refused to consider a Central Agreement. Based on the new
Law on Wage Formation that came into force in 1987, the government could no
longer intervene with the non-neo-corporatist guiding strategy (IV), except in
case of a national emergency caused by external factors. It therefore choose to
keep decentral negotiations on incomes policy as well as central consultations on
employment issues going by offering compensatory neo-corporatist policies.
And, of course, the linkage between the market sector and the (semi-) public
sector was still severed, so there was no urgent need for the government to inter-
vene with binding measures in incomes policy in the market sector. 
In 1989, despite various attempts and offers by the Lubbers II (CDA, VVD) govern-
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ment, central negotiations again did not result in a Central Agreement. Tripartite
negotiations on the long-term unemployed foundered on the FNV, while tri-
partite negotiations on the issues of sick leave and disability only resulted in the
institution of a working group that was to devise concrete policies for the future
(see chapter 5, section 5.3 and Appendix).
The explanation of the failed Central Agreement in this year was again the dis-
agreement between social partners on the major issues of incomes policy. And
as was the case in 1988, the government’s policies were not sufficient to bridge
the apparent gap between their agendas, but at least managed to keep negotia-
tions and consultations on these issues more or less going. Of course, the linkage
between the market sector and the (semi-) public sector was still severed. 
In 1995, employers’ organisations refused even to consider a Central Agreement.
Their aim was on the contrary differentiation of incomes policy. Decentral nego-
tiations were characterised by conflicts, strikes and a long duration. Government
policy was specifically targeted on job creation and succeeded in keeping social
partners on speaking terms over these issues. The three parties started a joint in-
vestigation on job creation as an input for the 1996 negotiations (see also chapter
5, section 5.4 and Appendix).
The explanation of the failed Central Agreement in this year is the refusal of one
of the social partners to consider such an agreement. As the government could
no longer intervene with the non-neo-corporatist guiding strategy (IV) because
of the new Law on Wage Formation of 1987, and the market sector and the (semi-)
public sector were delinked, it chose to keep social partners at least involved in
the employment issue.
In 2000, contacts between the government and social partners on the central level
could be described as consultations in which points of view with respect to in-
comes policy were exchanged. Neither party argued for a Central Agreement.
Decentral negotiations proceeded without much difficulty due to a booming
economy and a government policy that boosted buying power of the lower paid
and included a partial linkage between the market sector and the (semi-) public
sector (see also chapter 5, section 5.4 and Appendix).
The explanation for the failed Central Agreement in 2000 is that within the con-
text of a booming economy, all three parties were quite content with central con-
sultations and decentral negotiations on incomes policy. No actor desired a
Central Agreement as there was no urge for co-ordination. 
Summing up, the ineffectiveness of neo-corporatist government strategies in
terms of agendas was due to the behaviour of one or both of the social partners.
A neo-corporatist government strategy was only effective if social partners were
willing to negotiate a reordering of their preferences. In the eight years discussed
above that was not the case.
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6.2.3 Effective non-neo-corporatist government strategies
Concluding non-neo-corporatist government strategies were only effective in
terms of the agendas of the actors involved in negotiations on incomes policy in
three years between 1965 and 2000: 1970, 1983, and 1984.
In 1970, negotiations on incomes policy between social partners proceeded smooth-
ly and, aided by an initial neo-corporatist strategy of the government De Jong
(KVP, ARP, CHU, VVD), resulted in a bipartite Central Agreement based on the
14th bi-annual report of the SER. Again, a classical case of reordering or com-
pensating preferences by the government, based on the actors’ agendas (see also
chapter 5, section 5.1 and Appendix).
But trade unions and the government collided head-on about the new Law on Wage
Formation. Trade unions refused to participate in any further negotiations in the
SER and the STAR on both the future system of negotiations on incomes policy
and (future) wage issues, including the price indexation. They were reluctantly
supported by the employers’ organisations. In response, the government unilaterally
intervened in the agreement on the price indexation that was the cornerstone of
the bipartite Central Agreement, and ended its involvement in incomes policy in
this year with the non-neo-corporatist guiding strategy (IV).
The explanation for this rather unexpected combination of a non-neo-corporatist
government strategy and a Central Agreement is that the Central Agreement was
based on the initial neo-corporatist government strategy. The non-neo-corpora-
tist strategy with which the government ended its involvement in incomes policy
was the result of a conflict between social partners and the government about the
future process and substance of negotiations on incomes policy that spilled over
to the substance of the incomes policy of 1970. With its concluding non-neo-
corporatist strategy, the government made it quite clear that it intended to remain
the pivotal actor in negotiations on incomes policy, both with regard to the pro-
cess and the substance.
In 1983 and 1984, Central Agreements were struck while the government’s con-
cluding strategy was non-neo-corporatist (I: passive). These two years were both
covered by the famous Central ‘Wassenaar Agreement’ which was struck in De-
cember 1982. In 1983, under strong pressure by the incoming government Lubbers
I (CDA, VVD), trade unions and employers’ organisations succeeded in striking
a deal. The bipartite ‘Wassenaar Agreement’ involved an exchange of the automatic
price indexation for a reduction in working hours and the creation of part time jobs
in the market sector. Part of the agreement was also the continuation of a number
of working parties on employment issues. When after the agreement, decentral
negotiations on the exchange proceeded too slowly to the government’s liking, it
again threatened to intervene with binding measures. That induced trade unions
and employers’ organisations to conclude more decentral agreements based on the
Central ‘Wassenaar Agreement’. These collective agreements covered 1983 and 1984. 
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In response, government refrained from any further intervention in the market
sector and concentrated its own efforts on the (semi-) public sector. All linking
mechanisms were put on hold in 1983, and in 1984 wages, pensions and benefits
were cut (see also chapter 4; chapter 5, section 5.3; Appendix; and Hemerijck
2003: 53 ff.).
The Wassenaar Agreement is a peculiar Central Agreement. It was not the result
of a government policy that enabled social partners to reorder or compensate
their preferences. On the contrary, the Wassenaar Agreement was the result of a
threat by the government that it would continue to completely determine incomes
policy as it had done in 1980, 1981 and 1982 if no agreement in the market sector
would be reached (see also Jones 1999; Andeweg 2000: 706). The government’s
message to social partners was in effect: come to an agreement or become ob-
solete with respect to incomes policy in the market sector. And despite their
continued differences of opinion, after the three years 1980-1982, social partners
indeed favoured a bipartite agreement on incomes policy in the market sector
more than the continuation of a completely government directed incomes policy
in that sector that made them redundant. Incomes policy in the (semi-) public
sector, however, remained firmly under government control, despite heavy
opposition by the trade unions.
If the ‘Wassenaar Agreement’of 1983 is to be taken as the start of a ‘Polder Model’,
it was a ‘Model’ forced on social partners by the government. The ‘Model’ also
applied only to the market sector. Incomes policy in the (semi-) public sector was
completely under government control.
Summing up, the effective non-neo-corporatist government strategies in terms of
agendas were an expression of the leading role of the government in negotiations
on incomes policy under the condition of an institutional linkage between the
market sector and the (semi-) public sector. In 1970 in the context of a positive
macroeconomic performance; in 1983 and 1984 in the context of a negative
macroeconomic performance. 
6.2.4 Conclusion
The effectiveness of incomes policy of both the neo-corporatist and non-neo-
corporatist varieties in terms of Central Agreements was 22.2% in the period
1965 - 1973, and decreased to an all time low of 11.1% in the following period
1974 - 1982. In contrast, in the next period 1983 - 1992, effectiveness of all
incomes policies increased considerably to 50%. Effectiveness of incomes policy
reached a peak of 75% in the last period under investigation: 1993 - 2000. How-
ever, over the whole period 1965 - 2000 Dutch incomes policy in terms of Cen-
tral Agreements was only effective in a minority of 14 (38.9%) of the 36 years.
Dutch incomes policy in terms of agendas was not effective in a majority of 22
(61.1%) of the 36 years. But in all periods neo-corporatist incomes policies were
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indeed consistently more effective in terms of Central Agreements than non-neo-
corporatist incomes policies.
I have discussed the exceptions: first, the eight years in which a neo-corporatist
incomes policy was not effective, and secondly, the three years in which a non-
neo-corporatist incomes policy turned out to be effective. 
The ineffectiveness of neo-corporatist incomes policies was caused by the actors’
behaviour. In 1973, the rank and file of social partners on the decentral levels
could not deliver the agreement struck at the central level. In 1975, 1978, 1979,
1988, 1989, and 1995, one or both of the social partners in the end refused to come
to a Central Agreement, despite compensating government policies. Governments
did not revert to non-neo-corporatist strategies, either passive (I) or guiding (IV),
in order to keep on speaking terms with social partners. Finally, in 2000, in the
context of a booming economy, all three actors were quite happy to proceed with
incomes policy without a Central Agreement.
This analysis shows that there is no direct link between neo-corporatist govern-
ment strategies and the outcome of negotiations on incomes policy in terms of a
Central Agreement. Whether or not a Central Agreement is reached depends on
the behaviour of the social partners. In other words, the ‘structure induced equili-
brium’ that is indeed adequately operational to approach the core depends on the
behaviour of social partners.
The effectiveness of non-neo-corporatist incomes policies had to do with the govern-
ment insisting on its leading role in incomes policy under the institutional con-
dition of a linkage between the market sector and the (semi-) public sector. In
1970, a conflict between trade unions and the government about the new Law on
Wage Formation spilled over to the substance of incomes policy in that year. In
1983 and 1984, in the context of a severe economic downturn, accompanied by
rapidly rising unemployment and budget deficits, the government effectively
forced social partners to come to an agreement in the market sector (‘Wasse-
naar’). The government subsequently concentrated its efforts on reducing the
budget deficit by delinking the market sector and the (semi-) public sector and
did not further intervene in incomes policy in the market sector. Hence,
conditions to move closer towards the core were often simply absent.
6.3 Effectiveness of incomes policy in terms of outcome
Table 6.4 presents an overview of the outcome of the indicators for the pre-
ferences expressed in the agendas of the actors involved in incomes policy be-
tween 1965 and 2000. The preferences of the actors were identified in Table 6.1.
Based on the outcome of these indicators, I will establish, firstly, whether it was
likely that the core could have been approached. I will argue that the movement
towards the core was most likely approached most closely in 13 of the 36 years
(see Tables 6.5 and 6.6). Next I will answer the question whether the core was
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indeed approached more often and more closely in the years that the government
concluded its involvement in incomes policy with a neo-corporatist strategy. I
will argue that that was indeed more often the case. There was twice as much
movement towards the core, and the core was also more closely approached, in
the years that the government’s concluding strategy was neo-corporatist (see
Table 6.8). 
Thirdly, I will discuss the relation between the core situations observed and the
concluding styles of decision-making of trade unions and employers’ organisa-
tions. I will argue that there was, apparently, no relation between approaching the
core and a particular style of decision-making (see Table 6.9). 
Finally, I will discuss whether the core was more often and more closely ap-
proached in the years that a Central Agreement was reached. That is, whether the
core was more often and more closely approached in those years that the actors
involved in incomes policy were able to conclude a successful reordering of the
preferences on their respective agendas. I will argue that there was, apparently, a
positive relation as well between reaching a Central Agreement and approaching
the core. However, with regard to how closely the core could be approached,
there appears to have been a patterned variation (see Table 6.10).
6.3.1 Moving towards the core
In Table 6.5, the match between preferences and actual outcome between 1965
and 2000 is elaborated. Given the actors’ conflicting preferences (see section 6.1
and Table 6.1), I assume that substantively and empirically a movement towards
the core can be detected in the following ways:
- (4) all actors are able to realise a balanced match between their preferences
and actual outcome (what actors lose on one preference they win on another
and all actors win or lose more or less the same). This situation represents an
empirical movement closest towards the ideal point represented by the core42;
- (3) two of the three actors are able to realise a positive match between their pre-
ferences and actual outcome, whereas one actor is able to achieve a balanced
match. This situation also represents an empirical movement towards the ideal
42. Logically, the ideal core situation can represent the following three situations:
- all three actors are able to realise all their preferences in actual outcome (a win-win-win
situation);
- all three actors are able to realise a balanced match between their preferences and actual
outcome (a balanced situation);
- all three actors are to the same extent unable to realise all their preferences in actual outcome (a
lose-lose-lose situation).
Empirically and substantively, however, I contend that the core represents a balanced match between
all actors’ preferences and actual outcome, given the actors’ conflicting preferences that make both
a win-win-win and a lose-lose-lose situation unfeasible (see section 6.1 and Table 6.1).
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point represented by the core, but the core is not as closely approached as in
the situation that all actors are able to achieve a balanced match (4), as the
actor achieving a balance would prefer an alternative agreement;
- (2) one actor is able to realise a positive match between preferences and out-
come, whereas two actors are able to achieve a balanced match. This situation
also represents an empirical movement towards the ideal point represented by
the core, but the core is less closely approached as in the situation that two
actors are able to achieve a positive match (3), or all actors are able to achieve
a balance (4), as the two actors achieving a balance would both prefer an
alternative agreement;
- (1) finally, in all other situations at least one of the actors achieves a negative
match between preferences and outcome. This situation does not represent an
empirical movement towards the core. The actor achieving a negative match
would certainly prefer an alternative agreement.
It appears that in 13 of the 36 years (36.1 %%) the outcome was actually most
likely approaching a core situation (see Table 6.6). In the remaining 23 years
(63.9%), no movement towards the core could be observed. In other words,
Dutch incomes policy between 1965 and 2000 was apparently quite ineffective
with respect to achieving a balanced match between the preferences of all actors
involved in comes policy and actual outcome.
The distribution of the movements towards the core observed over the four
periods identified in chapter 5 is:
- 1965 - 1973 three core situations: 1965, 1966, 1968;
- 1974 - 1982 four core situations: 1976-1979;
- 1983 - 1992 two core situations: 1991, 1992;
- 1993 - 2000 four core situations: 1996-1998, 2000 (see Table 6.7).
Between 1965 and 1973, the preferences of trade unions were best matched with
actual outcome. The match between the preferences of employers’ organisations
and actual outcome in this period was usually negative. The match between the
preferences of the government and actual outcome was generally more or less
balanced; a negative outcome on one or more of the relevant indicators was
usually balanced by a positive outcome on other indicators.
The movements towards the core detected in this period reflect this situation.
Although some movement towards the core could be detected, some distance
between actual outcome and all three actors’ preferences remained. Two of the
core situations score 3 (1966, 1968) and one scores 2 (1965).
Between 1974 and 1982, the preferences of trade unions were still best matched
with actual outcome. However, the number of years in which their preferences
and actual outcome were more or less balanced greatly increased at the expense
of the number of years in which that match was positive. In three of these years
the movement towards the core most likely approached the core most closely
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(1976, 1978, and 1979). These core situations score 4. In another year there was
also some movement towards the core, but the core was less closely approached
(1977). The core situation in this year score 2. 
The match between the preferences of employers’ organisations and actual out-
come improved, partly due to approaching a core situation in this period. Finally,
the match between the preferences of the government and actual outcome di-
minished considerably, despite the four years in which a core was approached.
Between 1983 and 1992, the preferences of trade unions were least best matched
with actual outcome, despite the two years in which a core was approached most
closely (1991, 1992). The core situation in these years scores 4. The preferences
of employers’ organisations in this period were best matched with actual out-
come, although in the years that the movement towards the core could be ob-
served that match was less positive than in the remaining years. The match be-
tween the preferences of the government and actual outcome, finally, improved
considerably. Approaching the core in two years added to this improved match.
Between 1993 and 2000, the preferences of trade unions were again least match-
ed with actual outcome, although the match improved compared to the previous
period. The preferences of employers’ organisations in this period remained best
matched with actual outcome. The match between the preferences of the govern-
ment and actual outcome again improved considerably and reached almost the
same level as that of employers’ organisations.
Nevertheless, in four years a movement towards the core could be observed
(1996-1998, 2000). However, the core was less closely approached as in the
previous period. The core situations in this period score 3.
The trends with respect to the match between preferences and outcome for the se-
parate actors that can be observed for the whole period between 1965 and 2000 were:
- the preferences of trade unions were best matched with actual outcome be-
tween 1965 and 1973. That match diminished between 1973 and 1982, but re-
mained positive. Between 1983 and 1992, that match diminished further and
became negative. Finally, between 1993 and 2000, the match improved some-
what but did not come anywhere near the levels achieved between 1974 and
1982, let alone those achieved between 1965 and 1973;
- the match between the preferences of employers’ organisations and actual out-
come shows the opposite pattern of that of trade unions. The match was nega-
tive between 1965 and 1973, consistently improved between 1974 and 1992,
and, finally, became completely positive between 1993 and 2000;
- the match between the preferences of the government and actual outcome
shows a more varied pattern. The match was more or less balanced between
1965 and 1973 and considerably diminished between 1974 and 1982. Between
1983 and 1992 the match improved and finally became almost completely
positive between 1993 and 2000.
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These trends appear to follow changes in the macroeconomic context rather closely
(see section 6.3.5 and chapter 5). Trade unions were best able to realise their pre-
ferences in actual outcome during periods of macroeconomic prosperity, where-
as employers’ organisations did better during periods of macroeconomic adversity
(with the exception of the period 1993 - 2000). In other words, there seems to be an
inverse relationship between moving towards the core, due to economic circumstances.
Hence, ‘finding’ the core may well be helped by a ‘structure induced equilibrium’
(Central Agreement), but is also influenced by macroeconomic conditions.
6.3.2 Moving towards the core and government strategy
In this section the question will be answered whether a concluding neo-corpo-
ratist government strategy was indeed more effective in terms of approaching the
core than a non-neo-corporatist government strategy. In section 6.3.1 I have
argued that Dutch incomes policy in general was quite ineffective in approaching
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a core situation between 1965 and 2000. However, a neo-corporatist government
strategy was considerably more effective than a non-neo-corporatist government
strategy with regard to approaching the core (see Table 6.8).
In nine of the 13 years that a movement towards the core could be observed, the
government concluded its involvement in incomes policy with a neo-corporatist
government strategy. In the remaining four years, the government concluded its
involvement in incomes policy with a non-neo-corporatist government strategy.
In 1966 and 1976 it was the guiding (IV) strategy, and in 1968 and 1992 it was
the passive (I) strategy. Apparently, a neo-corporatist government strategy was
considerably more effective with regard to approaching the core than a non-neo-
corporatist government strategy, like it was with regard to reaching a Central
Agreement as well (see section 6.2).
6.3.3 Moving towards the core and styles of decision-making
There appears to be no relation between styles of decision-making of trade
unions and employers’ organisations and approaching the core (see Table 6.9).
Most concluding styles of decision-making are of the bargaining variety (B), and
this is also true for most (11) of the movements towards the core observed
between 1965 and 2000. It is interesting to note that a problem solving style of
decision-making (C) apparently was not conducive to approaching the core;
whereas a confrontational style of decision-making (A) did contribute to
approaching a core situation in two of the years.
Apparently, as was the case with reaching Central Agreements (see section 6.2
and chapters 4 and 5), approaching the core was not facilitated by co-operation
between trade unions and employers’ organisations. On the contrary, more or less
‘tough’ negotiations on incomes policy - confrontation and bargaining - appear
to have been more conducive to both reaching a Central Agreement and
approaching a core situation between 1965 and 2000.
6.3.4 Moving towards the core and Central Agreements
In this section I will explore the relation between Central Agreements and
approaching the core. The question to be answered is whether in the years that
the actors involved in incomes policy were able to reach a Central Agreement, a
movement towards the core could be observed more often than in the years that
no Central Agreement was reached. Table 6.10 shows that reaching a Central
Agreement was positively related with approaching the core. 
With regard how close a core situation could be approached, a patterned
variation can be observed. In the years that a Central Agreement was reached, the
core was usually moderately closely approached: most movements towards the
core in these years score 3. In the years that no Central Agreement could be
reached, the movement towards the core showed more variation. In four of these
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years the core was most closely approached and these score 4. In three of these
years the core was less closely approached and these score 2.
In other words, some sort of trade-off seems to have occurred between 1965 and
2000. When a Central Agreement was reached, a moderate movement towards
the core could be observed. When no Central Agreement could be reached, the
movement towards the core came either closer to a core situation than in
combination with a Central Agreement, or less closer, but still moving towards a
core situation. More or less ‘tough’ negotiations on incomes policy between
social partners - confrontation and bargaining - appear to have been conducive
to both reaching a Central Agreement and approaching a core situation between
1965 and 2000 (see also section 6.2 and chapters 4 and 5).
6.3.5 Moving towards the core, government strategy, style of decision-making
and Central Agreements
In line with what I expected, both concluding neo-corporatist government strate-
gies and Central Agreements apparently were conducive to approaching the core.
Reaching a Central Agreement considerably increased the likelihood that a core
was approached. A Central Agreement was more often reached by ‘tough’ nego-
tiations between social partners - either confrontation or bargaining - than by a co-
operative style of decision-making (problem solving).
Conversely, the effectiveness of non-neo-corporatist government strategies was
slightly increased if no Central Agreement could be reached (see Table 6.11 and
Figure 6.1)
A relation can be observed between the actors’ behaviour in terms of government
strategies, styles of decision-making, and reaching Central Agreements, on the one
hand, and approaching the core in terms of a match between actors’ preferences
and actual outcome, on the other hand. The movement towards the core was in-
creased by two combinations of actors’ behaviour. First, by neo-corporatist govern-
ment strategies resulting in Central Agreements that could be reached by more or
less ‘tough’negotiations between social partners. Second, but to a much lesser extent,
by non-neo-corporatist government strategies under the condition that no Central
Agreement could be reached based on ‘tough’ negations between social partners.
However, judging from the trends observed in section 6.3.1, actual outcome in
terms of preferences between 1965 and 2000 was also influenced the macro-
economic context. Changes in the macroeconomic context had a bearing on the
potential of actors to realise their preferences in actual outcome.
Trade unions were able to realise or balance their preferences in actual outcome
best during periods of economic prosperity. Employers’ organisations showed a
reversed pattern with regard to their preferences and actual outcome (except
during the period 1993 - 2000). The government, finally, showed a more varied
pattern due to its intermediate position between trade unions and employers’
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organisations, except in the period 1993 - 2000. In that period, the government
had the same level of success in matching its preferences with actual outcome as
employers’ organisations.
The combination of the actors’ behaviour and the macroeconomic context was
reflected in how closely a core situation could be approached in the various periods:
- 1965 - 1973: two core situations with score 3; one with score 2
- 1974 - 1982: three core situations with score 4; one with score 2;
- 1983 - 1992: two core situations with score 4;
- 1993 - 2000: four core situations with score 3 (see also Tables 6.6 and 6.7).
6.4 Concluding remarks
In this chapter I have discussed the effectiveness of Dutch incomes policy in
terms of the agendas of the actors involved. This discussion provides the answer
to research question 2:
Was Dutch incomes policy between 1965 and 2000 effective in terms of the
agendas of actors involved?
With respect to Central Agreements, the final answer to research question 2 must
be that Dutch incomes policy between 1965 and 2000 was more often not ef-
fective than effective in terms of the agendas of the actors involved, especially
between 1965 and 1982. Neo-corporatist incomes policies were indeed more
often effective than non-neo-corporatist incomes policies in this respect, es-
pecially after 1992. 
I contend, however, that this does not support the emergence of a ‘Polder Model’,
neither starting in 1983, nor in the 1990s (see also chapter 2, section 2.3; chapter
4; and chapter 5, sections 5.3 - 5.5). In effect, the ‘Model’ of negotiations on
incomes policy between 1965 and 2000 did not change dramatically over the
years. What did change was the effectiveness of that incomes policy in terms of
Central Agreements. Increased effectiveness of negotiations on incomes policy
in terms of Central Agreements after 1982, however, can be explained in terms of
the actors’ behaviour during the annual negotiations on incomes policy in a con-
text of institutional change due to macroeconomic and other externalities (EMU).
A neo-corporatist government strategy, combined with a Central Agreement that was
reached through more or less ‘tough’ negotiations between social partners, in-
creased actual outcome in terms of approaching the core. To a (much) lesser extent
that was also the case for non-neo-corporatist government strategies when no Cen-
tral Agreement could be reached through ‘tough’negotiations between social partners.
The macroeconomic context appeared to influence the actors’ potential to ap-
proach a match between their preferences and actual outcome. That was reflected
in how often and how close a core situation could be approached, given the com-
bination of actors’ behaviour in terms of government strategies, Central Agree-
ments and ‘tough’ negotiations between social partners.
7. Neo-corporatism and social democracy
In this chapter I will investigate the relation between neo-corporatism and social
democracy as indicated by government composition. The questions to be ans-
wered are, firstly, to what extent a neo-corporatist government strategy coincides
with social democratic participation in coalition government. Secondly, what
was the effectiveness of these neo-corporatist government strategies in terms of
the agendas of the actors involved in incomes policy (see chapter 6).
Quite a few students of neo-corporatism have indeed found a strong relation be-
tween social democratic participation or even dominance in government and
neo-corporatism comparatively (see for instance Cameron 1978, 1984; Marks
1986; Zimmermann 1986; Curtis 1987; Wilson 1990; Kurzer 1991; Western
1991; Crepaz 1992; and Keman 1993; see also Siaroff 1999 and chapter 2).
According to most researchers the function of neo-corporatism is to cope with
world market fluctuations and to further a positive macroeconomic performance.
An essential aspect of neo-corporatism is in their view the effectuation of some
sort of exchange between government and trade unions: government expenditure
on social security (including unemployment benefits) or welfare in general, in
return for a policy of wage moderation by the trade unions. Through the tra-
ditional links between trade unions and social democratic parties, social demo-
cratic participation in or dominance of government is seen by many as a pre-
requisite for the effectuation of this exchange. Social democratic (participation
in) government can provide for both social security (or welfare) and in exchange
for acquiescent trade unions that moderate their wage and other income related
demands.
In chapter 2, section 2.2, I have argued that for the Dutch case the link between
neo-corporatism and social democratic participation or even dominance in govern-
ment is, however, more complex. In the Netherlands, social democracy - repre-
sented by the PvdA - has always been part of coalition governments when in
government. Between 1965 and 2000, when the PvdA was in government, the
party either governed with the CDA or its precursors, or with the VVD and D66.
Until 1994, the CDA was usually both the median and largest party in parliament
and was always included in government (Laver and Schofield [1990] 1998: 113,
117, 118). That is to say, until 1994 the CDA usually was the pivot party that
dominated the centre space in the Dutch party system and was the largest party
in parliament (Keman 2002a: 16; see also Keman 1997: 87, 104-111; van
Kersbergen 1997, 1999; Figure 7.1).43 In 1994, the PvdA took over the position
as largest party in government and parliament from the CDA, but the CDA
remained the central or median party. In other words, for the major part of the
period 1965 to 2000, Dutch neo-corporatism appears not to be the product of
social democracy per se, but rather of christian democratic (participation in)
government with or without social democracy. At first sight, therefore, it seems
more convincing to argue that in the Netherlands, christian democracy is apparently
equally committed to the political provision of welfare as social democracy (see
Budge and Keman 1990: 142). 
Hence, the straightforward hypothesis regarding the relation between social
democratic government and neo-corporatist government strategies can not be
validated for the Netherlands from a comparative perspective. Yet, by focusing
on government composition and related measures, we can investigate the relation
between neo-corporatism and either christian or social democracy in the
Netherlands more closely (see Woldendorp et al 2000).
Although christian democracy and social democracy are often together in govern-
ment, this does not, however, mean that in the Netherlands they are ‘natural’
coalition partners, as is shown by their relative distances on the Left-Right index
in Figure 7.1.
Based on the policy distances between Left and Right, the CDA was the central
party between 1965 and 2000. After 1982, policy distances between Left and
Right diminished and the respective parties converged. From that perspective,
the 1994 ‘purple’44 coalition was less surprisingly than the continuation of that
coalition in 1998.
In chapter 5, I have given a brief overview of some major political developments
in the Netherlands during the period 1965 - 2000 (Woldendorp et al 2000; see
also Daalder 1995; Andeweg and Irwin 1993, 2002; chapter 2, section 2.6; and
chapter 3, section 3.2.2.1)
These included the fragmentation of the established, pillarised party system in
the 1960s and early 1970s that resulted in the emergence of a parliamentary
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43. In the 1977 and 1982 elections, the PvdA became the largest party in parliament, but CDA and VVD
together commanded a majority in parliament and subsequently formed a coalition government (see
also chapter 3, section 3.2.2.1 and Tables 3.1 and 3.2, and chapter 5, section 5.2).
44. ‘Purple’ being the result of mixing the ‘red’ of the PvdA with the ‘blue’ of the VVD.
stalemate in the early 1970s. The confessional parties chose to govern with the
VVD until they lost their combined majority in parliament in the early 1970s.
However, the PvdA together with the other centre and left parties could not
command a majority either (Andeweg and Irwin 2002: 98). In the late 1960s, the
PvdA started its ‘polarisation’ strategy against the KVP and the VVD (see Figure
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Figure 7.1: Left versus Right 1963 - 1998
year election
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Note: Left-Right index based on Pennings and Keman (2003: 55) who use and adaptation of 
Klingemann et al (1994). The index is based on the data published by Budge et al (2001). 
The Left-Right scale is computed as left issues minus right issues. The maximum value of the scale is 
100 (all emphasis on left issues). The minimum value of the scale is –100 (all emphasis on right 
issues).  CDA prior to 1977 is KVP, ARP, and CHU combined. Parties are positioned on the Left-
Right dimension on the basis of their coded party manifestos for each election. This position is used as 
a simple yardstick to show the distance between parties and the change over time. 
 
Left issues      Right issues 
Anti-imperialism     Military: positive 
Internationalism: positive    Constitutionalism: positive 
Peace       Individual freedom 
Democracy      Governmental and administrative efficiency 
Market regulation     Free enterprise 
Economic planning     Incentives to induce enterprise 
Protectionism: positive     Protectionism: negative 
Controlled economy  Economic orthodoxy  
Nationalisation Welfare state limitation 
Welfare state expansion Law and order 
Education expansion Social harmony 
Labour groups: positive 
 
7.1 and Andeweg and Irwin 2002: 40-42), believing that the decline of the
confessional parties in the end would result in a realignment of the party system
that would profit both the PvdA (left) and the VVD (right).
Between the mid 1970s and early 1980s, coalition governments went back and
forth between centre-left coalitions of CDA45 and PvdA (Den Uyl, van Agt II)
and centre-right coalitions of CDA and VVD (van Agt I, Lubbers I). Whenever
feasible, based on the number of seats in parliament, the CDA continued to opt for
a centre-right coalition with the VVD, as the PvdA persisted in its strategy of
‘polarisation’ against KVP and VVD (see Figure 7.1). Coalition governments
with the PvdA (and other centre or left parties) were only concluded when CDA
and VVD together could not command a majority in parliament (see also Daudt
1982).
In the 1980s and early 1990s, both centre-left and centre-right coalitions were
feasible based on the number of seats in parliament for each coalition govern-
ment. The CDA was both the dominant and central party in parliament and
government and determined whether it was to be a centre-right coalition with the
VVD (Lubbers I & II), or a centre-left coalition with the PvdA (Lubbers III). As
the PvdA had discontinued its ‘polarisation’ strategy after the failed Van Agt II
(CDA, PvdA, D66) government of 1981 - 1982, the CDA (re)considered the
PvdA as a potential coalition partner (see Figure 7.1). 
The Van Agt II government was an uncomfortable coalition of PvdA, CDA and
D66. CDA and VVD, the previous coalition parties, sustained losses in the 1981
elections, and so did the PvdA. D66 was the winner of these elections and
doubled in size. But the three parties, especially PvdA and CDA, differed greatly
in their views on budgetary and socio-economic policy. These differences were
duly noted in the government’s policy program (Regeeraccoord). However, no
policy compromises were formulated. Substantive policy decisions were left to
the government ministers who subsequently failed to agree on policy making (Tim-
mermans 2003: 75-88; see also Figure 7.1). The result of this coalition forma-
tion, which was primarily based on office seeking behaviour of the participating
political parties, was an unstable government coalition that quickly foundered
when in a period of severe economic crisis agreement on substantive policy
decisions (policy seeking) could not be reached.
In the mid 1990s a major change in coalition government occurred. Both CDA
and PvdA lost heavily in the 1994 elections that followed the Lubbers III (CDA,
PvdA) government. However, the CDA lost more seats than the PvdA who be-
came the largest party in parliament. The centre-left coalition of CDA and PvdA
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45. From 1975, the confessional parties KVP, ARP, and CHU contested elections with one party list,
CDA. In 1980, the separate party organisations merged as well (see ten Napel 1992; chapter 2,
section 2.6; and chapter 3, section 3.2.2.1). 
that was dominated by the CDA (Lubbers III) was replaced by the ‘purple’
coalition in which PvdA (left) and VVD (right) co-operated (Kok I & II). For the
first time since 1917, the CDA (or one or more of its forebears) was not in
government. And for the first time since 1951, PvdA and VVD were together in
government again.
The first ‘purple’ coalition (Kok I) of 1994 was a minimal winning coalition of
PvdA+D66+VVD, which was forced by D66, who refused to consider a centre-
right coalition government with the CDA and the VVD which was also an option
based on the number of seats in parliament and the ideological distances between
these parties in terms of Left and Right (see Table 7.1 and Figure 7.1). The
second ‘purple’ coalition of 1998 (Kok II) was an oversized coalition of PvdA,
D66, and VVD (Table 7.1).
The policy program of the Kok I (PvdA, D66, VVD) government was a classic
example of the functions of a Regeeraccoord in Dutch coalition government
(Timmermans 2003: 111-131). Socio-economic policy issues were the central
issues in the program. On all issues, ranging from employment, privatization and
tightening of social security legislation, to budgetary policy, explicit com-
promises and review procedures were formulated. Helped by accelerating econo-
mic growth, the policy program seemingly enhanced the government’s policy
making efficiency.
Above I have already briefly referred to the policy programs of some of the
coalition governments in the Netherlands between 1965 and 2000. As of 1963,
coalition governments in the Netherlands formulated their policy programs in
Regeeraccoorden, literally: government agreements (see also Daalder 1987; Keman
1996a, 2002). During the period under investigation, these policy programs
dramatically increased in size: from 3,500 words on average in the 1960s, 7,500
words in the 1970s, almost 20,000 words in the 1980s, to over 25,000 words in
the 1990s (Timmermans 2003: 34).46
These policy programs had two functions. They specified the policy agendas of
the government on all relevant portfolios and competences, and they contained
conflict prevention devices (Timmermans 2003: 21, 22). That usually increased
the efficiency of coalition policy making (Timmermans 2003: 154). During
coalition negotiations, manifest and potential policy conflicts were the main
topics. The Regeeraccoord served as a device to solve these conflicts by specifying
substantive and procedural compromises (Timmermans 2003: 36; see also Toirkens
1988; Andeweg 1990; Bovend’Eert 1990; and Timmermans and Bakema 1990).
In Dutch coalition governments, the distribution of portfolios is largely
proportional to the respective party’s seats in parliament. Larger parties usually
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46. Only in Belgium, policy programs in this period tended to be even larger (Timmermans 2003: 14).
get slightly less portfolios than their seats in parliament, smaller parties slightly
more (Laver and Schofield [1990] 1998: 172, 175; see also Budge and Keman
1990; Woldendorp et al 2000: 395-401; and Andeweg and Irwin 2002: 101-120). 
With respect to the ministries claimed by respective coalition parties, the largest
party usually takes the post of Prime Minister (PM).47 When in coalition with
either the PvdA or the VVD, the CDA, or its precursors, always took the port-
folio of Social Affairs (which includes Labour), the Ministry directly responsible
for incomes policy.48 The other portfolios in the so-called ‘socio-economic triangle’
that were most directly involved in incomes policy were the ministries of Finance
and Economic Affairs. With the exception of the short-lived governments Cals
(KVP, ARP, PvdA) in 1965/66 and van Agt II (CDA, PvdA, D66) in 1981/82, in
a coalition with the PvdA, the CDA always held two of the three portfolios in the
‘socio-economic triangle’, including Social Affairs (and Labour) (see also
Budge and Keman 1990: 112-126). In coalitions with the VVD in the 1960s and
1970s (with the exception of the government De Jong (KVP, ARP, CHU, VVD),
the CDA and its precursors also dominated the ‘socio-economic triangle’ with
two portfolios, including Social Affairs (and Labour). In the Lubbers I and II
governments in the 1980s, however, the CDA held on to the Ministry of Social
Affairs (since 1981 including Labour), but the VVD took the two other port-
folios in the ‘socio-economic triangle’: Economic Affairs and Finance (see also
Timmermans 2003: 89-110).
It was only in the ‘purple’ coalition from 1994 with the VVD and D66, that the
PvdA became the dominant party in government and held both the office of PM
and the Ministry of Social Affairs. The remaining two ministries in the ‘socio-
economic triangle’ in the Kok I (PvdA, D66, VVD) government were propor-
tionally distributed over the other two coalition parties: Economic Affairs went
to D66, the VVD took Finance. In the Kok II (PvdA, D66, VVD) government the
VVD acquired the Ministry of Economic Affairs as well, due to the large losses
of D66 in the 1998 parliamentary elections (Woldendorp et al 2000: 395-401;
see also chapter 3, section 3.2.2.1 and Tables 3.1 and 3.2; and Table 7.1). 
So the conclusion is that in the Netherlands, due to the negotiations game played
during the government formation and the differences between the participating
parties’ policy agendas, the power distribution is skewed. Therefore, a direct
relation between social democracy and neo-corporatism cannot be expected. 
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47. Although the three parties that later formed the CDA (KVP, ARP, and CHU) together were larger
than the PvdA in the 1972 elections, the CHU remained outside the government. In the government
Den Uyl (PvdA, PPR, D66, KVP, ARP) the PvdA was the largest party and took the post of PM (see
also chapter 3, section 3.2.2.1).
48. The exception being the short-lived government Van Agt II (CDA, PvdA, D66) in 1981-1982, in
which the PvdA held the office of Minister of Social Affairs (and Labour). But this government had
no substantial lasting influence on incomes policy (see also Table 7.2 and section 7.1.1).
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Although after 1993 the PvdA was the dominant party in government and held
the Ministry of Social Affairs, the party did not dominate the ‘socio-economic
triangle’ as well, as the CDA used to do in all coalition governments with the
PvdA and in some coalitions with the VVD (with the exception of the
government De Jong from 1967 to 1971, and the Lubbers I and II governments
between 1982 and 1989). This means that research into a possible relation
between neo-corporatist government strategies and social democratic
participation in government in the Netherlands is faced with a difficulty. The
international literature on this relation clearly states that neo-corporatism goes
together with social democratic (dominance in) government (see for instance
Wilson 1990; Western 1991; Kurzer 1991; and Crepaz 1992). In the Dutch case
that is only more or less the case for the ‘purple’ coalitions after 1993. In
coalition governments before 1994, the CDA was the dominant party in
government and the party primarily responsible for incomes policy (see also
Smith 1988; Cox 1989; Budge and Keman 1990: 142; and Lijphart and Crepaz
1991). Therefore, in the Netherlands the conditions governing international
research into the relation between social democracy and neo-corporatism in fact
only apply to the years after 1993, and even then not completely.
Taking this into account, I will conduct my discussion of the possible relation
between a neo-corporatist government strategy and the PvdA in government in
two stages. First I will establish whether government participation of the PvdA
as such and neo-corporatist government strategies indeed go together. Next I will
investigate whether or not there is a difference with regard to neo-corporatist
government strategies between coalition governments with the PvdA before
1994 and after 1993.
Based on the international literature on social democracy and neo-corporatism I
expect that coalition governments in which the PvdA participated concluded
their involvement in incomes policy more often with a neo-corporatist
government strategy than coalition governments in which the PvdA did not
participate. I also expect that from 1994, coalition governments in which the
PvdA participated and held both the office of PM and Minister of Social Affairs
did end with a neo-corporatist government strategy more often than coalition
governments with the PvdA prior to 1994 (section 7.1.1).49 That will also shed
some light on the occurrence of the so-called ‘Dutch Miracle’ as put forward by
many during the late 1990s.
Next I will discuss the years in which coalition governments did not perform
49. In the international literature, a neo-corporatist government strategy or incomes policy is thought to
be beneficial for macroeconomic and policy performance (see for instance Schmidt 1982; Alvarez
et al 1991; Kurzer 1991; Western 1991; Crepaz 1992; Keman 1993; Pennings 1997; Lijphart 1999;
Siaroff 1999; Traxler and Kittel 2000; and Kenworthy 2002). The link between social democratic 
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according to my expectations. For coalition governments with the PvdA these
are the years in which the government ended its involvement in incomes policy
with a non-neo-corporatist government strategy (section 7.1.2). For coalition
governments in which the PvdA did not participate, these are the years in which
the government concluded its involvement in incomes policy with a neo-cor-
poratist strategy (section 7.1.3).
Finally, I will discuss the effectiveness of incomes policy of coalition govern-
ments with and without participation of the PvdA in terms of the agendas of the
actors involved. In chapter 6, I have established that neo-corporatist government
strategies or incomes policies were consistently more effective in terms of re-
ordering the agendas of the actors involved than non-neo-corporatist government
strategies. Therefore, neo-corporatist government strategies more often resulted
in a Central Agreement than non-neo-corporatist government strategies. Con-
sequently, I expect coalition governments in which the PvdA participated to be
more effective in terms of Central Agreements than coalition governments in
which the PvdA did not participate. Furthermore, I expect that coalition govern-
ments in which the PvdA participated after 1993 were more effective in this
respect than before 1994 (section 7.2.1).
In chapter 6 I have also argued that a relation can be observed between the
actors’ behaviour in terms of government strategies, styles of decision-making,
and reaching Central Agreements, on the one hand, and approaching the core in
terms of a match between actors’ preferences and actual outcome, on the other
hand. The movement towards the core was increased by two combinations of
actors’ behaviour. First, by neo-corporatist government strategies resulting in
Central Agreements that could be reached by more or less ‘tough’ negotiations
between social partners. Second, but to a much lesser extent, by non-neo-cor-
poratist government strategies under the condition that no Central Agreement
could be reached based on ‘tough’ negations between social partners. The macro-
economic context had a bearing on how closely a core situation could be ap-
proached.
Consequently, I do expect coalition governments in which the PvdA participated
to be more effective in terms of approaching the core than coalition governments
in which the PvdA did not participate, and I expect that coalition governments
in which the PvdA participated after 1993 to be more effective in this respect
than before 1994 (section 7.2.2).
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(participation in) government and neo-corporatism that was found in comparative research suggests,
ipso facto, that social democratic (participation in) government is beneficial for performance. In
chapter 8, Dutch macroeconomic and policy performance (both the ‘Dutch Disease’ of the 1970s
and 1980s and the ‘Dutch Miracle’ of the late 1990s) will be discussed from a comparative per-
spective in order to establish whether the Dutch case was indeed different and exceptional with
regard to performance.
7.1 Government strategies and government composition
The issue in this section is the relation between social democracy and neo-
corporatist government strategies. That is, to what extent the choice of strategy,
implementation and outcome can be attributed to the participation of social
democracy.
7.1.1 Neo-corporatist government strategies and the PvdA in government
Of the 36 years between 1965 and 2000, the PvdA participated in government in
17 years (47.2%). The PvdA was out of government in 19 of the years (52.8%). 
The years listed in Table 7.2, are those in which governments with and without
participation of the PvdA did actually determine the substance and implemen-
tation of government policy, including incomes policy. These do not necessarily
always completely coincide with the years the PvdA was in or out of govern-
ment. Quite often, the first budget (the budget is at the heart of incomes policy)
of an incoming government was still largely, and sometimes even completely,
determined by the outgoing government. The participation of the PvdA in the
short-lived government Van Agt II (CDA, PvdA, D66) between November 1981
and May 1982 has not had a substantial influence on incomes policy in 1982 (see
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Appendix). Incomes policy in that year was largely determined by the previous
government Van Agt I (CDA, VVD) and the following caretaker government Van
Agt III (CDA, D66). Therefore, that government period was not included in the
years the PvdA was in government (see also chapter 3, section 3.2.3). 
In 13 of the 17 years (76.5%) that the PvdA was in government, the government
concluded its involvement in negotiations and implementation of incomes policy
with a neo-corporatist strategy. 
Governments in which the PvdA did not participate show the opposite pattern of
concluding government strategies. Those governments ended their involvement
in incomes policy with a neo-corporatist strategy in only six of the 19 years
(31.6% - see Table 7.3; see also Table 7.1).
The preliminary conclusion must be that governments in which the PvdA par-
ticipated indeed opted for a concluding neo-corporatist strategy in a clear majority
of the years involved. Governments in which the PvdA did not participate opted
for a non-neo-corporatist concluding strategy in a clear majority of the years in-
volved. That means that a neo-corporatist government strategy indeed coincided
with the participation of the PvdA in government. This finding concurs with
international research on neo-corporatism and social democracy.
How to account for the deviant cases? Governments in which the PvdA partici-
pated opted for a non-neo-corporatist concluding strategy in 1966, 1974, 1976,
and 1992. In these four years, social partners either were unable or unwilling to
come to an agreement on incomes policy on the central level. Governments in which
the PvdA did not participate, on the other hand, opted for a concluding neo-cor-
poratist strategy in 1965, 1973, and 1987-1989. Concluding government strate-
gies in these six years can also be explained by the peculiarities of negotiations on
incomes policy in these years. Below I will investigate these cases more closely.
I have distinguished between coalition governments with the CDA in which the
PvdA was not the dominant party, nor delivered the Minister of Social Affairs,
and coalition governments without the CDA in which that was both the case (see
Table 7.4).
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Now a different pattern can be detected. For coalition governments with the PvdA
(and the CDA) before 1994, the original strong relation between social demo-
cratic participation in government and concluding neo-corporatist strategies is
weakened considerably. Although governments with the PvdA still opted for a
concluding neo-corporatist strategy in a majority of the years, that majority
dropped from 76% to 60%. Governments in which the PvdA did not participate
remained stable in their preference for a concluding non-neo-corporatist strategy
in more than two-thirds of the years. 
For coalition governments with the PvdA (and the VVD) from 1994, the relation
between social democratic participation in government and the preference for a
concluding neo-corporatist government strategy was strengthened considerably.
In all seven years, the government opted for a concluding neo-corporatist govern-
ment strategy. That constitutes an increase from 76% to 100%, when compared
to all governments in which the PvdA participated. 
As the international literature on neo-corporatism and social democracy
suggested, there was indeed a positive relation between participation of the PvdA
in coalition government in the Netherlands and a concluding neo-corporatist
government strategy. That relation was strongest when the PvdA was both the
dominant party in government and held the office of Minister of Social Affairs.
There are, however, exceptions. In 1966, 1974, 1976, and 1992, governments in
which the PvdA participated but did not hold the office of Minister of Social
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Affairs, in the end opted for a non-neo-corporatist strategy. In 1965, 1973, 1979,
and 1987-1989, governments in which the PvdA did not participate nevertheless
opted for a concluding neo-corporatist strategy. That means that in itself, social
democratic (participation in) coalition government cannot be the only
explanation for the occurrence of concluding neo-corporatist government
strategies in the Netherlands between 1965 and 2000. Nevertheless, Table 7.4
shows that when the PvdA was the dominant party in government and took the
Ministry of Social Affairs, that government opted for a concluding neo-
corporatist strategy.
This finding supports those researchers that have concluded that Dutch neo-
corporatism cannot be explained solely by social democratic participation in
government. The peculiar feature of Dutch neo-corporatism is that it is also
shaped by the Dutch history of pillarisation that led to consociationalism or
consensus democracy and a dominant christian democracy in government until
1994 (see chapter 2, sections 2.2 and 2.6; see also Czada 1987; Smith 1988;
Braun 1989; Cox 1989; Wolinetz 1989, 1990; Kurzer 1991; Lijphart and Crepaz
1991; Hemerijck 1992; Keman 1993: 181-189; van Kersbergen 1995; Crepaz
and Lijphart 1995; Keman and Pennings 1995; Anderson 2001; Pennings and
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Figure 7.2: Corporatism 1963 - 1998
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Vergunst 2001; Armingeon 2002; and Keman 2002: 27-30). Empirical evidence
collected by Budge et al (2001) underscores that christian democracy in the
Netherlands was even more committed to neo-corporatism - at least in its
election manifestos - than social democracy (see Figure 7.2; see also Budge and
Keman 1990: 142; van Kersbergen 1995).
However, the Dutch ‘puzzle’ is that whereas coalition governments of CDA and
PvdA indeed opted for a concluding neo-corporatist government strategy in a
majority of the years, most remarkable is that coalition governments of PvdA
and VVD opted for a concluding neo-corporatist government strategy in all of
the years. Coalition governments of CDA and VVD, however, opted for a con-
cluding non-neo-corporatist government strategy in a clear majority of the years
(see Table 7.5).
Below, in sections 7.1.2, 7.1.3 and 7.1.4, I will discuss this ‘puzzle’ in more detail.
7.1.2 Non-neo-corporatist government strategies and the PvdA in government
In four years, coalition governments in which the PvdA participated but did not
hold the office of Minister of Social Affairs, opted for non-neo-corporatist con-
cluding government strategies: 1966, 1974, 1976, and 1992. The question to be
answered is what caused these governments to implement a non-neo-corporatist
concluding strategy. 
In 1966, trade unions and employers’ organisations were unable to reach an agree-
ment. They looked to the government Cals (KVP, ARP, PvdA)50 to break the
deadlock. Consequently, the government determined incomes policy in this year.
That government intervention has to be viewed against the backdrop of the demise
of the centrally guided incomes policy since 1965. All actors had some difficulty
in adjusting to the new institutions. The inability of social partners to reach an agree-
ment made them look to the government to solve their problems. The govern-
ment in turn did not hesitate to take over the determination of incomes policy as all
coalition governments of all persuasions had been accustomed to do prior to 1965.
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50. The KVP held the post of PM and the Ministry of Social Affairs (and Labour), the PvdA the
ministries of Finance and Economic Affairs (see Table 7.1).
To put it in other words, old habits die slowly (see also chapter 5, section 5.1).
Government strategy in 1974 and 1976 has to be understood within the context
of the macroeconomic effects of the first oil crisis of 1973. In 1974, after the rank-
and-file of the employers’ organisations rejected the provisional bipartite Central
Agreement that was brokered by the government, the oil crisis broke out. The
government Den Uyl (PvdA, KVP, ARP, D66, PPR)51 reacted with special
emergency legislation that gave it extraordinary powers to enforce temporary
macroeconomic policies to combat the effects of the oil crisis. This package was
carefully designed, based on the original agendas of trade unions and employers’
organisations, and the narrowly failed agreement. After implementation of the
six months binding policy package, social partners subsequently failed again to
reach any agreement for the remainder of the year. The emergency legislation was
then extended with a binding wage measure that, as well as the earlier package,
took into account the agendas of both trade unions and employers’ organisations.
In 1976, all attempts by the government Den Uyl to get parties to conclude a
Central Agreement failed. Trade unions and employers’ organisations were not
willing to come to an agreement. This induced the government to take over
responsibility for incomes policy with a policy package of extra public expen-
diture to boost the economy. The package included a ‘wage freeze’ as well. 
As social partners could not come to an agreement in both 1974 and 1976, the
government took over incomes policy in an effort to counter the macroeconomic
effects of the 1973 oil crisis (see also chapter 5, section 5.2).52
Finally 1992; in this year all three parties went their separate ways. Central
negotiations did not take place. Decentral negotiations resulted in compromises
between trade unions and employers’ organisations in which trade unions managed
to get their way to a large extent. As the Lubbers III (CDA, PvdA)53 government’s
policies with regard to the (semi-) public sector (deficit reduction) were not in
jeopardy - the linkage between market sector and (semi-) public sector was only
partially restored -, the government left responsibility for incomes policy in the
market sector to social partners (see also chapter 5, section 5.3). 
In other words, the non-neo-corporatist concluding government strategies
employed by coalition governments in which the PvdA participated but did not
hold the office of Minister of Social Affairs can be explained by the peculiarities
of negotiations on incomes policy in the years in which these strategies were
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51. The PvdA held the office of PM and the Ministry of Finance, KVP and ARP the ministries of
Economic and Social Affairs (including Labour) respectively (see Table 7.1).
52. The government Den Uyl was widely considered to be quite left of the centre and, consequently, the
government’s rapport with especially employers’ organisations was quite low (see for instance
Becker 1994: 247-257; van der Broek 2002).
53. The CDA held the office of PM and both the ministries of Economic and Social Affairs (including
Labour), the PvdA held the Ministry of Finance (see Table 7.1).
employed. In all four years, social partners could either not come to an agree-
ment on the central level, or did not want to negotiate on the central level. In
1966, the government reacted by reverting to the trusted pattern of the centrally
guided incomes policy and took over responsibility for incomes policy. In 1974
and 1976, the government also reacted by taking over incomes policy, but this
time it was an emergency policy to boost the economy in order to counter the
macroeconomic effects of the 1973 oil crisis. Lastly, in 1992, the government
remained passive with regard to incomes policy in the market sector because
there was no threat of a spill over from that sector to the (semi-) public sector.
This discussion of the non-neo-corporatist government strategies of govern-
ments in which the PvdA participated indicates, firstly, that it was mainly ex-
ternal circumstances (the change from a government guided incomes policy to a
‘free’ incomes policy in 1966 that was driven by economic growth; the socio-
economic effects of the 1973 oil crisis in 1974 and 1976; and the delinkage of
the market sector from the (semi-) public sector in 1992 that was instituted in
1983 and 1984 to counter the effects of the severe economic crisis in the early
1980s) that accounted for the actors’ behaviour.
Secondly, it indicates that the effect on government strategy of the external cir-
cumstances in the 1960s and 1970s differed from that in the 1990s. In the 1960s
and 1970s these induced the government to implement a non-neo-corporatist
guiding government strategy (IV) and in the 1990s to implement a non-neo-
corporatist passive government strategy (I).
With respect the nature of the deviant cases, the above discussion suggests that
the non-neo-corporatist government strategies in 1974 and 1976 were idiosyncratic,
whereas 1966 and 1992 were genuine exceptions to the rule. In 1974 and 1976
the government reacted to the macroeconomic effects of the 1973 oil crises. In
1966 the rules of the game were changing, and in 1992 the government con-
tinued its policy of deficit reduction by changing both the level and eligibility of
disability benefits without contributing any further to the process of negotiations on
incomes policy.
Part of the ‘puzzle’ that coalition governments of CDA and PvdA did not opt for
concluding neo-corporatist government strategies in all the years they were in
office (see Table 7.5) - as could be expected from both the international literature
on social democracy and neo-corporatism and from the position of the CDA on
neo-corporatism in its election manifestos (see Figure 7.2) - can therefore be
explained by macroeconomic circumstances and institutional changes that led
these governments to implement non-neo-corporatist government strategies in a
number of years.
7.1.3 Neo-corporatist government strategies and the PvdA not in government
In six years between 1965 and 2000, coalition governments without the PvdA
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nevertheless opted for a concluding neo-corporatist government strategy. That was
the case in 1965, 1973, 1979, and 1987-1989. The question to be answered is why
these governments did opt for a concluding neo-corporatist government strategy.
In 1965, the government was consistently involved as a third party in the annual
process of negotiations on incomes policy. The government tried to broker at
least a bipartite, but preferably a tripartite Central Agreement between trade
unions, employers’ organisations and the government. The government Marijnen
(KVP, ARP, CHU, VVD)54 actively intervened in the negotiations and tried to
facilitate agreement by offering a choice of various policy packages on incomes
policy to trade unions and employers’ organisations. When negotiations bogged
down in a deadlock, it was the government that resolved the deadlock with a new
proposal that was grudgingly accepted by both parties (see also chapter 5,
section 5.1).
In 1973, the government also consistently tried to get trade unions and em-
ployers’ organisations to conclude a bipartite Central Agreement by offering social
partners facilitating policies or policy packages. Within the SER, trade unions
and employers’ organisations also recommended in favour of a social contract
between the government and ‘social partners’. However, their views on how to
combat inflation differed fundamentally. Trade unions demanded an expansion
of the (semi-) public sector and a more levelled distribution of incomes from the
government. From employers’ organisations they demanded a commitment to com-
prehensive Central Agreements as a policy instrument, support for their demands
from government, and facilities for unions on the plant level. Employers’ or-
ganisations had quite a different programme. They demanded a reduction in the
growth of both (semi-) public and private expenditure by reducing both wage and
price rises. Their paramount goal was to regain competitiveness on the world mar-
ket. Although the outgoing Biesheuvel II (KVP, ARP, CHU, VVD)55 govern-
ment’s policy had significantly facilitated the bipartite Central Agreement con-
cluded between trade unions and employers’ organisations, implementation led
to conflicts between trade unions and employers on the branch and company levels.
Nevertheless, the government stuck to its neo-corporatist strategy (see also
chapter 5, section 5.1).
Negotiations on incomes policy in 1979 were largely determined by the Van Agt
I (CDA, VVD)56 government’s policy programme ‘Bestek 81’ (Direction 81).
191
54. The KVP held the post of PM and the Ministry of Social Affairs (including Labour), the CHU the
Ministry of Economic Affairs, and the VVD the Ministry of Finance (see Table 7.1).
55. This was a caretaker government in which the ARP held the PM-ship and the Ministry of Social
Affairs (including Labour), the KVP the Ministry of Finance, and the VVD the Ministry of
Economic Affairs (see Table 7.1).
56. The CDA held the office of PM and both the ministries of Social Affairs (including Labour) and
Finance, the VVD held the Ministry of Economic Affairs (see Table 7.1).
Due to the steadily worsening economic situation, the government planned to cut
(semi-) public sector spending. The aim was to reduce the rapidly growing
budget deficit, and to increase profitability of companies in the market sector. At
the same time, the government’s policy package to facilitate negotiations did in-
clude incentives for especially the trade unions to entice them to conclude a Cen-
tral Agreement. These incentives, however, fell far short of the unions’ demands.
Therefore, trade unions refused to conclude a Central Agreement for an incomes
policy that was largely based on the government’s policy programme. The sub-
sequently enlarged government’s policy package with extra public expenditure
equally failed to bring trade unions and employers’ organisations to a Central
Agreement. The enlarged policy package was the framework in which decentral
negotiations took place. In decentral negotiations on incomes policy, trade unions
succeeded in getting compensation for price rises, plus a modest wage rise on
top of that for about half of the workforce. Nevertheless, the government did not
intervene in the outcome of these negotiations and ended its involvement in
negotiations on incomes policy with a neo-corporatist strategy (see also chapter
5, section 5.2).
With respect to the concluding neo-corporatist government strategies in the years
1987-1989, the government of the day consistently tried to get trade unions and
employers’ organisations to conclude bipartite or tripartite Central Agreements
by offering social partners facilitating policies or policy packages. In 1987, the
Lubbers II (CDA, VVD)57 government succeeded with some difficulty in getting
trade unions and employers’ organisations to participate in a tripartite Central
Agreement. The agreement was that parties renewed their commitment to pre-
vious bipartite and tripartite agreements on employment policies. Decentral ne-
gotiations on incomes policy progressed with difficulty. Employers’ organisa-
tions determined the outcome with respect to working hours, while trade unions
succeeded in countering the government’s reduction of the level of social se-
curity benefits from 80 to 70% of last earnings.
In 1988, trade unions and employers’ organisations did not succeed in conclu-
ding a Central Agreement due to the large differences between their agendas.
Trade unions wanted a reduction of unemployment, equal treatment of workers
in the market and the (semi-) public sector, extra money for the lowest incomes,
and (massive) government investment in infrastructure and the environment to
create jobs. On top of that, the FNV also wanted an increase in real buying power
for all employees. The CNV on the other hand, was still prepared to exercise
wage moderation.
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57. The CDA held the PM-ship and the Ministry of Social Affairs (including Labour), the VVD the
ministries of Finance and Economic Affairs (see Table 7.1).
The Lubbers II (CDA, VVD) government, however, planned to considerably cut
the budget, including a continuation of differential treatment of employees in the
(semi-) public sector, and no extra government investments for jobs. As a con-
cession to trade unions, the government was prepared to up child and holiday
allowances, to give the lowest paid an extra one-off payment, and to lower taxes
and social security premiums to prop up buying power.
Employers’ organisations agreed to the aim of the government’s budget: a con-
tinuation of reducing the budget deficit, even at the expense of extra budget cuts,
and a continuation of the reduction of wage costs and other costs. They rejected
any Central Agreement as that would only serve as a minimum, and thus create
an upward effect on wage costs. For employers, differentiation was the key word.
They criticised the government’s budget for not going far enough in reducing
costs and expenditure. The increase in child and holiday allowances offered by
the government, for instance, had to be paid by employers and thus would in-
crease their wage costs. Central negotiations on incomes policy broke down. 
The four bi- and tripartite working parties on employment policies that were in-
stalled as a result of the 1986 negotiations continued their work and issued their
reports thanks to intervention by the Lubbers II (CDA, VVD) government. These
reports served as a basis for decentral negotiations. 
Decentral collective contracts regarded some 60% of the workforce in the market
sector and were largely determined by employers and only marginally featured
aspects of employment policies recommended by the working parties: a minimal
wage rise, no further collective reduction of working hours, no expansion of early
retirement schemes, and the introduction of flexible wage systems in a few contracts.
The government, however, refrained from intervention in these contracts and
concluded its involvement in incomes policy with a neo-corporatist strategy.
Despite attempts and offers by the Lubbers II (CDA, VVD) government, central
negotiations on employment policies did not result in a Central Agreement in
1989 either. Negotiations on incomes policy were conducted on the decentral
level and started to show some effect of the recommendations of the previous
working parties on employment. Wages rose moderately, no further reduction in
working hours was achieved, and early retirement schemes were not expanded.
But on the issue of sick leave and disability a tripartite working group was
started. The government concluded its involvement in incomes policy with a
neo-corporatist strategy (see also chapter 5, section 5.3).
Concluding neo-corporatist government strategies of coalition governments in
which the PvdA did not participate can also be explained by the peculiarities of
negotiations on incomes policy in the years in which these policies were employ-
ed. The CDA’s position on neo-corporatism in their respective election manifestos
does not seem to have had a systematic influence in this respect. That is to say,
concluding neo-corporatist government strategies of coalition governments of
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the CDA with, and especially without the PvdA, appear not to be linked to the
emphases on neo-corporatism in the various election manifestos of the CDA (see
Figure 7.2). 
In 1965, government and social partners conducted a classical neo-corporatist
reordering of needs that resulted in a Central Agreement brokered by the government. 
In 1973, that was also the case, but in this year, the rank and file of social
partners failed to deliver on the decentral levels. That the government stuck to its
neo-corporatist strategy was most likely due to its outgoing status.
In 1979, all efforts of the government to reach a Central Agreement foundered
on the unwillingness of trade unions to compromise on an incomes policy based
on the governments programme ‘Bestek 81’ (Direction 81). The incoming
government did not want to worsen its relation with trade unions any further and
refrained from implementing a non-neo-corporatist government strategy. 
From 1987-1989, all efforts of the government to reach a Central Agreement
succeeded only in 1987. That the government nevertheless stuck to its neo-cor-
poratist government strategy in 1988 and 1989 can be explained by the continued
delinkage of the market sector and the (semi-) public sector, in combination with
the new Law on Wage Formation of 1987 (see also chapter 4 and chapter 5).
With respect to the nature of the deviant cases, the above discussion suggests that
concluding neo-corporatist government strategies in 1973 and 1979 were idio-
syncratic, whereas 1965 and 1987-1989 were genuine exceptions to the rule that
coalition governments of CDA and VVD usually do not opt for a concluding neo-
corporatist government strategy, despite the CDA’s stance on neo-corporatism
(see Figure 7.2). In 1973 and 1979 government strategy was based on the
government’s political position: outgoing and incoming respectively. 
In 1965 and between 1987 and 1989 the rules of the game had changed. In 1965,
incomes policy changed from a centrally guided, government directed incomes
policy to a free incomes policy. In the years 1987-1989 the linkage between
market sector and (semi-) public sector had been severed, whereas the amended
Law on Wage Formation from 1987 only allowed for guiding, government
directed incomes policies in case of external emergencies (see also chapter 5,
sections 5.1 and 5.3). These changes in the rules of the game induced these
governments to opt for a concluding neo-corporatist government strategy.
7.1.4 The Dutch ‘puzzle’
As explained above, the Dutch ‘puzzle’ was that whereas coalition governments
of CDA and PvdA indeed opted for a concluding neo-corporatist government
strategy in a majority of the years, it is most remarkable that coalition govern-
ments of PvdA and VVD opted for a concluding neo-corporatist government
strategy in all of the years. Coalition governments of CDA and VVD, on the
other hand, opted for a concluding non-neo-corporatist government strategy in a
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clear majority of the years (see Table 7.5).
In section 7.1.2, part of the ‘puzzle’ that coalition governments of CDA and PvdA
did not opt for concluding neo-corporatist government strategies in all the years
they were in office (see Table 7.5) - as one would expect based on both the
international literature on social democracy and neo-corporatism and the policy
position of the CDA on neo-corporatism in its election manifestos (see Figure
7.2) - could be explained by macroeconomic circumstances and institutional
changes that led these governments to implement non-neo-corporatist govern-
ment strategies in a number of years. The non-neo-corporatist government stra-
tegies in 1974 and 1976 appeared to be idiosyncratic, whereas 1966 and 1992
were genuine exceptions to the rule. In 1974 and 1976 the government reacted
to the macroeconomic effects of the 1973 oil crises. In 1966, the rules of the game
were changing, but as social partners could not come to an agreement, the govern-
ment intervened and imposed incomes policy on social partners. In 1992, the
government continued its policy of deficit reduction by changing both the level
and eligibility of disability benefits without contributing any further to the
process of negotiations on incomes policy.
In section 7.1.3, the high incidence of concluding non-neo-corporatist govern-
ment strategies of coalition governments of CDA and VVD was explained by
first discussing the concluding neo-corporatist government strategies of these
governments. That discussion suggested that these concluding neo-corporatist
government strategies were partly idiosyncratic and partly genuine exceptions to
the rule that coalition governments of CDA and VVD usually did not opt for
concluding neo-corporatist government strategies, despite the CDA’s stance on
neo-corporatism (see Figure 7.2). The concluding neo-corporatist strategies of
these governments in 1973 and 1979 turned out to be idiosyncratic, whereas 1965
and 1987-1989 were apparently genuine exceptions. In 1973 and 1979 govern-
ment strategy was based on the government’s political position: outgoing and
incoming respectively. In 1965 and between 1987 and 1989 the rules of the game
had changed. In 1965, incomes policy changed from a centrally guided, govern-
ment directed incomes policy to a free incomes policy. In the years 1987-1989
the linkage between market sector and (semi-) public sector had been severed,
whereas the amended Law on Wage Formation from 1987 only allowed for guiding,
government directed incomes policies in case of external emergencies (see also
chapter 5, sections 5.1 and 5.3). These changes in the rules of the game induced
these governments to opt for a concluding neo-corporatist government strategy.
Part of the ‘puzzle’ that coalition governments of CDA and VVD score lowest on
neo-corporatist government strategies can now be explained by macroeconomic
circumstances and the institutional set-up of the process of negotiations on in-
comes policy. In the 1960s macroeconomic circumstances were positive, but the
change from a centrally guided, government directed incomes policy to a free in-
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comes policy frequently led to conflicts between social partners. Coalition govern-
ments of CDA and VVD tried to solve these conflicts by both neo-corporatist
and non-neo-corporatist government strategies during negotiations, but as that
proved usually unsuccessful, in the end these governments quite often reverted
to the concluding non-neo-corporatist guiding (IV) government strategy (see
also chapter 5, section 5.1). 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, these coalition governments had to contend
with a severe deterioration of macroeconomic performance that was exacerbated
by the institutional linkage between the market sector and the (semi-) public sector.
Despite all attempts, these governments’ opening neo-corporatist strategies usually
did not succeed in bringing social partners to an agreement. In the end these
coalition governments therefore usually reverted to the concluding non-neo-
corporatist guiding (IV) government strategy as well (see also chapter 5, sections
5.2 and 5.3). 
Finally, the explanation of the ‘puzzle’ that coalition governments of PvdA and
VVD did opt for a concluding neo-corporatist government strategy in all the
years they were in office in the 1990s must be that apparently neither macro-
economic circumstances nor institutional changes induced the PvdA as the do-
minant party in government and the party responsible for incomes policy to im-
plement a non-neo-corporatist government strategy (the VVD habitually scored
very low on neo-corporatism in its election manifestos - see Figure 7.2).
In other words, both accelerating economic growth after 1994 and the ad hoc
relinkage of the market sector and the (semi-) public sector based on the EMU
requirements, within the framework of the amended Law on Wage Formation
(1987), were conducive to concluding neo-corporatist government strategies of
coalition governments of PvdA and VVD (see also chapter 5, section 5.4).
7.2 Effectiveness of incomes policy in terms of agendas
In this section I will explore the effectiveness of incomes policy of coalition
governments with and without participation of the PvdA in terms of the agendas
of the actors involved. In chapter 6, I have established that Dutch incomes policy
between 1965 and 2000 was not effective in terms of reordering agendas in a
majority of the years. That is, in majority of the years incomes policy was not
congruent with a Central Agreement. However, I have also shown that a neo-
corporatist incomes policy was more often effective than not and also more than
four times as effective as a non-neo-corporatist incomes policy.
When viewed for the four sub-periods identified: 1965 - 1973; 1974 - 1982;
1983 - 1992; 1993 - 2000 (see chapter 5), I have detected a patterned distribution
of effective incomes policies in terms of reordered agendas. Effectiveness in
terms of reordered agendas was most prominent in the last two periods: 1983 -
1992 (5 Central Agreements) and 1993 - 2000 (6 Central Agreements). Neo-
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corporatist incomes policies were also consistently more effective than non-neo-
corporatist incomes policies. This increased effectiveness of (both neo-cor-
poratist and non-neo-corporatist) incomes policies from 1983 did not, however,
constitute the emergence of a ‘Polder Model’ (see chapter 4 and chapter 5).
Firstly, social partners seldom used the problem solving style of decision-making
(C: Battle of the Sexes). Central Agreements were usually based on the
bargaining style of decision-making (B: (repeated) Prisoners Dilemma). Second-
ly, Central Agreements were not always the result of a neo-corporatist govern-
ment strategy.
In chapter 6, I have also argued that a relation can be observed between the
actors’ behaviour in terms of government strategies, styles of decision-making,
and reaching Central Agreements, on the one hand, and approaching the core in
terms of a match between actors’ preferences and actual outcome, on the other
hand. The movement towards the core was increased by two combinations of
actors’ behaviour. First, by neo-corporatist government strategies resulting in Cen-
tral Agreements that could be reached by more or less ‘tough’ negotiations be-
tween social partners. Second, but to a much lesser extent, by non-neo-corporatist
government strategies under the condition that no Central Agreement could be
reached based on ‘tough’ negations between social partners. The macroeconomic
context had a bearing on how closely a core situation could be approached. Neo-
corporatist government strategies did indeed do (much) better than non-neo-
corporatist government strategies, and Central Agreements did make a positive
difference.
When viewed for the four sub-periods identified, I have detected a patterned dis-
tribution of effective incomes policies in terms of approaching the core as well:
- 1965 - 1973 three core situations: 1965, 1966, 1968;
- 1974 - 1982 four core situations: 1976-1979;
- 1983 - 1992 two core situations: 1991, 1992;
- 1993 - 2000 four core situations: 1996-1998, 2000 (see chapter 6, section
6.3.1 and Table 6.7).
7.2.1 Central Agreements
The issue to be addressed in this section is whether neo-corporatist strategies of
coalition governments in which the PvdA participated did indeed result in Cen-
tral Agreements more often than neo-corporatist strategies of governments in
which the PvdA did not participate. I will first address this issue for all coalition
governments in which the PvdA participated. Next I will differentiate between
coalition governments before 1994, in which the PvdA was never the dominant
party and did not hold the office of Minister of Social Affairs, and coalition
governments after 1993 in which the PvdA was the dominant party and did hold
the office of Minister of Social Affairs.
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Based on the international literature on neo-corporatism and social democracy I
expect that a neo-corporatist government strategy of governments in which the
PvdA participated was more successful in terms of reordering agendas than neo-
corporatist government strategies of governments in which the PvdA did not par-
ticipate. And I expect that a neo-corporatist government strategy of a coalition
government with the PvdA after 1993 was even more effective in this respect.
Table 7.6 shows that all concluding government strategies of coalition govern-
ments with the PvdA were only just more often effective in terms of reordering
agendas than they were not. All concluding government strategies of these
governments combined were, however, almost twice as effective as all conclu-
ding government strategies of coalition governments without the PvdA. That is,
governments with the PvdA were able to achieve a Central Agreement in just
over half of the years, whereas governments without the PvdA managed to
achieve a central Agreement in just over a quarter of the years. Hence, par-
ticipation of the PvdA in coalition government mattered with respect to reaching
a Central Agreement.
With regard to concluding neo-corporatist government strategies, governments
in which the PvdA participated were able to achieve a Central Agreement in
more than two-thirds of the years, whereas governments in which the PvdA did
not participate managed to achieve a Central Agreement in only one-third of the
years. Clearly, coalition governments with the PvdA did not only resort to a neo-
corporatist government strategy more than twice as often as coalition govern-
ments without the PvdA, but that concluding neo-corporatist government
strategy was also more than twice as effective in terms of the agendas of the
actors involved in incomes policy. Participation of the PvdA in coalition
government, therefore, did also matter with respect to both the choice of a
concluding neo-corporatist government strategy and the effectiveness of that
concluding strategy in terms of reordering the agendas of the actors involved in
incomes policy.
However, when we distinguish between coalition governments with the PvdA be-
fore 1994 and after 1993, a patterned variation can be observed (see Table 7.7).
All concluding government strategies of coalition government with and without
the PvdA before 1994 were all ineffective in terms of reordering agendas in a
majority of the years. Nevertheless, concluding government strategies of govern-
ments in which the PvdA did not participate were even less effective than con-
cluding government strategies of governments in which the PvdA participated.
Concluding neo-corporatist government strategies of governments, in which the
PvdA participated, on the other hand, were successful in two-thirds of the years,
whereas concluding neo-corporatist government strategies of governments in
which the PvdA did not participate were only successful in one-third of the
years. 
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But non-neo-corporatist concluding government strategies of governments with
the PvdA were all ineffective in terms of reordering agendas, while non-neo-
corporatist concluding government strategies of governments without the PvdA
were effective in almost a quarter of the years.
From this we can infer that participation of the PvdA in coalition government
before 1994 did matter indeed. Participation of the PvdA in coalition govern-
ment mattered with regard to the effectiveness of concluding government strate-
gies. It mattered with regard of the choice of concluding neo-corporatist govern-
ment strategies. It mattered also with regard to the effectiveness of concluding
neo-corporatist government strategies in terms of Central Agreements. 
Finally, the coalition governments with the PvdA after 1993. All concluding
government strategies of these governments were neo-corporatist. And in more
than 70% of the years these concluding neo-corporatist strategies were also
effective in terms of reordering the agendas of the actors involved in incomes
policy. Participation of the PvdA as the dominant party in coalition government
after 1993 did matter with regard to the choice of concluding neo-corporatist
government strategies, but not significantly with regard to the effectiveness of
that concluding neo-corporatist government strategy in terms of Central Agree-
ments (66.7% before 1994 and 71.4% after 1993).
My research findings show a mixed pattern with regard to the effectiveness of
incomes policy in terms of reordering agendas for governments with and without
the PvdA. At first sight, there is indeed a strong relation between an effective
concluding neo-corporatist incomes policy in terms of reordering agendas and
participation of the PvdA in coalition government. Concluding neo-corporatist
incomes policies of coalition governments in which the PvdA participated were
more than twice as effective as concluding neo-corporatist incomes policies of
coalition governments in which the PvdA did not participate. In that respect, the
findings support the international literature on social democracy and neo-cor-
poratism. However, as I already pointed out above, that literature cannot account
for either the concluding neo-corporatist incomes policies of coalition govern-
ments without the PvdA or for effective concluding neo-corporatist incomes
policies of these governments.
Second, there is only a marginal difference in effectiveness in terms of reorder-
ing agendas of concluding neo-corporatist incomes policies of coalition govern-
ments in which the PvdA participated before or after 1993 (66.7% as opposed to
71.4%). That means that social democratic dominance in government after 1993
did not significantly increase effectiveness of concluding neo-corporatist in-
comes policies in terms of reordering agendas as it did increase the occurrence
of neo-corporatist government incomes policies as such. This is contrary to what
I expected based on the international literature on social democracy and neo-
corporatism. And it shows that the PvdA as the dominant party in government
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after 1993 did not produce a new, nor a more effective ‘Polder Model’.
Although in this period Central Agreements were all based on neo-corporatist
government strategies, social partners still seldom used the co-operative problem
solving style of decision-making (C: Battle of the Sexes). Only two of the six
Central Agreements were based on that style of decision-making. The remaining
four Central Agreements were based on the ‘tougher’ bargaining style of decision-
making (B: (repeated) Prisoners Dilemma) (see chapter 3, section 3.3.3 and
Table 3.4; chapter 5, section 5.4; and chapter 6, section 6.3.5).
7.2.2 Moving towards the core
Table 7.8 shows that, as I expected, in a majority of the years all concluding govern-
ment strategies of coalition governments with the PvdA were effective in terms
of approaching the core, that is, approaching a match between the actors’ pre-
ferences as expressed in their respective agendas and actual outcome. Before
1994, in 60% of the years, coalition governments with the PvdA most likely
approached the core. After 1994, the core was most likely approached in 57.1%
of the years. As I expected, coalition governments without the PvdA were quite
ineffective in this respect. In only 15.8% of the years these governments were in
power, the core was most likely approached. Clearly, participation of the PvdA
in coalition government between 1965 and 2000 did indeed matter with regard
to approaching the core. 
Regarding concluding neo-corporatist government strategies, coalition govern-
ments in which the PvdA participated were clearly more effective in terms of ap-
proaching the core than coalition governments in which the PvdA did not parti-
cipate: 42.6% (6 movements towards the core in 13 years) compared to 33.3% (2
movements towards the core in six years). Obviously, a concluding neo-corpo-
ratist government strategy did matter with regard to approaching the core, in
particular when the PvdA participated in coalition government.
When we distinguish between coalition governments before 1994 and after 1993,
some minor variation can be observed. All concluding government strategies of
coalition governments of CDA and PvdA before 1994 were effective in 60% of
the years, whereas concluding government strategies of PvdA and VVD were
effective in 57.1% of the years after 1994. However, concluding government
strategies of coalition governments of CDA and VVD before 1994 were only
effective in terms of approaching the core in 15.8% of the years. In other words,
between 1965 and 2000, coalition governments of CDA and PvdA and of PvdA
and VVD were almost four times more effective in terms of approaching the core
than coalition governments of CDA and VVD. But the difference between
coalition governments with the PvdA before 1994 and after 1993 were minimal.
Participation of the PvdA in coalition government as the dominant party that was
responsible for incomes policy did not increase those governments’ effectiveness
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in terms of approaching the core.
Concluding neo-corporatist government strategies showed slightly more variation.
Concluding neo-corporatist government strategies of CDA and PvdA coalition
governments before 1994 were slightly less effective in terms of approaching the
core than after 1993: 50% (three movements towards the core in six years) com-
pared to 57.1% (four movements towards the core in seven years). Concluding
neo-corporatist government strategies of CDA and VVD governments before
1994, however, were only effective in 33.3% of the years. In other words, a con-
cluding neo-corporatist government strategy did matter with regard to approach-
ing the core, in particular when the PvdA participated in coalition government.
Lastly, with regard to concluding non-neo-corporatist government strategies an
interesting observation can be made. Concluding non-neo-corporatist govern-
ment strategies of coalition governments with the PvdA all occurred before
1994, during coalition governments of CDA and PvdA. These non-neo-corpo-
ratist government strategies were remarkably effective in terms of approaching
the core: the core was approached in 75% of the years (three movements towards
the core in four years).
The concluding non-neo-corporatist government strategies of CDA and PvdA
governments were considerably more effective in terms of approaching the core
than concluding neo-corporatist government strategies of these governments:
75% compared to 50% (three movements towards the core in six years). And
these concluding non-neo-corporatist government strategies of CDA and PvdA
coalition governments were even more effective in approaching the core than the
non-neo-corporatist government strategies of CDA and VVD governments: 75%
compared to 7.7% (one movement towards the core in 13 years).
Before 1994, participation of the PvdA in coalition government did indeed
matter with regard to approaching the core, both with regard to concluding neo-
corporatist and concluding non-neo-corporatist government strategies.
With regard to Central Agreements and approaching the core, a patterned va-
riation can be observed. Only in a minority of the years that a Central Agreement
was reached, the core was also most likely approached: 42.9% (six movements
towards the core in 14 years). In the years that Central Agreements were reached
or facilitated by coalition governments of CDA and PvdA before 1994, these
governments were less effective in approaching the core than in the years that no
Central Agreement could be reached: 50% (two movements towards the core in
four years) compared to 66.7% (four movements towards the core in six years).
In other words, before 1994, CDA and PvdA governments were even more
effective in approaching the core when no Central Agreement was reached.
For the other coalition governments, this relation was the reverse. CDA and VVD
governments before 1994 were slightly more effective with regard to approach-
ing the core in the years that a Central Agreement could be reached than in the
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years that no Central Agreement could be reached: 20% (one movement towards
the core in five years) compared to 14.3% (two movements towards the core in
14 years). PvdA and VVD coalition governments after 1993 were much more
effective in this respect: 60% (three movements towards the core in five years)
compared to 50% (one move towards the core in two years).
Reaching a Central Agreement in order to approach the core apparently mattered
for coalition governments of CDA and VVD before 1994 and for coalition govern-
ments of PvdA and VVD after 1993. 
With regard to the coalition governments of CDA and PvdA, a trade-off can be
observed between concluding neo-corporatist government strategies and Central
Agreements on the one hand, and approaching the core on the other hand. Con-
cluding neo-corporatist government strategies of these coalition governments
were less effective with regard to approaching the core than concluding non-neo-
corporatist government strategies: 50% compared to 75%. In addition, in the years
that incomes policy of these governments was concluded with a Central Agree-
ment, the core was less often approached than in the years that no Central Agree-
ment was reached: 50% compared to 75%. Apparently, before 1994, coalition
governments of CDA and PvdA were either effective in terms of concluding neo-
corporatist government strategies and reordering agendas by reaching Central
Agreements, or they were effective in terms of approaching the core. 
In other words, coalition governments of CDA and PvdA before 1994 - in which
the CDA was the dominant party in government and the party responsible for
incomes policy - either incorporated (or tried to incorporate) social partners in
incomes policy by means of Central Agreements but then left the outcome in
terms of preferences to depend on the skewed balance of power between the
actors involved that apparently negatively influenced implementation of the
agreements, or these coalition governments incorporated (or tried to incorporate)
social partners in incomes policy by approaching the core, that is, by establishing
a balance between preferences and outcome of all actors involved in incomes
policy that would be closest to the core.
Coalition governments of PvdA and VVD after 1993 - in which the PvdA was
the dominant party in government and the party responsible for incomes policy
- were, as I expected, much more successful in terms of concluding neo-cor-
poratist government strategies, but these governments were equally effective in
terms of Central Agreements (reordering agendas) and approaching the core as
coalition governments of CDA and PvdA before 1994. In other words, coalition
governments of PvdA and VVD after 1993 did not produce a new, nor a more
effective ‘Polder Model’ of negotiations on incomes policy in terms of reaching
Central Agreements and approaching the core.
The trade-off between concluding neo-corporatist government strategies and,
especially, Central Agreements, and approaching the core observed above for coa-
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lition governments of CDA and PvdA, however, did not apply to coalition govern-
ments of PvdA and VVD. Social partners were both fully incorporated in incomes
policy by concluding neo-corporatist government strategies and Central Agree-
ments, and the core was more often approached when a Central Agreement was
reached: 60% (three movements towards the core in five years) compared to 50%
(one movement towards the core in two years).
In other words, the balance of power between the actors involved in this period
was apparently less skewed than during coalition governments of CDA and
PvdA and, consequently, the agreements were more successfully implemented.
7.3 Social democracy and neo-corporatism reviewed
In comparative international research a number of students of neo-corporatism
have emphasised the political complexion of party government as a prerequisite
for neo-corporatism. However, there are conflicting views. Quite a few resear-
chers have found a strong relation between social democratic participation, do-
minance, or even control of government and neo-corporatism comparatively (see
for instance Cameron 1978, 1984; Marks 1986; Zimmermann 1986; Curtis
1987; Wilson 1990; Kurzer 1991; Western 1991; and Crepaz 1992; see also
Siaroff 1999). Other researchers have pointed out that this poses major analytical
and empirical problems for those countries which are considered to be neo-cor-
poratist, although social democratic government, or even social democratic par-
ticipation in coalition government, has been infrequent and other parties,
especially christian democratic parties, were the dominant parties in government
for most of the time (see chapter 2, sections 2.2 and 2.6; see also Czada 1987;
Smith 1988; Cox 1989; Wolinetz 1989, 1990; Kurzer 1991; Lijphart and Crepaz
1991; Hemerijck 1992; Keman 1993: 181-189; van Kersbergen 1995, 1997,
1999; Crepaz and Lijphart 1995; Keman and Pennings 1995; Keman 1997;
Anderson 2001; Pennings and Vergunst 2001; Armingeon 2002; Keman 2002:
27-30; and Keman 2002a: 16). Therefore, at first sight, it seems more convincing
to argue that the political provision of welfare, to which christian democracy is
equally committed as social democracy (Budge and Keman 1990: 142; see also
van Kersbergen 1995), combined with tripartism may well produce neo-cor-
poratism as a more successful strategy.
My research into the Dutch case has established that there is indeed a positive re-
lation between social democratic participation in government and the occurrence
of concluding neo-corporatist government strategies. Coalition governments of
PvdA and CDA and of PvdA and VVD both ended their involvement in incomes
policy more often with a neo-corporatist government strategy than governments
of CDA and VVD. The occurrence of concluding neo-corporatist government
strategies also increased when the PvdA was the dominant party in coalition govern-
ments with the VVD after 1993, although the VVD always scored low on posi-
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tive attitudes towards neo-corporatism in its election manifestos (see Figure 7.2).
The CDA’s positive stance on neo-corporatism in its election manifestos, how-
ever, apparently had little effect on the frequency of neo-corporatist government
strategies in coalitions with the PvdA before 1994, and neither did that stance
result in at least a match with the frequency of neo-corporatist government
strategies of coalition governments with the PvdA, when the CDA was in coalition
with the VVD. In other words, although in general christian democracy is ap-
parently equally committed to the political provision of welfare as social demo-
cracy (Budge and Keman 1990: 142; van Kersbergen 1995), and in the Nether-
lands also rather strongly in favour of neo-corporatism according to its election
manifestos (see Figure 7.2), that did not lead to more neo-corporatist govern-
ment strategies. Neither in coalition with the PvdA, nor in coalition with the VVD.
As I have shown in chapter 4 and chapter 5, the occurrence of concluding neo-
corporatist government strategies is heavily dependent on the behaviour of social
partners. And in this chapter I have shown that the occurrence of a concluding
neo-corporatist strategy increased with the participation of the PvdA in coalition
government. Apparently, the behaviour of social partners was more conducive to
neo-corporatist government strategies when the PvdA was in government.
My research also shows that there is a positive relation between social democracy
participating in coalition governments and the effectiveness of concluding neo-
corporatist government strategies in terms of reordering the agendas of the
actors involved. Concluding neo-corporatist government strategies of coalition
governments of the PvdA with either CDA or VVD were more successful in
terms of Central Agreements, than concluding neo-corporatist government strategies
of coalition governments of CDA and VVD. However, the effectiveness of con-
cluding neo-corporatist government strategies did not increase when the PvdA
became the dominant party in coalition governments with the VVD after 1993.
This implies that the PvdA as the dominant party in government after 1993 and
the party responsible for incomes policy, did not produce a new, nor a more
effective ‘Polder Model’ in terms of Central Agreements. Apparently, the insti-
tutional framework was less conducive towards establishing an equilibrium than
expected.
Participation of the PvdA in coalition government between 1965 and 2000 did
also matter with regard to the effectiveness of all concluding governments strategies
in terms of approaching the core. Coalition governments with the PvdA were
more effective than coalition governments without the PvdA. Coalition govern-
ments of CDA and PvdA before 1994 were equally effective as coalition govern-
ments of PvdA and VVD after 1993 in this respect.
The effectiveness of concluding neo-corporatist government strategies of both
these coalition governments, however, differed. Concluding neo-corporatist of
PvdA and VVD governments after 1993 were slightly more effective in approach-
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ing the core than concluding neo-corporatist government strategies of CDA and
PvdA coalition governments before 1994. And the same holds for reaching a
Central Agreement.
For CDA and PvdA coalition governments before 1994, a trade off could be ob-
served between concluding neo-corporatist government strategies and Central
Agreements on the one hand, and approaching the core on the other hand. Social
partners were either incorporated in the formation and implementation of in-
comes policy by concluding neo-corporatist government strategies and Central
Agreements, whereas outcome remained dependent on the balance of power
between the actors involved, or the core was approached. During coalition
governments of CDA and PvdA, social partners were less often incorporated in
the formation and implementation of incomes policy by means of Central
Agreements and the core was more often approached. After 1993, during coalition
governments of PvdA and VVD, social partners were almost continuously
incorporated in the formation and implementation of incomes policy by means
of Central Agreements and the core was as often approached as during CDA and
PvdA coalition governments.
This implies that the PvdA as the dominant party in government after 1993 and
the party responsible for incomes policy, did not produce a new, nor a more
effective ‘Polder Model’ in terms of approaching the core either. Not only was
the institutional framework apparently less conducive towards establishing an
equilibrium than expected, the equilibria that were established were apparently
also less conducive towards approaching the core than expected.
In my view, the results of my research show that social democratic (participation
in coalition) government in the Netherlands cannot be the main, let alone the sole
explanation for the occurrence of concluding neo-corporatist government strate-
gies, or for their effectiveness in terms of Central Agreements and approaching
the core. Government participation and dominance of christian democracy ap-
parently does feature in the equation. Both in terms of concluding neo-cor-
poratist government strategies, but also in terms of the effectiveness of non-neo-
corporatist government strategies in terms of Central Agreements and approach-
ing the core, that is, in terms of approaching a core situation based on the esta-
blishment of an equilibrium among the actors:
- coalition governments of CDA and PvdA showed both less concluding neo-
corporatist government strategies and less effective concluding neo-corpo-
ratist government strategies in terms of Central Agreements than might be ex-
pected on the basis of both international research and their stance on cor-
poratism in election manifestos. Nevertheless, these coalition governments
were effective with regard to approaching the core in a majority of the years
(60%); 
- coalition governments of CDA and VVD also showed both less concluding
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neo-corporatist government strategies and less effective concluding neo-cor-
poratist government strategies in terms of Central Agreements than might be
expected on the basis of both international research and the CDA’s stance on
corporatism in its election manifestos. However, the effectiveness of these
governments’ concluding non-neo-corporatist governments strategies in terms
of Central Agreements was considerably higher than those of CDA and PvdA
governments. Nevertheless, these coalition governments were quite ineffective
with regard to approaching the core (15.8%);
- finally, PvdA and VVD coalition governments both showed more concluding
neo-corporatist government strategies and more effective concluding neo-
corporatist government strategies in terms of Central Agreements than might
be expected on the basis of both international research and their stance on
corporatism in election manifestos. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of these
concluding neo-corporatist government strategies in terms of Central Agree-
ments did not significantly exceed the effectiveness of these strategies em-
ployed by CDA and PvdA governments; whereas the effectiveness with re-
spect to approaching the core was not higher than that of coalition govern-
ments of CDA and PvdA (see Table 7.9).
As I have argued in chapter 6, the effectiveness of non-neo-corporatist govern-
ment strategies in terms of Central Agreements had to do with the government
insisting on its leading role in incomes policy under the institutional condition
of a linkage between the market sector and the (semi-) public sector. In 1970, a
conflict between trade unions and the government De Jong (KVP, ARP, CHU,
VVD) about the new Law on Wage Formation spilled over to the substance of
incomes policy in that year. In 1983 and 1984, in the context of a severe econo-
mic downturn, accompanied by rapidly rising unemployment and budget
deficits, the government Lubbers I (CDA, VVD) effectively forced social part-
ners to come to an agreement in the market sector (the ‘Wassenaar’ agreement
of December 1982). The government subsequently concentrated its efforts on
reducing the budget deficit by delinking the market sector and the (semi-) public
sector and did not further intervene in incomes policy in the market sector (see
also Hemerijck 2003: 53 ff.). 
The effectiveness of concluding government strategies of both the neo-corpo-
ratist and non-neo-corporatist variety in terms of Central Agreements can there-
fore be explained in terms of the participation of the PvdA in government.
Concluding neo-corporatist government strategies of all coalition governments
in which the PvdA participated were more or less equally effective in terms of re-
ordering the agendas of the actors involved. But concluding non-neo-corporatist
government strategies of coalition governments in which the PvdA did not
participate were (much) more effective in terms of reordering the agendas of the
actors involved than concluding non-neo-corporatist government strategies of
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coalition governments in which the PvdA did participate. Apparently, partici-
pation of the PvdA in coalition governments with either CDA or VVD resulted
in neo-corporatist government strategies that were equally effective in terms of
Central Agreements, whereas the exclusion of the PvdA from coalition govern-
ment resulted in more effective non-neo-corporatist government strategies in
terms of Central Agreements.
In chapter 6, I have also argued that the movement towards the core was in-
creased by two combinations of actors’ behaviour. First, by neo-corporatist
government strategies resulting in Central Agreements that could be reached by
more or less ‘tough’ negotiations between social partners. Second, but to a lesser
extent, by non-neo-corporatist government strategies under the condition that no
Central Agreement could be reached based on ‘tough’ negations between social
partners. 
In this chapter, however, I have elaborated that a concluding neo-corporatist
government strategy and reaching a Central Agreement did matter with respect
to approaching the core, provided the PvdA participated in that coalition govern-
ment. I have also argued that in coalition governments of CDA and PvdA a trade-
off could be observed between concluding neo-corporatist government strategies
and, in particular, reaching a Central Agreement on the one hand, and approach-
ing the core on the other hand. Coalition governments of CDA and PvdA were
either effective in terms of concluding neo-corporatist government strategies that
resulted in Central Agreements, or they were effective in terms of approaching
the core. 
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My research findings show that the PvdA in coalition government was more
effective in determining concluding government strategies than other coalition
parties. In particular when the PvdA was also the dominant party in government
and responsible for incomes policy.
My research findings also show that although coalition governments in which
the PvdA participated were more effective in terms of Central Agreements than
coalition governments in which the PvdA did not participate, that effectiveness
was not increased when the PvdA became the dominant party in government and
responsible for incomes policy. The PvdA, therefore, appears to be instrumental
in producing an equilibrium between the actors.
My research findings also show that coalition governments in which the PvdA
participated were more effective in approaching the core than coalition govern-
ments in which the PvdA did not participate. But that effectiveness did not in-
crease when the PvdA was also the dominant party in government and responsible
for incomes policy. 
My research findings also show that the implementation of Central Agreements
on incomes policy did not imply a positive result in terms of approaching a core
situation. Before 1994, a trade-off could be observed during CDA and PvdA
coalition governments: the core was more often achieved when no Central Agree-
ment was reached.
Finally, my research findings show that at the end of the day the government
prevailed over incomes policy.
7.4 Concluding remarks
In this chapter I have explored the relation between concluding neo-corporatist
government strategies and the composition of coalition governments in the
Netherlands. First, I have established that participation of social democracy in
coalition governments does indeed make a (positive) difference with regard to
concluding neo-corporatist government strategies. Next I have established that
participation of social democracy in coalition governments also makes a (positive)
difference with regard to the effectiveness of concluding neo-corporatist govern-
ment strategies in terms of reordering the agendas of the actors involved in
incomes policy. Participation of the PvdA in government as the dominant party
that held the office of Minister of Social Affairs and was primarily responsible
for incomes policy did not, however, produce a new, nor a more effective ‘Polder
Model’ in terms of more Central Agreements or more often approaching the
core. Nevertheless, social democratic participation in coalition government was
an important factor that did contribute to concluding neo-corporatist government
strategies in the Netherlands.
Participation of the CDA as the dominant party in government until 1994, on the
other hand, did not make a (positive) difference with regard to concluding neo-
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corporatist government strategies. However, with regard to the effectiveness of con-
cluding neo-corporatist government strategies in terms of reordering the agendas
of the actors involved in incomes policy, participation of the CDA in coalition
governments did make a comparable (positive) difference as participation of the
PvdA. With respect to approaching the core, participation of the CDA in coalition
government only mattered in coalitions with the PvdA.
Finally, exclusion of the PvdA from coalition government did make a (positive)
difference with respect to the effectiveness of non-neo-corporatist government
strategies in terms of Central Agreements, but not in terms of approaching the core.
That means that parties matter with regard to government strategy. Especially the
PvdA with regard to neo-corporatist government strategies. Parties also matter
with regard to the effectiveness of government strategies in terms of Central
Agreements. PvdA and CDA matter with respect to the effectiveness of neo-cor-
poratist government strategies, whereas CDA and VVD matter with regard to the
effectiveness of non-neo-corporatist government strategies. Parties also matter
with regard to approaching the core. Coalition governments of CDA and PvdA
and of PvdA and VVD were most effective in this respect, whereas coalition
governments of CDA and VVD were least effective.
However, ceteris paribus, the composition of coalition government was not the
determining factor for either government strategy or the effectiveness of that strategy.
Especially the effectiveness of concluding government strategies of both the neo-
corporatist and non-neo-corporatist variety in reaching Central Agreements can
be explained in terms of the actors’ behaviour during the annual negotiations on
incomes policy in a context of institutional change due to macroeconomic ex-
ternalities (see chapter 6). The effectiveness of concluding government strategies
in approaching the core can also be explained in terms of the actors’ behaviour
during the annual negotiations on incomes policy and the macroeconomic con-
text (see chapter 6).
In the international literature, a neo-corporatist government strategy or incomes
policy is also thought to be beneficial for (macroeconomic and policy) perfor-
mance (see for instance Schmidt 1982; Alvarez et al 1991; Kurzer 1991; Western
1991; Crepaz 1992; Keman 1993; Pennings 1997; Lijphart 1999; Siaroff 1999;
Traxler and Kittel 2000; and Kenworthy 2002). 
There are of course rival explanations. For instance, inertia and incrementalism
may be important. Given the specific institutional arrangements of the public
sector, countries may perform better or worse when faced with a deteriorating
economy. From that point of view, the specific institutional arrangements in the
Netherlands in the 1970s and 1980s did perform less well than those of other
countries (see for instance Therborn 1986; Braun 1989; and Keman 1993a). An-
other factor influencing (macroeconomic and policy) performance is the trans-
formation of socio-economic structures due to globalisation, that is, increased
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world market integration on the one hand, and deindustrialisation on the other
hand, leading to a service-based economy. This process is especially pronounced
in the Netherlands (Andeweg and Irwin 2002: 177 ff.; Keman 2003).
In chapter 8, I will discuss the ‘Dutch Disease’ of the 1970s and 1980s and the
‘Dutch Miracle’ of the 1990s from a comparative perspective in order to esta-
blish whether or not the Dutch case is indeed different and exceptional with
regard to (macroeconomic and policy) performance.
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8. Performance of Dutch neo-corporatism
In this chapter I will discuss Dutch performance between 1965 and 2000. First I will
discuss the Dutch case comparatively. The question to be answered is whether or
not Dutch performance is different or exceptional when compared to that of
other countries or groups of countries. The frequent use in international com-
parative research of the notions of the ‘Dutch Disease’ and the ‘Dutch Miracle’
does seem to suggest that the Dutch case can be viewed as different and excep-
tional. Yet, I shall aim to show that that is much less the case than conventional
wisdom purports. Both during the period of the ‘Dutch Disease’ and of the ‘Dutch
Miracle’, Dutch performance was neither completely different, nor exceptional
compared to other (groups of) countries. Except in one respect: during the period
of the ‘Dutch Miracle’ the country showed comparatively a major retrenchment
of the welfare state, combined with a considerable increase in part-time partici-
pation of women on the labour market (see also chapter 2, section 2.3). 
Next I will investigate whether or not Dutch performance improves when Dutch
neo-corporatism is more effective in terms of the agendas of the actors involved
in incomes policy. In other words, the question to be answered is whether the ‘Dutch
Disease’ does indeed go together with less effective neo-corporatist government
strategies in terms of Central Agreements and approaching the core, and, con-
versely, the ‘Dutch Miracle’ with more effective neo-corporatist government strate-
gies in terms of Central Agreements and approaching the core (see chapter 6).
In addition, the frequent use in international comparative research of the notion
of the Dutch ‘Polder Model’ does seem to suggest that indeed the ‘Dutch Miracle’
is the result of effective neo-corporatists government strategies, whereas the
‘Dutch Disease’ appears to be the result of non-neo-corporatist or ineffective
neo-corporatist government strategies. However, I aim to show that government
strategies can be better explained by a combination of the actors’ behaviour and
the institutional setting of incomes policy within a specific context of perfor-
mance (see also chapters 4-6). 
In that context, neo-corporatist strategies can be defined as those outcomes in
which the government seeks to facilitate trade unions and employers’ organi-
sations to establish a ‘structure induced equilibrium’, that is, tries to bring the
actors involved in incomes policy to an agreement. In chapter 6, I have argued
that neo-corporatist strategies were indeed quite effective in terms of reaching
Central Agreements, but did not represent a new ‘Polder Model’ (see also chapters
4 and 5). In addition, I have also argued in chapter 6 that these Central Agree-
ments did not always approach the core as well (the match between the actors
preferences as expressed in their respective agendas and actual outcome), “in the
sense that no other alternative, allowed by the rules of procedure, is preferred
by” the three participating actors (Shepsle 1997: 283, 284; see also Scharpf
1987, 1998; Keman 1999). In other words, I have observed that reaching Central
Agreements was apparently not the same as matching preferences of the actors
involved in incomes policy and outcome. I have also found that failing to reach
Central Agreements did not necessarily imply fewer matches between preferen-
ces and outcome. From this I concluded that the alleged new ‘Polder Model’ was
neither more effective in terms of reaching Central Agreements, nor in ap-
proaching the core.
8.1 Indicators of performance
The ‘Dutch Disease’ is commonly characterised by a combination of mass un-
employment or jobless growth, and increasing budget deficits due to both in-
creased public expenditure in order to save and create employment and increased
social security transfer payments to the unemployed, resulting in stagflation
(high inflation and low economic growth - see for instance Therborn 1986;
Braun 1989; Hazeu 1998; Hartog 1999; Salverda 1999; Andeweg 2000; Brouwer
and Labohm 2000; Delsen 2000; Herbertsson et al 2000; Stokman 2000; Torvik
2001; Andeweg and Irwin 2002; den Butter and Mosch 2003; Keman 2003; and
Mosch 2004: 95-100).
By the same token, the ‘Dutch Miracle’ is characterised by a combination of job
growth, resulting in low unemployment, and reduced budget deficits due to re-
duced public expenditure for employment and to reduced social security transfer
payments to the unemployed, resulting in low inflation and a recovering or high
economic growth (see for instance Visser and Hemerijck 1997; Hazeu 1998;
Hartog 1999; Salverda 1999; Andeweg 2000; Brouwer and Labohm 2000;
Delsen 2000; Stokman 2000; Andeweg and Irwin 2002; den Butter and Mosch
2003; Keman 2003; and Mosch 2004: 95-100).
With regard to both the ‘Dutch Disease’ and the ‘Dutch Miracle’, a distinction
has to be made between policy performance and macroeconomic performance
(Vergunst 2004: 97). Policy performance refers to the implementation of politi-
cal decisions and is therefore shaped by policy choices. Indicators of policy
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performance are the budget deficit, public expenditure, and social security trans-
fers. Macroeconomic performance refers to the actual macroeconomic perfor-
mance and the effects of policy performance. Indicators of macroeconomic
performance are inflation, economic growth, and unemployment. 
The indicators used to capture Dutch policy performance and macroeconomic
performance will include the budget deficit, public expenditure, and social se-
curity transfers as indicators of policy performance and inflation, economic
growth, and unemployment as indicators of macroeconomic performance. To be
able to capture Dutch macroeconomic performance with respect to (un)employ-
ment more adequately, two additional comparative employment indicators will
be used as well: total employment and employment growth. Finally, as a last
comparative indicator for macroeconomic performance I will use the misery
index (inflation plus unemployment combined).
Inflation, economic growth, and unemployment are well established cross-national
indicators for macroeconomic performance or economic welfare (see for instance
Katzenstein 1985; Lehner 1987; Keman 1988, 1993; Castles 1989; Horn 1993; Layard
et al. 1994; Pennings 1997; Woldendorp 1997b; Lijphart 1999; Pennings et al 1999;
Armingeon et al 2000; Lane and Ersson 2000; and Traxler and Kittel 2000).
Total employment and employment growth are indicators that until recently were
less frequently used in international comparative research (but see Visser and
Hemerijck 1997; Hoogenboom and van Vliet 2000: 3; Keese 2000: 55-57;
Scharpf and Schmidt 2000; Scharpf 2001: 66; Andeweg and Irwin 2002: 183,
184; see also chapter 2, section 2.3).
The budget deficit, public expenditure and social security transfers are also long-
standing cross-national indicators. They inform on the size of the public economy
and the welfare state of a country or a group of countries. These indicators are
extensively used in the international comparative discussion on the issue of the
retrenchment or transformation of the welfare state (see for instance Esping-
Andersen 1996; Pierson 1996, 2001; Castles 1998, 2002, 2004; Keman 1998a,
2003; Armingeon 1999; Stephens et al 1999; van Kersbergen 2000; Kuhnle
2000; Huber and Stephens 2001; and Swank 2001).
I will therefore use the following indicators in my discussion of the Dutch case,
both comparatively, and when discussing the relation between Dutch neo-
corporatism, policy performance, and macroeconomic performance:
- the budget deficit - general government gross public debt as a percentage of
Gross Domestic Product (GDP);
- public expenditure - total outlays of government as a percentage of GDP;
- social security transfers - social security transfer payments as a percentage of
GDP;
- rate of inflation - consumer price index, percentage change from previous year;
- economic growth - annual economic growth as a percentage of GDP;
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- unemployment - standardised unemployment rates as a percentage of the total
labour force aged 15-64;
- total employment - total number of employed as a percentage of the popu-
lation aged 15-64;
- employment growth - annual percentage change of the total labour force;
- misery index - inflation plus unemployment.
For all indicators, the scores of the countries have been collected on an annual
basis for the period 1965 - 2000, if that information was available from the
OECD and other sources (for a full explanation of sources used see Tables 8.4
and 8.6).
I intend to use the policy performance and macroeconomic performance of other
(groups of) countries as a benchmark to establish whether or not the Dutch case
is indeed different or even exceptional. This comparison is not a new case study
based on ‘thick’ description of the formation and implementation of incomes
policy between 1965 and 2000 in the (groups of) countries concerned. Nor is this
comparison a pooled statistical analysis in order to establish causal relations be-
tween variables (see Ragin 1987; Janoski and Hicks 1994). Rather, as a measure
for comparison I will use the mean. I have opted for this measure, firstly, because
the mean gives a concise description of the typical performance of countries and
groups of countries on the various indicators for each selected period of time.
Secondly, because all the indicators are measured on a ratio scale (see Norusis
1988: 94-109, 180-194; Pennings et al 1997: 119-123, 152; and de Vocht 1997:
131-149).58
8.2 Periods of comparison
The first period in which the countries’ mean scores on the indicators will be
compared is obviously the whole period under investigation: 1965 - 2000. 
The second period of comparison is the period 1965 - 1982. This period con-
cerns, as it where, the pre-‘Polder Model’-period. With hindsight, Dutch litera-
ture on the ‘Polder Model’ and the ‘Dutch Miracle’ it apparently produced in the
late 1990s, takes the ‘Wassenaar Agreement’ between social partners in December
1982 as the starting point of the model59 (see for instance Visser and Hemerijck
1997: 12/13; van Empel 1997: 17; Albeda et al 1998: 92; Muysken 1999; Ande-
weg 2000; Delsen 2000: 9; Andeweg and Irwin 2002: 182; the Economist 2002;
den Butter and Mosch 2003; and Mosch 2004). 
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58. In this case, the mode is not a particular useful measure of central tendency (Norusis 1988: 102;
Pennings et al 1997: 117).
59. In chapter 2 and chapters 4-6, I have argued that a ‘Polder Model’ cannot be identified in the Nether-
lands. Not in the 1980s, nor in the 1990s.
^
^
By definition, the third period covers 1983 - 2000, the period of the ‘Polder Mo-
del’ and its alleged macroeconomic effect in the late 1990s: the ‘Dutch Miracle’.
This enables me to compare Dutch performance before and after the advent of
the perceived new model.
The fourth period covers the period of the ‘Dutch Disease’: 1978 - 1985. From
the literature on the disease (and the miracle) it is not quite clear in which exact
period the ‘Dutch Disease’ is actually located. Researchers sometimes tend to be
quite fuzzy in their periodisation. A majority of researchers locate the ‘Dutch
Disease’ at the end of the 1970s into the early 1980s, without any other speci-
fication as to when the end of the 1970s starts or the early 1980s end (see for
instance Hartog 1999; Brouwer and Labohm 2000; Delsen 2000; van Sinderen
2000; Stokman 2000; and the Economist 2002). Other researchers locate the
start of the disease much earlier. Hemerijck et al (2000), Andeweg and Irwin
(2002: 186, 189), and den Butter and Mosch (2003; see also Mosch 2004: 96),
state that the disease is the result of the 1973 oil crisis and that it actually starts
then. They refrain from specifying an end to the period of disease (Hemerijck et
al 2000), or they locate the end of the period of disease in either the early 1980s
(Andeweg and Irwin) or quite specifically in 1982 (den Butter and Mosch; see
also Mosch 2004: 115 ff.). Van Empel (1997) is also quite specific on the end of
the period of the disease: 1982; but much less so on the start: the 1970s. The SCP
(2000) stretches the period of the disease considerably: from the 1970s until the
first half of 1980s. They locate the start even earlier than den Butter and Mosch,
and Andeweg and Irwin, and they locate the end a few years after 1982. Salverda
(1999) on the other hand, locates the disease in the 1980s as a whole, while
Hazeu (1998) gives the shortest possible period for the disease: the early 1980s.
Based on the above periodisations, the possible range for the period of the
‘Dutch Disease’ stretches from 1970 right up to 1989. The majority of the re-
searchers, however, locate the period of the ‘Dutch Disease’ between the late 1970s
and the early 1980s. As these researchers all published after the discovery of the
‘Dutch Miracle’ by Visser and Hemerijck (1997) and the subsequent discovery
of the ‘Polder Model’ that appeared to be responsible for the miracle, they may
have been influenced by the date of the ‘Wassenaar Agreement’ between trade
unions and employers’ organisations of December 1982. That agreement and that
date is now ‘common wisdom’, but they are in my view incorrectly taken as a
watershed between a failed model of negotiations on incomes policy between
1965 and 1982, and a new, more effective ‘Polder Model’ after 1982 that even-
tually produced the ‘Dutch Miracle’ in the 1990s (see chapters 2-6).
Above I have argued that the ‘Dutch Disease’ was characterised by especially
mass unemployment and increasing budget deficits, resulting in increased public
expenditure and social security transfer payments, combined with low economic
growth and high inflation. Unemployment and budget deficits in the Netherlands
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were rapidly increasing and especially high between 1978 and 1985 (see also
Therborn 1986; and Braun 1989). For that reason, I regard the period of the
‘Dutch Disease’ to cover these years: 1978 - 1985. The start of this period is in
line with that loosely given by most other researchers: the ‘late’ 1970s. However,
with respect to the end of the period, I follow the SCP (2000), and locate the end
of the period of the ‘Dutch Disease’ slightly later than other researchers: 1985. 
The fifth and final period covers the ‘Dutch Miracle’: 1995 - 2000. From the
literature on model and miracle it is, as with the ‘Dutch Disease’, not exactly
clear at what specific point in time this ‘Dutch Miracle’ actually appeared. Visser
and Hemerijck (1997: 9/10) place its emergence somewhere during 1996 and
1997. So does van Empel (1997: 5). Both refer to reports that appeared in the
international press during 1996 and 1997 (see also Becker 2001a). In these
reports the unexpectedly positive performance of the Dutch economy in those
years was discussed. Unexpectedly, as the Dutch case hitherto had been most
famous internationally for its ‘Dutch Disease’. Andeweg and Irwin (2002: 145)
loosely refer to the ‘late 1990s’ as the period of the ‘Dutch Miracle’. Muysken
(1999) and Keman (2003) locate the period of the miracle in the second half of
the 1990s. Other researchers, however, refer to the whole period 1990 - 2000
(Hoogenboom and van Vliet 2000; see also the Economist 2002; and Keman
2003), or even to the period 1982/1983 - 2000. That is, from the ‘Wassenaar
Agreement’ until the end of the period (see for instance Hazeu 1998; Stokman
2000; and den Butter and Mosch 2003). Clearly, this last periodisation must be
incorrect as it simply conflates the start of the period of the presumed ‘Polder
Model’ with its actual performance, or the ‘Dutch Miracle’, that was only just
discovered by Visser and Hemerijck (1997). 
Based on the above periodisations, the period of the ‘Dutch Miracle’ may stretch
from 1982 right up to 2000. There is much less agreement among researchers
about the period of the miracle than there was about the period of the disease.
Most researchers, however, do agree that the ‘Dutch Miracle’ is essentially
characterised by job growth, that is, low unemployment, and by lower budget
deficits, resulting from reduced public expenditure and reduced social security
transfer payments, combined with an economic recovery and low inflation.
Unemployment and the budget deficit in the Netherlands started to come down
from about 1995. That may also explain a certain time-lapse between actual per-
formance and the moment that performance is also noticed in various international
statistical and other (press) reports. Therefore, 1995 is, in my view, a reasonable
starting point for the alleged ‘Dutch Miracle’ (see also Becker 2001a).
I will therefore use the following periodisation to compare Dutch performance
to that of other (groups of) countries:
- 1965 - 2000 - the whole period under investigation;
- 1965 - 1982 - the pre-‘Polder Model’-period;
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- 1983 - 2000 - the period of the alleged ‘Polder Model’;
- 1978 - 1985 - the period of the ‘Dutch Disease’, characterised by rapidly in-
creasing or high unemployment and budget deficits;
- 1995 - 2000 - the period of the ‘Dutch Miracle’, characterised by rapidly de-
creasing or low unemployment and budget deficits.
8.3 Countries included in the comparison
The first selection of countries that will be compared to the Netherlands are the
other developed liberal western democracies with market economies that are, as
the Netherlands, members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD - see also Castles 1998: 5 ff.). Membership of the OECD
has an impact on the member countries’ macroeconomic policies (see for the
Netherlands: Binnema 2004).
This selection of countries includes 19 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece (1974), Ireland, Italy, New
Zealand, Norway, Portugal (1974), Spain (1976), Sweden, Switzerland, the
United Kingdom, and the United States of America.60
The second selection of countries for the comparison with the Netherlands is the
European Union (EU), of which the Netherlands is a founding member.
Especially through the preparation for a European Monetary Union (EMU) and
a common currency (the Euro) in the 1990s, membership of the EU also had an
important impact on the member states’ macroeconomic policies.61 The EU
countries are also all members of the OECD. Included in the EU selection are 13
countries: Austria (1995), Belgium, Denmark (1973), Finland (1995), France,
Germany, Greece (1981), Ireland (1973), Italy, Portugal (1986), Spain (1986),
Sweden (1995), and the United Kingdom (1973). All countries are included in
the selection from either 1965 or the year they joined the EU. As with the OECD
selection, Luxembourg is excluded for its small size. 
The final selection of countries is a group of neo-corporatist West-European
countries to which also the Netherlands belong according to most comparative
cross-national research. These seven countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland.62 All countries are included in the
selection for the whole period 1965 - 2000. 
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60. I have excluded Iceland and Luxembourg from the selection of OECD countries because of their
small size; Israel because that country from a macroeconomic point of view virtually operates on
the footing of a war economy; and Japan and Turkey as non-western democracies. Lastly, Greece,
Portugal and Spain are included from the point in time these countries (re)joined the universe of
western democracies.
61. Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom did not join the EMU (and the Euro).
62. All countries are members of the OECD. All countries, except Norway and Switzerland, are members
of the EU as well, but Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom did not join the EMU (i.e. the Euro).
If a comparison of these countries’ performance and that of the Netherlands
shows that the Dutch case is indeed different or exceptional, that would support
the research suggesting that there was a ‘Dutch Disease’ and a ‘Dutch Miracle’.
If, on the other hand, a comparison between the macroeconomic performance of
the Netherlands and these groups of countries fails to show that the Dutch case
is indeed different or exceptional, than the research suggesting that the Nether-
lands experienced both a disease and a miracle is not supported.
The neo-corporatist countries in the final selection of countries do share a lot of
characteristics with the Netherlands. They are small and dependent on the world
market (Cameron 1978, 1984; Katzenstein 1985; Czada 1987; Lijphart and Crepaz
1991; Pennings 1997; see also Table 8.1). They are all parliamentary democracies
that have an electoral system based on proportional representation that result in
multi-party systems without a majority party. Multi-party systems without a
majority party usually make it necessary to form coalition governments (Wolden-
dorp et al 2000). They are also all considered to be neo-corporatist, although
researchers may disagree on the actual level of neo-corporatism (see Lijphart
and Crepaz 1991; Pennings 1997; Siaroff 1999; and chapter 2, section 2.6).63
And they are all consensus democracies (as opposed to majoritarian demo-
cracies: Lijphart and Crepaz 1991; Lijphart 1999: 248, 255; see also Table 8.1). 
In Table 8.1the scores on consensus democracy and world market dependence of
the eight small neo-corporatist West European countries are compared to those
of the other western democracies in the OECD universe. Only those countries
that are relevant for the period under investigation, 1965-2000, are included.
First, the variation within the group of eight countries will be discussed. Then
these will be compared to the other nations. Both individually and as a group.
There is some variation in scores on neo-corporatism within the group of eight
countries. Nevertheless, in general they are regarded as neo-corporatist. The
greatest differences of opinion are about Switzerland. But Lijphart and Crepaz
(1991) conclude that most researchers do consider Switzerland to be neo-
corporatist. Siaroff (1999: 184) on the other hand, concludes that with respect to
neo-corporatism Switzerland (with France) belongs to the cases “without
agreement on placement or even on conceptualisation”. However, in presenting
his own ranking of ‘integrated’ economies, Siaroff (1999: 198) firmly places
Switzerland in the neo-corporatist universe.
With respect to consensus democracy, with the exception of Austria, the eight
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63. For an overview of country scores on different scales of neo-corporatism developed by various
researchers, see also Woldendorp 1997b: 51; Pennings et al 1999: 284; Armingeon 2002; and
Vergunst 2004: chapter 3. In addition, Lehmbruch 1984; Schott 1984; Schmidt 1986; and Lehner
1988 have published scores of OECD-countries on neo-corporatism scales.
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countries all score high on the Executive-Party dimension of multi-party systems
based on proportional representation and coalition governments. And despite its
lower score, Austria is in this respect also more a consensus democracy than a
majoritarian democracy (see also Vergunst 2004: chapter 2.
There is more variation on the Federal-Unitary dimension. Austria and
Switzerland are federal states. The Scandinavian countries are all unitary states.
Belgium (before federalisation in 1995) and the Netherlands are unitary states
with some ‘federal’ tendencies (Lijphart 1999: 314).64
World market dependence for the eight countries is high. For the period 1965-
1988 it is above 50 per cent of GDP and for the 1990s it is above 60 per cent of
GDP. There is some within variation that hardly changes between periods.
Except Norway, the countries maintain their relative positions. Belgium and the
Netherlands have the highest dependency in both periods: above 90 (1965-1988)
and above 100 (1990s). Austria, Denmark, Finland, (Norway), Sweden and Switzer-
land score between 50 and 70 (1965-1988) and between 60 and 80 (1990s).
Comparing the group of eight countries to the other nations under review here
yields the following picture. Except for Germany, the other nations are clearly
not neo-corporatist. Germany is by many considered as a neo-corporatist country
and falls in the same category of neo-corporatism as the Netherlands and Den-
mark. According to Siaroff (1999: 184) the country is more neo-corporatist than
for example Finland and Belgium. 
With respect to consensus democracy, Italy, Germany, Ireland, and Portugal also
have a positive score on the Executive-Party dimension of multi-party systems
based on proportional representation and coalition governments. Italy scores as
high as the Netherlands and higher than Austria, which of the group of eight
scored lowest on this dimension of consensus democracy. Portugal scores much
lower than Italy, but still higher than Austria. Germany and Ireland also have
positive scores, but these are lower than Austria’s.
On the second, Federal-Unitary dimension, there is as much variation between
the other countries as there is in the group of eight countries. Australia, Canada,
Germany, and the United States of America are federal states. France, Greece,
Italy, New Zealand, Portugal and the United Kingdom are unitary states. Spain
is a unitary state with some ‘federal’ tendencies. This suggests that this dimension
of consensus democracy is less important for explaining ‘politics’ (Lane and
Ersson 2000; Armingeon 2002; and Vergunst 2004: chapter 2)
On world market dependence the group of eight countries scores above 50%
(1965-1988) and above 60% (1990s). In the period 1965-1988, the other nations
score below 50, except for Ireland (95.1), New Zealand (52.2), Portugal (63.8)
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64. Keman (2000) shows that for the Netherlands this classification is dubious.
and the United Kingdom (50.2). In the 1990s, the other countries score below 60,
except for Ireland (131.3), Portugal (66.5), and Canada (66.1).
The comparison between the eight small neo-corporatist West European coun-
tries and the other nations shows that:
- Germany is considered to be neo-corporatist by many;
- Italy, Germany, Ireland, and Portugal score high or positive on the Executive-
Party dimension of the consensus democracy model;
- Ireland, (New Zealand), Canada (the United Kingdom), and Portugal are de-
pendent on the world market.
Ireland and Portugal65 are, like the group of eight countries, also dependent on
the world market and score high on the Executive-Party dimension of consensus
democracy. But these are clearly no neo-corporatist countries according to
Lijphart (1999) and Siaroff (1999).
Canada, New Zealand, and the UK are countries that are, like the group of eight
countries, also dependent on the world market. But they are not neo-corporatist,
nor are they consensus democracies with respect to the Executive-Party dimen-
sion (see also Castles 1993).
Germany is considered as neo-corporatist, like the group of eight countries, and
tends towards a consensus democracy. Yet as a large country it is less dependent
on the world market.
Lastly, Italy is, like the group of eight countries, a consensus democracy with
respect to the Executive-Party dimension. But it is neither neo-corporatist, nor is
it as a large country as dependent on the world market. 
Based on these considerations, I conclude that the eight small neo-corporatist
West European countries are more similar than dissimilar with respect to neo-
corporatism, consensus democracy and world market dependence. And that as a
group they can be indeed distinguished from other developed western democracies.
In that sense, they form a ‘natural group’ (Peters 1998: 74; see also Lijphart
1971; Lijphart 1975; and Dogan and Pelassy 1990). 
Given the great similarities between the neo-corporatist countries, a comparison
of these countries’ performance and that of the Netherlands that shows that the
Dutch case is indeed different or even exceptional would even more than with the
comparison to the OECD and EU countries support the research suggesting that
there was both a specifically ‘Dutch’disease and also a specifically ‘Dutch’miracle.
I will therefore compare the Netherlands’ performance to the following (groups
of) countries:
224
65. Vergunst (2004: chapter 9) shows that Portugal experienced a shift from a more consensual political
system to a more majoritarian political system and back again between 1974 and 1998.
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- 19 OECD member states (excluding Iceland, Israel, Japan, Luxembourg, and
Turkey);
- 13 EU member states (excluding Luxembourg);
- seven other small neo-corporatist West-European countries (Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland).
8.4 Dutch performance between 1965 and 2000 from a comparative perspective
Table 8.2 shows that comparatively Dutch performance is quite stable, except for
employment growth. The Dutch case is not exceptional. Neither negative, nor
positive. Depending on the period, the Netherlands performed comparatively
strong on five indicators, but on five other indicators it did not. The country
especially scored lower than the other groups of countries on policy performan-
ce: the budget deficit, social security transfers, and public expenditure; and higher
on macroeconomic performance: inflation, economic growth, unemployment, the
misery index and employment growth (see Table 8.3 and Figure 8.1 for a sum-
mary). Hence, the often assumed direct relation is not visible on case level.
Dutch performance between 1965 and 2000 was lower than that of the other
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groups of countries with regard to the budget deficit, social security transfers,
public expenditure, total employment and employment growth (between 1965
and 1982). Performance was higher with respect to inflation, economic growth,
unemployment, employment growth (between 1965 and 2000 and between 1983
and 2000), and the misery index.
The relative position of the Netherlands with regard to the budget deficit has
remained stable. The country consistently scored the second highest deficit after
that of the other EU countries, despite showing the largest decrease of the deficit
between 1965 and 2000.
The Netherlands has also consistently scored highest of all groups of countries on
social security transfers. And transfer payments between 1965 and 2000 increased
with the OECD average.
In line with social security transfers, the Netherlands also consistently scored
highest of all groups of countries on public expenditure in general, despite showing
the lowest increase of all countries between 1965 and 2000.
In all periods, the Netherlands performed stronger than all other groups of coun-
tries with regard to inflation. The country also showed the second largest de-
crease in inflation between 1965 and 2000.
The Netherlands also performed stronger than the other groups of countries with
regard to economic growth. However, differences with the other groups of coun-
tries were minor, except with the neo-corporatist countries between 1983 and
2000. The Netherlands also showed the largest decrease in economic growth be-
tween 1965 and 2000.
With regard to unemployment the performance of the Netherlands remained stable
as well. The country consistently scored the second lowest level of unemploy-
ment. Besides, the country experienced the lowest increase in unemployment be-
tween 1965 and 2000. However, the Netherlands also consistently scored lowest
on total employment and showed the lowest increase in total employment be-
tween 1965 and 2000. With regard to employment growth, the Netherlands
showed a varied pattern. Employment growth was highest of all countries for the
whole period 1965 - 2000 and for the period 1983 - 2000. It was lowest of all coun-
tries during the period 1965 - 1982. The country also scored the highest increase
in employment growth between 1965 and 2000. This means that employment
growth was highest after 1982.
Finally, due to Dutch performance on inflation and economic growth (see above),
the country consistently scored lowest on the misery index. 
Hence, we can conclude that from a comparative perspective the Netherlands
was neither a completely different nor a wholly exceptional case. This conclusion
holds for the country’s performance over the whole period 1965 - 2000, as well
as for its performance in the periods before and during the alleged ‘Polder Model’:
1965 - 1982 and 1983 - 2000.
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8.5 The ‘Dutch Disease’ and the ‘Dutch Miracle’ from a comparative perspective
Table 8.4 shows that comparatively Dutch performance indeed deteriorated
during the period 1978 - 1985. During that period, the country’s performance
was lower than that of the other groups of countries with regard to the budget
deficit, social security transfers, public expenditure, economic growth,
unemployment, total employment, and employment growth. 
Although this may seem to indicate a period of an overall ‘Dutch’ disease in terms
of performance, it should be noted that the country’s performance on the budget
deficit, social security transfers, public expenditure, and total employment was
comparatively lower during the other periods investigated as well: 1965 - 2000;
1965 - 1982; and 1983 - 2000 (see section 8.4). Therefore, the specifically ‘Dutch’
disease between 1978 and 1985 consisted of a comparatively lower performance
on economic growth, unemployment and employment growth. 
A period of an overall ‘Dutch’ miracle of performance can not be indentified
either. Although Dutch performance during the period 1995 - 2000 did increase
considerably compared to the period 1978 - 1985, overall performance was
comparatively not stronger than in the other periods investigated: 1965 - 2000;
1965 - 1982; and 1983 - 2000 (see section 8.4). During the period of the ‘Dutch’
miracle the country’s performance was higher than that of the other groups of
countries with regard to public expenditure (due to a major reduction), economic
growth, unemployment and employment growth. In that respect the ‘Dutch’
miracle was almost the exact reverse of the ‘Dutch’ disease. However, the
country’s performance was lower than that of the other groups of countries with
respect to the budget deficit, social security transfers (despite a major reduction),
and total employment (despite a considerable increase). The country’s
comparative performance on inflation also slightly deteriorated during the period
of ‘Dutch Miracle’ (see Table 8.5 and Figure 8.2 for a summary). 
Both during the ‘Dutch’ disease and the ‘Dutch’ miracle, the relative perfor-
mance of the Netherlands with regard to the budget deficit remained stable. The
country consistently scored the second highest deficit after that of the other EU
countries, despite showing a considerable decrease of the deficit during the
period 1995 - 2000.
The Netherlands also consistently scored highest of all groups of countries on
social security transfers, in both periods, despite a decrease of some 30% in
social security transfers during the period 1995 - 2000. In this period, the other
groups of countries showed either a slight decrease: EU: 2.5%; or a slight in-
crease: 4% for the neo-corporatist countries and 3.3% for the OECD. In other
words, compared to the ‘Dutch’ disease, the ‘Dutch’ miracle with respect to social
security transfers consisted of a major welfare state retrenchment accounting for
a 30% reduction in social security transfers. Nevertheless, even during the ‘Dutch’
miracle, Dutch social security transfers remained highest of all groups of countries.
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Dutch performance with regard to public expenditure changed dramatically
between the ‘Dutch’ disease and the ‘Dutch’ miracle. From the highest expendi-
ture of all groups of countries during the period 1978 - 1985 to the lowest ex-
penditure between 1995 and 2000. In other words, the ‘Dutch’ miracle with re-
spect to public expenditure consisted of a considerably larger welfare state re-
trenchment than that of other groups of countries. Although all countries reduced
their expenditure between 1995 and 2000, Dutch welfare state retrenchment was
considerably larger with a reduction of some 23.5% than that of the EU (7.5%),
the OECD (3.5%), or the neo-corporatist countries (2%). 
Dutch performance with respect to inflation, however, was comparatively stronger
during the period of the ‘Dutch’ disease than during the ‘Dutch’ miracle, despite
a lower inflation in that period.
With regard to economic growth, Dutch performance was comparatively lowest
during the ‘Dutch’ disease and considerably higher during the ‘Dutch’ miracle.
Nevertheless, differences with the EU and the OECD countries were minimal.
And also with respect to unemployment, Dutch performance was comparatively
one of the lowest during the ‘Dutch’ disease and the highest during the ‘Dutch’
miracle. Unemployment in the other countries actually increased during the period
of the ‘Dutch’ miracle, whereas Dutch unemployment decreased considerably.
However, with regard to total employment, Dutch performance during both periods
was lowest of all other groups of countries, despite a major increase in total em-
ployment during the ‘Dutch’ miracle. Dutch performance with respect to em-
ployment growth changed from the lowest, in fact, negative growth during the
‘Dutch’ disease to the highest during the ‘Dutch’ miracle. That did not, however,
result in a change of relative Dutch performance on total employment (see above).
Finally, Dutch performance on the misery index during both the ‘Dutch’ disease
and the ‘Dutch’ miracle remained the highest of all other groups of countries.
Comparatively, therefore, the ‘Dutch’ disease was specifically characterised by
low economic growth, negative employment growth, high unemployment, and
high welfare state expenditure between 1978 and 1985. Whereas the ‘Dutch’ miracle
was specifically characterised by high economic and employment growth and
low unemployment, combined with a major retrenchment of the welfare state
between 1995 and 2000.66 Dutch retrenchment of the welfare state in the period
1995 - 2000 was not matched by the other (groups of) countries to which Dutch
macroeconomic performance is compared. In fact, the only other country that
experienced a major retrenchment of the welfare state in the same period was
Ireland (Castles 2002: 622-623; see also Castles 2004).
In other words, between 1978 and 1985, Dutch macroeconomic performance was
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66. For a more detailed discussion of various aspects of Dutch and other countries’ welfare state
retrenchment in the late 1990s, see Castles (2002, 2004).
considerably lower than that of other (groups of) countries with regard to econo-
mic growth, employment growth, and unemployment. Between 1995 and 2000,
Dutch macroeconomic performance was considerably stronger with regard to
economic and employment growth and unemployment. However, most of these
new jobs were part time jobs, occupied mainly by young people and, especially,
married women, while men above 55 years of age largely stopped working
(Salverda 1999; Hemerijck et al 2000; WRR 2000: 45-49; Becker 2001; Heme-
rijck 2003; and Keman 2003). At the same time, Dutch welfare state expenditure
was considerably reduced between 1995 and 2000. And this is an aspect of the
‘Dutch’ miracle that is not so often discussed in the international literature on the
‘Dutch Miracle’ (but see Green-Pedersen et al 2001; Green-Pedersen 200167;
Castles 2002, 2004; and Keman 2003). To conclude, the ‘Dutch’ miracle between
1995 and 2000 consisted of a considerable increase in part time participation of
women on the labour market, combined with a major retrenchment of the wel-
fare state. 
What we can observe, therefore, is a ‘mixed’ pattern, not a ‘unique’ change from
an encompassing ‘disease’ to a complete ‘miracle’. Comparatively, the specific
‘Dutch’ disease consisted of a lower macroeconomic performance in terms of
economic and employment growth, and, consequently, higher unemployment.
The specific ‘Dutch’ miracle comparatively consisted of higher macroeconomic
performance in terms of economic and employment growth, resulting in lower
unemployment, combined with a considerably larger retrenchment of the welfare
state. Hence, from a comparative perspective, the Netherlands was a different
and exceptional case with regard to the country’s degree of welfare state re-
trenchment during the period of the ‘Dutch Miracle’, but in other respects it was
not ‘uniquely’ different from other countries: neither positive nor negative.
8.6 Effectiveness of incomes policy in terms of agendas and performance
In this section I will investigate whether or not Dutch performance improves
236
67. Green-Pedersen (2001: 971 and 972 ff.) uses a different measure of welfare state retrenchment based
on ‘micro data (…) measuring what has happened to benefit levels, eligibility criteria, and so forth’.
The combined budgetary effects of legislative measures between 1982 and 1998 that effected
benefit levels and the like were calculated in terms of retrenchment (budgetary savings) or improve-
ment (additional expenditure), compared to the expected expenditure based on the original social
security schemes. Applied to unemployment benefits, old age pensions and disability pensions or
early retirement benefits between 1982 and 1998, a welfare state retrenchment of between 17% (old
age), 33.7% (unemployment) and 61.1% (disability) was calculated for the Netherlands. Note,
however, that this measure of welfare state retrenchment does not necessarily signify a decrease in
actual aggregated social expenditure of between 17% and 61.1%. The percentages show the
difference between the expected expenditure based on the original social security legislation and the
actual expenditure due to legislative and other measures to curb expenditure that were taken between
1982 and 1998.
when Dutch neo-corporatism is more effective in terms of the agendas of the
actors involved in incomes policy (see chapter 6). To put it differently, does the
‘Dutch Disease’ indeed go together with less neo-corporatist incomes policies
and with less effective neo-corporatist incomes policies in terms of Central
Agreements and movements towards the core? Conversely, does the ‘Dutch
Miracle’ go together with more neo-corporatist incomes policies and with more
effective neo-corporatist incomes policies in terms of Central Agreements and
movements towards the core?
The answers are affirmative with respect to Central Agreements. During the eight
year period of the ‘Dutch Disease’ between 1978 and 1985, incomes policy was
largely non-neo-corporatist and the two Central Agreements in this period in
1983 and 1984 were effectively forced upon social partners by the government
of the day. The six year period of the ‘Dutch Miracle’ between 1995 and 2000 was
characterised by exclusively neo-corporatist incomes policies that resulted in four
Central Agreements (see Table 8.6 and chapters 4-6). In section 8.6.1, I will discuss
the effectiveness of incomes policy in terms of Central Agreements in more detail.
With respect to approaching the core, the answers appear to be less straight-
forward. During the eight year period of the ‘Dutch Disease’ between 1978 and
1985, incomes policy was indeed largely non-neo-corporatist and ineffective in
approaching the core. However, in the only two years that a neo-corporatist in-
comes policy was implemented in 1978 and 1979, the core was indeed approach-
ed. Nevertheless, during the six year period of the ‘Dutch Miracle’ between 1995
and 2000, incomes policy was exclusively neo-corporatist and in four years the
core was approached as well (see Table 8.7 and chapters 4-6). In section 8.6.2, I
will discuss the effectiveness of incomes policy in terms of approaching the core
in more detail.
8.6.1 Effectiveness of incomes policy in terms of Central Agreements and per-
formance
During the period of the ‘Dutch Disease’ incomes policy was largely non-neo-
corporatist and the two Central Agreements in this period were forced upon so-
cial partners by the government. During the period of the ‘Dutch Miracle’, how-
ever, incomes policy was exclusively neo-corporatist and four Central Agree-
ments were reached.
That means that in the Netherlands between 1965 and 2000 a period of lower
performance indeed went together with less, and less effective, neo-corporatist
incomes policies in terms of Central Agreements, whereas a period of higher
performance went together with more, and more effective, neo-corporatist in-
comes policies. This may have contributed to the notion of an effective Dutch
‘Polder Model’ after 1982.
But the question remains: what comes first? Does the absence of effective neo-
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corporatist incomes policies in terms of Central Agreements produce a low(er)
(macroeconomic and policy) performance, while the presence of effective neo-
corporatist incomes policies in terms of Central Agreements produces a high(er)
performance? Or does a low performance make it difficult for the actors in-
volved to implement a neo-corporatist incomes policy and to come to a Central
Agreement, whereas a higher performance makes that more feasible?
The logical third possibility is that (macroeconomic and policy) performance
and neo-corporatist incomes policy are unrelated phenomena (see for instance
Therborn 1987; Schmitter 1989; Alvarez et al 1991; Crepaz 1992; Golden 1993;
Woldendorp 1997b; Flanagan 1999; Lane and Ersson 2000; and Kenworthy
2002). However, the majority of international research suggests that this is not
the case (see for instance Schmidt 1982; Alvarez et al 1991; Kurzer 1991; Western
1991; Crepaz 1992; Keman 1993; Pennings 1997; Lijphart 1999; Siaroff 1999;
Traxler and Kittel 2000). Therefore, it is necessary to investigate whether there
is a direct relation, in which neo-corporatism is as it were the mechanism that
produces performance by means of Central Agreements, or an indirect relation,
in which performance is the context in which neo-corporatism may occur and
Central Agreements can be struck.
In chapter 5, I have shown that concluding non-neo-corporatist government stra-
tegies mainly occurred between 1965 and 1986. Concluding non-neo-corporatist
government strategies in these years resulted from three causes. Firstly, an in-
crease in confrontation between social partners, especially between 1965 and 1973
after the demise of the centrally guided government incomes policy. Increased
confrontation made it difficult, if not impossible, to reach agreement. The in-
creased confrontation between social partners in this period occurred in a con-
text of macroeconomic growth and prosperity.
Secondly, an increase in deadlocks between social partners in the years between
1974 and 1982 that also resulted in an inability to reach agreement. The increase
in deadlocks between social partners in this period occurred in the context of a
deteriorating macroeconomic performance due to the two oil crises of 1973 and
1979/1980, combined with the linkage between the market sector and the (semi-)
public sector.
Thirdly, the delinkage of the market sector and the (semi-) public sector that was
effected by the government after 1983 on the basis of the Central (‘Wassenaar’)
Agreement that was forced upon social partners by the government of the day. The
delinkage of the market sector and the (semi-) public sector after 1983 occurred
in the wake of the severest macroeconomic recession after 1945: 1981 - 1983.
Between 1965 and 1973, the lack of agreement between social partners rein-
forced the habitual tendency of governments to take over again the determination
of incomes policy with a guiding government strategy (IV) as governments were
used to do in the previous period of the centrally, government guided incomes
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policy between 1945 and 1965. After the introduction of the new Law on Wage
Formation in 1970, concluding non-neo-corporatist government strategies were
of the passive variety (I) in an effort to give the new system of ‘free’ negotiations
on incomes policy between social partners a fair chance.
The few attempts at neo-corporatist strategies by the government were only mar-
ginally effective in producing a Central Agreement (1965 and 1970).
Between 1974 and 1982, the continued lack of agreement between social partners,
despite less confrontation, combined with the linkage between the market sector
and the (semi-) public sector, left the government but two options to redress the
combined macroeconomic and budgetary effects of the two oil crises in 1973
and 1979/80. Either to try and resolve the deadlocks between social partners by
a neo-corporatist strategy (II+III), or to take over responsibility for incomes policy
with a non-neo-corporatist guiding strategy (IV) in order to reach their policy
target of a moderate incomes policy in the market sector.68 In only one case a
neo-corporatist strategy was effective in bringing social partners to a Central
Agreement (1977).
The potential third option, the non-neo-corporatist passive strategy (I) was no real
option in this period given the combined effects of both oil crises and linkage on
performance and the government’s budget.
Finally, the remaining five concluding passive government strategies (I) all
occurred between 1983 and 1992: 1983 - 1986, and 1992. In 1983, in the wake of
the severest post war economic recession between 1981 and 1983, the government
Lubbers I (CDA, VVD) managed to force social partners to come to a Central
Agreement on incomes policy in the market sector (‘Wassenaar’: 1983, 1984)69
that enabled the government to delink the market sector and the (semi-) public
sector, to leave incomes policy in the market sector largely to social partners, and
to concentrate its own policy efforts on reducing the budget deficit. The govern-
ment’s concluding strategy between 1983 and 1986, therefore, was the non-neo-
corporatist passive strategy (I). This situation was formalised with the new Wage
Law of 1987 that stated that binding government interventions in incomes policy
were only admissible in case of externally induced economic emergencies.
Therefore, the period of the ‘Dutch Disease’ between 1978 and 1985 was the period
in which social partners were unable to come to agreements, despite a context of
increasingly severe macroeconomic problems due to the two oil crises, and in-
creasing budgetary problems due to the linkage between the market sector and
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68. Due to the linkage, higher wages in the market sector had an immediate impact on incomes in the
(semi-) public sector (salaries of government employees and others, social security benefits, social
assistance, and pensions). And that had an immediate impact on the government’s budget, producing
ever growing budget deficits (see also chapters 4-6; and Hemerijck 2003: 53 ff.).
69. Between 1965 and 1986 only five Central Agreements were concluded: 1965, 1970, 1977, 1983, and
1984.
the (semi-) public sector. That initially left governments only one option: to imple-
ment a non-neo-corporatist, binding incomes policy (see also chapters 5 and 6). 
The imposed Central (‘Wassenaar’) Agreement in 1983 and 1984, on the other
hand, enabled the government to delink the market sector and the (semi-) public
sector, to leave incomes policy in the market sector to social partners, that is, to
implement a non-neo-corporatist, passive incomes policy and to concentrate its
own policy efforts on the reduction of the budget deficit.
That means that binding non-neo-corporatist incomes policies in the period of
the ‘Dutch Disease’ between 1978 and 1985 were caused by a combination of dis-
agreement between social partners in the context of both a severely deteriorating
economy and a linkage between market sector and (semi-) public sector between
1978 and 1982. The passive non-neo-corporatist incomes policies in the period
of the ‘Dutch Disease’ were caused by a combination of a forced agreement
between social partners in the context of both a severely deteriorating economy
and the delinkage between market sector and (semi-) public sector between 1983
and 1985 (see also Hemerijck 2003: 53 ff.).
In other words, (macroeconomic and policy) performance, combined with the
behaviour of social partners induced the government to implement institutional
changes with regard to incomes policy during the period of ‘Dutch Disease’.
Disagreement between social partners, and between social partners and the
government, in a context of severely deteriorating macroeconomic performance
led to non-neo-corporatist incomes policies, a change in the institutional setting
of incomes policy, and few Central Agreements. If the macroeconomic context
is negative, then neo-corporatism (the mechanism) is less feasible.
In chapter 5, I have also shown that the majority of the concluding neo-corpo-
ratist government strategies occurred after 1986, and so did the majority of the
effective neo-corporatist government strategies. From 1987, the ad hoc relinkage
of incomes in the market sector and in the (semi-) public sector and the budgetary
discipline as a consequence of the EMU (1991 - 1999) in a context of economic ups
and downs between 1987 and 1994, followed by an economic recovery after
1995 meant that non-neo-corporatist government strategies were not an option. 
Passive non-neo-corporatist government strategies were no option because of the
ad hoc relinkage. The relinkage implied that wages and other terms of employ-
ment that were negotiated in the market sector had a direct effect on wages and
benefits, including pensions, in the (semi-) public sector and, consequently, on
the government’s budget.
Binding non-neo-corporatist government strategies were no option because no
severe, external macroeconomic emergencies occurred, as was required by the
new Law on Wage Formation of 1987. Consequently, government strategy was neo-
corporatist and that facilitated considerably more agreements between social
partners (and between social partners and the government) than in the period
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1965 - 1986 (nine: 1987, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1996 - 1999).
Therefore, the period of the ‘Dutch Miracle’ between 1995 and 2000 was the period
in which social partners, assisted by the government, could come to agreements
in the context of an economic recovery. Government assistance was induced by
the institutional features of the annual process of negotiation and implemen-
tation of incomes policy: negotiable, ad hoc relinkage of the market sector and
the (semi-) public sector on the one hand; and budgetary discipline enforced by
changes in the exogenous context (EMU) on the other hand. More agreement
between social partners, and between social partners and the government, and
changes in the institutional setting of incomes policy, in a context of a recovering
macroeconomic performance, led to neo-corporatist incomes policies and that
facilitated quite a few Central Agreements. Hence, if the macroeconomic context
is positive, then neo-corporatism (the mechanism) is more feasible. 
The final answer to the questions posed in this section is that it was rather (macro-
economic and policy) performance, combined with the behaviour of social part-
ners and institutional change, that made neo-corporatism more (or less) feasible
and effective, than the other way around. The ‘Dutch Disease’ was not caused by
the absence of a ‘Polder Model’, but the ‘Dutch Disease’, combined with the be-
haviour of social partners, made neo-corporatism less feasible and rather in-
effective in terms of Central Agreements. This induced the government to in-
stitutional change (delinkage). Likewise, the ‘Dutch Miracle’ was not caused by
an effective ‘Polder Model’, but the ‘Dutch Miracle’, combined with the be-
haviour of social partners and budgetary discipline enforced by the EMU, in-
duced the government to institutional change (ad hoc relinkage) that made neo-
corporatism more feasible and rather effective in terms of Central Agreements.
This combination of (macroeconomic and policy) performance with institutional
change and the behaviour of social partners as a context for feasibility and
effectiveness of neo-corporatism is further substantiated by the effectiveness of
incomes policy in terms of Central Agreements before 1983 and after 1982. The
effectiveness of all incomes policies - both neo-corporatist and non-neo-cor-
poratist - between 1985 and 1982 was considerably lower than between 1983 and
2000. The effectiveness of incomes policy in terms of Central Agreements was
adversely influenced by, first, institutional change from a centrally guided, govern-
ment directed incomes policy to a free incomes policy during a period of macro-
economic prosperity that led to confrontation between social partners (1965 -
1973). Secondly, by another institutional change - the linkage of market sectors
and (semi-) public sector - during a period of macroeconomic deterioration that
led to frequent deadlocks between social partners (1974 - 1982) (see also
chapters 5 and 6).
The above discussion of the relation between (macroeconomic and policy) per-
formance and neo-corporatism by means of reaching Central Agreement suggests
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that the cross-national argument that neo-corporatism is beneficial for per-
formance (see for instance Schmidt 1982; Alvarez et al 1991; Kurzer 1991; Western
1991; Crepaz 1992; Keman 1993; Pennings 1997; Lijphart 1999; Siaroff 1999;
Traxler and Kittel 2000; and Kenworthy 2002) is not supported for the Dutch
case. Rather, the evidence from the Dutch case tends to support those researchers
that question a beneficial relation between neo-corporatism and (macroecono-
mic and policy) performance (see for instance Therborn 1987; Schmitter 1989;
Alvarez et al 1991; Crepaz 1992; Golden 1993; Woldendorp 1997b; Flanagan
1999; Lane and Ersson 2000; and Kenworthy 2002). In the Dutch case I have
analysed that neo-corporatism (or the absence of neo-corporatism) may explain
policy formation and implementation in a number of years, that is, may explain
whether or not a Central Agreement was reached. But I have also found that neo-
corporatism did not explain (macroeconomic and policy) performance by means
of Central Agreements (see also Woldendorp 1997b).
8.6.2 Effectiveness of incomes policy in terms of approaching the core
During the period of the ‘Dutch Disease’ incomes policy was largely non-neo-
corporatist and on the whole ineffective in approaching the core. However, in the
two years that a neo-corporatist incomes policy was implemented - 1978 and
1979 - this incomes policy was effective as the core appears to have been ap-
proached. During the period of the ‘Dutch Miracle’ incomes policy was exclu-
sively neo-corporatist and quite effective in approaching the corer. But neo-cor-
poratist incomes policy was less effective than during the period of the ‘Dutch
Disease’: 66.7% compared to 100% (see Table 8.7).
As with the effectiveness of incomes policy in terms of Central Agreements, it
is necessary to investigate whether there is a direct relation in which neo-cor-
poratism is the mechanism that produces (macroeconomic and policy) perfor-
mance by means of approaching the core, or an indirect relation in which per-
formance is the context in which neo-corporatism may occur and produces
movements towards the core.
With regard to Central Agreements I argued that when the (macroeconomic and
policy) performance context was negative, neo-corporatism as the mechanism
that produces Central Agreements was less feasible. When the performance con-
text was more positive, neo-corporatism as the mechanism that produces Central
Agreements was more feasible. The effectiveness of neo-corporatist incomes
policies, however, largely depended on the behaviour of social partners within
the institutional setting.
A comparable pattern can be observed for movements towards the core. During
the period of the ‘Dutch Disease’ (macroeconomic and policy) performance was
negative and incomes policy was both largely non-neo-corporatist and rather
ineffective in approaching the core. Nevertheless, in the two years that a neo-
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corporatist incomes policy was implemented, the core was approached as well.
During the period of the ‘Dutch Miracle’, (macroeconomic and policy) perfor-
mance was positive, incomes policy was exclusively neo-corporatist and rather
effective in approaching the core. However, neo-corporatist incomes policy was
less effective in this respect than during the period of the ‘Dutch Disease’.
This suggests that when the (macroeconomic and policy) performance context is
negative a neo-corporatist incomes policy was less feasible and it was more
difficult to approach the core. When the performance context was positive a neo-
corporatist incomes policy was more feasible and it was apparently easier to
approach the core.
A different pattern can be observed for the effectiveness of incomes policy be-
fore and during the alleged ‘Polder Model’. The effectiveness of incomes policy
in terms of approaching the core did not increase during the period of the ‘Polder
Model’. If anything, incomes policy during the period of the alleged ‘Polder
Model’was slightly less effective in approaching the core. Furthermore, the effective-
ness of neo-corporatist incomes policy in terms of approaching the core before
1983 was decidedly higher than after 1982. The same goes for non-neo-cor-
poratist incomes policies (see Table 8.8). This supports my argument that it was
the (macroeconomic and policy) performance context in which neo-corporatism
may occur and produces movements towards the core, rather than neo-cor-
poratism that produces performance by means of approaching the core. It also
supports my argument that the effectiveness of neo-corporatist incomes policy
largely depended on the behaviour of social partners within the institutional
setting (see also chapters 5 and 6).
As with Central Agreements, the above discussion of the relation between (macro-
economic and policy) performance and neo-corporatism by means of approach-
ing the core suggests that the cross-national argument that neo-corporatism is
beneficial for performance is not supported for the Dutch case.70 Rather, the
evidence from the Dutch case tends to support those researchers that question a
beneficial relation between neo-corporatism and (macroeconomic and policy)
performance.71 In the Dutch case I have analysed that neo-corporatism (or the
absence of neo-corporatism) may explain policy formation and implementation
in a number of years, that is, may explain whether or not a core situation was
approached. But I have also analysed that neo-corporatism did not explain
(macroeconomic and policy) performance by means of approaching the core
(see also Woldendorp 1997b).
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70. See for instance Schmidt 1982; Alvarez et al 1991; Kurzer 1991; Western 1991; Crepaz 1992; Keman
1993; Pennings 1997; Lijphart 1999; Siaroff 1999; Traxler and Kittel 2000; and Kenworthy 2002.
71. See for instance Therborn 1987; Schmitter 1989; Alvarez et al 1991; Crepaz 1992; Golden 1993;
Woldendorp 1997b; Flanagan 1999; Lane and Ersson 2000; and Kenworthy 2002.
8.6.3 Conclusion
Both for reaching Central Agreements and approaching the core I have argued
that it was the (macroeconomic and policy) performance context that made a
neo-corporatist incomes policy more (or less) feasible, instead of a neo-cor-
poratist incomes policy that produced (macroeconomic and policy) performance
by means of Central Agreements or movements towards the core. In addition, I
argued that the effectiveness of neo-corporatist incomes policy largely depended
on the behaviour of social partners within the institutional setting. 
However, we can observe a trade-off between approaching the core and reaching
a Central Agreement (see also chapter 6, section 6.3.4 and chapter 7, section
7.2.2). During both the period of the ‘Dutch Disease’ (1978 - 1985) and the pre-
‘Polder Model’ (1965 - 1982) incomes policy was less often neo-corporatist than
during the period of the ‘Dutch Miracle’ (1995 - 2000) and the alleged ‘Polder
Model’ (1983 - 2000), but both neo-corporatist and non-neo-corporatist incomes
policies were more effective in approaching the core. Neo-corporatist and non-
neo-corporatist incomes policies during both the period of the ‘Dutch Miracle’
and the alleged ‘Polder Model’, on the other hand, were more effective in terms
of reaching a Central Agreement than during the period of the ‘Dutch Disease’
and the pre-‘Polder Model’ (see Table 8.8).
In chapter 6, section 6.3.5, I have analysed the relation between the actors’ be-
haviour in terms of government strategy, style of decision-making, and reaching
Central Agreements, on the one hand, and approaching the core, on the other
hand. I concluded that the movements towards the core could be increased by
two combinations of actors’ behaviour. First by neo-corporatist government
strategies that resulted in Central Agreements which could be reached by more
or less ‘tough’ negotiations between social partners. That was especially the case
during the period of the ‘Dutch Miracle’ and the alleged ‘Polder Model’.
Second by both neo-corporatist and non-neo-corporatist government strategies
under the condition that no Central Agreement could be reached based on
‘tough’ negotiations between social partners. That was especially the case during
the period of the ‘Dutch Disease’ and the pre-‘Polder Model’.
My analysis of the relation between (macroeconomic and policy) performance
and neo-corporatism in the Dutch case also supported the view of those research-
ers that question the assumed beneficial relation between neo-corporatism and per-
formance, either by means of reaching Central Agreements, or by approaching
the core.
8.7 Concluding remarks
In this chapter I have first discussed the ‘Dutch Disease’ and the ‘Dutch Miracle’
from a comparative perspective. The issue was whether the Dutch case was
indeed different and exceptional. From a comparative perspective, neither a
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specifically ‘Dutch’ disease, nor a specifically ‘Dutch’ miracle in terms of over-
all performance could be identified. Insofar there was a specifically ‘Dutch’ di-
sease of low performance between 1978 and 1985, that consisted of lower average
economic growth, negative average employment growth, and, to a lesser degree,
higher average unemployment. The specifically ‘Dutch’ miracle of higher per-
formance between 1995 and 2000 consisted of a (much) higher average em-
ployment and economic growth, and lower average unemployment, combined
with a considerable retrenchment of the welfare state. Especially this last aspect
of the ‘Dutch’ miracle has drawn little attention yet from a comparative point of
view, although it was indeed different and exceptional (but see Green -Pedersen
et al 2001; Green-Pedersen 2001; Castles 2002, 2004; and Keman 2003).
Next I discussed the effectiveness of incomes policy in terms of Central Agree-
ments, and performance. The issue was whether the ‘Dutch Disease’ did go to-
gether with less, and with less effective, neo-corporatist government strategies,
and, conversely, the ‘Dutch Miracle’ with more, and more effective, neo-cor-
poratist government strategies. Although that was indeed the case, which may have
contributed to the notion of a positive relation between a Dutch ‘Polder Model’
and the ‘Dutch Miracle’, I argued that it was not the actors’ behaviour that ex-
plained performance, but rather the (macroeconomic and policy) performance
and (the changes in the) institutional context combined, that explained the actors’
behaviour in terms of neo-corporatist government strategies and Central Agree-
ments.
Finally, I discussed the effectiveness of incomes policy in terms of approaching
the core and performance. The issue was whether the ‘Dutch Disease’ did go
together with less, and with less effective, neo-corporatist government strategies,
and, conversely, the ‘Dutch Miracle’ with more, and more effective government
strategies. Although the ‘Dutch Disease’ did indeed go together with less neo-
corporatist government strategies than the ‘Dutch Miracle’, and the core was
indeed less often approached during the ‘Dutch Disease’ than during the ‘Dutch
Miracle’- which may have contributed to the notion of a positive relation
between a Dutch ‘Polder Model’ and the ‘Dutch Miracle’- I argued that it was
not the actors’ behaviour that explained performance, but rather performance
and the (changes in) the institutional context combined, that explained the actors’
behaviour in terms of neo-corporatist and non-neo-corporatist government
strategies and approaching the core. That could explain why the core was more
often approached during the period of the pre-‘Polder Model’ than during the
period of the ‘Polder Model’ and the ‘Dutch Miracle’.
In other words, the behaviour of the actors involved in incomes policy did neither
produce the ‘Dutch Disease’, nor the ‘Dutch Miracle’. It was the (macroeconomic
and policy) performance and exogenous context (EMU) that defined the ‘room
to manoeuvre’ of government and social partners, and induced the actors to (the
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changes) in their behaviour and to changes in the institutional context (transition
from a government guided incomes policy to a ‘free’ incomes policy, linkage and
delinkage, and budgetary discipline). Neo-corporatism does matter, but
apparently as a contingency (Scharpf 1998; see also Woldendorp 1997b). It is
not the driving factor of recovery as identified by, for instance, Visser and
Hemerijck (1997).
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9. Summary and conclusions
In this final chapter I will present a reflection of the research presented here and
will draw conclusions. This includes a recapitulation of the answers to the two research
questions, a treat of concepts and theory based on the evidence they produced,
and a discussion of the added value and possible use of the results of my investigation.
To that effect, I will briefly recall the two research questions, the conceptualisa-
tion of neo-corporatism as a government strategy for conflict regulation, the research
design and the operationalisation of the research questions. Next I will report the
most important research findings. I will then briefly discuss the relation between
neo-corporatism and social democracy in government and the performance of Dutch
neo-corporatism from a comparative perspective. By way of conclusion, I will end
this chapter with a discussion of the implications of my research findings. I will dis-
cuss the implications for the ‘Polder Model’ and for the conceptualisation of neo-
corporatism and cross-national research on neo-corporatism, incomes policy and per-
formance, as well as the implications for the ‘Dutch Disease’and the ‘Dutch Miracle’.
9.1 Research questions
Over the years, the Netherlands figured prominently in the Dutch and the inter-
national comparative debate on neo-corporatism among political scientist and
institutional economists. The general evaluation of the Dutch case in the first
wave of neo-corporatist research between the mid 1970s and early 1990s was
one of declining neo-corporatism, or at least of declining effectiveness of neo-
corporatism in terms of performance. The Netherlands seemed to develop from
an exemplary and effective model of neo-corporatism based on a centrally guided,
government directed incomes policy in the 1950s, to an equally exemplary but
singularly ineffective model of declining or ineffective neo-corporatism based
on a free incomes policy in the (late) 1970s and the 1980s that became known as
the ‘Dutch Disease’. 
In neo-corporatist research of the late 1990s this evaluation has been modified.
Almost overnight, the Netherlands again became an exemplary positive model of
effective neo-corporatism: the ‘Polder Model’ that produced the ‘Dutch Miracle’.
Miraculously, neo-corporatism was, or suddenly became, effective again.
Recent events have shown, however, that the ‘Dutch Miracle’ appeared not
sustainable, despite the ‘Polder Model’. Economic growth halted (2002) and then
became negative (2003). Unemployment and the budget deficit again increased
considerably, like during the previous period of the ‘Dutch Disease’ in the late
1970s and early 1980s. In the wake of this economic downturn, the ‘Polder
Model’ itself came under criticism as well, because it apparently was unable to
prevent the ‘miracle’ it had seemingly produced from turning into a ‘disease’
once again. Hence, the phenomenon labelled ‘Polder Model’ appears to be more
a cyclical event rather than a form of structure induced, patterned behaviour of a
continuous (and successful) nature.
This changing evaluation of the Dutch case over time is a reflection of the
difficulty that most concepts of neo-corporatism have with grasping changes and
developments in Dutch neo-corporatism adequately. Quite often the application
of these concepts to the Dutch case merely results in a description of historical
developments in the Netherlands, instead of explaining these developments.
To be able to interpret these developments better, I have analysed the Dutch case
from an alternative, actor-oriented point of view. The concept of neo-corporatism
as a government strategy for conflict regulation that I have used in my research
was developed in order to explain Dutch incomes policy as the outcome of a
process of negotiations between trade unions and employers’ organisations, and
between these social partners and the government. The first objective of my
research was to establish whether this approach of neo-corporatism as a
government strategy was indeed able to offer a plausible explanation of Dutch
incomes policy between 1965 and 2000. Hence the first research question:
1. Can neo-corporatism, defined as a government strategy for conflict regulation,
offer a plausible explanation for the formation and implementation of Dutch
incomes policy between 1965 and 2000?
The next objective of the research was to determine whether Dutch incomes
policy between 1965 and 2000, as the common outcome of negotiations between
trade unions, employers’ organisations and the government, was effective. The
issue is whether incomes policy delivers what the actors involved set out to
achieve.72 This was expressed in the second research question:
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72. A match between agendas (preferences) and incomes policy (an agreement or movement towards
the core - see chapter 6) does not necessarily imply a match between preferences and actual outcome
(policy and macroeconomic performance - see chapter 8) as well.
2. Was Dutch incomes policy between 1965 and 2000 effective in terms of the
agendas of actors involved?
These questions were developed to clarify the Dutch case and, in the process,
they have led to better concepts that yield more precise evidence.
9.2 Neo-corporatism as a government strategy for conflict regulation
The concept of neo-corporatism as a government strategy for conflict regulation
was elaborated by a discussion of both international and Dutch literature on the
Netherlands as a case of neo-corporatism. My angle for research was neo-cor-
poratism as a government strategy for conflict regulation.
Essential to my conceptualisation of neo-corporatism is the relative autonomy
and the mutual instrumentalisation of the actors involved. The rules of the game
ensure both the relative autonomy of the actors, and the possibility (not the
necessity, or the inevitability) for mutual instrumentalisation, that is, the possibility
to come to joint or interdependent action. Employers’ organisations and unions
have the option to co-operate or not with each other and with the government.
The government can also opt to follow a neo-corporatist strategy of policy for-
mation and implementation; or rather choose to impose policies on employers’
organisations or unions. The interactions between the relevant actors are by and
large the result of the extant ‘rules of the game’ and the perceived need to co-
operate in order to achieve optimal outcomes for all (mutual instrumentalisation).
This conceptualisation of neo-corporatism tries to correct for the formal insti-
tutional bias of most other approaches of neo-corporatism in which the inter-
action between institutions and actors is regarded as a causal relation, rather than as
a mechanism, that not only entails restraints but also offers opportunities to actors.
Therefore, I have argued, it is vital to incorporate into the concept the degree of
mutual dependence of the three actors involved on each other’s willingness to co-
operate. To a large extent they need each other’s co-operation to accomplish their
own goals. Each actor therefore tends to make its own co-operation contingent
on the policy options available and on the concessions of the other actors involved.
In chapter 2 I have argued that this interdependence of actors can be best under-
stood by combining elements of a Rational Choice-approach with some of the
insights gained from the so-called New Institutionalism-approach: Rational In-
stitutionalism. According to the Rational Choice-approach, each actor will act
according to its perceived self-interest, that is, each actor will make a cost -
benefit calculation of the goals pursued, in relation to the goals pursued by other
actors. This calculation takes into account that, in order to avoid sub-optimal out-
comes, policy agreements need to be both encompassing and to avoid zero-sum
outcomes. A neo-corporatist government strategy can facilitate such a solution
by providing public goods, for example the redistribution of economic welfare
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by means of social security benefits, that are binding for all involved, in exchange
for co-operation to achieve macroeconomic stability by means of wage restraint,
that will be beneficial for all.
The New Institutionalism-approach on the other hand, points to the constraints
on the actions of the different actors within the institutions. The feasibility of
their actions motivated by self-interest is limited or defined by their room to ma-
noeuvre. The room to manoeuvre is heavily dependent on the styles of decision-
making within the institutions. Therefore, institutions can be seen as interme-
diating variables in which a trade-off or even a pay-off of intentions and feasible
options can take place, in such a way that zero-sum games are the exception
rather than the rule. In turn, through the recurrent process of consultation and
negotiation, this stimulates the occurrence of a ‘logic of accommodation’, in-
stead of a ‘logic of conflict’. In this sense, societal conflict, as part of the process
of consultation and negotiation, is the basis for consensus building by co-
operation and compromise (Scharpf 1987, 1998; Keman 1992, 1999). With three
actors there are multiple games that aim at moving from conflict to consensus by
means of ‘politics’.
Government plays a vital part in this process. In the neo-corporatist arena all
actors usually have comparable lists of needs and interests (agendas). But almost
by definition these needs and interests differ in importance attached to them by
the actors involved. Usually trade unions and employers’ organisations have
quite conflicting ranking orders (or preferences). This implies that government
has to mediate and to encourage the occurrence of viable agreements (compro-
mises), or to impose such agreements. At the same time, the government itself is
also an actor with a comparable list of interests in a certain ranking order (or
preferences). To reach agreement between all three actors, it will be necessary to
try and reorder each actor’s list of interests on the basis of potentially shared
interests. In the process of consultation and negotiation, with all corresponding
conflicts, it becomes clear whether or not this reordering may occur and an
agreement can be reached (or imposed), sanctioned by parliament. Whether this
(structure induced) agreement also approaches the core (that is, the optimal
shared point of preferences) is another matter (see chapter 6).
The elaboration of the theoretical notions that are associated with the concept of
neo-corporatism as a government strategy for conflict regulation in chapter 2
serves the purpose to evaluate neo-corporatist theory, to elucidate the Dutch case
and to answer the research questions.
9.3 The Dutch crucial case study
In chapter 3 I have argued why the Netherlands is a ‘crucial’ case and, con-
sequently, why a ‘crucial’ single case study is a valid research design to provide
the answers to my two research questions. The research consists of a comparative
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single case study of the formation, implementation and effectiveness of Dutch in-
comes policy between 1965 and 2000 and is an inter-temporal study that focuses
on change over time between 1965 and 2000. In effect, it consists of a time series
of 36 consecutive cases of formation and implementation of incomes policy and
effectiveness per year. This sequence of 36 cases within the single case study
both enhances the internal and - to some extent - the external validity of the
research as well as shows possible variations over time. Internal validity is
enhanced by 36 separate investigations of the formation and implementation of
incomes policy, whereas the use of the same indicators for 36 comparable cases
within a fixed context can be considered as enhancing external validity (Pen-
nings et al 1999).
9.3.1 The period, the institutional setting, and the actors
The period under investigation is 1965 - 2000. The choice for this period was
based on a discussion of Dutch incomes policy after 1945. The concept of neo-
corporatism as a government strategy for conflict regulation entails both relative
autonomy and mutual instrumentalisation of the actors involved. Therefore, the
period of the centrally guided, statutory incomes policy dictated by the govern-
ment was excluded from the research. That period covered the years between
1945 and, roughly 1963. Between 1963 and 1968/70, incomes policy in the
Netherlands was in transition from a completely government guided policy to a
formally free incomes policy. 
Next the institutional setting for the annual negotiations on the formation and
implementation of incomes policy has been determined. This includes the annual
central negotiations between trade unions and employers’ organisations, and
between social partners and the government in the STAR, the SER, and during
the Spring and Autumn consultations. Furthermore, the two laws dating from
1927 and 1937 respectively, governing collective contracts between trade unions
and employers’ organisations have been identified. The combined effect of these
two laws is that the great majority of the workforce in the market sector is covered
by collective contracts between trade unions and employers’ organisations. 
The legal framework regarding central negotiations is regulated by the Law on
Wage Formation of 1970 that was amended in 1986. From 1987, only a national
emergency, caused by ‘external’ factors’ could serve as a legitimate cause for
government intervention in the formation and implementation of incomes policy
with general binding measures. 
The actors involved in the cycle of annual central negotiations on wages and
other terms of employment are party government and ‘peak’ organisations of trade
unions and employers’ organisations. The government is the coalition govern-
ment of the day. In the annual negotiations with trade unions and employers’ or-
ganisations ministers represent the government. At the very least, the Minister of
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Social Affairs is involved. Depending on the issues at stake, the general economic
situation and the atmosphere between the actors involved, the government can be
represented by a delegation of ministers. In such a delegation, apart from the
Minister of Social Affairs, also the Ministers of Economic Affairs and Finance
(forming together with Social Affairs the so-called ‘socio-economic triangle’),
the Minister of Internal Affairs (responsible for incomes policy in the public
sector), and the Prime Minister can be included. 
The peak trade union organisations are the FNV, the CNV and the MHP. Of these
trade union federations, the FNV is the leading actor. The VNO-NCW is the
main focus of research with regard to the peak organisations of employers. 
9.3.2 Government strategies and styles of decision-making
I have devised an instrument of analysis to investigate the Dutch case that is based
on an operationalisation of government strategies and styles of decision-making
of trade unions and employers’ organisations. With this instrument of analysis,
using ‘thick’ (detailed) description of agendas, annual negotiations (process) and
outcomes, all possible stages in the process of negotiations and all possible
outcomes can be accounted for, be these neo-corporatist or not (see Appendix).
With this instrument neo-corporatist government strategies that fail in terms of
Central Agreements or approaching the ‘core’ can be detected as well. The same
goes for co-operative styles of decision-making of trade unions and employers’
organisations that go together with non-neo-corporatist government strategies.
Lastly, with this instrument, it is also possible to avoid ‘Dutch-centrist’ expla-
nations of Dutch incomes policy and to compare the formation and implemen-
tation of Dutch incomes policy to that of other countries. That makes this tool
also an eminently suitable instrument of analysis for other case studies and for
investigating comparable processes of negotiations on incomes policy across time
and across countries as well. It is, therefore, a useful tool for political analyses
of policy.
Government strategy in this study is operationalised in four strategies. In addition,
based on Kuypers and Scharpf, I operationalised three styles of decision-making
that could be employed by trade unions and employers’ organisations. This
enables me to account for all possible combinations of government strategy and
style of decision-making, as well as for any changes in strategy and style of
decision-making during the annual bargaining process on incomes policy.
I have also argued that neo-corporatist outcomes in terms of government strategy
are not necessarily successful in terms of agreements on incomes policy. In
terms of agreements on incomes policy, only four outcomes are feasible. First, a
bipartite Central Agreement between trade unions and employers’ organisations.
Second, a tripartite Central Agreement between all three actors. Third, no Central
Agreement. Lastly, a government directed or imposed incomes policy. 
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This means, that as a typology the combination of four government strategies
and three styles of decision-making is by definition exhaustive; all possible
combinations of government strategies and styles of decision-making across
time (and systems) can be accounted for. However, in terms of patterned
behaviour the various categories are empirically not mutually exclusive. The four
outcomes in terms of agreements on incomes policy may be reached through a
variety of stages and outcomes of the bargaining process, thereby showing both
the process and variation over time. The process and the variation can both be
captured by this instrument of analysis (see chapter 3 and Appendix). 
Using two dimensions - government strategy and style of decision-making - to
place one result - incomes policy in a given year - allows for ‘comparing’ the
behaviour of actors vis-à-vis process (negotiations) and structure (neo-cor-
poratist institutions). Using 12 options to arrive at one result in a given year also
allows for reconstructing and understanding strategic interdependent behaviour
of social partners and government. In other words, using this instrument of
analysis allows for a diachronic analysis of Dutch neo-corporatism as a ‘rational
game’ with a (dynamic) equilibrium, without having to resort to idiosyncratic
explanations.
Based on my discussion and operationalisation of styles of decision-making, I
have argued that a ‘Polder Model’ that emphasises co-operation between social
partners must be located in the problem solving style of decision-making: C - Battle
of the Sexes (see Scharpf 1998: 53-57). In addition, government strategy must
be neo-corporatist as it is supposed to support or facilitate this co-operation. 
9.4 Research findings
The research findings pertaining to the two research questions are reported in
chapters 4, 5 and 6. Chapters 4 and 5 provide the answer to research question 1,
and chapter 6 provides the answer to research question 2. 
9.4.1 Research question 1
In chapter 4, the main research findings of the Dutch case study are discussed.
Opening and concluding government strategies and styles of decision-making of
trade unions and employers’ organisations are discussed and compared, as is the
sequence of government strategies and styles of decision-making during the
annual process of negotiations on the formation and implementation of incomes
policy. This discussion of the research findings regards both the whole period
1965 - 2000, and a comparison of the periods 1965 - 1982 and 1983 - 2000. The
latter comparison is made to establish whether the emergence of a ‘Polder Model’
after 1982 can be detected.
I have observed that governments in the Netherlands between 1965 and 2000
were indeed almost always actively involved in the start of the annual process of
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negotiations on the formation and implementation of incomes policy. I have also
observed that in a majority of cases the government was actively involved in the
outcome of the process of negotiations on incomes policy as well. 
The opening strategy of governments was neo-corporatist in a majority of the
years. However, concluding government strategies are less often neo-corporatist,
albeit they still covered a majority of the years between 1965 and 2000. 
Concluding non-neo-corporatist government strategies were especially promi-
nent before 1983. Concluding neo-corporatist government strategies were especially
prominent after 1982. However, the ‘Wassenaar Agreement’ of December 1982
in itself can not be considered as a ‘watershed’ with respect to government
strategy: government strategy was non-neo-corporatist from 1980 - 1986. From
1980 - 1982 it was the guiding strategy (IV), and from 1983 - 1986 it was the
passive strategy (I). Most concluding neo-corporatist government strategies after
1982 occurred between 1987 and 2000. Hence, Dutch incomes policy was
basically neo-corporatist; however, as a process neo-corporatism was dynamic
and patterned over time. 
With regard to styles of decision-making of trade unions and employers’ organi-
sations, I have observed that the opening style of decision-making was either
confrontational (A: Chicken), or bargaining (B: Prisoners’ Dilemma) in most
years. Problem solving (C: Battle of the Sexes) as an opening style of decision-
making was quite rare. Nevertheless, social partners were less confrontational in
their concluding style of decision-making, both before 1983 and more in parti-
cular after 1982.
However, less confrontation did not lead to a significant increase in the con-
cluding problem-solving style. The main concluding style of decision-making
remained the bargaining style (B: Prisoners’ Dilemma), also after 1982. From
the point of view of styles of decision-making as well, the ‘Wassenaar Agree-
ment’ of December 1982 can not be considered as a watershed. In this respect, I
disagree with researchers of Dutch neo-corporatism like Visser and Hemerijck
(1997), Hazeu (1998) and Hemerijck and Visser (2000).
That social partners were able to come to agreements, especially after 1987, was
not primarily due to an increase in the ‘Battle of the Sexes’ problem solving style
of decision-making (C), although that is, according to Scharpf (1998), the ‘best’
game to reach agreement (and approach the core). Apparently, in the Netherlands
that game was less suited to arrive at agreement (and to approach the core) than
more or less ‘tough’ negotiations based on the bargaining style (B: Prisoners’
Dilemma), or on an alternation between the confrontational style (A: Chicken)
and the bargaining style (B: Prisoners’ Dilemma).
In other words, Dutch neo-corporatism with regard to incomes policy was
typically a combination of the concluding neo-corporatist co-operative govern-
ment strategy (II) and the bargaining style of decision-making (B: Prisoners’
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Dilemma), instead of a ‘Polder Model’ combination of a concluding neo-cor-
poratist government strategy (co-operative or congruent) and the concluding
problem solving style of decision-making (C: Battle of the Sexes). Historical
chronology (like before or after ‘Wassenaar’ 1982) and exogenous shocks (like
the oil crises of 1973 and 1979/80) were apparently less relevant for the specific
character of Dutch neo-corporatism. In stead, Dutch neo-corporatism appeared
more as an embedded, path dependent practice (see below).
The answer to research question 1 is, therefore, affirmative. Yes, neo-corporatism,
defined as a government strategy for conflict regulation, can offer a plausible
explanation for the formation and implementation of Dutch incomes policy in a
majority of the 36 years between 1965 and 2000. However, neo-corporatism
varied considerably over time.
Neo-corporatism also mattered as it produced less confrontation between social
partners. Yet, at the same time social partners hardly ever used the problem
solving style of decision-making (C: Battle of the Sexes). The slight increase in
that style of decision-making after 1982 did not constitute - as it is often argued
- a change to a new Dutch ‘Polder Model’ in the period 1983 - 2000.
Patterned variation
In chapter 5, the affirmative answer to research question 1 that is given in chapter
4, is elaborated and substantiated by a substantive discussion of opening and
concluding government strategies and styles of decision-making of trade unions
and employers’ organisations. This discussion is conducted for four sub-periods:
1965 - 1973; 1974 - 1982; 1983 - 1992; and 1993 - 2000. The four sub-periods
identified, have been based on a combination of political developments in the
Netherlands and external economic shocks and watersheds.
Based on this substantive discussion the following observations can be made.
First, the decrease from opening to concluding neo-corporatist government stra-
tegies occurred mainly in the period 1965 - 1982. This was due to an increase in
confrontation (A: Chicken) between social partners in the period 1965 - 1973
based on their differing agendas that made it difficult for them to come to
Central Agreements. And although confrontation (A: Chicken) decreased in the
period 1974 - 1982, the concomitant increase in bargaining (B: Prisoners’
Dilemma) was equally based on the actors’ differing agendas and, consequently,
did not result in more Central Agreements either, but rather in more deadlocks
during negotiations. 
The few concluding neo-corporatist government strategies in these two periods
were only marginally successful at resolving the deadlocks (B: Prisoners’
Dilemma) or reducing the confrontation (A: Chicken) between social partners
and producing a Central Agreement (1965, 1970, 1977). 
When confrontation and deadlocks could not be resolved by neo-corporatist
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government strategies, the government was effectively left with two options:
either to prevent the Chicken game (A) from completion and to resolve the
Prisoners’ Dilemma (B) by imposing incomes policy on social partners (non-
neo-corporatist guiding strategy), or to refrain from intervention (non-neo-cor-
poratist passive strategy) and let social partners come to a conclusion amongst
themselves. One of my main findings, therefore, is that government appears to
have been a central player to produce results or to avert disaster. In this respect,
I concur with researchers like Teulings and Hartog (1998), Hartog (1999),
Keman (1999), Hoogenboom and Van Vliet (2000), Slomp (2002) and Van Waarden
(2002) who all stress the role of the government as a third and quite often
dominant party involved in Dutch incomes policy.
Second, the 17 concluding non-neo-corporatist government strategies conse-
quently also occurred mainly in the same two periods 1965 - 1973 and 1974 -
1982. The nine concluding non-neo-corporatist guiding government strategies
(IV) all occurred exclusively in these periods, as did three of the eight con-
cluding non-neo-corporatist passive government strategies (I). The remaining
five concluding passive government strategies (I) all occurred in the third period
1983 - 1992, in the years directly following the ‘Wassenaar’ Agreement (1983 -
1987). Again, the ‘Wassenaar’ Agreement can not be considered as a watershed
with respect to government strategy. These passive government strategies in the
period 1983 - 1992 reflect the effects of the delinkage of the market sector from
the (semi-) public sector that was effected from 1983 - 1989. This delinkage was
based on the Central ‘Wassenaar’ Agreement that was forced on social partners
by the government to resolve the alternation between confrontation (A: Chicken)
and bargaining (B: Prisoners’ Dilemma). As incomes policy in the market sector
did no longer affect incomes policy in the (semi-) public sector, government
could subsequently afford to leave incomes policy in the market sector to social
partners. This situation was formalised with the new Wage Law of 1986 that
states that binding government intervention in incomes policy as of 1987 is only
admissible in case of externally induced economic emergencies.
In the latter part of this period, in a number of years the government actively
intervened in the annual negotiations on incomes policy in the market sector by
neo-corporatist government strategies in order to resolve the Prisoners’ Dilemma
(B: bargaining) between social partners on employment issues and that induced
social partners to come to a Central Agreement on these issues in 1987, 1990,
and 1991.
Finally, in the period 1993 - 2000, the ad hoc relinkage of incomes in the market
sector and in the (semi-) public sector and the budgetary discipline forced by the
EMU (1992-1999) in a context of an economic recovery after 1995 meant that
non-neo-corporatist government strategies were not an option. Consequently,
government strategy was neo-corporatist and that facilitated even more agree-
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ments between social partners (and between social partners and the government)
than in the previous period (6: 1993, 1994, 1996 - 1997).
However, Central Agreements after 1982 were both usually based on the con-
cluding bargaining style of decision-making (B: Prisoners’ Dilemma), instead of
on the concluding problem solving style (C: ‘Battle of the Sexes’), and not
always the result of neo-corporatist government strategies as well. Therefore,
there is no empirical evidence to support the emergence of a Dutch ‘Polder
Model’ of neo-corporatism, neither after 1982, nor in the 1990s.
This substantive discussion of the behaviour of social partners in terms of game
theory and in combination with government strategies shows that the instrument
of analysis that I have developed yields important information for the expla-
nation of the complete process of annual negotiations on incomes policy in the
Netherlands between 1965 and 2000.
The final, elaborated answer to research question 1 therefore confirms the affir-
mative answer given in chapter 4: yes, neo-corporatism, defined as a government
strategy for conflict regulation, can offer a plausible explanation for the for-
mation and implementation of Dutch incomes policy between 1965 and 2000. It
also shows that the emergence of a new Dutch ‘Polder Model’, either after 1982
or in the 1990s, is not supported by the research findings.
9.4.2 Research question 2
In chapter 6 I have provided the answer to research question 2. The effectiveness
of incomes policy is analysed in terms of Central Agreements and movements
towards the core (that is, the optimal shared point of references).73
Over the whole period 1965 - 2000 Dutch incomes policy in terms of Central
Agreements was only effective in a minority of years. But in all periods neo-
corporatist incomes policies were indeed consistently more effective in terms of
Central Agreements than non-neo-corporatist incomes policies. This is an
important finding in view of my theory of neo-corporatism and of my empirical
investigation of Dutch neo-corporatism. Neo-corporatism did matter, but it was
not always successful.
In addition, I have discussed the eight years in which a neo-corporatist incomes
policy was not effective, and the three years in which a non-neo-corporatist in-
comes policy turned out to be effective. 
The ineffectiveness of neo-corporatist incomes policies was caused by the
actors’ behaviour. In 1973, the rank and file of social partners on the decentral
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73. I have observed that although Central Agreements often also involve a movement towards the core,
reaching a Central Agreement is not (always) necessary to approach the core. A Central Agreement
can result in no movement towards the core, whereas the core can be approached without Central
Agreement.
levels could not deliver the agreement struck at the central level. In 1975, 1978,
1979, 1988, 1989, and 1995, one or both of the social partners at the central level
in the end refused to come to a Central Agreement, despite compensating govern-
ment policies. Governments did not revert to non-neo-corporatist strategies,
either passive (I) or guiding (IV), in order to keep on speaking terms with social
partners. Finally, in 2000, in the context of a booming economy, all three actors
were quite happy to proceed with incomes policy without a Central Agreement.
This analysis shows that the ‘rules of the game’ do allow for ‘índividual’ actions
of the actors involved. This analysis also shows that there is no direct (or: causal)
relation between neo-corporatist government strategies (research question 1) and
the outcome of negotiations on incomes policy in terms of a Central Agreement
(research question 2): neo-corporatism does matter, but it is not always present,
nor always effective.
The effectiveness of non-neo-corporatist incomes policies seems related to the
government insisting on its leading role in incomes policy under the institutional
condition of a linkage between the market sector and the (semi-) public sector.
In 1970, a conflict between trade unions and the government about the new Law
on Wage Formation spilled over to the substance of incomes policy in that year.
In 1983 and 1984, in the context of a severe economic downturn, accompanied
by rapidly rising unemployment and budget deficits, the government effectively
forced social partners to come to an agreement in the market sector (‘Wassenaar’).
The government subsequently concentrated its efforts on reducing the budget
deficit by delinking the market sector and the (semi-) public sector and did not
further intervene in incomes policy in the market sector.
Both concluding neo-corporatist government strategies and Central Agreements
apparently were conducive to approaching the core. Reaching a Central Agree-
ment considerably increased the likelihood that a core was approached. A Cen-
tral Agreement was, however, usually reached by ‘tough’ negotiations between
social partners - either confrontation (A: Chicken) or bargaining (B: Prisoners’
Dilemma) or an alternation between both - rather than by the problem solving
style of decision-making (C: Battle of the Sexes). Conversely, the effectiveness
of non-neo-corporatist government strategies was slightly increased if no Central
Agreement could be reached. 
This analysis again shows that neo-corporatism does matter, but that there is no
direct (or: causal) relation between neo-corporatist government strategies (research
question 1) and the outcome of negotiations on incomes policy in terms of effective-
ness (research question 2): neo-corporatism is not always successful.
In addition, actual outcome in terms of preferences between 1965 and 2000 was
also influenced the macroeconomic context. Changes in the macroeconomic
context had a bearing on the potential of actors to realise their preferences in
actual outcome (see Table 6.7 in chapter 6).
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With respect to Central Agreements, the final answer to research question 2 must
be that Dutch incomes policy between 1965 and 2000 was more often not
effective than effective in terms of the agendas of the actors involved, especially
between 1965 and 1982. Neo-corporatist incomes policies were indeed more
often effective than non-neo-corporatist incomes policies in this respect,
especially after 1992. 
I contend, however, that this does not support the emergence of a ‘Polder Model’,
neither starting in 1983, nor in the 1990s. In effect, the ‘Model’ of negotiations
on incomes policy between 1965 and 2000 did not change dramatically over the
years. The ‘Model’ typically consisted of a concluding neo-corporatist govern-
ment strategy (II: co-operative) and the concluding bargaining style of decision-
making (B: Prisoners’ Dilemma). 
What did change was the effectiveness of the concluding incomes policy in
terms of Central Agreements. Increased effectiveness of negotiations on incomes
policy in terms of Central Agreements after 1982, however, can be explained in
terms of the actors’ behaviour during the annual negotiations on incomes policy
in a context of institutional change (delinkage and relinkage) due to macro-
economic and other externalities (EMU). Hence, the ‘game’ remained the same,
but it became easier to reach compromises on the preferences of each actor due
to institutional changes effected by the government in response to externalities.
With respect to movements towards the core, the final answer to research
question 2 must be that Dutch incomes policy between 1965 and 2000 was also
more often not effective than effective. Although a neo-corporatist government
strategy, combined with a Central Agreement that was reached through more or
less ‘tough’ negotiations between social partners, increased actual outcome in
terms of approaching the core, that was also the case for non-neo-corporatist
government strategies when no Central Agreement could be reached through
‘tough’ negotiations between social partners, albeit to a (much) lesser extent.
In addition, the macroeconomic context appeared to influence the actors’ potential
to approach a match between their preferences and actual outcome (see also
chapter 8). That was reflected in how often and how close a core situation could
be approached, given the combination of actors’ behaviour in terms of government
strategies, Central Agreements and ‘tough’ negotiations between social partners.
Neo-corporatism does matter, but it is not always effective. In other words, there
is no direct (or: causal) relation between neo-corporatist government strategies
(research question 1) and the outcome of negotiations on incomes policy in
terms of effectiveness (research question 2). 
9.5 Neo-corporatism and social democracy in the Netherlands
In chapter 7 I have explored the relation between concluding neo-corporatist
government strategies and the composition of coalition governments in the
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Netherlands. First, I have observed that participation of social democracy in
coalition governments does indeed make a (positive) difference with regard to
the occurrence of concluding neo-corporatist government strategies, especially
after 1993 when the PvdA was the dominant party that held the office of Minister
of Social Affairs and was primarily responsible for incomes policy. 
Next I have observed that participation of social democracy in coalition govern-
ments also makes a (positive) difference with regard to the effectiveness of
concluding neo-corporatist government strategies in terms of Central Agree-
ments and movements towards the core. Participation of the PvdA in government
after 1993 did not, however, produce a new, or a more effective ‘Polder Model’
in terms of more Central Agreements or more often approaching the core. 
Exclusion of the PvdA from coalition government did make a (positive) difference
with respect to the effectiveness of non-neo-corporatist government strategies in
terms of Central Agreements, but not in terms of approaching the core.
Closer analysis of these findings show that coalition governments of PvdA and
CDA before 1994 were either effective in terms of concluding neo-corporatist
government strategies and Central Agreements, or in approaching the core.
Coalition governments of PvdA and VVD after 1993 were more successful in
terms of concluding neo-corporatist government strategies, but not in terms of
either Central Agreements or approaching the core. 
Social democratic participation in coalition government in the Netherlands between
1965 and 2000, therefore, appears to have been beneficial for reaching equilibrium
between social partners: either by way of concluding neo-corporatist government
strategies and Central Agreements, or by way of approaching the core.
This observation supports researchers that have comparatively found a close
relationship between social democratic government and neo-corporatism (see for
instance Marks 1986; Zimmermann 1986; Curtis 1987; Wilson 1990; Kurzer
1991; and Western 1991).
However, this observation also shows that in the Dutch case this has not implied
a straightforward relationship between the participation of social democracy in
coalition government and both the occurrence and the effectiveness of neo-
corporatist incomes policies. Participation of the PvdA in coalition government
resulted in either concluding neo-corporatist government strategies and Central
Agreements, or in movements towards the core. Therefore, the comparative
(almost causal) relationship between social democratic government that leads to
neo-corporatism, which in turn is effective in terms of the agendas of the actors
involved (both agreements and movements towards the core), can not be sub-
stantiated for the Dutch case. Social democratic participation in coalition govern-
ment in the Netherlands mattered in terms of neo-corporatism, but that neo-
corporatism was not always present, nor always effective.
263
9.6 Performance of Dutch neo-corporatism: the ‘Dutch Disease’ and the ‘Dutch
Miracle’
In chapter 8 I have discussed the ‘Dutch Disease’ and the ‘Dutch Miracle’ from
a comparative perspective. The issue is whether the Dutch case was indeed different
and exceptional when compared to a number of international benchmarks. 
From a comparative perspective, neither a specifically ‘Dutch’ disease, nor a
specifically ‘Dutch’ miracle in terms of overall performance could be identified.
Comparatively, Dutch performance can not be considered as exceptional: neither
in terms of negative nor of positive performance. Therefore, judgements of the
Dutch case as ‘disease’ or ‘miracle’ are not justified. 
Insofar there was a specifically ‘Dutch’ disease of lower performance between
1978 and 1985, that appears to have consisted of lower average economic growth,
negative average employment growth, and, to a lesser degree, higher average un-
employment, compared to 19 OECD countries, 13 EU countries and seven other
small neo-corporatist West European countries. 
The specifically ‘Dutch’ miracle of higher performance between 1995 and 2000
appears to have consisted of a (much) higher average employment74 and economic
growth, and lower average unemployment75, combined with a considerable
retrenchment of the welfare state in terms of benefits, compared to the three
benchmarks I have used. Especially this last aspect of the ‘Dutch’ miracle has
drawn little attention yet from a comparative point of view, although it is indeed
different and rather exceptional (but see Green-Pedersen et al 2001; Green-
Pedersen 2001; Castles 2002, 2004; and Keman 2003).
Next I have discussed the effectiveness of incomes policy in terms of Central
Agreements, and performance. The issue is whether the ‘Dutch Disease’ did go
together with less, and with less effective, neo-corporatist government strategies,
and, conversely, the ‘Dutch Miracle’ with more, and more effective, neo-corpo-
ratist government strategies. Although that was indeed the case, which may have
contributed to the notion of a positive relation between social democratic partici-
pation in coalition government, a Dutch ‘Polder Model’ and the ‘Dutch Miracle’,
I have argued that it was not the actors’ behaviour that explained performance,
but rather the (macroeconomic and policy) performance and (the changes in the)
institutional context combined, that explained the actors’ behaviour in terms of
neo-corporatist government strategies and Central Agreements.
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74. A large part of employment consisted of part time jobs occupied mainly by women and young people
(see for instance WRR 2000; Hemerijck et al 2000; Becker 2001; Hemerijck 2003; and Keman 2003).
75. ‘Broad’ unemployment (the proportion of the labour force claiming unemployment benefits,
disability benefits and welfare benefits) was 19.1% in 1999, as compared to 18.6% in 1979 and
21.9% in 1992 (SCP 2000: 284) whereas total employment was 61.8% in 1998 and 61.6% in 1970
(Scharpf 2001: 66).
Finally, I have discussed the effectiveness of incomes policy in terms of ap-
proaching the core and performance. The issue is whether the ‘Dutch Disease’
did go together with less, and with less effective, neo-corporatist government
strategies, and, conversely, the ‘Dutch Miracle’ with more, and more effective
government strategies. Although the ‘Dutch Disease’ did indeed go together with
less neo-corporatist government strategies than the ‘Dutch Miracle’, and the core
was indeed less often approached during the ‘Dutch Disease’ than during the
‘Dutch Miracle’ (which may have contributed to the notion of a positive relation
between social democratic participation in coalition government, a Dutch ‘Polder
Model’ and the ‘Dutch Miracle’) I have argued that it was not the actors’ be-
haviour that explained performance, but rather performance and the (changes in)
the institutional context combined, that explained the actors’ behaviour in terms
of neo-corporatist and non-neo-corporatist government strategies and approach-
ing the core. That can explain why the core was more often approached during
the period of the pre-‘Polder Model’ before 1983 than during the period of the
alleged ‘Polder Model’ after 1983 and during the ‘Dutch Miracle’ between 1995
and 2000.
In other words, it was not the behaviour of the actors involved in incomes policy
that produced the ‘Dutch Disease’, nor was the ‘Dutch Miracle’ the result of the
alleged ‘Polder Model’. It was the (macroeconomic and policy) performance and
exogenous context (EMU) that defined the ‘room to manoeuvre’ of government
and social partners. This induced the actors (especially the government) to ad-
justing the institutional context (transition from a government guided incomes
policy to a ‘free’ incomes policy, linkage and delinkage of market sector and
(semi-) public sector, and a strict budgetary discipline). That institutional change
subsequently induced the actors to changes in their behaviour. Neo-corporatism
did matter in this process (as did social democratic participation in government),
but apparently as a contingency. It was not the driving factor of recovery.
9.7 Implications of the research findings
The research findings for both the Dutch case study and the international
comparison elaborated above have implications for the ‘Polder Model’ and for
the conceptualisation of neo-corporatism and cross-national research, as well as
for the ‘Dutch Disease’ and the ‘Dutch Miracle’.
9.7.1 There is no ‘Polder Model’
In chapter 3 I have argued that a ‘Polder Model’ that emphasises co-operation
between social partners must be located in the problem solving style of decision-
making (C: Battle of the Sexes). In addition, government strategy must be neo-
corporatist as it is supposed to support or facilitate this co-operation to make the
‘Polder Model’ work. 
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In chapters 4, 5 and 6, I have concluded that there is hardly any evidence to
support the emergence and existence of such a ‘Polder Model’ in the Netherlands
as a structural feature. Neither after 1982, nor in the 1990s. Although concluding
neo-corporatist government strategies did increase considerably after 1982, the
main concluding style of decision-making of both trade unions and employers’
organisations remained the competitive bargaining style (B). Dutch neo-cor-
poratism was typically a combination of the co-operative neo-corporatist govern-
ment strategy (II) and the bargaining style of decision-making (B: Prisoners’
Dilemma). In my view, this does not represent a typical ‘Polder Model’. In ad-
dition, the observed increase in the number of concluding neo-corporatist govern-
ment strategies after 1982 actually occurred after 1986. From the perspective of
concluding government strategies, a ‘Polder Model’ could only have emerged
since 1987. 
From the perspective of social partners, there was no straightforward relation be-
tween concluding government strategies and concluding styles of decision-making.
The main concluding style of decision-making was the competitive bargaining
style (B: Prisoners’ Dilemma)), regardless of government strategy. And the pro-
blem solving style of decision-making (C: Battle of the Sexes) also occurred in
combination with both neo-corporatist and non-neo-corporatist concluding govern-
ment strategies. In other words, even if the government might have promoted a
‘Polder Model’ from 1987, social partners were apparently not very keen to
participate in that model with a corresponding co-operative style of decision-
making (C: Battle of the Sexes).
That means that actors’ own preferences remained the central focus during ne-
gotiations on incomes policy (see chapter 6). This was shown by social partners’
preference for the bargaining style of decision-making (B: Prisoners’ Dilemma)
over problem solving (C: Battle of the Sexes) and by the government’s preference
for the co-operative neo-corporatist government strategy (II) that aimed at facilitating
agreement between social partners.
The emergence of a ‘Polder Model’ was also analysed from the perspective of
Central Agreements. The ‘Polder Model’ is assumed to foster agreements be-
tween social partners and between social partners and the government. After
1982 the number of Central Agreements was indeed considerably higher than
before 1983. This finding seems to imply that although a ‘Polder Model’ could
not be identified from the perspective of concluding government strategies and
styles of decision-making, concluding neo-corporatist government strategies
were nevertheless quite successful in bringing competitive social partners to an
agreement. However, these Central Agreements were not all based on concluding
neo-corporatist government strategies and neither did all concluding neo-cor-
poratist government strategies result in Central Agreements. After 1982, of the
13 concluding neo-corporatist government strategies, nine were combined with
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a Central Agreement. Conversely, of the five concluding non-neo-corporatist
government strategies after 1982, two were combined with a Central Agreement. 
The emergence of a ‘Polder Model’ was also analysed from the perspective of
movements towards the core. The ‘Polder Model’ is also assumed to facilitate
more shared movements closer to the core, based on concluding neo-corporatist
government strategies and Central Agreements. I have indeed observed that both
concluding neo-corporatist government strategies and Central Agreements were
conducive to approaching the core. However, so were concluding non-neo-cor-
poratist government strategies when no Central Agreement could be reached. In
addition, the core was slightly less often approached after 1982 than before 1983.
My analysis shows that although neo-corporatism does matter, there is no direct
(or: causal) relation between neo-corporatist government strategies (research
question 1) and the outcome of negotiations on incomes policy in terms of ef-
fectiveness (research question 2).
The emergence of a ‘Polder Model’ was furthermore analysed from the per-
spective of government participation of the social democratic PvdA. Social
democratic dominance in the ‘purple’ government coalition with the liberal
VVD after 1993 did not significantly increase the effectiveness of concluding
neo-corporatist government strategies in terms of Central Agreements or more
movements towards the core. In other words, dominance of the PvdA in govern-
ment after 1993 did not produce a new or a more effective ‘Polder Model’ either.
Social democratic participation in coalition government in the Netherlands ap-
pears to have been beneficial for reaching an equilibrium between social partners:
either by way of concluding neo-corporatist government strategies and Central
Agreements, or by way of approaching the core.
Therefore, I contend that neither from the perspective of government strategy
and style of decision-making of social partners, nor from the perspective of
Central Agreements and approaching the core, or social democratic dominance
in government, there is evidence to support the emergence of a ‘Polder Model’
in the Netherlands. Neither after 1982, nor in the 1990s. My research findings
imply that the importance that researchers attached to the ‘Wassenaar Agree-
ment’ of December 1982 is overrated. The ‘Wassenaar Agreement’ can not be
considered as a watershed. 
My research findings support those researchers who point to the flexible character
of Dutch neo-corporatism in combination with a central role for the government
during the period 1965 - 2000 (or indeed during the whole period after 1945).76
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76. See for instance Cörvers and van Veen 1992; Teulings 1995, 1996, 1997; Keuzenkamp 1997; van
Empel 1997; Visser and Hemerijck 1997; Hazeu 1998; Teulings and Hartog 1998; Hartog 1999;
Keman 1999; van Sinderen 2000; Hoogenboom and van Vliet 2000; Gelauff 2000; Stokman 2000;
Slomp 2002; van Waarden 2002; Molina and Rhodes 2002.
Neo-corporatism did exist in the Netherlands between 1965 and 2000, but it
varied both in occurrence and in effectiveness. That variation, however, did not
constitute a new ‘Model’ after 1982, or in the 1990s. The ‘Model’ of negotiations
on incomes policy between 1965 and 2000 did not change considerably. In this
respect, I disagree with those researchers that equate conflict and deadlocks
between social partners with diminishing or disappearing neo-corporatism.77 In
my view, a neo-corporatist strategy of the government is no guarantee for
success. Neither in terms of the corresponding styles of decision-making of trade
unions and employers’ organisations, nor in terms of agreements or movements
towards the core. Sometimes the ‘Model’ is effective, sometimes it is not,
depending on the macroeconomic and exogenous (EMU) context, which drives
the actors’ behaviour and may lead to changes in the institutional context (from
a government guided to a free incomes policy, linkage, delinkage, relinkage)
effected by the government, which then in turn influence the actors’ behaviour.
It is exactly this process of institutional changes and subsequent changing
behaviour of the actors involved that can be captured by the instrument of
analysis developed in this thesis. In that way it is possible to overcome the formal
institutional bias of other approaches of neo-corporatism in which institutions
define the behaviour of the actors, by showing that the interaction between
institutions and actors is in effect more a mechanism in which actors are not only
restrained by institutions but can also change these institutions which in turn
effects their behaviour. And, as I have shown, this process can be interpreted by
using elements of a Rational Choice approach in the form of game theory,
combined with elements of the so-called New Institutionalism approach.
9.7.2 The concept of neo-corporatism and cross national research
The concept of neo-corporatism as a government strategy and its subsequent
operationalisation in government strategies and styles of decision-making of
trade unions and employers’ organisations that has been used in this research is
able to provide a plausible analysis for the formation and implementation of
Dutch incomes policy between 1965 and 2000. This instrument of analysis can
account for all (possible) stages in the process of negotiations on incomes policy
and for all (possible) outcomes as well.
In that respect it does a better job than most existing conceptualisations and
operationalisations of neo-corporatism (see also Vergunst 2004). These tend to
focus on both the formal institutionalisation of the process of formation and
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77. See for instance Lehmbruch 1979; Panitch 1979; Armingeon 1983; Marks 1986; Curtis 1987;
Wolinetz 1989, 1990; Cox 1989; Kurzer 1991 and Dutch researchers like Akkermans and Grootings
1979; Teulings 1980; Akkermans and Nobelen 1983; Arendsen and Geul 1983; Nobelen 1983; Geul
et al 1985a, 1985b; Nobelen et al 1985; Terlouw 1985; and Albeda and Ten Hove 1986.
implementation of incomes policy and on consensus on incomes. The existence
of these institutions of incomes policy and consensus on incomes policy in these
institutions or as a result of these institutions are used as explanatory factors for
neo-corporatism. No institutions, or no consensus: no neo-corporatism. These
rather static conceptualisations of neo-corporatism result in a higher or lower
score of the Netherlands on equally static and timeless scales of neo-corpo-
ratism. These conceptualisations and the subsequent scores on the scales of neo-
corporatism are not able to account for the actual formation and implementation
of incomes policy in the Netherlands between 1965 and 2000.
The conceptualisation of neo-corporatism as a government strategy for conflict
regulation and its subsequent operationalisation in the instrument of analysis that
is used in this research proves to be able to account for the actual government
strategy, as well as for the actual style of decision-making of trade unions and
employers’ organisations, in the Netherlands between 1965 and 2000. Strategy
and style of decision-making result in a particular incomes policy in a given year
as an outcome of the annual process of consultation and negotiation on incomes
policy. My ‘strategic’ conceptualisation and operationalisation has also proven to
be able to account for the effectiveness of incomes policy in terms of agendas.
The research based on the ‘crucial’ case study shows that there has not been so
much of a change in the Dutch ‘Model’ of neo-corporatism, as a patterned dis-
tribution of effectiveness of the existing ‘Model’. The changes in the effective-
ness of the existing ‘Model’ can be explained by the behaviour of the actors in-
volved in the formation and implementation of incomes policy in the Nether-
lands within the macroeconomic and exogenous context (EMU) and the (changes
in the) institutional context combined (see section 9.7.1).
This means that my research findings suggest that with regard to the formation
and implementation of incomes policy in the Netherlands between 1965 and
2000 there is both institutional continuity (‘path dependency’ or ‘rigidity’ based
on ’increasing returns’ - see Thelen and Steinmo 1992; Pierson 2000), and some
‘bounded change’ (Pierson 2000: 256) or ‘institutional dynamism’ (Thelen and
Steinmo 1992: 13 ff.), usually effected by the government of the day. The
institutional changes or dynamism - change from a government guided to a free
incomes policy, linkage, delinkage, relinkage - were induced by the macro-
economic context and exogenous change (for instance EMU - see Steinmo et al
1992: 16, 18; Pierson 2000: 266). The research findings do not support the
occurrence or existence of a ‘critical juncture’ (Pierson 2000: 251), nor of a
solution to an ‘institutional crisis’ (Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 16, 21/22), ex-
emplified by for instance the ‘Wassenaar Agreement’ of 1982.
In other words, the process of negotiations on the formation and implementation
of incomes policy in the Netherlands between 1965 and 2000 shows a pattern of
gradual institutional development and that changes both the issues and the scope
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of negotiations and agreements. This gradual institutional change is usually im-
plemented by the government, if necessary against the preferences of one or both
of the social partners. These actions of the government are driven by the macro-
economic context and exogenous changes like the EMU. Within the adjusted
institutional setting, the actors then continue their negotiations on the formation
and implementation of incomes policy. But these negotiations are then based on
changes in both the issues that can be negotiated and the scope of the agreements
that can be concluded.
The implications of my conceptualisation and operationalisation of neo-cor-
poratism as a government strategy for cross-national research are twofold. Firstly,
the instrument of analysis that is used for the Dutch consecutive, ‘crucial’ case
study in this research can and should also be used for a more dynamic in-depth
analysis of the formation and implementation of incomes policy in other coun-
tries and for the comparison of those incomes policies. A cross-national compa-
rison of incomes policy based on this instrument of analysis can and will con-
tribute to alleviating the present methodological trade-off between comparing
multiple cases and researching a single case, by combining elements of both
research methods: comparing multiple cases based on a ‘thick’, or at least quali-
tative description and analysis of these cases.78 The usefulness of a strategic or
more dynamic operationalisation of neo-corporatism in cross-national research
into neo-corporatism, incomes policy and performance is supported by the
research findings of other researchers that have recently used different, but also
more dynamic operationalisations of neo-corporatism as well (see for instance
Siaroff 1999; Kenworthy 2001, 2003; Pennings and Vergunst 2001; Molina and
Rhodes 2002; Traxler 2004; and Vergunst 2004). 
Secondly, with minor adaptations, that instrument of analysis can also be used to
investigate and compare the formation and implementation of policies in other
policy areas than incomes policy. Hence, it appears a promising instrument for
generating new insights with regard to questions that emanate from ‘New
Institutionalism’.
9.7.3. The ‘Dutch Disease’ and the ‘Dutch Miracle’
From the comparative perspective, no specifically ‘Dutch’ disease, nor a
specifically ‘Dutch’ miracle in terms of overall performance could be identified
when the Dutch case was compared to the performance of 19 OECD countries,
13 EU countries and seven other small neo-corporatist West-European countries. 
Although the period of the so-called ‘Dutch Disease’ did indeed go together with
less, and with less successful, neo-corporatist government strategies, and,
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78. Based on these qualitative descriptions it is also feasible to apply Boolean analysis or Fuzzy-set
logic to the comparison (see for instance Ragin 2000 and Pennings 2003).
conversely, the period of the alleged ‘Dutch Miracle’ with more, and more
successful, neo-corporatist government strategies, it was not the actors’ be-
haviour that explained performance, but rather the macroeconomic and exogenous
context (EMU) and (the changes in the) institutional context combined, that ex-
plained the actors’ behaviour in terms of neo-corporatist government strategies
and Central Agreements and the results in terms of approaching the core.
In other words, phenomena like the ‘Polder Model’, the ‘Dutch Disease’, and the
‘Dutch Miracle’ appear to be used more as ‘labels’ for depicting change and
perhaps ‘symbolic’ politics that are in fact established and ongoing practices that
can be more aptly described as ‘muddling through’ by the three actors involved
in incomes policy.
9.8 Concluding remarks
In this study I have developed an actor-oriented approach of neo-corporatism.
Central elements of my approach include the relative autonomy of the actors
involved (government and social partners) and at the same time their interde-
pendence (what the actors can get individually depends on the other actors).
Institutions are considered to be intermediate structures that offer both oppor-
tunities and restraints for actions. I have developed this actor-oriented approach
of neo-corporatism as a government strategy for conflict regulation in order to
investigate and understand Dutch incomes policy systematically as the outcome
of a process of negotiations between social partners and between social partners
and the government (research question 1). My second objective was to find out
whether Dutch incomes policy was effective as well (research question 2).
I have observed that Dutch incomes policy between 1965 and 2000 was indeed
neo-corporatist, but that neo-corporatism was dynamic and patterned over time.
I have also observed that Dutch incomes policy on the whole was not effective
in terms of Central Agreements and movements towards the core. However, neo-
corporatist incomes policies were indeed more effective than non-neo-cor-
poratist incomes policies. Neo-corporatism did matter, but it was not always
present or effective.
Based on my observation of Dutch incomes policy I have been able to correct the
formal, institutional bias of other concepts of neo-corporatism as I have shown
that neo-corporatism can and does vary over time. I have also been able to
correct the direct identification of neo-corporatism and consensus that is often
assumed in other concepts of neo-corporatism as I have shown that consensus on
incomes policy may indeed be the result of neo-corporatism, but that in the
Netherlands consensus between social partners was not the point of departure of
negotiations on incomes policy. Finally, I have been able to correct the
identification of neo-corporatism and effectiveness (Central Agreements and
movements towards the core) or (macroeconomic and policy) performance that
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can be often found in other concepts of neo-corporatism. I have shown that neo-
corporatism in the Netherlands was not always present or indeed effective in
terms of agendas or performance.
Empirically, I have observed that the Netherlands did not experience a major
institutional transition from an ineffective variety of neo-corporatism that had
produced the ‘Dutch Disease’ to an effective ‘Polder Model’ variety of neo-
corporatism that subsequently produced the ‘Dutch Miracle’. On the contrary, I
have shown that the process of negotiations on incomes policy in the Nether-
lands was embedded in a pattern of gradual institutional change that changed
both issues and scope of negotiations and agreements.
With regard to both the ‘Dutch Disease’ and the ‘Dutch Miracle’ I have shown
that comparatively, the Dutch case was neither completely different, nor com-
pletely exceptional. Except with respect to a considerable retrenchment of the
welfare state during the period of the ‘Dutch Miracle’.
I addition, I have observed that the interactions between social partners to a large
extent determined whether or not a Central Agreement could be reached and how
the government reacted in response. Nevertheless, the government appeared to
be the central actor during negotiations on incomes policy. Based on the macro-
economic and exogenous context that drove the behaviour of social partners, the
government implemented gradual institutional change (transition from a govern-
ment guided to a free incomes policy, linkage, delinkage, relinkage) which in
turn influenced all actors’ behaviour in terms of issues and scope of negotiations.
The variations in Dutch neo-corporatism can be understood by the actors’ be-
haviour within this gradual institutional change effected by the government.
Within that gradual institutional change, Dutch neo-corporatism between 1965
and 2000 typically consisted of a combination of the bargaining style of decision-
making between social partners (shaped as a kind of Prisoners’ Dilemma) and
the neo-corporatist co-operative government strategy (facilitation of negotiations
between social partners). A transition to a ‘Polder Model’ of the problem solving
style of decision-making (that is, Scharpf’s use of the ‘Battle of the Sexes’) and
a neo-corporatist government strategy (co-operative or congruent) could not be
observed. Both during the ‘Dutch Disease’ and the ‘Dutch Miracle’ Dutch neo-
corporatism represented a combination of bargaining (social partners) and co-
operation (government). This observation again shows that the observed
occurrence of phenomena like the ‘Polder Model’, the ‘Dutch Disease’, and the
‘Dutch Miracle’ is not supported by empirical evidence, but rather overstates
certain elements of a more temporary nature.
My research has shown that the central issue for Dutch neo-corporatism between
1965 and 2000 was whether the three actors involved in incomes policy could
agree upon a result that was both ‘fair for all’ (Central Agreement) and at the
same time ‘best for all’ (moved closest to the core). I have observed that some-
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times this could indeed be achieved, but more often that was not the case.
Neo-corporatist institutionalisation of Dutch incomes policy is important to
understand the formation and implementation of incomes policy. However, it
represents an intermediate mechanism that shapes behaviour, rather than drives
that behaviour. The tripartite composition of neo-corporatism in the Netherlands
is a constant in Dutch politics and policy formation, but as such it is not
exemplary for neo-corporatism per se. Where many researchers comparatively
regard the Netherlands as ‘typical’ for neo-corporatism as an ideal type, other re-
searchers - including many Dutch students of neo-corporatism - tend to overstate
its ‘a-typical’ nature. My conclusion is that neither view is correct; nor is it
correct to regard Dutch politics of intermediation and tripartism as outdated or
irrelevant. On the contrary, it is precisely the way in which the three actors in-
volved in incomes policy do ‘business’, as was recently shown by the negotiations
and conflicts regarding the conclusion and implementation of the Central Agree-
ments covering 2005 and 2006. 
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Appendix
Government strategy and style of decision-making of trade unions 
and employers’ organisations in the Netherlands 1965-2000
Brief elaboration of post war socio-economic policy-making in the Netherlands
Neo-corporatism as a government strategy to restore or create consensus under
the conditions of relative autonomy and mutual instrumentalisation of the actors
involved, can only be expected to function, if at all, under precisely these circum-
stances, that is, relative autonomy and mutual instrumentalisation. In order to
argue that the period 1965-2000 in the post-war history of Dutch incomes policy
best satisfies these requirements, I will give a brief sketch of both the relevant
organisations and the history of Dutch incomes policy since 1945. 
Post war Dutch incomes policy is usually described as a transition from a cen-
trally guided, statutory incomes policy by the government to a formally free
incomes policy, that is, free from government intervention (Fernhout 1980: 151-
153, 155; Windmuller and De Galan 1977: 2, 26-27; Dercksen et al 1982: 122-
126; de Liagre Böhl et al 1981: 106-109; Fortuyn 1981: 325-329, 373-424; van
Ruysseveldt and Visser 1996: 211-214; see also van Waarden 2003).
We can discern three main periods in Dutch incomes policy after 1945:
- 1945-1963, guided and differentiated statutory incomes policy;
- 1963-1968/70, transition to a formally free incomes policy;
- 1968/70 - present, a formally free incomes policy.
In the period between 1945 and 1963, the Minister of Social Affairs determines
incomes policy, after recommendations from the STAR. It is also the Minister
who formulates the guidelines, which the College van Rijksbemiddelaars has to
apply when they check collective contracts between employers and unions (Fern-
hout 1980: 143; Windmuller and De Galan 1977, Vol. 2: 16-21; Fase 1980: 47-
51). The SER usually confines itself “to recommendations concerning social
security, terms of employment, labour legislation and the main issues of wage
policy, if they were specifically asked” to give a recommendation (Windmuller
and De Galan 1977, Vol. 2: 29 - translation jjw). The participation of interest
groups in government policy in this period, confined to social issues, is restricted
to non-binding recommendation with regard to policy formation, and to imple-
menting government policy. Government and parliament (the political parties
heading the various pillars) remain the dominant actors and determine the agenda.
Interest groups are not meant to take on government tasks (except in the execution
of government policy), nor are they invited to determine policies themselves. In
the institutionalised relation between government and interest groups in the area
of socio-economic policy, it is the government (and parliament) that acts, the
interest groups re-act (see also: Teulings 1980: 18; Nobelen 1983: 102 ff). In the
last instance it is the ‘coercive’ or ‘statutory powers’ of the government (Panitch
1979: 142), which keeps the employers’ organisations and unions together in the
implementation of the centrally guided statutory incomes policy.
In other words, the coalition governments of christian democratic and social de-
mocratic parties in the post-war period both created the framework for macro-
economic planning and policy-making, and integrated the relevant socio-econo-
mic actors in that framework ‘top-down’. It is clearly party government and
parliament that determine the room to manoeuvre for the interest groups.
Between 1963 and 1968/1970, with many conflicts and experiments, the tran-
sition from statutory incomes policy to a formally free incomes policy takes
effect (van Doorn et al 1976; Windmuller and De Galan 1977; Fase 1980: 300/1,
303-305). The Law on Wage Formation (1968/70) is the political expression of
this transition. However, the government retains the authority to intervene with
a six-month wage freeze. 
Within the union federations major changes occur. The affiliated branch unions
become more powerful vis-à-vis the central federation. Slowly, negotiations on
the branch and industry level gain more importance.
Generally, this period is regarded as a time of polarisation and conflict. Con-
sensus within the institutions is on the decline and decentralisation within the
union federations has resulted in a less co-operative inclination. From the perspective
of neo-corporatism as a government strategy, however, this period is more in-
teresting than the previous one. Unions and employers’ organisations take a much
more independent stance towards each other and towards the government. The
government loses its absolute domination in the area of wage policy, but still
retains the power to intervene if they feel the general economic situation calls for
intervention. Although party government (and parliament) ultimately can still
determine the ‘rules’ of the game, the conditions for neo-corporatism as a possible
government strategy to forge or restore consensus in a situation of both autonomy
of the actors and mutual instrumentalisation have been shaped (Keman et al 1985).
Since 1970 incomes policy is formally free, although the government retains the
power to intervene. From 1970 tot 1986, the government could intervene with a
wage freeze if it felt the general economic situation called for intervention. In
1986 the Law on Wage Formation is amended. Government intervention in wages
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in the market sector is from 1987 only allowed in case of a national emergency,
caused by external factors (Korver 1993: 394). Trade unions and employers’ or-
ganisations have now ample room to manoeuvre to pursue their interests in the
market sector, but in case of an emergency, government (and parliament) can still
take over. The government’s leading role with regard to incomes policy in the
(semi-) public sector remains beyond question. The ultimate, deciding responsibility
for incomes policy, therefore still rests with party government and parliament.
If there was ever a period in which the interactions between government, unions
and employers’ organisations with respect to policy-making could be analysed in
terms of a neo-corporatist strategy, it is precisely this period. Incomes policy in
the market sector is free. Interest groups have ample room to manoeuvre, but in
case of an emergency party government (and parliament) can still take over. Eco-
nomic problems mount as a consequence of the oil shocks in 1973 and 1979/
1980. This is precisely the environment in which neo-corporatism, as a possible
government strategy to restore consensus and foster economic growth, will have
to prove its worth. Consequently, the research will be focused on incomes policy
between 1965 and 2000.
In this period the rules governing the annual incomes policy are such that within
the market sector trade unions and employers’ organisations are ostensibly free
to pursue their own agenda’s. However, government can overrule the outcome,
and has a leading role with regard to incomes policy in the (semi-) public sector.
Availability and use of data
In this research project the annual negotiations between trade unions and em-
ployers’ organisations on wages and other terms of employment, and the match-
ing government policies and interventions between 1965 and 2000 have been
studied. For the trade unions and employers’ organisations primary sources
include their annual notes with which they enter these negotiations. The govern-
ment’s policies and interventions are documented in the annual budget and related
government notes and parliamentary discussions. All these documents, plus the
accompanying actions, are more or less extensively reported in the SER Bulletin
(SIB - see references), which has served as the main source for the research. 
The extent of the SIB’s information on incomes policy varies over the years.
Until 1980, annual negotiations and consultations are extensively reported in the
weekly Bulletin, as are the government’s corresponding actions and policies.
Early 1981, the SIB changes from a weekly to a bi-weekly, and in autumn 1982
to a monthly Bulletin. These editorial changes are accompanied by a marked
decrease in useful information on annual negotiations and consultations on in-
comes policy in 1981, 1982 and 1983. From 1984, the SIB briefly regains its pre-
vious high standard in presenting comprehensive information concerning in-
comes policy. However, in 1988, 1989 and 1990, there is again a sharp decrease
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in useful reports on negotiations and consultations with regard to annual incomes
policy. From 1991 to 1995, the reports on annual incomes policy are more extensive
and comprehensive again, although they do not reach the high standards
prevalent before 1981 and between 1984 and 1988. From 1996, this information
becomes more scarce and haphazard. And from 2001, the SIB finally ceases to
report altogether on the annual negotiations and consultations on incomes policy.
For the periods in which the SIB is not a reliable source, additional sources have
been used, including the annual reports of trade unions and employers’organisations,
the annual government budgets, policy agreements (Regeeraccoorden) and govern-
ment declarations of incoming governments, and other relevant information as
reported in the records of parliament (Handelingen van de Tweede Kamer der Staten-
Generaal) and in the official government gazette (Nederlandse Staatscourant).
This information has been supplemented with other sources. These include
Windmuller et al (1977, 1983), van Doorn et al (1976), Fase (1980), STAR
(1985), and Akkermans (1999). These sources extensively report the annual
negotiations between trade unions and employers’ organisations and the match-
ing government interventions until 1985. Similar sources for the late 1980s and
1990s that focus specifically and with great detail on these annual negotiations
and related government interventions do not exist. But Korver (1993), van Botten-
burg (1995), STAR (1995), van den Toren (1996), van Heertum-Lemmen and
Wilthagen (1996), Visser and Hemerijck (1997, 1998), Roebroek and Hertogh
(1998), Akkermans (1999), Visser (1999), Hemerijck and Visser (2000), Hemer-
ijck et al (2000), Hemerijck (2002), and Slomp (2002) do provide additional
information on a number of years.
Government strategies and styles of decision-making
Government strategies:
I =  Passive
II =  Co-operative
III =  Congruent
IV =  Guiding
Styles of decision-making of trade unions and employers’ organisations:
A =  Confrontation
B =  Bargaining
C =  Problem solving
The focus is on both the effects of different government strategies on the styles
of decision making between trade unions and employers’ organisations, and the
effect of different styles of decision making between trade unions and
employers’ organisations on government strategies.
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Combinations of styles of decision-making of trade unions and employers’
organisations:
196579
For 1965 the government Marijnen (KVP, ARP, CHU, VVD) wants to limit the
rise of wages to 4-5%, including 1.5% compensation for the rise in social
security premiums for old age and disability pensions.
If necessary, the government announces it will intervene in collective contracts
through the Board of Government Mediators (College van Rijksbemiddelaars).
The goal of government policy is to redress the slight economic dip by reducing
real income; maintaining a balanced budget and issuing higher interest rates on
credit (SIB 36, 1964: 12-15).
The government gives the trade unions and employers’ organisation a choice
between various packages:
- a binding wage measure across the board of 1.5% compensation per 01-01-
1965 for rising social security premiums (old age and widow’s pensions), plus
a maximum of 3.2% wage increase;
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Combinations of styles of
decision-making
Classification Resulting combined style of
decision-making
AA Both trade unions and
employers’ organisations opt
for confrontation
A = Confrontation
(Chicken game)
AB, BA One of the parties opts for
confrontation, the other for
bargaining
A = Confrontation
(Chicken game)
AC, CA One of the parties opts for
confrontation, the other for
problem solving
A = Confrontation
(Chicken game)
BB Both trade unions and
employers’ organisations opt
for bargaining
B = Bargaining
(Prisoners’ Dilemma)
BC, CB One of the parties opts for
bargaining, the other for
problem solving
B = Bargaining
(Prisoners’ Dilemma)
CC Both trade unions and
employers’ organisations opt
for problem solving
C =  Problem solving
(Battle of the Sexes)
79. Since 1965, after the so-called ‘wage explosions’ of 1963, 1964 and 1965, the search for a new
system of wage negotiations is on. The main problems of the existing system are the fact that
government beforehand determines the maximum allowed wage rise, and also severely limits the
freedom of negotiations on other issues. Between 1963 and 1968/1970, the system changes from an
almost completely government led system to a formally free system (van Doorn et al 1976;
Windmuller et al 1983: 152-161).
- a binding wage measure across the board above 1.5% accompanied by a cor-
respondingly lower maximum for wage increases;
- a binding wage measure across the board which prescribes both com-
pensation and total wage increase in detail (SIB 47, 1964: 15-18).
The agendas of trade unions and employers’ organisations are determined by
their different views on economic prospects. Unions feel that the forecast for
1965 made by the Central Planning Bureau (CPB) is too pessimistic, like it was
in the previous years (SIB 41, 1964: 2, 3). They reject the calculations, based on
this forecast, which indicate that a wage rise of 2% in real terms is the maximum
which can be afforded, and prepare for tough negotiations (SIB 38, 1964: 19).
The government’s alternative, tax reductions instead of wage rises, is rejected.
Unions feel that better wages in 1965 are both desirable and unavoidable. The
government’s other proposals, in a letter to the Foundation of Labour (STAR),
for a small wage rise (in combination with tax reductions), are rejected as well.
And in response, the unions up their demands (SIB 48, 1964: 7-9).
Employers’ organisations refuse to negotiate over these demands (SIB, 39: 1964:
21, 32; SIB 42, 1964: 6, 7). Their main objection is that wage rises can not be
incorporated in prices, because government has capped prices. A, in their view,
too high a rise in wages, as the unions demand, will lead to a deterioration in
competitiveness of Dutch firms (SIB 48, 1964: 7). Eventually, employers’ orga-
nisations agree to a (small) general wage rise. Unions, however, want both a
general wage rise, and to continue negotiations on the branch and company level
(SIB 44, 1964: 2, 3).
When the negotiations in the SER and the STAR grind to a halt, the government
intervenes through the minister of Social Affairs with a new proposal. The
proposal includes a slightly higher wage rise than in the previous packages (3.5%
instead of 3.2%), a rise of the minimum wage, the possibility of paying special
bonuses, and extra child allowances for larger families. With this package, the
government succeeds in getting the chairmen of the peak organisations to close
a deal in informal talks. The ‘wage agreement 1965’ (loonakkoord 1965) includes:
- a wage increase as of January 1st, 1965;
- an acceptable wage cost increase of 3%;
- a continuation with wage differentiation in those companies that have applied
that in 1964 as well;
- a minimum wage of 110.= guilders per week;
- the introduction or improvement of wage systems linked to performance;
- a bonus payment, subject to renewed talks between STAR and government, if
and when economic growth turns out to be better than expected (SIB 49,
1964: 2-4; SIB 50, 1964: 2; STAR 1985: 45, 46). 
To facilitate agreement, government takes over part of the employers’ premiums
for child allowances (SIB 49, 1964: 2-4). Notwithstanding disagreement over the
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exact contents of this Central Agreement, it is later elaborated in the STAR and,
reluctantly, accepted by both parties (SIB 50, 1964: 2). Neither party is content
with the agreement, but, apparently, both parties view it as the best possible
result.
Despite larger wage rises at the branch level than allowed for in the agreed
package, the STAR approves the collective contracts concluded, without any
subsequent interference by the government (Windmuller et al 1983: 197). In
June 1965 the government even authorises the payment of a 2% bonus, which
was part of the agreed package.
The government actively intervenes in the negotiations by offering various
packages to trade unions and employers’ organisations. When negotiations bog
down in a deadlock, it is the government that resolves the deadlock with a new
proposal that is grudgingly accepted by both parties.
1966
The agenda of the government Cals (KVP, ARP, PvdA) concerning the wage
negotiations for 1966 is heavily influenced by the massive evasion of the maxi-
mum wage rise allowed by the government Marijnen (KVP, ARP, CHU, VVD) in
1965 (Windmuller et al 1983: 197, 199/200). The government decides to autho-
rise the Board of Government Mediators again to check the wage agreements in
the collective contracts, instead of the STAR.
During the negotiations for 1966, both trade unions and employers’ organisations
show a declining willingness to compromise. They have great difficulties with
the way wages are determined. Consequently, pressure on the government to
come up with a new system for wage and incomes policy increases (van Doorn
et al 1976: 226-247).
Trade unions and employers’ organisations fail to reach an agreement on wages
in the STAR. The main obstacles are the demands of the unions for a wage rise
in real terms and the level of a minimum wage. Unions demand 125 guilders per
week (SIB 46, 1965: 23; SIB 47, 1965: 17, 18). Employers feel that a minimum
wage goes against the freedom of wage formation, as it diminishes the flexibility
in wage structure in companies. Nevertheless, they are willing to agree to a raise
amounting to 110 guilders per week (SIB 46, 1965: 23; SIB 47, 1965: 17-19;
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1965
Government strategy III III
Trade unions style A B
Employers’ organisations style A B
Combined styles social partners A B
Outcome IIIB
SIB 48, 1965: 20). In response, unions accuse the employers of taking out their
previous defeat on this issue on the lowest paid and demand that the government
changes the provisional legislation on the minimum wage into a proper law (SIB
48, 1965: 24).
Employers’ organisations and trade unions do reach agreement on other aspects
of terms of employment:
- equal pay for men and women (for equal jobs) - the STAR will judge
collective contracts on this issue;
- a gradual reduction of working hours without a timetable (the government
wanted to set July 1st, 1967 as the starting date) (STAR 1985: 46).
Due to the lack of agreement between unions and employers’ organisations on
wages, the STAR does not look unfavourable on government intervention with
regard to this issue. The government then sets the level of the minimum wage on
120 guilders. The unions are more content than the employers who warn that this
level will have a detrimental effect on general wage formation (SIB 50, 1965: 7-
10; SIB 2, 1966: 28). The government also determines the norm for the
maximum allowed wage rise in 1966: 6 - 7% (SIB 46, 1965: 2). And on the issue
of a reduction of working hours, it is also the government that takes the decision.
Despite attempts by the Board of Government Mediators to implement
government limits in separate collective contracts, these limits are regularly
broken. Trade unions profit from the demand for labour (SIB 8, 1966: 6, 7; van
Doorn et al 1976: 232).
After several warnings and consultations with trade unions and employers’
organisations on a number of collective contracts that had wage rises above the
prescribed norm, the government intervenes in these contracts through the Board
of Government Mediators. Halfway 1966 the government toughens its control
over prices and again declares its determination to strictly enforce the prescribed
norm for wage rises (SIB 8, 1966: 6 - 7; SIB 9, 1966: 2, 3; SIB 11, 1966: 21;
SIB 15, 1966: 17; SIB 21, 1966: 5 - 8; SIB 23, 1966: 26, 27; STAR 1985: 46,
47). This policy is also vigorously enforced by the interim government Zijlstra
(KVP, ARP) (Windmuller et al 1983: 201; SIB 24, 1966: 22).
As trade unions and employers’ organisations cannot agree on the level of the
minimum wage, it is the government that breaks the deadlock and fixes that
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1966
Government strategy I III IV
Trade unions style B B B
Employers’ organisations style B B B
Combined styles social partners B B B
Outcome IVB
level. The amount chosen is between the offer of employers’ organisations and
the demand of the trade unions. It is also the government that breaks the
deadlock on the wage rise in real terms, sets the norm for the maximum allowed
wage rise, and finally enforces that norm in decentral negotiations.
1967
In 1967 the interim government Zijlstra (KVP, ARP) determines beforehand that
wage rises should not exceed the expected rise in productivity of 3.5% (SIB 36,
1966: 11-15; SIB 45, 1966: 7 - 8; SIB 46, 1966: 15 - 16).
The agreed goals of central negotiations are to achieve a positive balance of
payments and less inflation, and to maintain employment. Therefore, a limitation
or reduction of wage costs and prices is necessary. Despite agreement between
trade unions and employers’ organisations over these goals and means, central
negotiations break down. The main breaking point is the demand of the trade
unions that, apart from the general wage rise, remaining (financial) possibilities
for better terms of employment on the branch and company level may be used
for wages in the form of a temporarily blocked savings account. On the amount
of the general wage rise, an agreement was almost reached (SIB 37, 1965: 24,
25; SIB 47, 1966: 17, 18).
Eventually, government breaks the dead-lock and determines the whole package:
- a wage rise of 4% in 1967 when collective labour contracts are renewed;
- 1.5% per 01-07-1967;
- a rise in the minimum wage;
- an increase in social security benefits of 5% through indexation beforehand,
and the remainder afterwards;
- no reduction in working hours, unless already agreed to in longer term
contracts (more than one year);
- no price indexation of wages on 01-07-1967;
- no capping of the rise in the health care premiums above 6.2% (SIB 48, 1966:
14 - 15).
However, all other demands of the trade unions, especially with regard to rising prices,
taxes and social security premiums were ignored (Windmuller et al 1983: 201).
The differences with the original demands of the unions are striking. Although
the general wage rise is close to their demands, the other conditions imposed by
the government make it unacceptable for the unions. Firstly, the government
does not allow any indexation of wages to rising prices afterwards. Secondly, the
government sets strict limits for total rises in wage costs, which are to be con-
trolled by the STAR. In response, the NVV pulls out of the whole incomes policy
system and refuses any further co-operation. And although employers’ organi-
sations in the first instance seem to comply with this part of the government
package, the main employers’ organisation CSWV later also declines to co-operate
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(SIB 48, 1966: 15-16, 28; SIB 1, 1967: 21).
The government, however, is not moved to further concessions. Because the
NVV and the CSWV refuses to co-operate and to check the proposed collective
contracts through the STAR on their concurrence with government policy, all
responsibilities for wages and related terms of employment are taken from the
STAR and placed in the hands of the Board of Government Mediators. The
Board is instructed to apply the government’s policy package across the board.
This means that no differentiation on the branch level are accepted (SIB 48,
1965: 15, 16; SIB 1, 1967: 21; SIB 6, 1967: 12; SIB 14, 1967: 15, 16; van Doorn
et al 1976: 243-246). 
The government breaks the deadlock in the negotiations between employers’
organisations and trade unions by imposing its own policy package with regard
to wages and income. In response, trade unions and employers’ organisations
refuse further co-operation with the government.
1968
In 1968 the government De Jong (KVP, ARP, CHU, VVD) ostensibly leaves the
negotiations on wages to the trade unions and employers’ organisations. How-
ever, the government does determine beforehand that wage rises should not
exceed the expected rise in productivity of 3% (SIB 36, 1967: 2). The govern-
ment also announces its determination to intervene when wage rises in collective
contracts exceed this norm (SIB 40, 1967: 20). In its consultations with the
STAR, however, the government retracts on this announcement and agrees to
wait for the results of the negotiations between trade unions and employers’
organisations (SIB 40, 1967: 21, 22). 
Trade unions and employers’ organisations at least agree about one thing: both
are against binding agreements on the central level. If and when parties agree on
the central level, the government should honour these agreements. The Minister
of Social Affairs should only intervene if and when collective contracts threaten
to destabilise the national economy. However, parties again disagree on the issue
of the minimum wage. Trade unions oppose further differentiation in wages
between branches and companies and therefore demand a raise of the minimum
wage comparable to the average wage and price rises. Employers’ organisations
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1967
Government strategy IV
Trade unions style B
Employers’ organisations style B
Combined styles social partners B
Outcome IVB
do not want to go further than a raise comparable to the average wage rise (SIB
38, 1967: 10-12).
On October 24th, 1967, parties reach an agreement in the STAR about a free
incomes policy without a Central Agreement, although the agreement does in-
clude the minimum wage. The agreement stipulates that there is to be no Central
Agreement or norm, and that the government should only intervene in collective
contracts when these threaten to seriously disrupt the economy. If and when the
Minister of Social Affairs intervenes, he/she should first seek advice of an
independent Committee of Economic Experts in which no civil servants are
represented and that can rely on the trust of both unions and employers’ organi-
sations. The organisations also reach an agreement on the division of payment of
rising social security premiums over employers and employees (SIB 41, 1967: 4,
5; SIB 2, 1968: 17; SIB 4, 1968: 28, 29).
The minister of Social Affairs accepts these agreements. However, the govern-
ment increasingly worries about the extent of agreed wage rises and reductions
in working hours, and, after extensive consultations with the STAR, frequently
interferes in concluded collective contracts through the Board of Government
Mediators (the recently appointed Committee of Economic Experts is by-passed),
much to the resentment of the trade unions. The main focus for intervention is
the reduction of working hours. Government wants to preserve some room for
heavier taxation resulting from the introduction of the VAT (SIB 7, 1968: 5, 6;
SIB 8, 1968: 15-18; SIB 9, 1968: 24; SIB 11, 1968: 24-26; SIB 14, 1968: 22-25;
SIB 20, 1968: 24, 25; SIB 21, 1968: 9-13). In the end, however, the government
does not ratify merely one clause about a reduction in working hours in the
collective agreement in the building trade. And this only after consulting the in-
dependent Committee of Economic Experts (SIB 43, 1968: 9).
The government also considers emergency legislation to extend the duration of
all collective contracts of 1968 into 1969 with six months. A majority in parlia-
ment opposes these proposals and they are eventually dropped (van Doorn et al
1976: 262; SIB 20, 1968: 24 - 25; SIB 21, 1968: 9 - 13; SIB 22, 1968: 9 - 12, 20 - 21).
Notwithstanding these disagreements, in 1968 also the Bill on the Minimum
Wage and Minimum Holiday Allowance is passed (SIB: 17, 1968: 28, 29; SIB
18, 1968: 4; SIB 34, 1968: 28 - 29; SIB 37, 1968: 40 - 42). On 23 February 1969
it becomes law (SIB 9, 1969: 6).
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1968
Government strategy IV I IV I
Trade unions style B B B B
Employers’ organisations style B B B B
Combined styles social partners B B B B
Outcome IB
The government starts by setting its own wage norm first, but then agrees to give
trade unions and employers’ organisations a chance to work out an agreement
amongst themselves. The government at first accepts the agreement that there
will not be a binding Central Agreement, but then increasingly intervenes in
decentral contracts. In the end, however, most interventions are dropped.
1969
In 1969 the same transitional system of wage negotiations as in 1968 is in force.
Although wage negotiations are ostensibly free from government intervention,
the government De Jong (KVP, ARP, CHU, VVD) again states that wage rises
should not exceed the expected rise in productivity (4%) as far as they did in
1968; and that part of those rises should be in the form of special savings
accounts that are blocked for a number of years. The government also announces
it will intervene (again) in collective contracts if trade unions and employer’
organisations do not heed the limits set by the government (SIB 36, 1968: 12 -
14; SIB 37, 1968: 25 - 33; SIB 43, 1968: 9). 
In this year also, negotiations are conducted decentrally, on the level of branches
and companies. Trade unions take a tougher stand than in the previous year (SIB
28, 1968: 10; SIB 31, 1968: 21, 22; SIB 40, 1968: 9, 10; SIB 41, 1968: 11, 17-
19). Partly the Bill on Wage Formation put before parliament in September 1968
is to blame. And partly because of the decisions by parliament regarding the
minimum wage (SIB 36, 1968: 20). Also, trade unions feel that government
policy aims at changing the distribution of incomes in favour of company profits.
On top of that, the internal pressure from individual branch unions on the national
federations to take a tougher stand also mounts increasingly.
Employers’ organisations keep fairly quiet. They feel that government policy
does not go far enough and fear that the proposed growth of the (semi-) public
sector will lead to shortages of capital and, consequently, to reduced investments.
They remain set against all forms of wage earner funds and blocked savings
accounts (SIB 43, 1968: 6, 7; SIB 46, 1968: 6, 7).
The results of the decentralised negotiations widely exceed the government’s
wage limits (originally a 6.5% rise in wage costs was forecasted for the whole of
1969, but already in June it is expected to exceed 11%). Consequently, the
government repeatedly intervenes in collective contracts. The main issues are the
reduction in working hours and wage rises that exceed the government’s norms.
The government prefers some form of a blocked savings account (SIB 2, 1969:
5, 6, 15; SIB 4, 1969: 2-5; SIB 5, 1969: 16, 17; SIB 20, 1969: 32; SIB 21, 1969:
37; SIB 22, 1969: 12; SIB 25, 1969: 8, 9; van Doorn et al 1976: 278, 289-292;
Windmuller et al 1983: 223). To curb inflation (and price compensation in
wages), and to accommodate the trade unions by compensating policies, the
government institutes a temporary (five month) price stop (SIB 15, 1969: 16-18;
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SIB 21, 1969: 13; SIB 24, 1969: 11; SIB 34, 1969: 22-24; van Doorn et al 1976: 296).
Trade unions and employers’ organisations conclude decentral contracts that
widely exceed the government’s proclaimed wage limits. Consequently, govern-
ment repeatedly intervenes in those contracts.
1970
The government De Jong (KVP, ARP, CHU, VVD) refuses to accommodate the
trade unions with regard to their demands for wage earner funds (vermogensaan-
wasdeling - VAD) and special savings accounts in which pay rises can paid but
that are also blocked for a number of years. Notwithstanding the offer by the trade
unions to lower their wage demands in return. The government also unilaterally
imposes a threshold in the indexation of wages. On the other hand, the govern-
ment follows the recommendation of the SER that new collective contracts can
include a maximum wage rise of 5% plus a 1.5% reduction in working hours and
postpones rises in VAT and rents (SIB 36, 1969: 7-11; MEV 1970: 9).
Trade unions demand a real rise in wages of 2%, plus concrete government
policies to combat unemployment and increase the number of houses (SIB 24,
1969: 2; SIB 36, 1969: 16). Both trade unions and employers’ organisations op-
pose the rise in VAT, because of the consequences for prices. In response, the
government not only postpones the proposed rise in VAT, but also issues a
number of other measures to get both parties to exercise moderation with regard
to wages. Both the employers’ organisations and the government agree that wages
may rise some 2.5% in real terms. All in all, the differences between parties are
minimal as far as wages are concerned (SIB 36, 1969: 17).
Based on the 14th bi-annual report of the SER, a compromise is reached. In
return for indexation of the expected 2.5-3% wage rise to compensate for price
rises, the trade unions agree to co-operate in wage moderation (SIB 26, 1969: 2-
5; SIB 27, 1969: 20). Decentral negotiations on the branch and company levels
proceed smoothly. The government does not interfere in the results in an effort
not to worsen relations with the trade unions any further.
Despite the ease with which wage negotiations are concluded, trade unions
collide head-on with the government on the issue of the Law on Wage Forma-
tion, especially with regard to clause 8. According to this clause, government is
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1969
Government strategy IV I IV
Trade unions style A A A
Employers’ organisations style B B B
Combined style social partners A A A
Outcome IVA
entitled to intervene in individual collective contracts if and when it deems this
necessary. When the Bill is eventually passed, NVV and NKV boycott wage
negotiations on the central level in both the SER and the STAR (Windmuller et
al 1983: 223 ff.; SIB 38, 1969: 12, 13; SIB 38, 1969: 18-20, 23). Consequently,
they refuse to participate in the formulation of recommendations by the SER on
the institution of a Committee of Economic Experts (which has to advice the
government on decentrally concluded contracts) and on the issue of price in-
dexation of wages. In return, the Minister of Social Affairs, Roolvink (ARP),
unilaterally decides to implement a ‘threshold’ of 3.5% in the price indexation
(that means that only when prices have risen 3.5% or more, wages will be in-
dexed accordingly). This leads to a further deterioration of the already very
strained relations with the trade unions (van Doorn et al 1976: 345). And
although employers’ organisations are ‘disappointed’ that unions seem to take
out their grudge against government on the system of negotiations in industry
(SIB 38, 1969: 13), in the STAR they support the unions in their refusal to have
talks with the government as long as clause 8 is in force (SIB 2, 1970: 17).
Negotiations on incomes policy proceed fairly smoothly and result in a bipartite
compromise based on the 14th bi-annual report of the SER. The conflict between
trade unions and the government is about a part of the new system of nego-
tiations on incomes policy as laid down in the Law on Wage Formation (clause
8). Trade unions refuse to participate in any further negotiations on the central
level. They are reluctantly supported by employers’ organisations. In response,
the government unilaterally intervenes in the price indexation agreement.
1971
Wage negotiations in 1971 are completely determined by the effects of the so-
called ‘400 guilders wave’ of the second half of 1970. This was the result of a
number of originally ‘wild-cat strikes’ that started in the ports of Rotterdam and
were eventually taken over by the trade unions (van Doorn et al 1976: 362-373;
Windmuller et al 1983: 225/226). The government De Jong (KVP, ARP, CHU,
VVD) announces in its 1971 budget that it aims to neutralise the effects of these
wage rises by a binding wage measure. However, the SER gives a negative re-
commendation and the government retracts its plans (SIB 43, 1970: 19). To
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1970
Government strategy II IV
Trade unions style C C
Employers’ organisations style C C
Combined style social partners C C
Outcome IVC
better the relations with the trade unions, and to (re)start central negotiations, the
government also announces it will ‘freeze’ clause 8 (i.e. will not make use of it)
of the Law on Wage Formation (SIB 40, 1970: 16, 17; Windmuller et al 1983: 223).
Following the ‘400 guilders wave’, in November 1970, trade unions and em-
ployers’ organisations reach agreement in the form of a recommendation by the
SER. They agree that, in order to regain a stable economic development, wages
should rise slower than productivity (SIB 43, 1970: 2-7). Trade unions, however,
insist that price rises should be included, whilst employers’organisations emphatically
disagree. Employers are of the opinion that the demand of the trade unions will
mean that the targets set in the recommendation of the SER will not be met. They
therefore ask the government to exercise its own responsibility in order to achieve
the desired wage moderation in 1971 (SIB 44, 1970: 12-16; SIB 45, 1969: 26, 27). 
Negotiations between trade unions and employers’ organisations break down. In
response, in December 1970, the government imposes a binding wage measure
for 1971 based on clause 10 of the Law on Wage Formation. The measure is
amended by parliament:
- collective contracts as of 11-12-1970 are extended with a six-month period
when they expire;
- wage rises, including the ‘400 guilders wave’, in contracts already accepted
by the Board of Government Mediators remain untouched;
- a 3% wage rise per 01-01-1971 for contracts expiring on 31-12-1971, plus
another 1% on 01-04-1971;
- the same wage rise apply for the longer term contracts when they expire;
- the ‘400 guilders’ are incorporated in wages immediately after expiration of
contracts (SIB 45, 1970: 24-26; SIB 46, 1970: 21-23; SIB 47, 1970: 26;
STAR 1985: 48, 49). 
At the same time, the government imposes a price measure which states that only
some specifically named external costs, plus the effects of the ‘400 guilders
wave’ may be included in the recalculation of prices. Employers’ organisations
object strongly to this part of the package, but acknowledge that government, in
the face of insufficient guarantees for a necessary restraint in wage rises by or-
ganised labour and employers, has its own responsibility. They support the
government’s wage measure and blame the trade unions and announce they will
loyally co-operate with the government and shall not try to undermine its policy
by giving in to ‘extreme’ demands of unions (SIB 40, 1970: 6, 16, 17; SIB 41,
1970: 6, 10-12; SIB 44, 1970: 15, 16; SIB 45, 1970: 27; SIB 48, 1970: 21). The
trade unions, however, organise a national strike of one hour on 15 December
1970, just preceding the parliamentary debate on the government’s measures
(SIB 45, 1970: 27; SIB 46, 1970: 15-18, 23). Despite the governments appeal to
trade unions and employers’ organisations to co-operate loyally, the trade unions
accuse the government of giving in to employers and announce they will not be
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silenced and will try to redress the government’s policy after expiration where
ever possible. After expiry of the wage measure they demand wage rises and
organise strikes on the branch and company level to press their argument (SIB
45, 1970: 27; SIB 46, 1970: 23). In practice the effect of the wage measure was
limited (Windmuller et al 1983: 226/227).
The government starts with taking a firm stand on wages. Then retracts its
proposed package to give trade unions and employers’ organisations a chance to
come to an agreement. To facilitate central negotiations, the government ‘freezes’
clause 8 of the Law on Wage Formation. Central negotiations break down. Then
the government breaks the deadlock with its own (binding) policy package.
Employers’ organisations support the wage measure in that package. Trade
unions announce they will try to redress the government’s binding wage measure
after expiration. And that is what they do. The new government refrains from
intervention (see 1972).
1972
The second provisional recommendation of the SER about wage and price policy
in June 1971 suggests the introduction of a new system of formulating and
implementing incomes policy. In the first recommendation of October 1970, the
SER rejected detailed interventions in wages and prices by the government
(clause 8). During 1971, following the binding wage measure after the so-called
‘400 guilders wave’, the notion took shape that a binding general wage measure
is equally ineffective (clause 10). The SER proposes that an annual report on
economic prospects, prepared by independent ‘crown members’ of the SER, will
be discussed in the SER. The results of this discussion shall than form the basis
on which the respective points of view of trade unions and employers’ organi-
sations in the STAR will be formulated. The key is that prescriptions or in-
structions are to be replaced by a situation in which trade unions and employers’
organisation mutually try to influence each others demands (van Doorn et al
1976: 428-433).
Based on this report by the SER, the new government Biesheuvel I (KVP, ARP,
CHU, VVD, DS70) abolishes the wage measure of the preceding government De
Jong (KVP, ARP, CHU, VVD) retroactively (SIB 28, 1971: 2-3, 31; Windmuller
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et al 1983: 227). The government also announces it will ‘freeze’ (meaning: not
to make use of) clause 8 of the Law on Wage Formation, which makes it possible
for government to intervene in negotiated contracts (SIB 34, 1971: 20-25; SIB
28, 1971: 2, 3). Furthermore, the government announces that wage negotiations
should take place in complete freedom from government intervention. The govern-
ment proposes to come to an effective control of inflation by means of ‘broad’
deliberations (that is, with as many of the relevant parties and institutions as
possible) (SIB 24, 1971: 11-20; SIB 28, 1971: 32-35; SIB 34, 1971: 2-6, 20; SIB
35, 1971: 5, 6).
The trade unions’ agenda aims at ‘moderation under conditions’, meaning under
the conditions that government policies include the necessary (financial) room
for public and social services, direct private investments and see to a more just
distribution of income by levelling the range between lower and higher incomes
(SIB 38, 1971: 28-32). The NVV originally calculates a total combined wage
rise of 13.5%, but, as the others, quickly agrees to the maximum of 12%, which
the SER Committee of Economic Experts has set (SIB 40, 1971: 2-7). In effect,
this implies that the trade unions agree with combating inflation only, and do not
demand a real rise of wages. As it turns out, government refuses to meet the
conditions set by the unions (SIB 44, 1971: 5; SIB 45, 1971: 15-17; van Doorn
et al 1976: 459, 465, 466).
Employers’ organisations reject any rise in incomes in real terms and strictly
keep to their agenda that compensation for rising prices should be maximised to
6% to keep in line with the recommended 12% rise in the combined total wage
sum as recommended by the SER. However, the rest of the SER does not share
their point of view (SIB 38, 1971: 7, 8; SIB 39, 1971, 2, 3; SIB 43, 1971: 2-7;
SIB 44, 1971: 5-7). Growing unemployment, which leads them to the point of
view that their bargaining position has improved, may have influenced this
position (SIB 39, 1971: 4-6; van Doorn et al 1976: 461). This position, combined
with their refusal to discuss the conditions mentioned by the trade unions, means
that the failure of wage negotiations in the STAR is settled before they have even
properly started (SIB 45, 1971: 17, 18; van Doorn et al 1976: 462).
Although negotiations between trade unions and employers’ organisations on the
central level break down and ensuing repeated tripartite discussions on socio-
economic policies also do not lead to results, the government does not intervene
(SIB 35, 1971: 5-7; SIB 39, 1971: 2-6; SIB 41, 1971: 19, 20; SIB 45, 1971: 15-
18; SIB 46, 1971: 19-23). Government squarely puts the blame on trade unions
and employers’ organisations, but refrains from any concrete intervention to start
up the process of negotiations again. The government restricts itself to verbal
insistence on wage moderation. As a result, both parties claim that the
government supports their point of view (SIB 41, 1971: 19, 20; SIB 45, 1971:
17; van Doorn et al 1976: 467).
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Negotiations continue on the branch and company level, accompanied by strikes.
The government clearly does not wish to alienate trade unions and employers’
organisations, but to give the new wage setting system a fair chance. The slight
economic dip in 1971 may have alleviated their fear for exorbitant wage rises.
And in general, the outcome is a combined total wage rise of some 12%, as
recommended by the SER’s expert committee (van Doorn et al 1976: 499-500).
The government goes to great lengths to remove any obstacles in order to get
trade unions and employers’ organisations to conclude a central agreement. But
negotiations break down. The government does not intervene in order not to
aggravate relations with especially the trade unions any further. Decentral
negotiations are marked by conflicts.
1973
The need to combat inflation leads the government Biesheuvel II (KVP, ARP,
CHU, VVD) to urge the trade unions and employers’ organisations to conclude a
Central Agreement for 1973. In return, government is prepared to implement a
comprehensive policy for incomes and prices (SIB 35, 1972: 28-35).
In the 17th bi-annual report of the SER, both trade unions and employers’ or-
ganisations recommend a social contract between government and ‘social
partners’ to combat inflation (SIB 20, 1972: 2-5). Expectations rise high, but are
sorely tested. As a precondition for their participation in an anti-inflation policy,
trade unions demand from government an expansion of the (semi-) public sector
and a more levelled distribution of incomes, and from employers’ organisations
a commitment to central agreements, a positive position regarding the unions’
demands from government, and facilities for unions on the plant level (SIB 27,
1972: 15-20; SIB 35, 1972: 43-45). Employers’ organisations have quite a different
view on how to counter inflation. Their preferred policies are a reduction in the
growth of both public and private expenditure by reducing wage and price rises
to regain competitiveness on the world market (SIB 20, 1972: 20; SIB 23, 1972:
10-14). In response, trade unions announce a package of minimum demands which
government and employers’ organisation must meet to make a Central Agree-
ment feasible (SIB 42, 1972: 2-7). Within the NVV, the industrial trade union has
difficulties with this minimum package, because it is, in their view, restricted to
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material demands only. When the peak organisations reach a provisional agree-
ment with the employers’ organisations, it takes some time to placate them (SIB
41, 1972: 4-7; SIB 42, 1972: 6).
The outgoing government plays a crucial part in the negotiation process. By
making concessions to both parties, an agreement is reached (SIB 42, 1972: 10,
11). Employers’ organisations initially refuse to sign the official agreement,
because government in the mean time has capped prices in a response to a recent
price hike. This puts the result of the laborious process of negotiations in jeopardy
(SIB 35, 1972: 36; SIB 41, 1972: 8, 9; SIB 44, 1972: 19-22; SIB 45, 29-31).
Only after new concessions by the government regarding price calculations (SIB
45, 1972: 32, 33; SIB 46, 1972: 23), employers’ organisations agree to sign. The
price paragraph of the agreement is put on hold for as long as the government
price cap is in force.
This in turn leads the trade unions to demand compensation as well. The govern-
ment responds by not implementing its original plans for a franchise in the health
care insurance and for a ‘freeze’ of the amount of child allowance for the second
child (SIB 41, 1972: 8, 9).
The resulting Central Agreement concluded on 6 December 1972 is a
compromise based on major concessions by government to both parties:
- the price index figure in 1973 may exceed the figure of 1972 with a
maximum of 3.75%;
- other improvements of terms of employment in 1973, including wages, may
not exceed 3.5%;
- wages will be indexed completely, but with a ‘threshold’ of 0.75%;
- special attention for the position of the lowest paid;
- a step-by-step reduction in working hours that will not jeopardise the rise in
productivity; the aim is to achieve the 40-hour working week and a standard
of 20 holidays per annum in 1975 (SIB 41, 1972: 8, 9; SIB 42, 1972: 2-7, 10-
13; SIB 46, 1972: 23, 24; STAR 1985: 49).
In the manufacturing industry, the implementation frequently leads to big rows
(and strikes) between unions and employers’ organisations (and between the
general trade unions and the unions for higher paid employees who are not (yet)
represented in the neo-corporatist institutions on the central level), especially
with regard to wage demands in guilders, instead of percentages. More and more,
the unions use that device to give lower paid workers a higher raise than higher
paid employees (SIB 47, 1972: 10, 11; SIB 5, 1973: 9-12, 14, 21, 22; SIB 6, 1973:
17-20; SIB 9, 1973: 5, 6). As a result, first the NVV, and later also the NKV do
not participate any more in the SER and the STAR. Only with great difficulty
relations are patched up (SIB 15, 1973: 23-27; SIB 16, 1973: 21-25; SIB 18, 1973:
13-17; STAR 1985: 49). On the whole, the general trade unions are only mar-
ginally successful in pressing their demands (Windmuller et al 1983: 229-231).
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Although government policy has significantly facilitated the bipartite Central
Agreement, implementation leads to conflicts on the branch and company levels.
1974
The original demands of trade unions and employers’ organisations are quite far
apart: employers refuse any wage rises except compensation for rising prices;
trade unions demand that compensation, plus another 2.5%, and a structural rise
in the legal minimum wage on top of that. The employers are set dead against
any levelling of incomes. The trade unions are in favour. The employers are against
a further increase of the (semi-) public sector. The trade unions support the new
Den Uyl (PvdA, KVP, ARP, D66, PPR) government’s policy platform: a more
just distribution of incomes, power and knowledge, and they want a further
expansion of the (semi-) public sector (SIB 27, 1973: 26-31; SIB 33, 1973: 3-5).
From the start it is doubtful whether negotiations between unions and employers
will result in an agreement. Nevertheless, due to the insistence of the govern-
ment, parties remain at the negotiating table, and even reach some sort of a pro-
visional agreement:
- 2.5% wage rise (half in a percentage, the other half in guilders);
- price compensation with a 0.3% ‘threshold’ (for rising taxes), and a minimum
of 160 guilders per per cent for incomes up to 35,000 guilders per year
(higher incomes receive progressively less price compensation per percent)
(SIB 41, 1973: 25-30).
However, the rank and file of the employers’ organisations reject the agreement,
especially on the basis of the levelling effect of the agreed price compensation
(SIB 41, 1973: 25-31; SIB 42, 1973: 18-20). 
Trade unions refuse to continue the negotiations and return to their position at
the start of the negotiations. They do maintain the compromise reached on the
compensation of price rises in wages (SIB 42, 1973: 18-20).
The government reacts to the outbreak of the oil crisis in 1973 by preparing special
emergency legislation (Machtigingswet) which gives government extraordinary
powers for a three month period to enforce socio-economic policies to combat
the economic effects of the oil crisis and the oil boycott against the Netherlands.
The proposed government measures are based on the original Central Agreement
that failed (SIB 42, 1973: 39; SIB 43, 1973: 28-34; SIB 1, 1974: 13-15; STAR
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1985: 49, 50):
- workers receive a specified wage rise of 45 guilders per month under the
duration of the Machtigingswet;
- price indexation, if agreed in contracts, is permitted;
- no special bonuses are allowed, unless specified in contracts, and should in
that case not exceed the amount or level of 1973;
- a reduction of working hours is permitted only when agreed to before 01-12-
1973, or included in existing contracts;
- as an interim measure, three months after expiry of contracts, a 3% price
compensation will be paid, with a ‘floor’ of at least 150 guilders per per cent.
The trade unions are not dead set against government intervention and do not
object to the government’s preparations for emergency legislation, although they
have a number of conditions: the measures should be temporary, employment
must be safeguarded, all income groups must participate, prices must be kept in
check, and there must be a 2.5% wage rise (SIB 43, 1973: 28-32; SIB 46, 1973:
36-38). The point of view of employers’ organisations is also clear. Although
they appreciate the fact that government has devised its policies in close consul-
tation with ‘social partners’, they strongly object to the government’s ‘favouritism’
towards the unions. And they feel it is wrong that the government uses the failed
agreement as a starting point of policies. They demand support for ailing
industries, no reduction in working hours, less costly labour legislation and a
general reduction in government expenditure (SIB 43, 1973: 32-34; SIB 44,
1973: 18, 19, 37, 38; SIB 45, 1973: 34-36).
The resulting emergency legislation (SIB 46, 1973: 15-21; SIB 47, 1973: 2-12)
takes into account the demands of both parties, without necessarily honouring
all. During the parliamentary debate, both parties appeal to parliament (SIB 47,
1973: 38, 39), but after parliamentary approval, they accept the legislation with-
out much murmur (SIB 46, 1973: 36-38). 
Under the Machtigingswet’s package, during the first three months of 1974 trade
unions and employers’ organisations are again granted the opportunity to come
to an agreement amongst themselves. The government proposes a new package
that includes the expenditure of some 2,000 to 2,500 million guilders to facilitate
the realisation of a Central Agreement (SIB 11, 1974: 11-13; SIB 12, 1974: 33-34).
Again, trade unions and employers’ organisations fail to come to an agreement.
As a result, based on the Machtigingswet, government issues a binding wage
measure:
- after expiration of contracts wages and other terms of employment are
‘frozen’ for three months;
- three months after expiration of contracts a wage rise of 15 guilders per
month is allowed;
- three moths after expiration of contracts a price compensation of 3% is
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allowed as an advance payment;
- the advance payment of the 3% price compensation will be at least 37.50
guilders per month and the minimum price compensation will be 160 guilders
on an annual basis;
- the price compensation will have a ‘threshold’ of 0.3%.
In its intervention, government remains quite close to the positions taken by
trade unions and employers’ organisations during the failed negotiations. There-
fore, both parties can and do accept the measures, although employers’ organi-
sations are more critical than trade unions (SIB 12, 1974: 32-34; SIB 13, 1974:
20-25; SIB 14, 1974: 15-19; SIB 15, 1974: 10-13).
Government tries to get trade unions and employers’ organisations to strike a
deal. Parties conclude an agreement, but that is rejected by the rank and file of
one of the parties. Negotiations are in a deadlock. The oil crisis induces the govern-
ment to implement its own policy package with regard to wages, based on the failed
Central Agreement. When parties can again not agree on wages, notwithstanding
a government policy package of public expenditure to facilitate negotiations, the
government implements a binding wage measure, taking into account the agendas
of the other actors. Both parties grudgingly accept this binding wage measure.
1975
To combat inflation, the government Den Uyl (PvdA, KVP, ARP, D66, PPR)
aims at the conclusion of a Central Agreement for 1975. The trade unions de-
mand, and are offered, a wage earner fund (VAD) as a pre-condition for agreeing
to a Central Agreement (SIB 39, 1974: 26-27), to which employers’ organi-
sations strongly object (SIB 38, 1974: 7-8), without, however, rejecting a Central
Agreement as such (SIB 39, 1974: 28). The rest of the 3,500 million guilder
package of government expenditure proposed is carefully tuned to accommodate
both trade unions and employers’ organisations. The package aims at boosting
production and employment, at an increase in incomes in real terms, and at less
inflation (SIB 44, 1974: 2-10):
- a temporarily lower income tax (840 million);
- extra funds for the housing and building sector (915 million);
- an extra 170 million for expenditures by local councils and provinces;
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- extra funding to protect and create jobs (200 million);
- extra funding to accommodate demand and supply on the labour market (200
million);
- assorted other measures (1,200 million).
Trade unions and employers’ organisations have the same point of view for
negotiations: a real increase in wages of 2.5-3% (SIB 26, 1974: 18-21; SIB 40,
1974: 39, 40). They differ in their assessment of price rises (SIB 42, 1974: 24,
25). But the unions also demand some sort of wage earner fund as a precondition
for a Central Agreement (SIB 38, 1974: 2-7). The government insists that parties
should postpone negotiations, to give government the opportunity to come up
with a policy package to make a Central Agreement possible. 
When the policy package of 3,500 million guilders is eventually revealed, in-
cluding the promise of a Bill on wage earner funds (SIB 39, 1974: 26, 27), it
does not bring unions and employers’ organisations to an agreement, despite all
attempts by the government (SIB 44, 1974: 2-10). Differing expectations of eco-
nomic growth, and the employers’ organisations resistance against any form of
wage earner funds, are the main stumbling blocks (SIB 39, 1974: 28; SIB 43,
1974: 5-8, 24, 25; SIB 44, 1974: 17). Further elucidation of the government’s
package also fails to bring the parties to an agreement, despite the relatively
minor differences between them. Employers’ organisations offer a wage rise of
1.5%, trade unions initially demand 3%, but are later willing to settle for 2%.
The breaking point is the levelling character of the price compensation de-
manded by the trade unions: half as a percentage and the other half in guilders80
(SIB 38, 1974: 2; SIB 44, 1974: 24, 25; SIB 45, 1974: 2, 6-8, 29; Windmuller et
al 1983: 230). The industrial employers’ organisation proposes a compromise: a
2% wage rise, provided the unions drop their demands for union facilities on the
plant level and the publication of all incomes (SIB 47, 1974: 23). As the retail
employers refuse to go along with this proposal, it is eventually dropped and cen-
tral negotiations break down. The decision on incomes policy is left to govern-
ment and parliament. Both parties petition parliament, that eventually approves
the government’s package (SIB 38, 1974: 2-8).
Negotiations are continued on the branch and company level. Government does
not intervene in these negotiations for which their policy package serves as the
bottom line (SIB 47, 1974: 23-26), notwithstanding the worsening of the eco-
nomic situation. It does not want to jeopardise its relations with both parties any
further, given the strains left by the Machtigingswet applied in 1974. Instead, it
keeps topping up its offers: apart from the 3,500 million mentioned above, another
1,000 million of government expenditure is announced (SIB 8, 1975: 15-21).
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80. Initially, the unions also demanded the wage rise be paid partly as a percentage and partly in guilders
(SIB 31, 1974: 9-13).
The government’s policy package of public expenditure first serves as an attempt
to get trade unions and employers’ organisations to conclude a central agreement.
Negotiations, however, grind to a halt in a deadlock. The subsequently enlarged
government’s package of public expenditure is nevertheless implemented and
serves as the bottom line for decentral negotiations in which government does
not intervene.
1976
In 1976, the Den Uyl government ((PvdA, KVP, ARP, D66, PPR) does its utmost
to arrive at an agreement with trade unions and employers’ organisations for
1976. The government again proposes extra government expenditures up to
3,000 million guilders despite growing budget deficits, to get trade unions and
employers’ organisations to agree to a Central Agreement:
- VAT increase postponed for 6 months (800 million);
- support for ailing industries (550 million);
- labour market policies (350 million);
- job-creation programmes (400 million);
- social security premiums paid by employers taken over by government via
taxes (600 million);
- furthering company investments by fiscal measures (50 million) (SIB 34,
1975: 13-26; 47, 48; SIB 42, 1975: 4).
The agendas of trade unions and employers’ organisations differ quite substan-
tially. Employers want real wage costs to lag 2.5% behind productivity. They are
also adamantly against any price compensation. Trade unions especially want to
preserve price compensation (SIB 38, 1975: 34-36; SIB 39, 1975: 23-25). There-
fore, there is no basis for further negotiations on the central level (SIB 41, 1975:
30, 31; SIB 42, 1975: 27-29).
With its policy package to boost the economy, government tries to bring parties
to a Central Agreement. However, negotiations between trade unions and employers’
organisations break down rapidly, despite several attempts of the government to re-
new consultations (SIB 41, 1975: 30, 31; SIB 42, 1975: 26-30; SIB 44, 1975: 17-20).
Failing a Central Agreement, government considers a binding wage measure.
When sounding out the respective opinions of the parties involved, employers’
organisations profess to have ‘major’, and trade unions even ‘insurmountable’
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objections (Teulings et al 1981: 56-58). Notwithstanding their objections, govern-
ment decides to use clause 10 of the Law on Wage Formation: a temporary
‘freeze’ of wages and other terms of employment by extending the duration of
collective contracts for a six-month period, excluding the compensation for
rising prices. As part of the package the government also ‘freezes’ the incomes
of the professions and high earners. The increase of VAT is postponed, the mini-
mum wage is raised extra, and price rises are capped. Ailing industries receive
extra subsidies (SIB 45, 1975: 10-17; STAR 1985: 50). Both employers’ or-
ganisations and trade unions object to the government’s intervention in what
should be, in their view, ‘free negotiations’.
During the period of the wage freeze, many discussions and negotiations between
government, trade unions and employers’ organisations take place. The government
tries to accommodate the trade unions by announcing it will come with a Bill on
the VAD and on a new style Workers’Council (Ondernemingsraad - OR). The govern-
ment also announces it will delete the infamous clause 8 from the Law on Wage
Formation, which gives the government the authority to intervene in individual
collective contracts, when deemed necessary. To accommodate employers’ orga-
nisations, the government promises to come up with Bills enabling a downward
adjustment of minimum wages and social security benefits (SIB 14, 1976: 2; SIB
18, 1976: 15; SIB 19, 1976: 74; SIB 22, 1976: 2, 3; SIB 24, 1976: 3-7, 29-33).
Meanwhile, the government is preparing itself for the event that negotiations for
the second half of 1976 break down as well. If that is the case, the ‘wage freeze’
will be extended with another six months, including a binding small wage rise
as compensation for rising prices (SIB 19, 976: 2, 3; SIB 26, 1976: 28). During
the negotiations, the government tries in vain to get trade unions and employers’
organisations to come to an agreement (SIB 25, 1976: 27-30). These cannot agree,
not even when the government extends the six-month freeze with another month
to give them extra time to conclude their negotiations. Especially the trade unions
criticise this extension. As no agreement can be reached, government decides to
extend the wage freeze to cover the second half of 1976 as well (SIB 28, 1976:
2-8; SIB 43, 1976: 25; SIB 47, 1976: 4-6). All in all, government policy in 1976
puts quite a strain on relations with both parties. But especially with the trade
unions, and more specifically with the FNV, relations have seriously deteriorated
(SIB 28, 1976: 17-23; Windmuller et al 1983: 233-235). 
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The government tries to facilitate negotiations by introducing a compensatory
policy package of public expenditure. However, negotiations break down rapidly
and are not resumed despite efforts by the government. Consequently, the
government institutes a six-month wage ‘freeze’ and implements its own policy
package of public expenditure. Negotiations continue for the period after the
wage ‘freeze’. However, negotiations bog down in a deadlock despite all efforts
by the government to induce both parties to come to an agreement. Therefore,
the government extends the wage ‘freeze’ to cover the rest of 1976 as well.
1977
As a result of both binding wage measures in 1976, relations between the Den
Uyl government (PvdA, KVP, ARP, D66, PPR) and the trade unions have reach-
ed an all time low. Relations with employers’ organisations are strained as well,
because of the government’s reform programme: wage earner Funds (VAD),
Works Councils (OR), rents and land policy (SIB 25, 1976: 22, 23). This has a
major impact on the negotiations for 1977. The government decides in advance
not to intervene in negotiations between trade unions and employers’ organisa-
tions (SIB 36, 1976: 32; SIB 40, 1976: 43, 44).
The agendas of trade unions and employers’ organisations (again) differ greatly
at the end of 1976. Employers still want to end the system of automatic price
compensation in wages to keep wage costs below productivity (SIB 18, 1976:
24-30; SIB 43, 1976: 23, 24), and are dead set against the reform programme of
the Den Uyl government (see also SIB 3, 1976: 9-12). The trade unions on the
other hand, reach the conclusion that the automatic price compensation is their
only effective defence against an ineffective government price policy. Never-
theless, they are willing to exclude some price effects from the index, like a rise
in VAT (SIB 41, 1976: 3-7). And they support the government’s policy program-
me, which includes a Bill on Wage Earner Funds (SIB 25, 1976: 20, 21; SIB 45,
1976: 16).
Despite incitements and mediation by the government, accompanied with in-
centives (lower taxes on wages and profits: SIB 40, 1976: 41, 42), parties are not
able to reach a Central Agreement. The main stumbling block is the automatic
price compensation. Consequently, negotiations are continued on the branch and
company levels (SIB 47, 1976: 13). With the guided incomes policy of 1976 still
fresh on everyone’s minds, and helped by reasonably good economic prospects,
the government does not intervene in these negotiations.
Early 1977 a series of strikes is organised by the trade unions to defend the
system of automatic price compensation. Negotiations on the lower levels grind
to a halt completely. The deadlock is broken by active mediation of the govern-
ment on the central level, at the request of the employers’ organisations (SIB 4,
1977: 20, 21; SIB 7, 1977: 14-16; Windmuller et al 1983: 239). In February 1977
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parties reach an agreement, the so-called ‘Protocol of The Hague’ (Haags Proto-
col). This Protocol is not a detailed Central Agreement, but a basis for further
negotiations on the branch and company level. In the Protocol, the demands of
the unions are honoured to a large extent. The system of automatic price com-
pensation remains in force that year, and on top of that a wage rise in real terms
is agreed. However, trade unions have to agree to a joint study of the whole
system of price compensation, and to a joint study on the relation between
profits and jobs (SIB 7, 1977: 14-17; SIB 20, 1977: 9; STAR 1985: 50, 51).
Based on the Protocol, negotiations on the branch and company levels resume.
The government refrains from any direct intervention, but continues with its pro-
gramme of reform and incentives to prop up collective contracts on the branch
and company levels (SIB 5, 1977: 11-13, SIB 7, 1977: 7, 8; SIB 8, 1977: 4-6, 14;
SIB 21, 1977: 11; SIB 26, 1977: 21; Windmuller et al 1983: 236, 237).
In the end, trade unions and employers’ organisations did not reach agreement on
their joint studies (Akkermans 1999: 52-54).
The government facilitates central negotiations between trade unions and em-
ployers’ organisations. Central negotiations break down. Negotiations on the de-
central level are marked by conflicts over the automatic price compensation. A
bipartite Central Agreement, mediated by the government, eventually resolves
these conflicts.
1978
Despite the Den Uyl government (PvdA, KVP, ARP, D66, PPR) is outgoing, they
actively intervene in negotiations on incomes policy for 1978. Following its
involvement in the so-called ‘Protocol of the Hague’ of 1977, both trade unions
and employers’ organisations expect a substantial contribution from the govern-
ment. Government in turn is prepared to come with a policy package of public
expenditure of 2,500 million, provided trade unions and employers’ organisa-
tions come to a Central Agreement aimed at wage moderation (SIB 40, 1977: 19,
20; SIB 41, 1977: 5, 6; SIB 42, 1977: 3, 4, 15).
Before negotiations even start, the FNV states its support of the policy goals of
the government. However, they and the other trade unions do not want to accept
a policy of moderation (of wages and government expenditure) for more than one
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year. There is little confidence in the results of such a policy (SIB 29, 1977: 22).
Employers’ organisations register a large series of complaints against the govern-
ment’s policy package. Their main objection remains the price compensation,
unless more sources of price rises are excluded from the index. On the whole,
employers’ organisations feel that the policy package of the government does not
sufficiently lower costs for them, despite extra offers by government (SIB 33,
1977: 16-19; SIB 34, 1977: 27, 28, 31; SIB, 42, 1977: 14 -18).
The trade unions are strongly opposed to the demand of the employers’ organi-
sations, but remain willing to negotiate. Although their demand for restoration
of buying power by means of price compensation is not relinquished, they do not
exclude the possibility that some sacrifices will have to be made for a reduction
in working hours in order to combat unemployment (SIB 26, 1977: 5, 6; SIB 34,
1977: 27, 28, 30, 31, 36, 37; SIB 36, 1977: 2; SIB 37, 1977: 22, 23; SIB 38,
1977: 9; SIB 41, 1977: 8, 9).
Both parties do agree that the government’s policy package is not sufficient to
reach a Central Agreement. Trade unions are indignant at the government’s
proposal not to raise wages (SIB 40, 1977: 15; SIB 41, 1977: 5), but blame the
employers’ organisations for the failure of the central negotiations (SIB 43,
1977: 24, 30, 31). Employers’ organisations feel that the package is not sufficient
to keep both buying power in tact and enhance the competitiveness of the market
sector. They conclude that negotiations will have to be devolved to the branch
and company levels. As a consequence, central negotiations break down (SIB 41,
1977: 6; SIB 43, 1977: 20-26).
Due to growing unemployment, the main item in the negotiations on the branch
and company level is the unions’demand for agreements on jobs and job security (Ar-
beidsplaatsenovereenkomst - APO), in return for moderation of wage demands
(including the price compensation) (SIB 43, 1977: 24-26; SIB 3, 1978: 17-19).
Because it is outgoing, the Den Uyl government does not intervene in the ensuing
negotiations on the branch and company levels, and neither does the incoming
government Van Agt I (CDA, VVD). The new government announces it will
honour the policy package devised by the Den Uyl government, and throws in
another 50 million to support agreements on jobs and job security concluded on
the branch level (the trade unions had demanded 500 million) and an extra 1,000
million to cut costs for employers (SIB 7, 1978: 10, 11; SIB 8, 1978: 24, 25).
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Both governments try in vain to bring trade unions and employers’ organisations
to a central agreement by offering compensating policy packages for public ex-
penditure. Both governments refrain from intervention in decentral negotiations.
1979
The policy programme ‘Bestek ‘81’ (Direction ’81) of the government Van Agt
I (CDA, VVD) largely determines negotiations on wages and terms of employ-
ment for 1979. Because of the worsening economic situation, government plans
to cut social security expenditure, health care and wages of civil servants and
other (semi-) public sector employees. The government’s aim is to reduce budget
deficits and at the same time to increase profitability in the market sector. To win
support by the trade unions, the government announces the speedy introduction
of the bills regarding the VAD and the OR (SIB 25, 1978: 12-19; Roebroek and
Hertogh 1998: 377, 378; Akkermans 1999: 57, 62, 63). Bestek ’81, to a large
extent, determines beforehand the room for wage rises. To accommodate the
trade unions government pledges to protect the purchasing power of people on
minimum wages and benefits, but only if and when the results of negotiations do
not exceed the limits set by the government.
Central negotiations break down in a very early stage. Trade unions blame the
government: it had nothing to offer (SIB 32, 1978: 23; SIB 42, 1978: 3-9; SIB
43, 1978: 14). Employers are disappointed but stress they were only prepared to
strike a cost-effective deal. The government squarely blames the FNV and
continues with the implementation of its policy programme (SIB 42, 1978: 6-9;
SIB 43, 1978: 7, 8; SIB 45, 1978: 37-39; SIB 3, 1979: 9-11; SIB 24, 1979: 19;
SIB 29, 1979: 6).
All trade unions have great difficulties with the government’s policy programme
Bestek ’81. They feel that the low-income groups pay for those policies and that
these policies do not reduce unemployment (SIB 33, 1978: 34-36; SIB 34, 1978:
11-14, 18, 19, 21, 22). The unions are especially indignant at the cuts in social
security benefits and wages in the (semi-) public sector which the government
announces prior to deliberations on those issues in the SER. Therefore, trade
unions decide to counter the government’s policies by including compensatory
demands in the negotiations on wages and other terms of employment. They
demand compensation for inflation for lower and middle income groups, a re-
duction in working hours, and agreements on jobs and job security (APO’s).
There is, however, a difference between FNV and CNV. The FNV is much more
inclined than the CNV to push negotiations to the brink (SIB 34, 1978: 11-14;
SIB 37, 1978: 11-13; SIB 38: 1978: 12).
Due to this clash between government and especially the FNV, employers’ orga-
nisations can afford to lean back, at the same time, however, insisting that Bestek
’81 should be implemented as quickly and completely as possible (SIB 42, 1978:
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3). When central negotiations eventually break down, because the trade unions feel
the government package is insufficient, employers’ organisations profess their
disappointment and renew their plea for a speedy implementation of Bestek ’81
(SIB 44, 1978: 2).
Both parties then intensely lobby parliament for their demands, but the govern-
ment succeeds in getting their programme approved without major changes. The
final version of Bestek ’81 does include some concessions to the trade unions,
but again, these fall far short of what the unions want (SIB 43, 1978: 14, 15; SIB
44, 1978: 2, 7). 
Renewed attempts by the government to get parties to conclude a Central Agree-
ment by offering a policy package of public expenditure of 770 million fail as
well, because the FNV feels that both the offer of the government and the re-
sponse of the employers’ organisations beforehand reject all their demands. The
CNV, habitually, takes a more positive stance towards negotiations and deliberations
between parties and the government (SIB 45, 1978: 37-39; SIB 1, 1979: 11-14;
SIB 3, 1979: 9-11).
During the ensuing negotiations on the branch and company levels, only the
FNV demands a wage rise above inflation. Half of the workforce receives a modest
wage rise on top of the price compensation. In all contracts the number of holidays
increases with one or two days. Total wage costs increase with some 6.5%.
Government does not intervene in the outcome of the negotiations (Windmuller
et al 1983: 241-243; SIB 2, 1979: 4-6). On the central level, talks about extra
employment policies, based on Bestek ’81, continue (SIB 4, 1979: 22; SIB 5,
1979: 7, 13, 17; SIB 8, 1979: 8; SIB 9, 1979: 17). A joint report of a tripartite
working party is, however, in the final instance rejected by the FNV, who in turn
come with their own report (SIB 32, 1979: 14, 15; SIB 33, 1979: 17, 18; SIB 34,
1979: 24; SIB 35, 1979: 16).
The government determines beforehand the room for wage rises. At the same
time, the government’s policy package to facilitate negotiations does include
incentives for especially the trade unions to entice them to conclude a central
agreement. These incentives, however, fall far short of the unions’ demands. The
subsequently enlarged government’s policy package with extra public expen-
diture equally fails to bring trade unions and employers’ organisations to a cen-
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tral agreement. The enlarged policy package is the framework in which decentral
negotiations take place. Government does not intervene in the outcome of these
negotiations.
1980
Wage negotiations for 1980 are completely dominated by the effects of the
second oil crisis of 1979. Trade unions, especially the FNV, make every effort to
get central negotiations going. Finally, they issue a concrete demand of a wage
rise of 2% above the price compensation (SIB 37, 1979: 21, 22; SIB 38, 1979:
10, 11). Only then, do employers’ organisations take up a clear position (SIB 38,
1979: 12). They regard this demand as ‘a slap in the face’ as it means a rise in
total wage costs of 5%. If unions stick to their demands, employers’ organi-
sations announce, they will not negotiate. As the government has announced tax
cuts, they feel that any demand above a 0.5% wage rise is unfounded. Employers
feel that the unions’ demands with respect to both wages and a reduction of
working hours miss their mark: keeping buying power in tact and reducing un-
employment (SIB 39, 1979: 5).
The Van Agt I government (CDA, VVD) then intervenes with an incomes policy
proposal based on wage moderation: price compensation plus 0.5% (SIB 37,
1979: 25).
The FNV counters with a demand for price compensation plus 1%. With this
demand employers can agree. However, negotiations break down on a condition
of the FNV: an extra payment between 0 and 1% for dirty, dangerous, and
disagreeable jobs (SIB 40, 1979: 5, 6; STAR 1985: 52). This became the so-
called ‘nearly-agreement’ (bijna-accoord) of 1980, which was (all but) con-
cluded, partly thanks to government intervention (see also Akkermans 1999: 67,
72-83, 88 on the internal ramifications for the FNV of this ‘nearly-agreement’).
Early January 1980, the new economic forecasts of the effects of the second oil
crisis become public (SIB 1, 1980: 49, 50). In response, government asks both
parties to agree to a four-month wage pause, to gain time to devise a policy ad-
justment and to try and get both parties to a Central Agreement after all. Both
parties refuse, and the government imposes a two-month ‘freeze’ of wages and
other terms of employment, excluding the price compensation. In this ‘wage
pause’ of two months the government will decide on appropriate measures to
counter the economic downturn. Trade unions and employers’ organisations are
asked to refrain from general wage rises and to reduce price compensations as
well. In return, the government offers a tax cut to protect the purchasing power
of people living on minimum wages and social security benefits (SIB 34, 1979:
39; SIB 37, 1979: 25; SIB 38, 1979: 7-9; SIB 2, 1980: 9-20; SIB 7, 1980: 7-11). 
Trade unions and employers’ organisations eventually fail to reach an agreement,
be it amongst themselves or with the government, even after an extension of the
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‘wage pause’ with another month, and repeated threats by the government that it
will ask for an extension of its regulatory powers under the Law on Wage For-
mation and impose a binding wage measure if no Central Agreement is reached
(SIB 33, 1979: 29-31; SIB 38, 1979: 7-9; SIB 40, 1979: 5, 6; SIB 4, 1980: 9, 10;
SIB 6, 1980: 14, 15, 24-26; SIB 7, 1980: 16, 17). 
Consequently, and despite strikes organised by the FNV against the proposed
extension of the governments powers (SIB 2, 1980: 14; SIB 4, 1980: 8, 9; SIB 8,
1980: 5-20; SIB 9, 1980: 18, 19), the government imposes a binding wage measure:
no real wage increase is allowed and the price compensation is reduced by
paying a set amount of 26 guilders per month to all (SIB 7, 1980: 7; Windmuller
et al 1983: 245/246). This intervention is followed by extra budget cuts to keep
the deficit under 6% (SIB 6, 1980: 16-20; SIB 7, 1980: 7-13; STAR 1985: 52).
Both employers’ organisations and trade unions thoroughly disagree with the
government’s intervention policy, be it from a different perspective. They do agree
on ‘free’ negotiations, without continuous government interference, but disagree
on the contents of the government’s policy. Employers’ organisations feel the
government does not go far enough, the FNV feel the government goes much too
far. The CNV’s position is between the FNV and the employers’ organisations
(SIB 6, 1980: 26-30). The government in turn, feels that parties can not
guarantee that free negotiations will not lead to excessive wage rises, which in
turn, through all linking mechanisms between the market and the (semi-) public
sector, will lead to even greater budget deficits (SIB 5, 1980: 9).
First the government facilitates central negotiations by announcing tax cuts.
When negotiations break down, government tries to get them going again by an
incomes policy proposal that almost succeeds in getting trade unions and
employers’ organisations to come to a central agreement. Then the effects of the
second oil crisis begin to become clear, and government asks both parties to
agree voluntarily to a wage pause. As parties refuse, the government institutes a
binding wage pause. As trade unions and employers’ organisations still cannot
come to an agreement, despite incentives offered by the government, the
government finally imposes a binding wage measure. The binding wage measure
is heavily opposed by both trade unions and employers’ organisations.
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1981
In 1981, driven by the steadily worsening economic situation, the Van Agt I
government (CDA, VVD) again sets limits to wage negotiations. No binding wage
measure will be imposed, if the rise of combined total wages remains below 8%.
Moreover, government is prepared to accept a higher budget deficit and offers
500 million to combat unemployment for every per cent that combined total
wages rise less than 8% (SIB 24, 1980: 3-6; SIB 25, 1980: 7-9). If, however,
trade unions and employers’ organisations cannot reach an agreement, the price
compensation or the holiday allowance will be capped (SIB 28, 1980: 3, 4).
Again, government urges trade unions and employers’ organisations to reach a
Central Agreement to exercise wage restraint. To make that possible, the govern-
ment proposes a policy package of public expenditure (SIB 25, 1980: 7-9; SIB
29, 1980: 17, 18; SIB 32, 1980: 24, 25). The package is, however, rejected by the
FNV, because it falls far short of the goals set by the FNV: a clear and working
employment policy, the targeted use of natural gas revenues for investment and
jobs, and a more fair distribution of the proposed income reductions. In addition,
the reductions in the price compensation by reducing its index and the cuts in
holiday allowances are non-negotiable for the FNV (SIB 24, 1980: 6; SIB 27,
1980: 11; SIB 29, 1980: 6, 7). For the CNV, the reduction of the price com-
pensation is negotiable, if that money, plus the natural gas revenues, is put into
a National Fund for Employment that is to promote investments that provide jobs
(SIB 26, 1980: 17, 18; SIB 27, 1980: 11).
Employers’ organisations, however, support the government’s policies. Their main
criticism regards the high level of the budget deficit and insufficient cuts in
public expenditure. They do agree with the reduction of the price compensation
(SIB 27, 1980: 10, 11; SIB 29, 1980: 7).
During negotiations employers’ organisations hold back and do not respond to
advances by the trade unions. Instead, they ask the government to implement its
projected policy of wage restraint (SIB 30, 1980: 4, 5). The differences between
both parties do not pertain as much to the amounts involved in the requested
moderation, but rather to the distribution over the different income groups, and
the effects on employment and profitability.
When negotiations do break down, government responds with a partial wage
measure, based on its previous policy proposals, which affects both new and
existing contracts. The price compensation is reduced by 2%, and the holiday
allowance with 0.5%. Existing ‘floors’ in holiday allowances are not to be in-
creased, and the allowances are capped at a maximum of 433.33 guilders per
month. The aim is a rise of combined total wages of 4 to 5%. In exchange, taxes
are cut as well. The government’s package does leave some room for extra
payments for dirty, dangerous and disagreeable jobs, but the government
immediately warns that ‘excessive’ wage rises will not be tolerated, that is, will
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lead to an encompassing wage measure (KHA 1980: 675, 698, 707, 775; SIB 32,
1980: 24-26; SIB 34, 1980: 7, 8; SIB 2, 1981: 42, 43; STAR 1985: 53). Trade
unions express their disappointment; especially because existing contracts are
broken open (SIB 32, 1980: 26). Employers’ organisations feel that the govern-
ment’s intervention is inevitable, because of failing government policy. As long
as the government does not solve the problems in the (semi-) public sector, the
only way out is to restrain the (parties in the) market sector (SIB 34, 1980: 9-11).
Early 1981, notwithstanding their disagreements on incomes policy, talks be-
tween employers’ organisations and trade unions on employment and labour
market policies continue in the STAR. These talks result in an understanding
between trade unions and employers’ organisations on three points: to further
employment, to redistribute existing employment, and to improve the operation
of the labour market. This understanding forms the basis for a series of recom-
mendations for decentralised negotiations on the branch and company levels. On
the central level, two working parties are installed to devise policies on employ-
ment and on bottlenecks in the labour market (SIB 2, 1981: 36, 37; SIB 3, 1981:
63-65; SIB 4, 1981: 84, 85; SIB 6, 1981: 145-147; STAR 1985: 53).
The government proposes a policy package of public expenditure to get trade
unions and employers’ organisations to conclude a central agreement on incomes
policy. The package is rejected by trade unions. In response, employers’ organi-
sations refuse to negotiate. Consequently, the government imposes its own in-
comes policy package on trade unions and employers’ organisations. 
On the issue of employment, trade unions and employers organisations manage
to come to an understanding on their own. This understanding forms the basis
for decentral negotiations.
1982
Before and in 1982, three governments are involved in wage negotiations: the
government Van Agt I (CDA, VVD), Van Agt II (CDA, PvdA, D66) and Van Agt
III (CDA, D66). The first Van Agt government continues with Bestek ’81: wage
moderation and cuts in social security benefits, health care, and wages of civil
servants and other (semi-) public sector employees, to prop up company profits
and reduce rising budget deficits (SIB 19, 1981: 465).
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The Van Agt II government proposes a dual policy package: reduction of the
growing budget deficit by continuation of cuts in government expenditure, ac-
companied by a job creation policy (SIB 24, 1981: 578-79; SIB 25, 1981: 603;
SIB 5, 1982: 100, 101). When parties cannot conclude a Central Agreement,
government intervenes with a partial wage measure (SIB 25, 1981: 600, 601).
Although the government in principle agrees to the contractual freedom of trade
unions and employers’ organisations, it reserves the right to intervene when deemed
necessary, but with a minimum of force, hence the ‘partial’ wage measure:
- a maximum of 46.50 guilders in compensation for each per cent price rise;
- holiday allowances are again cut with 0.5% and remain capped at 433.33 per
month;
- existing ‘floors’ in holiday allowances may, however, be increased with 5%
(SIB 3, 1982: 49, 50; STAR 1985: 54).
The second Van Agt government has a very bad relation with both the trade
unions (because of its proposals to reduce payments during sick leave (SIB 1,
1982: 7; SIB 5, 1982: 98, 99; SIB 6, 1982: 119, 120)) and the employers’ orga-
nisations (due to the levelling effect of capping and reducing the price compen-
sation and the holiday allowance). Due to internal disagreement over the policy
of job creation between the PvdA on the one hand, and the CDA and D66 on the
other, the government expires after six months (Windmuller et al 1983: 250-51;
Roebroek and Hertogh 1998: 379).
The minority government Van Agt III continues the original policy of the Van
Agt I government: further wage moderation and budget cuts. For the first time,
social security benefits are cut as well (SIB 11, 1982: 241, 242). The govern-
ment’s main task, however, is to organise elections. The partial wage measure
remains in force.
Although both trade unions and employers’ organisations agree that economic
growth is necessary, their opinions on the policy measures required to achieve
that goal are wide apart. Both parties object to the package the new Van Agt II
government proposes for the realisation of an agreement. Trade unions fear too
much moderation and employers’ organisations too little budget cuts. Within a
matter of weeks, negotiations have broken down and the government announces
a partial wage measure. Both parties protest to this intervention, individually and
as the STAR. Their main objections are that the intervention does away with
contractual freedom, and that it is not in the interest of economic growth. The
parties differ on the proposed corrections of the distribution of measures over
higher and lower income groups. The trade unions feel that the proposed distri-
bution remains unfair to the lower paid; the employers’ organisations are against
any kind of ‘levelling’ measures (Windmuller et al 1983: 250, 251; KHA 1982:
104-108; SIB 25, 1981: 600-602).
Parallel to the wage negotiations, the co-operation between both parties on
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employment, working hours and the operation of the labour market continues.
The two working parties formed in 1981 issue reports which act as a series of
recommendations to parties for decentralised negotiations on the branch and
company level on issues like part time work, early retirement, job creation,
education, labour exchange, et cetera (SIB 23, 1981: 552; SIB 24, 1981: 572-
575). Attempts by the Van Agt II government to prop up this co-operation by
issuing an employment package founder on the internal disagreement within the
government between the PvdA on the one hand, and the CDA and D66 on the
other (SIB 4, 1982: 84; SIB 5, 1982: 100-102; Windmuller et al 1983: 250-51).
On the issue of incomes policy, the various governments pursue their own course,
as trade unions and employers’ organisations cannot come to an agreement. On
the employment issue, parties intensify their co-operation, both on the central
and the decentral level.
1983
The outgoing minority government Van Agt III (CDA, D66) proposes a tough
budget for 1983. The aim is to prevent government finances getting out of
control completely. The expected budget deficit over 1982 will be above 10% of
GDP. Therefore, the government plans some 13,000 million guilders in budget
cuts in 1983 by ‘freezing’ social security benefits and salaries in the (semi-)
public sector on their July 1st, 1982 levels. And even then the expected deficit
for 1983 will reach 12% of GDP. Trade unions and employers’ organisations are
asked to comply and to exercise a 2% wage moderation, that is, inflation minus
2%. If not, government will intervene to make sure its budget policy is not un-
dermined by agreements between unions and employers. In return, government
is prepared to hold the financial finalisation of the budget until after consul-
tations with the STAR over wages and other terms of employment for 1983 (SIB
15, 1982: 329; Roebroek and Hertogh 1998: 379-80).
On 28 October 1982 CDA and VVD reach an agreement over a government
policy platform for 1984-1986. This opens the way for the formation of the
Lubbers I government. The 1983 budget is largely taken over from the outgoing
government. For 1984-1986, the new government proposes wage moderation for
the market sector of 2% per year (inflation minus 2%). The (semi-) public sector
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will face cuts of some 12,000 million guilders in total. Half of this amount is
achieved by cutting social security benefits and wages and other terms of
employment in the (semi-) public sector. The other half will come out of the
reduction of other government expenditure. Special measures to spare the lowest
paid workers are made conditional on the results of consultation with and
between trade unions and employers’ organisations (Nederlandse Staatscourant
28-10-1982; Visser and Hemerijck 1997: 100).
The agenda of the trade unions differs radically from the proposed government
policies. For both the FNV and the CNV jobs are the main issue. They accept
that in view of the severe economic problems income for workers cannot be
maintained. FNV and CNV reject, however, that cutting wages only can solve the
problems. In their view, that will only increase unemployment as a result of
declining domestic demand. Instead they argue for a comprehensive policy agree-
ment between the government, the trade unions and the employers’ organisa-
tions. The core of that agreement should be an exchange between price compen-
sation and jobs, by a reduction in working hours. The trade unions reject the
proposed cuts in the (semi-) public sector. They want to preserve all existing
linkages between the market and the (semi-) public sector (SIB 8, 1982: 166,
167; SIB 14, 1982: 307; SIB 15, 1982: 328, 329).
The employers’ organisations on the other hand see the proposed budget for
1983 as only the first step in a programme of even more cuts in the (semi-) public
sector to get government finances in balance again. They argue for free nego-
tiations on the decentral level of branches and industries, and reject a compre-
hensive central package like the unions propose. Only the retail organisations
protest against the announced government cuts for fear of reduced domestic
demand (SIB 15, 1982: 328, 329).
Both trade unions and employers’ organisations agree, however, that further
direct government intervention in wages and other terms of employment is un-
desirable (SIB 15, 1982: 328).
The incoming government Lubbers I puts pressure on trade unions and em-
ployers’ organisations by announcing that its government declaration in parlia-
ment will include yet again an intervention in wages and other terms of employ-
ment (see also Jones 1999; Andeweg 2000: 706). This induces Van Veen, chair-
man of the STAR for the employers’ organisations, to persuade Kok, chairman
of the STAR for the trade unions, to come to an agreement, the so-called ‘Ak-
koord van Wassenaar’ of 19 and 24 November 1982, to keep government out of
the market sector. Trade unions agree to suspension of the price indexation in
1983 and 1984, and employers agree to a reduction in working hours and the
creation of part time jobs in order to redistribute employment. Both acknowledge
that in the end it is the profitability and competitiveness of Dutch companies that
are the reference points for negotiations.
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The ‘Wassenaar Agreement’ is not a Central Agreement with detailed clauses,
but a ‘recommendation’ to parties on the branch and industry level to ‘break
open’ existing contracts in order to effect an exchange of price compensation for
a reduction in working hours81. In essence, the agreement is the first step of
decentralisation of wage negotiations in the market sector (SIB 6, 1985: 114).
On the central level, actors start working parties on the redistribution of em-
ployment and on youth unemployment (SIB 16, 1982: 353, 354; van Bottenburg
1995: 192-197; SIB 5, 1995: 10-13; SIB 12, 1997: 3-9; Kuipers 1998: 15-21;
Bruggeman and Camijn 1999: 265-271; STAR 1985: 54, 55; Visser and
Hemerijck 1997: 81, 82; Visser 1999: 288; Hemerijck and Visser 1999: 129-131;
Hemerijck 2002: 231-232).
The Wassenaar Agreement regards the market sector. In response to the agree-
ment, the government drops the proposed wage measure from its government
declaration on 22 November 1982, but announces even greater cuts in the (semi-)
public sector. Instead of 12,000 million over the whole period 1984-1986, it will
be 7,000 million annually over those three years, or 21,000 million in toto. And
for 1983, on top of the 13,000 million already in the budget, another 1,200
million is added. Reduction of the budget deficit and deregulation of social
security legislation to achieve a more flexible job market are the two main points
of the government’s policy platform (SIB 16, 1982: 359). Strongly opposed by
the trade unions, the government introduces the necessary legislation to ‘freeze’
social security benefits, the minimum wage and wages in the (semi-) public
sector. In effect, the (semi-) public sector is de-linked from the market sector
(SIB 16, 1982: 359; SIB 17, 1982: 386, 387; Visser and Hemerijck 1997: 101;
Akkermans 1999: 38).
In the market sector, the agreement is a great success, initially. On January 18,
1983 more than 75% of workers under collective contracts have their price com-
pensation suspended pending negotiations over where and how to use that money.
But not all renegotiations succeed (SIB 1, 1983: 19). The government therefore
announces that it will intervene with binding measures if unions and employers
fail to agree on a reduction in working hours. Both parties oppose the possibility
of intervention (SIB 2, 1983: 49-51). But under pressure of the government,
trade unions and employers’ organisations on the branch and industry level
succeed in reaching more agreements. In April 1983, some two-thirds of workers
under collective contracts have their price compensation exchanged for a re-
duction in working hours, usually in the form of early retirement and more
holidays. The collective contracts to this effect are usually for a period of up to
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81. The official title of the agreement is ‘Centrale aanbevelingen inzake aspecten van een werkgelegen-
heidsbeleid’ which translates roughly as ‘Central recommendations with regard to aspects of an em-
ployment policy’.
two years. They end January 1st, 1985 or after (SIB 9, 1984: 202). About one-
third of the workforce eventually receives their price compensation in cash as no
deals could be concluded. Trade unions and employers’ organisations are content
with these results, and so is the government, who refrains from intervention (SIB
4, 1983: 97; SIB 5, 1983: 126, 127). 
The government, in the mean time, continues and intensifies its programme of
budget cuts by announcing a reduction of the minimum wage for the under-23,
a reduction of social security benefits with 2%, and a capping of the holiday
allowance for (semi-) public sector employees (SIB 3, 1983: 69, 70; SIB 4, 1983:
98; Roebroek and Hertogh 1998: 384-85). 
Under strong pressure from the incoming government, trade unions and em-
ployers’ organisations succeed in striking a deal. The bipartite ‘Wassenaar Agree-
ment’ is an exchange of the automatic price compensation for a reduction in
working hours and the creation of part time jobs. Part of the agreement is the
continuation of studies and working parties on employment issues. As decentral
negotiations on the exchange proceed too slowly to the government’s liking, the
government threatens to intervene with a binding measure. This induces trade
unions and employers’ organisations to conclude more decentral agreements. 
Government policy is targeted on the reduction of the budget deficit by delinking
the market and the (semi-) public sector and cutting benefits and wages in the
(semi-public) sector. The proposed cuts are not implemented in 1983.
1984
The Lubbers I (CDA-VVD) government’s original policy proposals for a 2% cut
in minimum wages and social security benefits in October 1982 (see 1983) are
shelved. Instead, in May and August 1983, the government seeks official advice
from the SER on a new policy proposal for 1984. The new proposal includes:
- no indexation of minimum wages and social security benefits in 1984 (as is
prescribed by law);
- a 3.5% cut of all social security benefits and the legal minimum wage as of
1 January 1984;
- a reduction of social security benefits from 80 to 70% of last earned wages
(SIB 5, 1983: 113-117; SIB 9, 1983: 197).
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Combined style social partners A B C B C
Outcome IC
In line with these cuts, the salaries of civil servants and other (semi-) public
sector employees will also be cut by 3.5% on January 1st, 1984. 
The proposals are included in the 1984 budget that aims at a reduction of govern-
ment spending with some 10,600 million guilders in 1984, including a 2,000 mil-
lion guilder reduction in costs for employers (SIB 7, 1983: 170; SIB 9, 1983: 205).
Trade unions are opposed to these cuts. They argue that the people hardest hit by
the recession will carry the brunt of the budget cuts. Instead, unions propose a
lower cut in incomes for everyone, plus an employment programme to combat
unemployment, even if that means a higher budget deficit in 1984. They an-
nounce actions against the government’s 1984 budget (SIB 4, 1983: 98; SIB 6,
1983: 143, 144, 150; SIB 7, 1983: 170; SIB 9, 1983: 205, 206; SIB 10, 1983:
236, 241).
The employers’ organisations on the other hand, advocate even tougher cuts and
changes in the social security system. They feel that government is not going far
enough (SIB 6, 1983: 143). As to the 1984 budget, employers support the
government. If the budget is implemented completely, 1984 will be the first year
in which public spending and the budget deficit will not rise. The announced
reduction in costs for employers in the market sector is welcomed as well (SIB
7, 1983: 170; SIB 9, 1983: 206).
In October 1983, a majority in parliament approves the proposed budget (SIB
10, 1983: 236).
Consultations between the government, trade unions and employers’ organi-
sations in the STAR in October and November 1983 do not lead to agreement.
Trade unions organise the largest strikes and other actions by (semi-) public
sector employees and civil servants since 1945. Government acknowledges that
the difference in treatment of (semi-) public sector employees and civil servants
compared to workers in the market sector is a problem. In the market sector no
wage cuts are implemented, but instead an exchange between price indexation
and a reduction in working hours was effected in 1983. However, as trade unions
and employers’ organisations are not prepared to ‘break open’ existing collective
contracts in the market sector to effect comparable cuts in wages in return for a
further reduction in working hours, there is little the government can do to amend
this. The trade unions’ alternative plans are not acceptable for the government,
as they would increase the budget deficit. Employers’ associations support the
government. In a gesture to the trade unions, the 3.5% cut in wages and benefits
in the (semi-) public sector is reduced to 3%, and social security premiums paid
by employees are reduced with 1.3% (SIB 10, 1983: 236, 237; SIB 11, 1983:
257-271; STAR 1985: 56, 57; Akkermans 1999: 108-112).
This difference between trade unions and employers’ organisations is reflected in
the divided recommendation by the SER on the proposed cuts and other changes
in the social security benefit system: trade unions advise against, employers in
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favour (SIB 10, 1983: 213-218).
The agreement between government and employers’ organisations on this issue
induces the trade unions to step up their actions. The FNV also temporarily stops
its participation in all national advisory bodies until the law countering the 1984
budget has been officially effectuated (SIB 12, 1983: 289, 290). This is the case
early December 1983. All actions then cease officially. But the FNV threatens to
end its participation in the SER permanently, unless government is prepared to
have meaningful consultations, including a discussion of alternative proposals,
for future years. Duly, government states that it is well prepared to do so and
seeks to include social partners in its deliberations from an early stage. In
response, the FNV returns to the SER (SIB 12, 1983: 288, 289; SIB 1, 1984: 12).
In January 1984, government starts a round of separate consultations with trade
unions and employers’ organisations. On the agenda are the announced cuts in
social security benefits from 80 to 70% of last earned wages. Employers’ organi-
sations fear extra costs will result from these cuts, because in practice, through
collective contracts, benefits are usually - at least temporarily - increased from
80 to 100% of last earnings. Without any accompanying legislation these pro-
posed cuts will effectively mean higher costs for employers. Trade unions on the
other hand remain dead set against the proposed cuts. As a result, in March 1984
the SER again delivers a divided recommendation on the proposed cuts in social
security benefits as of 1 July 1984: employers are in favour, despite their mis-
givings on costs, and trade unions are against (SIB 2, 1984: 44).
Nevertheless, government decides to postpone its original plan to reduce
benefits from 80 to 70% of last earned wages in 1984. Instead, for 1984 a few
less drastic cuts are proposed, plus some changes in the system of bookkeeping
of social security funds. This policy change, however, does not pacify trade
unions. Employers’ organisations still prefer the original plan. But in June 1984,
a majority in parliament approves the government’s change in policy (SIB 4,
1984: 96; SIB 6, 1984: 159).
As most collective contracts (re)negotiated and concluded in 1983 cover 1984 as
well, negotiations in branches and industries in the market sector are minimal.
Incomes policy in the market sector is determined by the bipartite Central
Agreement and ensuing collective contracts struck in 1983 that cover 1984 as
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Trade unions style C
Employers’ organisations style C
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Outcome IC
well. Incomes policy in the (semi-) public sector is determined by the government’s
new policy package that is implemented against heavy opposition by the trade unions.
198582
Agendas and consultations for 1985 are influenced by the April 1984 recommen-
dation of the SER on mid-term socio-economic policy: ‘economic growth and
combating unemployment in a comprehensive policy’, both with respect to con-
tent and with respect to the organisation of consultations.
Trade unions and employers’ organisations agree on the general goals of the
policy: a recovery of the market sector, a reduction of public spending in relation
to market income to provide for growth in the market sector, a reduction of the
budget deficit, and a continuation of the redistribution of employment. They dis-
agree, however, on ways and means and timetables to reach these goals. Em-
ployers’ organisations want a continuation of the reduction of public spending to
reduce the budget deficit and costs for employers. In order to reach that goal,
incomes in the (semi-) public sector should lag behind those in the market sector.
Trade unions fear for growing unemployment as a result of reduced government
spending and cuts in (semi-) public sector incomes. They argue for solidarity
between (semi-) public sector and market sector. And they propose to use the
announced reduction in costs for employers to create employment. To this end
they are prepared to wait with a major reduction in the budget deficit until the
economy has sufficiently recovered.
The recommendation of the SER also proposes a reorganisation of consultations
between government, trade unions and employers’ organisations. In the be-
ginning of each year, the so-called spring consultation should be used to sound
out the ideas for next year’s socio-economic policies, in preparation for the
coming budget in September. In the autumn consultation, government and social
partners then can co-ordinate their policies for the coming year (SIB 4, 1984: 65-
70). The new system was immediately put in action.
Spring consultation
The Lubbers I (CDA, VVD) government announces it will continue with the
implementation of its original policy platform of reducing public spending and
the budget deficit. With regard to the projected annual reduction in costs for
employers, government is prepared to use that money to support the negotiations
315
82. In 1985, new legislation effectively ended any existing links between the market and the (semi-)
public sector with regard to wages. Within the (semi-) public sector, trade unions and employers’
organisations are ‘free to negotiate wages (…) but within limits set by the Cabinet’. In continuous
consultations with trade unions, ‘eight sectoral bargaining jurisdictions’ are introduced in 1993,
regarding ‘central government, local government, police, education’, (health) care, social services,
and the like (Visser and Hemerijck 1997: 101-102).
between employers’ organisations and trade unions on wages and other terms of
employment, but only if and when that may lead to a further reduction in working
hours, instead of an increase in wages. If that goal is achieved, government will
also reduce working hours in the (semi-) public sector.
Trade unions argue for fewer cuts in public spending to preserve employment in
the internal sector of the economy, and propose to use the reduction in costs for
employers for investments in the internal sector of the economy in order to boost
employment.
Employers’ organisations urge the government to continue its policies to reduce
public spending and the budget deficit, but to increase the proposed reduction of
costs for employers in 1985, and not to use that money for other purposes (SIB
5, 1984: 117, 118)
Agendas
The government’s agenda for 1985 has two priorities: a further reduction in
working hours (instead of higher wages) in the market sector, and a continuation
of the cuts in the minimum wage and in social security benefits. In 1985, the
minimum wage and social security benefits will again not be indexed for higher
prices. And the level of benefits will be reduced from 80 tot 70% of last earned
wages as of January 1st, 1985. By introducing tax reductions, the buying power
of the lowest paid and the people on benefits will be more or less maintained.
Employers will receive a reduction in costs of some 1,500 million guilders (SIB
9, 1984: 202, 203,210, 211; SIB 10, 1984: 245; SIB 11, 1984: 254).
The trade unions’ agenda for 1985 gives priority to a combination of maintaining
buying power of workers and getting a further reduction in working hours. A 36-
hour working week in 1986 is the ultimate goal. The FNV threatens to ‘seize’ the
proposed reduction in costs for employers as well, if government continues its
plans to reduce benefits as of January 1st, 1985 (SIB 10, 1984: 243-245; SIB 11,
1984: 269). All trade unions criticise the government’s 1985 budget for under-
mining solidarity between workers in the market sector and in the (semi-) public
sector, and between people on wages and people on benefits. In their view the
budget is also one-sidedly aimed at a reduction in costs for employers and a
reduction in government expenditure. Both of which have a negative bearing on
employment (SIB 8, 1984: 190; SIB 9, 1984: 211, 212).
The agenda of employers’ organisations for 1985 includes:
- no general collective increase in wages, but a continuation of wage moderation;
- no general collective reduction in working hours;
- special attention for employment measures aimed at young people (SIB 12,
1984: 290).
Employers’ organisations are in favour of the government’s 1985 budget with
respect to the reduction of spending and of the deficit. However, they feel the
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proposed reduction of costs for employers is both too low and in fact not a
reduction at all, due to some of the other government’s proposals. These include
a reduction of reserves of social security funds, which have been accumulated
over the years by contributions from employers. Also the proposed reduction of
social security benefits from 80 to 70% of last earnings will have to be ‘repaired’
by employers through collective contracts which up the legal percentages to
100% of last earned wages. Both these policies will effectively cost employers
more than they will get in the form of cost reductions. This aspect of government
policy is not helpful in restoring company profitability (SIB 9, 1984: 214, 215;
SIB 10, 1984: 244, 245).
Outcome
The SER advises almost unanimously against reducing paid sick leave from 80
to 70% of last earned wages, as that will jeopardise negotiations over the res-
toration of profitability and the redistribution of paid work (SIB 10, 1984: 217-
219). The SER is evenly split between trade unions and employers’ organisations
with respect to the government’s proposal not to index the minimum wage and
social security benefits. Employers are in favour; trade unions oppose the
proposal (SIB 10, 1984: 219-223).
During the autumn consultation, the government announces it will implement its
budget in 1985, as a majority in parliament has now approved it. Trade unions
reiterate their objections and employers’ organisations their support (except with
respect to the proposed reduction in costs for them). As no tripartite agreement
can be reached, negotiations for 1985 are referred to trade unions and employers’
organisations on the level of branches, industries and firms (SIB 10, 1984: 214). 
The FNV continues its actions and demonstrations against the government’s
proposed budget for 1985 (SIB 11, 1984: 270), and, together with the CNV,
announce that they will try to redress the effect of the government’s cuts in the
minimum wage and benefits in the collective contracts. Trade unions want a
further reduction in working hours as well.
Employers complain that this is a violation of the 1982 Wassenaar Agreement for
1983. That is based on both restoration of profitability and redistribution of
work. Redressing government’s policy, as the unions want, has a negative effect
on profitability of companies (SIB 10, 1984: 243; SIB 1, 1985: 15).
During decentral negotiations, the FNV organises strikes and other actions in
manufacturing industry and the building trade. Government threatens to inter-
vene in collective contracts if cuts in benefits are ‘repaired’, but does not live up
to it. In general, the social security cuts from 80 to 70% of last earned wages are
‘repaired’ to 100% in collective contracts. And in most agreements either a
further reduction in working hours is included, or at least a study into the
feasibility thereof. However, most workers will not get a 36-hour week in 1986.
317
Usually, a reduction of working hours is achieved by early retirement, part-time
jobs, and more holidays. The average full time working week remains around 38
hours in 1985 (and in 1986 in two-year collective contracts). Most agreements
cover one year, as opposed to 1983 when a majority of agreements lasted longer
than one year (SIB 3, 1985: 54; SIB 4, 1985: 75; SIB 5, 1985: 105-107).
Employers’ organisations and trade unions have a different evaluation of 1985.
The employers stress that collective contracts concluded, on the whole support
the notion of a combined strategy as agreed in the Wassenaar Agreement: res-
toration of economic growth (profitability) and of employment. This combined
strategy was also the basis of the July 1984 recommendations of the STAR on
youth unemployment. Employers also stress that the diversity in collective
contracts underlines their preference for decentralised negotiations leading to a
differentiation in results, that is, various forms of a reduction in working hours,
as opposed to a general, collective reduction.
Trade unions on the other hand state that 1986 will be crucial in their fight for a
redistribution of employment by reducing weekly working hours. In 1986, the
36-hour week will have to be effected, including concrete plans for employing
new, additional staff to fill the hours relinquished by the original staff. Until now,
this has not yet been the case. Further delay may give rise to the (dangerous) idea
that a redistribution of work does not lead to more employment. That the re-
duction in working hours in whatever form had indeed not yet resulted in more
employment up till mid 1985, was later borne out by research of the Ministry of
Social Affairs and Employment in September 1985 (SIB 7, 1985: 148, 149; SIB
9, 1985: 193; SIB 6, 1986: 18).
The government implements its own policy with regard to aspects of incomes
policy. Central negotiations between the three actors involved do not result in
any tripartite agreement. Decentral negotiations are characterised by strikes and
other conflicts organised by the trade unions to redress at least part of the
government’s policy package. Despite repeated threats, the government does not
intervene in these negotiations, although trade unions succeed in redressing the
effect of part of the government’s policy package. On the issue of working hours,
however, employers are able to withstand unions’ demand for a 36-hour week in
1986.
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Government strategy IV III I IV I
Trade unions style B B A A B
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Combined style social partners B B A A B
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1986
The Lubbers I (CDA-VVD) government’s agenda for 1986 is a continuation of
stiff budget cuts to reduce the budget deficit further. Employees in the (semi-)
public sector face a reduction of 2,000 million guilders. The minimum wage and
social security benefits are again not indexed to price hikes. That saves another
1,800 million. The insetting economic recovery has to be boosted primarily by
the continuation of the government’s policy to reduce public spending and the
budget deficit. Government sees no use for further large reductions in costs for
employers. Consequently, some of these subsidies will be terminated. For the
government, consultations with trade unions and employers organisations must
focus on two issues: labour market bottlenecks and long-term unemployment
(SIB 8, 1985: 169; SIB 9, 1985: 182-184; SIB 10, 1985: 209, 219, 220).
Trade unions position their agenda for 1986 in connection with the coming ge-
neral elections in that year and publish their agendas for the whole period 1986-
1990 in which a new government will be in charge. Their main points for the
period include a 32-hour working week in 1990 and solidarity between people at
work and people living on benefits, and between people working in the market
sector and people employed in the (semi-) public sector. The budget deficit has
to be reduced, but only in line with economic growth. Government’s policy
should increase spending in the domestic market sector of the economy. And as
an employer, government should also reduce working hours in the (semi-) public
sector (SIB 2, 1985: 37, 38; SIB 5, 1985: 104).
For 1986 specifically, trade unions go for a 36-hour week in the market sector.
In the (semi-) public sector a 37-hour week in 1986 and a 36-hour week in 1987
is demanded. On top of that, the FNV demands a 1.5% wage rise, which can also
be utilised for a further reduction in working hours, or can even be increased if
employers refuse any further reduction. The CNV refrains from wage demands
on the central level. That is left to branch and industry unions (SIB 7, 1985: 148,
149; SIB 11, 1985: 244, 245).
Like the trade unions, employers’ organisations position their agenda for 1986 as
part of their agenda for the new government’s period 1986-1990. Their main
points are the continuation of the reduction of the (semi-) public sector to reduce
the budget deficit, lower taxes and social security premiums for employers and
employees, and a moderate and differentiated development in the costs of wages
and other terms of employment. Redistribution of work (Wassenaar) should be
left to the branches, industries, and individual firms. It should definitely not be
collectively imposed. The same should apply to decentral negotiations on wages
and other terms of employment (SIB 5, 1985: 104, 105; SIB 10, 1985: 219, 220;
SIB 11, 1985: 244).
For 1986 specifically, employers’ organisations demand a 2,000 million guilder
reduction of costs for employers, part of which can be used to maintain buying
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power of employees in the market sector (SIB 4, 1985: 78).
Both trade unions and employers’ organisations are disappointed with the govern-
ment’s 1986 budget. Trade unions disagree with the government on all issues
regarding unemployment, government investment, reduction of working hours,
and the focus of cuts on (semi-) public sector employees and social security
benefits. More government investment and a further reduction of working hours
in the (semi-) public sector should in their view, tackle unemployment. And
again, employees in the (semi-) public sector and people living on social security
benefits bear the brunt of most budget cuts (SIB 9, 1985: 183, 184).
Employers organisations are disappointed over the, in their view, meagre re-
duction of costs for them in 1986 and fear that they will even face an increase in
costs in 1987. Employers’ organisations do, however, favour the government’s
general agenda of reducing the (semi-) public sector and the budget deficit (SIB
9, 1985: 182, 183).
For the tripartite consultations on November 29, 1985, the government sets the
agenda: furthering employment and combating unemployment. All three parties
involved agree that the policy to further economic growth, redistribute employ-
ment and solve labour market bottlenecks (Wassenaar) should be continued. To
that effect, four working parties will report on possible solutions for education
and training within industry, the long-term unemployed, youth unemployment
and better information on the actual number of unemployed (SIB 11, 1985:
232)83.
In the mean time, decentralised negotiations on wages and other terms of
employment are taking place in the market sector. Already in an early stage, the
FNV announces that the 36-hour week is not an issue for massive labour con-
flicts (SIB 2, 1986: 17). Consequently, the FNV, but also the CNV, are left out of
negotiations in some firms and industries where employers conclude separate
contracts with the MHP. These contracts do not include any further reduction in
weekly working hours (SIB 3, 1986: 11-14). Also in manufacturing industry, em-
ployers refuse a 36-hour working week. They prefer early retirement, part time
jobs and on-the-job-training for young people. In response, the FNV initially
refuses to sign the reports on education and training, and long-term unemploy-
ment on which agreement had been reached in the respective working parties on
the central level (SIB 3, 1986: 11, 12).
However, in May 1986, government, trade unions and employers’ organisations
agree in the STAR to set a common goal of less than 500,000 people to be
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83. After ‘Wassenaar’, government has refrained from direct intervention in wages or wage levels in the
market sector. In 1986, the 1970 Law on Wage Formation is amended. As of 1987, only one ‘legiti-
mate reason for government intervention in the formation of wages’ in the market sector remains,
and that is ‘a national emergency, caused by ‘external factors’ (Korver 1993: 394).
unemployed in 1990. This has to be reached by a variety of measures as men-
tioned in the final four reports on education and training (bipartite), long-term
unemployment (tripartite), youth unemployment (bipartite), and unemployment
figures and statistics (tripartite). The national organisations of trade unions and
employers call upon their affiliates to use these reports in the negotiations on the
branch and industry levels (SIB 4, 1986: 1, 2, 10-14).
Eventually, trade unions have to accept that the 36-hour week will not be reached
in 1986, which makes the prospect of a 32-hour week in 1990 unfeasible. Never-
theless, most contracts in manufacturing industry concluded in 1986 cover two
years, instead of one (SIB 5, 1986: 18; CNV Annual Report 1987: 24). Em-
ployers’ organisations conclude that the outcomes of the 1985 and 1986 nego-
tiations are completely in line with the Wassenaar Agreement. Some collective
contracts already have recommendations and measures with regard to education
and training, youth unemployment and the long-term unemployed (SIB 6, 1986: 18).
On the central level, the government succeeds in getting trade unions and em-
ployers’ organisations to come to an agreement amongst themselves and with the
government on aspects regarding (un)employment. On the decentral level ne-
gotiations on incomes policy are characterised by conflicts over working hours.
Employers’ organisations determine the outcome. The government determines
incomes policy in the (semi-) public sector.
1987
After the general elections early 1986, CDA and VVD continue their coalition
government in Lubbers II. The main point of their policy platform 1986-1990 is
to combat unemployment. To that effect, the government will further the economic
recovery, and continue to reduce government spending and the budget deficit. In
this effort, government seeks to work closely together with social partners and
aims at a Central Agreement or understanding regarding the main issues of
socio-economic policy for the coming period (SIB 7, 1986: 7-9; SIB 9, 1986: 11,
12; Roebroek and Hertogh 1998: 396).
As the Lubbers II government prepares the 1987 budget, it turns out that re-
venues from natural gas will drop dramatically in 1987. This induces the govern-
ment to implement further cuts in expenditure, and impose higher taxes and
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Government strategy I
Trade unions style A
Employers’ organisations style A
Combined style social partners A
Outcome IA
other revenues. Notwithstanding these emergency measures, the budget deficit
will rise again in 1987 (SIB 9, 1986: 11, 12). The minimum wage and social
security benefits will again not be indexed to higher prices (SIB 8, 1986: 8; SIB
9, 1986: 1; SIB 11, 1986: 9; SIB 12, 1986: 15).
Trade unions agree with the central issue of the government: bringing down un-
employment. They are, however, sceptical whether that goal can be reached with
the proposed policy platform. And they criticise the government’s continuation
of cuts in the (semi-) public sector, including benefits, as opposed to the market
sector. A general agreement or understanding with the government is only possible
if major policy changes are effected (SIB 7, 1986: 8-10; SIB 9, 1986: 12, 13).
With regard to the actual budget for 1987, trade unions acknowledge the need for
further cuts due to reduced revenues from natural gas. They oppose, however, the pro-
posed cuts for their adverse effects on employment and argue instead for higher
taxation and other revenues from companies and citizens (SIB 9, 1986: 12).
Unions’ agendas for 1987 differ. The FNV continues its campaign for the 36-hour
week. The CNV brings up a new issue: ‘investment wages’ (investeringsloon),
some form of wage rises to be paid into temporarily blocked accounts. This would
enable trade unions to differentiate demands according to the profitability of
companies, without any negative knock-on effects on benefits, pensions, in-
flation and the like (SIB 9, 1986: 11, 15).
Employers’ organisations also agree with what they see as the central policy issue
of the government: a further reduction of government spending to reduce the
budget deficit (SIB 7, 1986: 9, 10). But they are critical about the actual budget
for 1987, which will bring substantial extra costs for them (SIB 9, 1986: 12).
Employers’ organisations are also hesitant about the Central Agreement the
government proposes. They favour decentralised negotiations and solutions on
the basis of the four reports agreed upon in May 1986 (SIB 9, 1986: 13).
Tripartite consultations on October 31, 1986 do not lead to some sort of Central
Agreement on jobs before income, as the government had hoped for. However,
parties do agree on continuing the measures against unemployment which were
proposed in May 1986 (SIB 10, 1986: 1, 2). But even on these issues, agreement
is hard to reach. Employers’ organisations refuse to discuss terms for part time
work as long as the FNV insists on a legal arrangement for trade union activities
within companies (SIB 11, 1986: 14; SIB 12, 1986: 14). Trade unions and em-
ployers’ organisations are also at loggerheads regarding the minimum wage and
the holiday allowance.84 Employers oppose any extra rise, whilst trade unions
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84. Apart from the bi-annual indexation of the minimum wage and social security benefits required by
law (which was stopped since July 1st, 1983), the law on the minimum wage and the minimum
holiday allowance also asks for a review every three years to see if there is a need for an extra rise
of the minimum wage and the minimum holiday allowance.
want an extra rise (SIB 12, 1986: 1-3). As central negotiations bog down, decen-
tral negotiations continue, both in the market sector and in the (semi-) public
sector (SIB 12, 1986: 15; SIB 1, 1987: 15).
Early 1987, the government proposes new talks to resume the consultations
which were broken off in October 1986. All parties have their doubts whether
renewed talks will lead to results. Trade unions want more jobs and higher social
security benefits if they are to accept a ‘moderate’ development of wages and
other costs related to terms of employment. Employers’ organisations on the other
hand want lower wage costs (SIB 1, 1987: 13). 
Finally, in June 1987, central tripartite consultations resume. The outcome is a
confirmation of previous agreements in the STAR, and their continued application
on the levels of branches, industries and companies. Parties agree to a moderate
development of wages and other costs, to facilitate decentral agreements in order
to reduce unemployment. No central guidelines as to the appropriate means will
be issued. That will be left to the organisations on the decentral level.
In return, government pledges to do its best - within given financial constraints
- to ensure that the (semi-) public sector will be treated equal to the market sector
with respect to wages and benefits. Government also pledges to ensure that its
other policies will further and support the moderate wage and cost development
in the market sector as much as possible. Lastly, government pledges to try and
boost economic recovery by investment in the infrastructure.
The original working parties - youth unemployment, education and training,
long-term unemployment, and employment figures - will continue their work. To
show the government’s involvement, all working parties will be tripartite from
now on. Their reports will serve as inputs for the 1988 budget (SIB 6, 1987: 1, 2).
Decentral negotiations on collective contracts cover some 40% of the workforce,
as many contracts concluded in 1986 cover two years. Negotiations are tough. A
redistribution of work by reducing working hours is usually achieved by ne-
gotiating an earlier age to qualify for early retirement schemes, and extra days
for education and training purposes. Where appropriate, unions do succeed in
countering the reduction in social security benefits from 80 to 70% of last
earnings (CNV Annual Report 1987: 24, 25; 1988: 31; VNO Sociaal Economi-
sche Kroniek 1987: 70, 71). Visser and Hemerijck conclude “by 1987 the
campaign for shorter working hours was dead” (1997: 104).
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Outcome IIIB
With some difficulty, government succeeds in getting trade unions and employ-
ers’ organisations to participate in a tripartite Central Agreement. The agreement
is that parties renew their commitment to previous bipartite and tripartite
agreements on employment policies. Decentral negotiations progress with some
difficulty. Employers’ organisations determine the outcome with respect to
working hours, while trade unions succeed in countering the reduction in social
security benefits from 80 to 70%.
1988
The Lubbers II (CDA, VVD) government’s agenda for 1988 includes the repeal
of the law which governs the bi-annual indexation of the minimum wage and
social security benefits. Since July 1st, 1983 the law has not been applied in
order to achieve sufficient cuts in public spending. And the law will also not be
applied in 1988. The government proposes to replace the law with a system in
which the government can annually decide whether and how the minimum wage
and benefits may be adjusted to the general economic situation. As a concession
to the trade unions, government is prepared to up child allowances with 6%, and
to increase the minimum holiday allowance for people on minimum wages and
benefits from 7.5 to 8%. The people worst off will receive an extra one-off
payment on top of that. The government also proposes to end the legal minimum
wage for 15 to 17 year-olds, as they are usually enrolled in some sort of edu-
cation scheme at the workplace (SIB 1, 1987: 11; SIB 7, 1987: 12; SIB 10, 1987:
8; SIB 3, 1988: 1, 2, 5-7). The 1988 budget also includes lower taxes on wages
and lower social security premiums in order to keep wage costs down. However,
investment premiums for companies will be stopped. All in all, government
plans to reduce expenditure in 1988 with an additional 4,000 million, on top of
the 3,000 million in the policy programme (CNV Annual Report 1988: 28, 29;
Queen’s Speech 1987; Miljoenennota 1988)
The trade unions’ agendas for 1988 differ slightly. Both FNV and CNV want to
reduce unemployment, to have equal treatment of workers in the market sector
and in the (semi-) public sector, to get extra money for the lowest incomes and
for (massive) government investment to create jobs. If those demands can be
met, the CNV is prepared to exercise wage moderation. The FNV, however, also
want wage rises to increase real buying power of all employees. The FNV
especially argues for an active, anti-cyclical government investment policy in
infrastructure and the environment, instead of a continuation of budget cuts.
Both trade unions criticise the government for not living up to its promise made
during the spring consultations in 1987 to try and achieve a comparable
development of terms of employment in both the market and the (semi-) public
sector - within given financial constraints (FNV Annual Report 1987: 5, 6; 1988:
5, 7, 9; CNV Annual Report 1988: 31, 32).
324
Trade unions also oppose the government’s plans to shelve the law on the mini-
mum wage and the proposal to end the minimum wage for 15 to 17 year-olds
(SIB 9, 1987: 11, 12; SIB 10, 1987: 8).
The agenda for 1988 of the employers’ organisations aims at a continuation of
the reduction of the government’s budget deficit, even if that requires additional
budget cuts, and at a continuation of the reduction of wage and other costs to
support the continuation of wage moderation by the unions. Employers’ organi-
sations reject any Central Agreement for 1988 as that will, in their view, only
serve as a minimum, and thus create an upward effect on wage costs. Differen-
tiation is the keyword for them. From this perspective, employers are critical of
the government’s budget. Although the proposed cuts in taxation are welcomed,
employers feel that expenditure is still not under control. And while buying
power for employees will remain stable or even slightly increase, profitability
will decrease because of higher wage costs for companies. In 1988 moderation
of wages and other terms of employment is required, and government should
reduce spending. Employers’ organisations do support the government plans
with regard to the minimum wage, but only grudgingly agree to the increase in
child and holiday allowances, as that will increase their wage costs (SIB 9, 1987:
11; SIB 10, 1987: 8; VNO Annual Report 1987: 6, 12, 16).
The autumn consultations in September 1987 reveal the grave differences of
opinion between trade unions and employers’ organisations. The issue is the re-
lation between a moderation in wage costs and boosting employment. Parties can
not reach an agreement. Intervention by the government ensures that the four
working parties will continue their work and issue their final reports. These re-
ports will serve as recommendations for the organisations on the decentral
levels. The object is to further employment by taking measures on the company
level. This decentralised policy should also include a ‘sensible’ redistribution of
work and a moderate development of wages. In November 1987, the STAR (SIB
9, 1987: 11; SIB 1, 1988: 9) issues the four reports. And in February 1988 the
government and the STAR come to an agreement with respect to the law on paid
sick leave. Trade unions and employers’ organisations get greater responsibilities
in the implementation of that law than was originally planned by the government
(SIB 2, 1988: 7; SIB 4, 1989: 11).
The negotiations in branches and industries cover some 60% of the workforce in
the market sector. The outcome is a minimal rise in wages, no further collective
reductions in working hours, and although early retirement schemes are
maintained, they are not expanded. Education and training will be intensified,
flexible wage systems are introduced in some contracts, but the number of
clauses covering the re-employment of the long-term unemployed has not
increased (VNO Annual Report 1988: 11, 12; CNV Annual Report 1988: 31,
32).
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Trade unions and employers’ organisations cannot come to a central agreement.
The four working parties on employment policies continue their work and issue
their reports thanks to government intervention. These reports serve as a basis
for decentral negotiations. Decentral contracts are largely determined by em-
ployers and only marginally feature aspects of employment policies recom-
mended by the working parties.
1989
The Lubbers II (CDA, VVD) government’s agenda for 1989 again includes the
delinkage of prices and the minimum wage and benefits. The government also
again announces its intention to replace the law governing this indexation with a
new law that would allow a more flexible annual adjustment of minimum wage
and benefits (SIB 10, 1988: 1, 2). For the autumn consultations with trade unions
and employers’ organisations the government focuses on (un)employment.
Government grants and subsidies are earmarked to create jobs and to get the
unemployed back to work. A host of policies is proposed. Ranging from (wage)
subsidies for companies employing long-term unemployed to grants for taking
on young people in training schemes; from (wage) subsidies for employers
taking on people for unskilled labour paying the minimum wage to a modest
increase in income for families living on one minimum benefit. Taxes will be
cut, and child allowances will increase, to increase or maintain real buying power
of workers. And there is some extra money to improve terms of employment for
civil servants (SIB 11, 1988: 15, 16; Hoofdpunten van het regeringsbeleid 1989).
The trade union’s agenda includes equal treatment of employees in the market
and the (semi-) public sector, and an equal division of the available financial
room for terms of employment over wages, employment, and labour market
policies (FNV Annual Report 1988: 5, 7). Trade unions oppose the continuation
of the government’s policy of de-linking wages and benefits in the (semi-) public
sector from wages in the market sector (SIB 10, 1988: 1, 2).
The employers’ organisations criticise the government for its growing ex-
penditure and rising budget deficit (VNO Annual Report 1989: 9). Employers’
organisations support the government’s policy of de-linking the (semi-) public
sector from the market sector (SIB 10, 1988: 1, 2).
In October 1988, the government, trade unions and employers’ organisations
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Outcome IIA
meet to discuss government’s proposals to further employment and reduce un-
employment. Parties agree to refer these proposals to the new tripartite Central
Board for Employment (Centraal Bestuur Arbeidsvoorzieningen - CBA),
heading the new organisation of employment agencies85. The aim is to arrive at
a concrete plan for action, with recommendations (and financial support by the
government) for the affiliates of trade unions and employers’ organisations to get
the long-term unemployed back into paid work (SIB 11, 1988: 15, 16; SIB 6,
1989: 8).
In a response to a majority SER recommendation to reinstate the linkage be-
tween the minimum wage and benefits and wages in the market sector in 1989,
the government announces that it plans to use an extra 200 million to prop up
buying power of people on minimum wages and benefits in 1989. Employers see
this as a concession to trade unions. They themselves had argued for a reduction
of the gross minimum wage instead (FNV Annual Report 1988: 7; 1989: 20;
CNV Annual Report 1988: 30; VNO Annual Report 1988: 10).
In January 1989, the three parties meet again. This time the issue on the agenda
is the fast growing number of people on sick leave and disability benefits. All
parties agree that it is indeed an important social problem, that concrete steps
have to be taken to stem the inflow of people in these benefits and to further the
outflow of people from these benefits into paid jobs. To devise these concrete
policies, a tripartite working group is set up. Their brief is to propose measures
to reduce absence due to illness, to further the quality of work on the workplace
in order to prevent people falling ill, to give employers a financial stake in re-
ducing both the number of people on sick leave and on disability benefits, and
to get people on benefits back to paid jobs. 
To stress the urgency of the matter, government announces it will introduce
compulsory quota if efforts of social partners are not sufficiently successful. The
government will also see to it that the proposed law governing the quality of jobs
(Arbowet - Arbeidsomstandighedenwet) will come into force in 1990 (SIB 3,
1989: 13, 14).
Eventually, the tripartite talks on the long-term unemployed founder on the de-
mand of the FNV to release people on and just above the minimum wage from
the obligation to pay social security premiums (FNV Annual Report 1988: 9).
Decentral negotiations result in more clauses in collective contracts on education
and training, childcare, and projects for the long-term unemployed. Wages rise
moderately. No further collective reduction in working hours is achieved, early
retirement schemes are not expanded (VNO Annual Report 1989: 13, 14; FNV
Annual Report 1989: 7).
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85. For an extensive overview of Dutch labour market and employment policies, see Visser and
Hemerijck (1997: 155-179; 1998: 201-226) and Keman and Woldendorp (2000: 219-227).
Despite attempts and offers by the government, central negotiations on employ-
ment policies do not result in an agreement. On the issue of sick leave and dis-
ability a tripartite working group is started. Decentral negotiations show some
effect of the recommendations from the previous working parties on employment.
1990
May 2, 1989: the CDA-VVD government breaks up.
September 6, 1989: general elections.
November 7, 1989: start of the new CDA-PvdA government.
The new Lubbers III (CDA, PvdA) government’s agenda for 1990 is largely
based on the outgoing government’s budget. It includes a reinstatement of the
linkage between market and (semi-) public sectors, an increase in child allowances,
a targeted maximum wage rise of 2.5% for both sectors, and some 4,000 million
in tax cuts (SIB 1, 1990: 16; Startbrief). 
The government’s policy programme for 1990-1994 aims at economic recovery
plus ‘social renewal’ (sociale vernieuwing). That is getting people (married
women, partially disabled, long term unemployed, ethnic minorities) into paid
jobs by an active labour market policy (Roebroek and Hertogh 1998: 397).
The agenda of the trade unions for 1990 was derived from their programmes
covering the next government’s reign 1990-1994. The FNV, in its programme: ‘It
can be done differently, better’, stresses that no government can count on their
unconditional support. Support is conditional on the government’s policies ad-
dressing the union’s demands. The FNV demands more government expenditure
for the environment, for infrastructure and for education, health- and childcare.
It also wants to make up for the arrears incurred by the minimum wage and
social security benefits since their indexation to wages in the market sector has
been halted from July 1st, 1983. Benefit percentages of last earned wages should
be increased from 70 to at least 75%. To that effect, the proposed tax reduction
for higher incomes should be halved. The FNV also wants a 35-hour working
week in 1994.
The CNV, in its programme ‘The future in jobs’ also argues for a reduction in
working time, but has no preference for any of the possible measures: a shorter
working week, part time jobs, early retirement, longer holidays, et cetera. That
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should be left to the preferences on the industry and company level. The CNV
wants more support for families living on one income. And the benefit percen-
tages of last earned wages should increase to 75% (SIB 8/9, 1989: 1-3).
For 1990 specifically, the FNV demands a 4% wage increase, plus another 2%
for employment measures. The CNV refrains from issuing a central wage de-
mand, but agrees that part of the available ‘wage room’ should be used for em-
ployment (SIB 1, 1990: 16; CNV Annual Report 1990: 49-51; FNV Annual
Report 1990: 7).
Employers’ organisations also announce their programme for 1990-1994: ‘Give
employers full play in Europe’. Less government expenditure and lower costs for
companies is their main demand. Benefits should not be linked unconditionally
to wage rises in the market sector. No further reductions in the working week,
lower minimum wages and a continuation of wage moderation are next. Govern-
ment should spend less on subsidies and grants for rents, housing and social ser-
vices, in exchange for lower taxes. And disability insurance must be reconsider-
ed to stem the influx of claimants (SIB 8/9, 1989: 1-3)
For 1990 specifically employers criticise the reinstated automatic linkage be-
tween the market and the (semi-) public sector, and the government’s reluctance
to continue with budget cuts at the expense of the deficit. Expected economic
growth is basically used to pay for the linkage. The slightest economic downturn
will therefore increase government expenditure and the budget deficit. The an-
nounced average wage rise of 2.5% is much too high (VNO Annual Report 1989:
4, 5, 11-13).
Despite these differences, the autumn consultations on December 1st, 1989 lead
to an agreement. The three parties involved issue the so-called ‘Gemeenschap-
pelijk Beleidskader’ (GBK), or ‘Joint Policy Framework’. Its aims are:
- to institute an ‘activating labour market policy’86;
- reinstating the linkage between wages and benefits in the (semi-) public
sector and wages in the market sector as of January 1st, 1990;
- sustaining competitiveness of companies.
To achieve these aims, parties agree that a moderate development of wage costs
is essential. And to support that, government will stabilise government expen-
diture, social security premiums and continue to reduce the deficit. Parties also
agree that on the basis of this policy framework, more efforts are needed. Either
in the form of concrete agreements on the decentral level, or by further study and
recommendations by joint working parties. Subjects to be covered include the
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86. This is a concerted effort to get the individual unemployed to accept a job. Not only by subsidies
and grants for companies employing the formerly unemployed, or by employment schemes targeted
at companies or industries, but by directly approaching the individual unemployed with an offer
‘they can’t refuse’ on pain of benefit reductions.
redistribution of work, education and training, the position of women on the
labour market, furthering employment, a competitive market sector, good labour
relations and satisfactory labour conditions on the workplace (quality of jobs).
These recommendations have to be implemented in collective contracts (SIB 1,
1990: 1, 2, 13, 14; Akkermans 1999: 133; Slomp 2002: 242). Only the MHP
distances itself form the GBK as it feels itself ‘threatened’ by the sacrifices
asked from middle and higher ranking staff with regard to wage moderation (SIB
1, 1990: 16).
Decentral negotiations for collective contracts proceed with some difficulty.
Employees in the (semi-) public sector demand more than twice as much (6%)
as the government is prepared to offer (2.5%). Also in other industries and com-
panies there are problems. In some industries initial wage rises achieved are so
high that central trade union officials feel compelled to warn against high wage
demands which may undo the re-established link between the (semi-) public
sector and the market sector. In other industries negotiations break down and
strikes are organised because of tough demands of employers regarding early
retirement, overtime and waiting days when on sick leave. This induces the FNV
to accuse the VNO of going directly against the GBK (SIB 1, 1990: 16, 17; SIB
2, 1990: 21; SIB 3, 1990: 14-18). A government investigation covering 524
companies that was released in February 1990 seems to support this view. The
great majority of employers have until then done nothing with recommendations
by the STAR with regard to employment for ethnic minorities, young people and
the long-term unemployment. Government stresses that part of the GBK is the
agreement of all three parties to closely monitor decentral agreements. Govern-
ment reiterates its threat to come with compulsory quota, although it still prefers
consultations and voluntary agreements (SIB 3, 1990: 26; SIB 7/8, 1990: 28).
Trade unions regret that the agreements made in the GBK have not been concrete
enough (target numbers) and that employers have not been fully prepared to
implement these agreements (SIB 5, 1990: 8). Employers do agree that more
should be done with respect to non-wage agreements made in the GBK (SIB 5,
1990: 19). Slomp (2002: 236) concludes: “soon the agreement was a dead letter”.
In the end, all contracts expired are renewed. Wage rises are slightly above the
government’s target of 2.5%: between 2.7 and 2.8%, which is considerably lower
than the initial union demands of about 4%. But on the other terms of employ-
ment trade unions hold their ground, although no further reduction in working
hours per week is achieved. Furthermore, in all contracts concluded after the
GBK is issued, clauses are included stipulating specific employment measures
with respect to the targeted groups: ethnic minorities, young people and the
long-term unemployed (SIB 3, 1990: 25, 26; SIB 4, 1990: 18, 19; SIB 5, 1990:
14-19; SIB 7/8, 1990: 28). Employers’ organisations insist that this shows that
government does not have to go at it alone or impose policies with respect to
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childcare, ethnic minorities, or the long-term unemployed (SIB 4, 1990: 4-13;
SIB 5, 1990: 8, 19).
Nevertheless, government decides to give the money earmarked for childcare to
local authorities instead of to social partners. Both trade unions and employers’
organisations protest this decision. In the GBK, the three parties had agreed on
further consultations on this issue before any money would be spent. Clauses in
collective contracts on childcare are now endangered, as contract parties had
anticipated a government subsidy. And the SER had also advised to give the
money to social partners, instead of to the local authorities. However, govern-
ment sticks to its decision and refers social partners to the 700 local authorities
for consultation (SIB 4, 1990: 15; SIB 6, 1990: 17).
Tripartite negotiations result in a tripartite Central Agreement. Decentral negotiations
are characterised by strikes and other conflicts and end in compromises, based
on employment policies recommended by earlier working parties.
1991
The first budget prepared wholly by the Lubbers III government (CDA, PvdA)
contains a host of temporary policies aimed at a reduction of government
expenditure in 1994 with some 7,000 million guilders. The government announ-
ces it will propose structural measures in the spring of 1991, after the SER has
advised on socio-economic policies for 1991-1994.
In the mean time, government does not want wage rises to exceed 3%, in order
to be able to pay for the renewed linkage between wages, the minimum wage and
social security benefits. Unless the coming autumn consultation results in
agreements on wage moderation, jobs for (ethnic) minorities, and a reduction of
the number of people on sick leave and with disability benefits, government will
do away with the ‘consensus model’ and unilaterally impose socioeconomic po-
licies on trade unions and employers’ organisations (SIB 10, 1990: 18; SIB 11,
1990: 26; van Heertum-Lemmen and Wilthagen 1996: 121, 127, 219).
For trade unions, employment is again the central issue on the agenda, combined
with the linkage between wages in the market sector and wages and benefits in
the (semi-) public sector. Unions are willing to exchange wage moderation for
employment by a further reduction in working hours, and to conclude a Central
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Agreement with employers to that effect, provided the government actively
supports the creation of employment with its policies (SIB 10, 1990: 18, 19). The
FNV wants a further reduction in working hours per week to a 35-hour week in
1993. Wage rises should, in their view, not exceed inflation (estimated at about
2.5%) plus the rise in productivity in the various industries. Half of that rise in
productivity may be used for employment for (ethnic) minorities or other pur-
poses than wages. Both FNV and CNV warn against high wage rises demanded
by their various affiliated unions, which range form 4% (manufacturing, civil
servants) to more than 10% (ports) (SIB 11, 1990: 26; SIB 12, 1990: 19; SIB 1,
1991: 14, 15; SIB 2/3, 1991: 23).
Employers’ organisations announce they will not exchange wage rises for em-
ployment (SIB 7/8, 1990: 24). They flatly refuse a further reduction in working
hours and the reinstatement of any form of automatic indexation to prices (SIB
12, 1990: 19).
Autumn consultations in the STAR in October 1990 on the high level of sick
leave and disability claimants and unemployment of (ethnic) minorities lead to a
joint, tripartite declaration and a unanimous, bipartite report. The joint declaration
on sick leave and disability acknowledges the shared responsibility of all three
parties to the following package:
- special attention to health and safety measures on the workplace as an item
for negotiations on collective contracts;
- special attention for the prevention of absence due to illness on the company
level;
- intensified attempts to reintegrate workers on sick leave in the workforce;
- relaxing the rules and regulation to allow people on benefits to (re)start
working without prejudicing their rights on benefits (SIB 11, 1990: 23, 24;
van Heertum-Lemmen and Wilthagen 1996: 73-77; 118-144).
The report on reducing the high level of unemployment among (ethnic) mi-
norities forms the basis for a joint policy of trade unions and employers’ organi-
sations for ‘more work for minorities’. The target is to get 60,000 people from
(ethnic) minorities a job within a period of 4-5 years, starting in 1991. Edu-
cation, training and preventing discriminatory hiring policies are to be the main
tools. To that effect companies and employers’ organisations will work closely
with the regional employment offices (SIB 12, 1990: 14-16).
In response, the government announces it will refrain from any legal measures
to compel companies to employ (ethnic) minorities. The government will,
however, seek advice from the SER as to legislation, which might support this
agreement (SIB 1, 1991: 14; SIB 2/3, 1991: 19; SIB 3, 1992: 1, 2).
On the wage and working hours issue, trade unions and employers’ organisations
remain in disagreement. Unions want a 4-day working week and offer wage mo-
deration in exchange. Employers do want wage moderation, but are dead set
332
against any further reduction in working hours or a 4-day working week (SIB 12,
1990: 18).
Decentralised negotiations on these issues take place in the context of a divided
recommendation by the SER in January 1991 on socio-economic policies 1991-
1994, and the more structural policy programme of budget cuts 1991-1994 pro-
posed by the government in the so-called ‘Tussenbalans’ of February 1991.
The SER is divided between on the one hand the FNV and CNV, and on the other
hand the MHP, employers’ organisations and all ‘crown members’. FNV and
CNV oppose a further reduction in government expenditure, but would rather
use expenditure to create jobs. The more people in jobs, the less the budgetary
problems of the government. They are also in favour of a net linkage between
wages in the market sector and wages and benefits in the (semi-) public sector.
The majority in the SER sees it the other way round. Less government expen-
diture means fewer costs for companies and citizens which gives more room for
investment and jobs in the market sector. The linkage between market and (semi-
) public sector should not be on a net basis, and there should be ample provision
to suspend or delay the linkage if deemed necessary (SIB 7/8, 1990: 1-3, 6, 7;
SIB 2/3, 1991: 5-8).
The ‘Tussenbalans’ increases the reduction in government expenditure 1991-
1994 from 7,000 million to 12,800 million guilders. The government pledges to
retain the linkage between wages and benefits in the market and the (semi-)
public sector, but announces a rise in social security premiums if the rise of
wages goes above its target of 3%. Trade unions remain critical: employment is
not increased by budget cuts, and the (semi-) public sector again bears the brunt
of the reduction in government expenditure. Trade unions differ in their view on
the wage moderation demanded by the government. For the FNV wage mode-
ration is conditional on job creation in the market sector by a reduction in weekly
working hours. The CNV is in favour of wage moderation, but not under threat
of higher social security premiums.
Employers’ organisations agree with the CNV: the government’s position makes
any fruitful co-operation between social partners rather difficult. They find the
announced ‘punishment’ by higher premiums if wage rises come above the pre-
scribed limit ‘unacceptable’. At the same time, employers’ organisations stress
that the announced budget cuts remain insufficient and that other government
policies greatly increase costs both for business and citizens, making job cre-
ation even more difficult (SIB 2/3, 1991: 26, 27). Consequently, employers’
organisations boycott the spring consultations on the preparation of the 1992-
budget (SIB 4/5, 1991: 26; Bruggeman and Carmijn 1999: 287-88).
In branches and industries, collective contracts result in an average rise of about
4.7% in the market sector, which is well above the government’s target of 3%,
but fall short of the demands of some trade unions, which were as high as 10%.
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Nevertheless, the government refrains from intervention. There is no significant
further reduction of working hours in any form (early retirement, shorter work-
ing week, longer holidays, et cetera) (SIB 8, 1992: 22). But almost all contracts
contain clauses about reducing sick leave and disability (SIB 6/7, 1991: 32). As
to ‘more work for minorities’, 1991 has been used to set up a machinery to get
minorities a job. However, no significant number of people from minorities has
actually been employed yet in 1991 (SIB 6/7, 1991: 32).
Employers’ organisations conclude that decentral negotiations can lead to very
moderate wage rises. Employers’ organisations announce they do not want to
return to the (old) model of Central Agreements between social partners and
government, at least not on this issue (SIB 6/7, 1991: 34).
Under pressure from the government, trade unions and employers’ organisations
come to an agreement amongst themselves and with the government on sick
leave, disability and employment for ethnic minorities. Decentral negotiations on
incomes policy result in a higher wage rise than originally stipulated by the govern-
ment. Despite earlier threats, the government in the end refrains from interven-
tion. Most contracts also include clauses on sick leave and disability, and on
employment for ethnic minorities. Neither has yet materialised in any significant
reduction or improvement.
1992
Negotiations on incomes policy for 1992 are conducted in the aftermath of the
so-called ‘disability crisis’ between July and October 199187. The crisis starts
with a divided recommendation by the SER on sick leave and disability in July
1991. Employers and ‘crown members’ want to limit disability benefits, both
with respect to the percentage of last earnings and duration of the benefit. All
three trade unions reject this. Employers, ‘crown members’, CNV and MHP
agree on a much broader definition of suitable employment that people on sick
leave or disability benefit have to accept when offered (SIB 6/7, 1991: 1, 13-23:
Akkermans 1999: 140-144).
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87. See Visser and Hemerijck (1997:117-155; 1998: 159-201) and Roebroek and Hertogh (1998: 373-
460) for a detailed reconstruction of social security reforms between 1982 and the mid-1990s.
In response to this divided recommendation, the Lubbers III (CDA, PvdA)
government announces it will reduce both the percentage of last earnings and the
duration of benefits, broaden the definition of suitable employment and make an
exchange between days on sick leave and holiday’s compulsory (SIB 6/7, 1991:
1, 15, 33; Roebroek and Hertogh 1998: 397-401; 436-459). Trade unions than
start a series of actions, demonstrations and strikes against these proposals (SIB
10/11, 1991: 23). Their actions have some success. Government refrains from re-
ducing the duration of benefits. Instead, the percentage of last earnings is reduced
to 70% for the first year on sick leave. After that year people come into disability
benefit, and depending on age, the percentage is increased until a maximum of
80%. Existing benefits will not be reduced, but will remain ‘frozen’ until they
are on the same level as new cases. By law, all existing agreements in collective
contracts to increase benefit percentages to either 100% (sick leave) or 80%
(disability) are suspended by the government. These will have to be renegotiated.
Government calls upon employers not to give in to union demands in this respect
(SIB10/11, 1991: 24, 25).
The government’s 1992 budget reiterates the above policies. The government’s
targeted wage rise for 1992 is 3% in both the market and the (semi-) public
sector, with an expected inflation of 3.25%. The linkage between the market and
the (semi-) public sector will not be fully restored in 1992. That would call for a
3.6% increase (SIB 9, 1991: 12; SIB 10/11, 1991: 4, 31; SIB 3, 1992: 22; SIB 4,
1992: 15).
Trade unions reject the government’s policies on three counts. With regard to
sick leave and disability, the incomplete linkage between the market and the
(semi-) public sector, and the targeted maximum wage increase (SIB 10/11,
1991: 4). The CNV threatens to demand a 5% wage increase across the board
now the government has shown to be a completely ‘untrustworthy partner’. Be-
cause of bleak economic prospects, the FNV is much more moderate in its wage
demands: wage rises should at least cover expected inflation (3.5%). Further
wage demands will depend on the situation in the various branches and indus-
tries. Apart from wages, the FNV demands more jobs, especially for (ethnic)
minorities, and compensation for the government’s policies with regard to sick
leave and disability (SIB 10/11, 1991: 28). All three trade unions hold the
government responsible for destroying the existing ‘good social climate’ by its
policies (SIB 10/11, 1991: 31).
Employers’ organisations are content with the original government’s proposals
on sick leave and disability benefits (SIB 6/7, 1991: 15). They are more critical
towards the final policies, as these mean an increase in costs for employers if
they cannot manage a reduction in sick leave and disability claims among their
staff (SIB 10/11, 1991: 24). For 1992 and 1993 employers’ organisations an-
nounce they will refuse to agree on increasing the legal percentages of last
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earnings for disability benefits. Employers praise the ‘realistic’ position taken by
the FNV with respect to wages in 1992, but question whether the affiliated
branch and industry unions will comply (SIB 10/11, 1991: 26, 28, 30). Em-
ployers’ organisations criticise the government for its failure to reduce expen-
diture and its continuous increase of costs (benefits, rents, premiums, taxes, et
cetera). All economic growth expected in 1992 will be needed for extra govern-
ment expenditure. On top of that, government entertains a very ‘centralistic’
view on wage developments (SIB 10/11, 1991: 31).
The outcome for 1992 is that no autumn consultations between government,
trade unions and employers’ organisations take place. Government does not want
to budge on its disability policies, trade unions see no perspective for negotia-
tions with the government due to its continued reduction in spending, and em-
ployers’ organisations feel that on the one hand government does not go far enough
in reducing expenditure, and on the other hand keeps increasing costs for business
(and citizens).
In negotiations on the branch and industry level, employers put the financing of
the early retirement schemes on the agenda. Costs have doubled in 10 years.
Trade unions demand compensation for the government’s policies regarding sick
leave and disability. Parties agree that absence due to illness (the first step
towards disability) should be reduced (SIB 10/11, 1991: 17, 19, 26; Bruggeman
and Carmijn 1999: 287-288; STAR 1995: 98). 
In most collective contracts, trade unions succeed in getting compensation for
government policies with regard to sick leave and disability, albeit sometimes in
exchange for wage rises. This induces the government to publicly criticise
employers for undermining its policies to reduce absence due to illness (SIB 3,
1992: 21, 22, 25). 
Trade unions also manage to preserve existing schemes for early retirement, and
get an average wage rise of around 4.4% in the market sector. Almost no con-
crete agreements are struck to reduce absence due to illness. The same goes for
increased employment for (ethnic) minorities (SIB 5, 1992: 13; SIB 9, 1992: 8;
SIB 6, 1993: 9). Despite industrial action, wage rises in the (semi-) public sector
do not exceed 3%, the government’s target for 1992 (SIB 6/7, 1992: 12).
Central negotiations on incomes policy do not take place. All parties go their
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separate way. Trade unions clash with the government on its policy with regard
to disability and sickness. In decentral negotiations trade unions manage to get
their way to a large extent.
1993
The Lubbers III (CDA, PvdA) government’s main worry for 1993 is the per-
centage of expected wage rises, based on collective contracts concluded for 1992
and 1993. In the market sector the average wage rise already reaches 5%, cover-
ing 30% of employees under collective contracts. In the (semi-) public sector it
is 4.5%. This endangers the restored linkage between wages in the private sector,
the minimum wage, wages in the (semi-) public sector, and benefits. It also
endangers the government’s two main policy aims: more jobs and more people
at work. Therefore, the government favours a Central Agreement for 1993 to
restrict wage rises to a compensation for price rises, in exchange for lower taxes
and lower social security premiums. Wage rises in new contracts should not ex-
ceed 4%. The linkage of wages and benefits between the market and the (semi-
) public sector will be partial, like in 1992. Instead of a 3.8% rise (the average
expected wage rise across the board in 1993) the rise in the (semi-) public sector
will be restricted to 2.5%, both to keep government expenditure under control
and give people on benefits an incentive to find a job (SIB 3, 1992: 25; SIB 4,
1992: 13; SIB 6/7, 1992: 15; SIB 9, 1992: 10, 11; SIB 10, 1992: 8; SIB 11, 1992:
17). The government’s policy to reduce absence due to illness (see 1992) will be
implemented starting January 1st, 1993 (SIB 11, 1992: 26).
As economic forecasts for 1993 become progressively poorer, the government
asks trade unions and employers’ organisations to suspend agreed wage rises in
existing contracts for 1993 and to refrain from wage rises in new contracts. In
effect, government asks both parties to agree to ‘freeze’ wages in 1993 on the
1992-level. If parties can not agree voluntarily, the government threatens to
impose a wage freeze unilaterally (SIB 12, 1992: 14, 15; SIB 1, 1993: 14; Visser
and Hemerijck 1997: 106).
Finally, with great difficulty, the government succeeds in striking an internal
compromise between CDA and PvdA on the disability issue. Old cases will be left
alone (PvdA), but new cases will receive 70% of last earnings (instead of 80%)
for a maximum of three years (instead of until retirement) and then a lower benefit
until retirement, depending on age and other criteria (CDA) (SIB 3, 1993: 23).
FNV and CNV are not averse to a Central Agreement in which wage moderation
is exchanged for employment. They differ in appraisal of such an agreement. The
FNV wants concrete deals on employment first, before entering into wage
negotiations. The FNV is also quite critical of the government’s employment
policies. These do not create employment, but seek to get the unemployed out of
benefits. The CNV is more positive, both on government policies and on central
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negotiations. For the CNV a co-ordinated socio-economic policy is impossible
without Central Agreement between government and social partners. And to be
effective, such an agreement should be struck for at least five years. The MHP
does not agree that central negotiations are necessary to ensure wage mode-
ration. That can be left to negotiators on the decentral levels (SIB 5, 1992: 8; SIB
9, 1992: 10, 11; SIB 10, 1992: 15; SIB 11, 1992: 24).
At first, unions do not want to break open existing contracts. But if concrete
agreements on employment can be struck, the FNV is willing to consider the
possibility (SIB 12, 1992: 12, 15; SIB 3, 1993: 22)
Employers’ organisations are initially not in favour of a Central Agreement on
wage moderation, employment issues and lower costs for business and citizens
(SIB 4, 1992: 13). As economic forecasts worsen, employers also declare their
willingness to come to a Central Agreement. For employers’ organisations, how-
ever, the negotiations should be placed within the context of the EMU88, and its
consequences for the Dutch ‘consultation economy’ (overlegeconomie). Em-
ployers’ organisations are positive over the government’s 1993 budget, but feel
that it is not up to international economic developments that may undermine
economic growth (SIB 10, 1992: 14). Although they do not want to interfere in
existing contracts for 1993, employers’ organisations propose a wage ‘pause’ in
1993 by extending all expiring contracts with a few months (SIB 12, 1992: 12).
Negotiations and consultations take place against a background of steadily
worsening economic prospects for 1993. The same goes for the recommendation
by the SER on the EMU and its effects on economic developments, socio-eco-
nomic policy and consultations between social partners and between social
partners and the government89. The recommendation is unanimous and aims at
a joint policy of government, trade unions and employers’ organisations to get
more people into paid jobs. To that effect, both a reduction in costs imposed by
government on business and citizens, and a moderate wage cost development is
needed. To achieve these objectives, the ‘consultation economy’ has to be re-
vitalised (SIB 11, 1992: 1, 13-16; STAR 1995: 18-20). This unanimous recom-
mendation paves the way for a Central Agreement between employers’ organisa-
tions and trade unions in November 1992, after weeks of negotiations. Even-
tually, it is the government that makes the agreement possible after negotiations
in the end break down on the employers’ demand for a three-month wage pause.
In the final Central Agreement employers’ organisations and trade unions agree
to a two-month wage pause by extending collective contracts that expire on
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88. In December 1991 in Maastricht, the EU agreed upon the EMU. As of January 1, 1997, for a country
to be able to join the EMU, the budget deficit should be 3% or less of GDP, the public debt 60% or
less of GDP, and inflation should not exceed the EU-average with more than 1%.
89. SER, Convergentie en overlegeconomie. Den Haag, advies 92/15 of 20 November 1992.
January 1st, 1993 (collective contracts expiring on a later date will not be ex-
tended). This time will be used to formulate joint policies to further employment
and to reduce unemployment. In the mean time, government will take extra
fiscal and other measures to prop up buying power of employees. In conjunction
with a lower than expected inflation, real buying power in 1993 will increase
with 2.5%. The government will also refrain from direct intervention in wages
(SIB 12, 1992: 1, 10, 11; SIB 1, 1993: 14; STAR 1995: 17; Akkermans 1999: 147).
In November 1992, the SER also unanimously advises the government not to
implement the full linkage between wages in the market sector and wages and
benefits in the (semi-) public sector (SIB 12, 1992: 2).
Based on the Central Agreement, in September 1993 the STAR issues guidelines
for decentral negotiations. The aim is to keep older employees at work by various
devices (a complete reversal of policies since the late 1970s). Existing early
retirement schemes in which younger employees pay for the retirement of older
colleagues should be changed into schemes in which employees start saving to
pay for their early retirement themselves. Retirement in general should become
more flexible. People wanting to continue working after the legal retirement age
of 65 should be able to do so (SIB 19, 1993: 8).
Negotiations on the branch and industry level focus on the reparation of the effects
of government policy regarding sick leave and disability. Employers’ organisa-
tions and the government reject that reparation. The government even calls on
employers’ organisations not to give in to union demands and threatens not to
make collective contracts containing such clauses binding for the whole industry
concerned. However, on the whole, unions manage to get their way, albeit that
employees usually have to pay at least part of the price themselves. Only in a few
cases explicit arrangements have been made to reduce absence due to illness that
involve any pecuniary incentives, positive or negative. The average wage rise in
1993, however, is well below target: 2.6%, compared to an expected rise of around
4%, and slightly lower than inflation (SIB 4, 1993: 17; SIB 5, 1993: 9, 12, 13; SIB
6, 1993: 11-13; SIB 7, 1993: 16, 17; SIB 8/9, 1993: 10, 11; SIB 10, 1993: 10, 11;
SIB 12, 1993: 20, 21; Visser and Hemerijck 1997: 106; van den Toren 1996: 57). 
By the end of 1993, the STAR agreement ‘more work for minorities’ of 1990, is
estimated to have helped some 30,000 of the planned 60,000 people (between
1991 and 1996) to a job (SIB 2, 1995: 20, 21).
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Faced with deteriorating economic prospects, the government finally succeeds in
getting trade unions and employers’ organisations to come to a bipartite Central
Agreement on a wage pause. Decentral contracts involve a trade-off between
wage rises and reparation of the effects of the government’s policy with regard
to sick leave and disability.
1994
To reach its goal of a reduced budget deficit in 1994, the Lubbers III government
(CDA, PvdA) faces additional budget cuts of some 8,000 million. Government
considers a binding wage measure as well, to keep wages in the market sector in
line with de-linked wages and benefits in the (semi-) public sector, in order to
preserve as much employment as possible in the face of growing job losses. In
its 1994 budget, the government also proposes to freeze the minimum wage and
benefits in 1994. The SER is asked for advice on both issues. Simultaneously,
the government proposes to scrap the legal obligation to ask for the SER’s
recommendation (SIB 8/9, 1993: 1, 2, 7, 10, 11; SIB 10, 1993: 12; Visser and
Hemerijck 1997: 106, 107).
As an alternative to a binding wage measure, the government also toys with the
idea of a ‘solidarity pact’ with employers’ organisations and trade unions. The
pact would include no wage rises for a three-year period, to prevent
unemployment rising further (SIB 8/9, 1993: 14).
Trade unions reject any government intervention in wages and refuse to break
open collective contracts in 1994 to achieve a zero wage rise. They accuse the govern-
ment of undermining their position, instead of furthering an exchange between
wages and employment (SIB 10, 1993: 13). Instead, they propose an employ-
ment plan that would require the co-operation of all three parties. Employers
should increase company investment, further part time work, and agree to a
continuation of the reduction in working hours. Government should support
those efforts with fiscal and other policies, and should also implement their own
investment programme in infrastructure, R&D, environment and housing, at the
expense of a higher deficit. In exchange, unions are willing to accept a loss in
buying power, which means no wage rises in real terms (SIB 8/9, 1993: 2, 7, 10,
14, 15; SIB 11, 1993: 10).
For the decentral negotiations, trade unions limit their demands to compensation
for price rises, or less, depending on the actual situation in companies and in-
dustries. Other demands include a further collective reduction in working hours,
and the right for employees to change from full time employment to part time
employment if they so wish. All in all, it is left pretty much to branch and in-
dustry unions to fill in the package. The overriding objective is (the preservation
of) employment (SIB 11, 1993: 8, 10).
Employers’ organisations also oppose any binding wage intervention by the
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government, and they do not agree to break open existing contracts to implement
a wage freeze (SIB 8/9, 1993: 2, 7, 10). Employers’ organisations also reject any
long-term Central Agreements. They only want to negotiate for 1994, and only
with the trade unions (SIB 11, 1993: 10). In effect, employers’ organisations want
decentral negotiations with the unions restricted to the market sector, and the
government to continue its policy of reducing government spending (SIB 10,
1993: 13).
The rejection of binding wage interventions by trade unions and employers’ or-
ganisations is reflected in the almost unanimous recommendation by the SER
against such an intervention. Negotiations should be left to the decentral level of
branches and industries, because it is on that level that the most effective trade-offs
(or even pay-offs) between wages and other issues can be made. The SER also
unanimously advises to freeze the minimum wage and benefits in 1994, although
the FNV insists on compensatory measures by the government (SIB 12, 1993: 17).
Against the background of a deteriorating economy and pressure from the govern-
ment, employers’ organisations and trade unions manage to come to a Central
Agreement in November/December 1993: ‘A new direction’ (‘een nieuwe koers’).
The agreement sets the agenda for decentral negotiations in 1994 and following
years. In response, the government retracts from its planned intervention (van
Heertum-Lemmen and Wilthagen 1996: 219; Akkermans 1999: 148-149; Visser
1999: 289; Slomp 2002: 237).
The aim of the agreement is to contribute to a restoration of profitability of
business and to increase employment, both in terms of the number of jobs and
the number of people in jobs. The room for actual wage rises will depend on the
situation in the branches and industries, and should preferably be used to increase
employment. Employers’ organisations give up their resistance to collective re-
ductions in working hours, trade unions agree to a further decentralisation, dif-
ferentiation and flexibilisation of the terms of employment (Visser and Hemer-
ijck 1997: 107-08; van den Toren 1996: 58).
As to wage rises already agreed to in existing contracts, parties are suggested to
use those for other issues, like:
- part time work and flexible working patterns during people’s working lives
(STAR report September 1993);
- education and training;
- creating jobs for the long term unemployed and the partially handicapped;
- keeping older employees at work (STAR report June 1993);
- reducing absence due to illness (STAR report November 1991) (SIB 12,
1993: 1, 11-14; SIB 1, 1994: 5, 14; Bruggeman and Carmijn 1999: 288-89;
STAR 1995: 76-79; 111-121; van Heertum-Lemmen and Wilthagen 1996:
77-80; 144-168).
Decentral negotiations proceed on the basis of the Central Agreement. Wage
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rises in the market sector are minimal, but most contracts contain clauses on
blocked, tax-free savings accounts that are introduced by the government to
make wage moderation more feasible. Wages in the (semi-) public sector remain
frozen (SIB 7, 1994: 19; SIB 8/9, 1994: 9; SIB 10, 1994: 17; Visser and
Hemerijck 1997: 108).
Pressure by the government, combined with economic difficulties, brings trade
unions and employers’ organisations to conclude a bipartite Central Agreement.
Decentral negotiations proceed on the basis of this agreement.
1995
Negotiations for 1995 take place against the background of the general elections
in May 1994, and the SER’s unanimous recommendation on socio-economic
policy for the new government’s term in March 1994. 
Under pressure from its affiliated unions, the FNV distances itself from the
originally unanimous recommendation. As a result, all the other parties involved
accuse the FNV of damaging the ‘consultation economy’. The main bone of con-
tention is that the FNV rejects the continuation of the austerity policy of budget
cuts to comply with the EMU criteria of a maximum budget deficit of 3% GDP,
and a public debt of not more than 60% of GDP. All other parties in the SER
agree that government expenditure should be kept in check. Parties differ on how
to achieve that. The employers’ organisations and a majority of ‘crown members’
want to economise on social security benefits. Trade unions and a minority of
‘crown members’ want to shift taxes and other levies from labour to energy and
the environment. All parties agree that the linkage between wages in the market
sector and wages and benefits in the (semi-) public sector should not be
implemented if wages in the market sector and general unemployment increase
above a certain level. Delinking is also seen as an incentive for people on bene-
fits to seek and accept low paid jobs. Long-term unemployment of especially the
low and unskilled is identified as one of the two main socio-economic issues for
the new government. The other problem is the reform of the whole imple-
mentation machinery of social security benefits.
The FNV supports the general direction of the recommended policies, but rejects
the recommended extra budget cuts, especially on benefits, and wants to pre-
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serve, or rather to restore, the linkage between the market and the (semi-) public
sector (SIB 4/5, 1994: 1, 9-16).
A majority in the SER later that year agrees with the government that in 1995
the market and the (semi-) public sector can remain delinked. FNV, and now also
CNV, disagree, because they do not foresee excessive wage rises, nor an alarm-
ing increase in the number of unemployed (SIB 12, 1994: 20).
The agenda of the new, ‘purple’ government Kok I (PvdA, D66, VVD) is as far
as financial and socio-economic policies are concerned directed by the EMU
criteria. For 1995 the agenda includes a number of items. Firstly, delinkage of
wages and benefits in the market and (semi-) public sectors. Secondly, budget
cuts of some 4,500 million, including lower taxes, premiums and other levies.
Thirdly, a proposal for a complete overhaul of sick leave and disability benefits.
And fourthly, tougher criteria for unemployment benefits. In general, it will be
more difficult to get benefits, the duration of benefits will be shorter, and
benefits will not be indexed to inflation.
To increase employment (the new government’s motto is ‘jobs, jobs, jobs’ (werk,
werk, werk)), the government wants wage moderation. In return, it offers
reductions in taxes and premiums, plus an employment policy to create 40,000
‘additional’ jobs for the long-term unemployed90. Social partners are asked to
include pay scales for low paid jobs in their collective contracts under pain of not
declaring these contracts binding for the whole sector or industry (SIB 10, 1994:
2, 8, 9; SIB 11, 1994: 14; SIB 12, 1994: 22; SIB 3, 1995: 28).
The trade unions’ agenda for 1995 is quite moderate. Unions set a general wage
rise of around 2.5%, which will be just over expected inflation. In sectors and
industries which are doing well, unions have additional financial demands, like
blocked saving accounts, extra holidays, and the like (SIB 11, 1994: 12).
Employers’ organisations aim at differentiation in 1995. No collective (de)cen-
tral agreements on wages, working hours, and so on. The companies should be
the focus of negotiations, as was agreed in the 1994 agreement ‘A new direction’.
Those companies that are doing well can afford (large) wage rises and also a
reduction in working hours, but on an individual basis, not across the board (SIB
12, 1994: 22).
The issues during the autumn consultations are (un)employment and wage mo-
deration. Trade unions are only prepared to continue their policy of wage mo-
deration if more new jobs are created. The 40,000 ‘additional’ jobs offered by the
government do help, but are not sufficient. More part time jobs and a redistri-
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90. ‘Additional’ jobs are jobs subsidised by the government that are ‘necessary’, but for various reasons
not fulfilled. The single most important reason being that wage and other labour costs are too high
to make it profitable for employers to hire people for these activities (see Visser and Hemerijck
(1997: 155-179; 1998: 159-201).
bution of work by a further reduction in working hours are needed. Not enough
new jobs will mean higher wage demands. The unions declare that for them 1995
will be a crucial year with respect to the exchange of wage moderation for jobs.
Employers’ organisations are quite happy with the way central consultations
have been conducted lately: parties exchange their point of views and come to
the shared opinion that unemployment should be decreased. But to effect that,
employers maintain that decentralised, differentiated agreements are the best in-
struments. They reject any collective, across the board wage rises.
The government pledges its commitment to further part time jobs and a redistri-
bution of work by reducing regulations that impede a more flexible labour
market, provided that trade unions and employers agree to more low and unskill-
ed jobs in their respective collective contracts. To further that objective, govern-
ment is prepared to reduce wage costs for employers of those jobs (SIB 11, 1994:
1; SIB 2, 1995: 22; SIB 3, 1995: 30).
Decentral negotiations are characterised by a long duration and a number of con-
flicts in manufacturing, the building industry, banking and other sectors. One of
the main issues is the cost for early retirement schemes. On the whole, trade
unions have to accept a redesign of the schemes from a collective annual levy to
an individual savings system. Wage rises vary, but do not exceed 2.5%. No
significant reduction of working hours is achieved. In the (semi-) public sector,
however, wage rises are much lower, in return for a further reduction of working
hours per week to a 36-hour week in 1997.
Although more lowly paid jobs are created in collective contracts, government
doubts this will be enough to significantly increase the number of those jobs.
Government and social partners therefore agree to a joint investigation how to
create more of these jobs as input for 1996. Moreover, government announces it
plans to use the money earmarked for a reduction of costs for business to create
low and unskilled jobs. Both trade unions and employers’ organisations agree to
this proposal (SIB 4, 1995: 22, 23; SIB 5, 1995: 34, 35; SIB 6, 1995: 6, 22, 23;
SIB 7/8, 1995: 22, 23; SIB 9, 1995: 22; SIB 10, 1995: 27; SIB 11, 1995: 11; SIB
12, 1995: 26; SIB 1, 1996: 26; SIB 2, 1996: 27).
Central negotiations on (un)employment and wage moderation do not lead to a
central agreement, but parties agree to a joint investigation how to create more
344
1995
Government strategy II II II
Trade unions style A B A
Employers’ organisations style C B A
Combined style social partners A B A
Outcome IIA
jobs as input for 1996. Decentral negotiations on incomes policy are characterised
by conflicts and long duration. Trade unions realise their wage demands, but
have to accept the re-financing of early retirement schemes.
1996
The Kok I (PvdA, VVD, D66) government’s agenda for 1996 includes:
- a restoration of the linkage between market and (semi-) public sector with
regard to wages and benefits;
- a continuation of wage moderation;
- the creation of more low and unskilled jobs through collective contracts;
- subsidies for employers employing long-term unemployed;
- privatisation of the costs for sick leave to employers.
Public debt is declining, the budget deficit will go down below 3%, employment
is expected to grow with 100,000 jobs (sufficient to absorb new people entering
the labour market), and therefore unemployment will not increase (SIB 10, 1995:
14-16).
Trade unions agendas aim at a further reduction in working hours, plus a real rise
in wages. The FNV demands a 36-hour week in 1996, preferably in the shape of
a 4-day working week. Above the expected 2% inflation, the FNV demands at
least a 1% real increase in wages = 3%. The CNV concludes that as in 1995 the ex-
change of wage moderation for jobs has not resulted in more jobs, wage mode-
ration in 1996 is off the agenda. As the FNV, the CNV demands 3% and a re-
duction in working hours. In the longer term, the CNV wants to achieve a 4-day
working week of 32 hours (SIB 9, 1995: 22; SIB 11, 1995: 18).
Employers’ organisations give priority to flexibility of working hours and wages
in 1996. Their main objective is to get rid of all special allowances for working
overtime, working at night, in the weekends, and on holidays (SIB 7/8, 1995: 22).
They do not agree to the government’s policy of privatising sick leave benefits
(SIB 11, 1995: 16, 19).
Autumn consultations in October 1995 are wholly devoted to long-term unem-
ployment of ethnic minorities. The 1991 agreement on ‘more work for minori-
ties’ is extended with one year, to include 1996 as well. And trade unions and
employers’ organisations promise the government to do their utmost to get more
people from ethnic minorities a job. In exchange, the government ceases its
policy of making collective contracts only provisionally binding. In 1996, parties
agree, the STAR will report on the effects of the concerted efforts of unions and
employers. With respect to the privatisation of sick leave benefits, the govern-
ment refers the employers’ organisations to parliament that will have the last say
on this matter (SIB 11, 1995: 16, 19).
Decentral negotiations proceed with few problems, except at Philips. On the
whole, wage rises are about 3%. However, no significant reductions in working
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hours are achieved, although employers’ organisations did halt their central co-
ordination of this issue (Visser and Hemerijck 1997: 108). On the other hand, no
significant reduction in special allowances for working odd hours, as employers
insisted upon, is achieved either. Trade unions do succeed in getting a better deal
for ‘flex workers’ by the STAR agreement on ‘flexibility and security’ (SIB 5,
1996: 3-5). And most collective contracts include at least some clauses referring
to lower pay scales for low and unskilled jobs. But not enough to the government’s
liking. Unions and employers are advised that unless more of those jobs are
created, parties may see their contracts not made binding (SIB 1, 1997: 27; SIB 3,
1996: 26; SIB 4, 1996: 26; SIB 5, 1996: 28, 29; SIB 6, 1996: 26; SIB 7/8, 1996: 24).
Central negotiations are about the long-term unemployment of ethnic minorities.
The 1991 bipartite agreement is extended for another year. In exchange, the
government ceases its policy of making collective contracts only provisionally
binding. Decentral bargaining on incomes policy results in compromises.
1997
The Kok I (PvdA, VVD, D66) government’s agenda for 1997 includes the link-
age between market and (semi-) public sectors, plus a tax reduction of 1,000
million targeted especially at lower incomes derived from paid work to further
employment in low paid jobs and increase the financial difference between low
paid jobs and benefits. Although social security premiums will bring in an
additional 4,500 million to top up depleted reserves, this will have no negative
effects on either buying power or jobs. The EMU deficit will be 2.2% (Mil-
joenennota 1997).
The agendas of trade unions differ only slightly. The FNV assumes a total
‘negotiation space’ of 3.5-4%. Their maximum wage demand is 3%. This leaves
a maximum of 1% for ‘good causes’ like education and training, fighting age
discrimination, more security for flex workers, and employment agreements
targeted at the long-term unemployed. The 36-hour working week is also still on
the agenda. For the CNV the ‘good causes’ take priority over wages (FNV
Annual Report 1997: 1; CNV Annual Report 1997: 8).
For 1997, employers’ organisations again aim at a reduction of special allowances
for over time, working late, and working in weekends and on holidays. A re-
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duction in working hours will only be accepted in combination with proportion-
ally lower wages. In general, employers want more flexibility in working hours
and other terms of employment on the company level, as was agreed upon in the
1994 agreement ‘A new direction’. And wage rises should not exceed 2.5% (SIB
2, 1997: 22). From government, employers expect deregulation of markets and
industrial relations, and a sound budget policy (VNO NCW Annual Report
1996: 8; 1997: 6).
During the autumn consultations in October 1996, trade unions and employers’
organisations reach an understanding. Both parties reaffirm the 1994 agreement
‘A new direction’. For 1997, parties specifically agree to intensify education and
training schemes on the company level, and to get more people from ethnic
minorities a job (CNV Annual Report 1996: 15, 16; FNV Annual Report 1997:
4; VNO NCW Annual Report 1996: 41; Slomp 2002: 244).
Decentral negotiations proceed with few difficulties. The average wage rise in
the market sector is about 1.8%. The level of payment for low and unskilled jobs
is steadily going down to the level of the legal minimum wage. Collective schemes
of early retirement are giving way to more flexible and individual schemes, and
costs are more and more transferred from employers to workers. Most collective
contracts contain clauses referring to ‘additional’ jobs. But again no significant
reduction in working hours per week is achieved. Although theoretically “about
half of all full-time employees will move to an average working week of 36 hours
in the next year or so”(Visser and Hemerijck 1997: 108), this is usually in the
form of a 38-hour working week plus more holidays (SIB 7, 1998: 26; FNV
Annual Report 1997: 4).
However, for the government these agreements on jobs for the lower and un-
skilled are still progressing too slowly. Parties are again warned that if the pace
is not stepped up, the government will reconsider its policy with regard to
declaring collective contracts binding for whole industries (SIB 1, 1997: 27).
Trade unions and employers’ organisations re-affirm their commitment to the
1994 bipartite Central Agreement ‘A new direction’ and the 1991 and 1996 bi-
partite Central Agreements aimed at getting the long-term unemployed and
ethnic minorities a job. Decentral contracts are concluded without much problems,
although trade unions are only marginally successful in pressing their demands.
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1998
The Kok I (PvdA, VVD, D66) government’s agenda for 1998 includes an in-
crease in government spending with some 10,000 million and at the same time a
further reduction of the deficit to 1.7%. The government plans to shift financial
responsibility for sick leave and disability to employers. Lowering taxes and
other costs will create jobs for especially the low paid, unskilled. Although social
security premiums are again raised to continue to top up depleted reserves, the
negative impact on labour costs is offset by the growing number of people in jobs
and the declining number of benefit claimants. The government claims that in
general the policy of reducing (labour) costs to further wage moderation has
proved to be successful in the past years (Miljoenennota 1998).
For 1998, trade unions demand higher wages, above the expected level of 2%
inflation. FNV and MHP issue central figures: 3.75% and 4% respectively. Apart
from a real rise in wages, FNV and CNV also want central negotiations and
agreements on education and training, and on the rising level of labour intensity
in the workplace. The quality of jobs, or health and safety on the workplace, also
becomes an issue. For these and other issues another 1-1.25% is targeted by the
FNV (SIB 10, 1997: 22; SIB 1, 1998: 34; CNV Annual Report 1997: 14; FNV
Annual Report 1998: 13, 17-19).
Employers’ organisations reject the total wage cost percentages of 4-5% mention-
ed by the FNV. Employers fear that demands of that magnitude may easily
trigger a veritable ‘wave’ of excessive wage rises. Employers reiterate their ge-
neral policy position: lower wage costs by lower taxation and lower social security
premiums, flexibilisation of jobs, working hours and wages, and a restrained
general incomes policy (SIB 9, 1997: 22; VNO NCW Annual Report 1997: 14)
The outcome of central consultations is the agreement between social partners
on ‘Agenda 2002’, a new agenda for contractual negotiations in the coming years.
The 1994 agreement ’A new direction’ is vindicated, but a new central issue is
added: continuous investment in adaptability of companies and employees. The
agreement covers a large number of items and aims at
- a modernisation of industrial relations in which market demands on com-
panies have to be harmonised with demands and protection of employees;
- a further decentralisation and differentiation of wages and terms of
employment in which the economic profitability of companies, branches and
industries is the point of reference;
- a restrained general incomes policy;
- a continuation of declaring collective contracts binding for whole industries
(SIB 12, 1997: 23).
The agreement recommends social partners on the decentral levels to conclude
contracts on issues like education and training, career planning, combining paid
work and care, pensions, health and safety on the workplace, older employees,
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the long-term unemployed, and labour intensity (STAR Annual Report 1997: 8,
9; Slomp 2002: 238).
The outcome of decentral negotiations shows an average wage rise of about
2.8%, well below original demands. The number of contracts containing clauses
on individual arrangements for flexible retirement and saving holidays for early
retirement steadily increases (SIB 7/8, 1999: 18).
The FNV concludes that the recommendations of ‘Agenda 2002’ have not been
fully implemented in collective contracts in 1998. To further implementation, the
FNV will specifically focus on the issues in the agreement in the coming nego-
tiations on collective contracts in 1999 (FNV Annual Report 1998: 6).
VNO NCW on the other hand sees ‘Agenda 2002’ as part of a whole series of
recent bipartite agreements that signal the success of the STAR. In their view,
’Agenda 2002’ is a good mix between wages and other issues. It has to be im-
plemented on the decentral levels. That requires that the government exercises
restraint with respect to interference in industrial relations. Legislation can only
thwart negotiations and exchange between unions and employers (VNO NCW
Annual Report 1997: 17).
Trade unions and employers’ organisations agree on a new bipartite agenda for
contractual negotiations in the coming years (‘Agenda 2002’), based on the 1994
bipartite agreement ‘A new direction’. Decentral contracts are a trade-off be-
tween wages and re-financing of early retirement schemes.
1999
Negotiations for 1999 take place against the background of general elections in
May 1998. Trade unions and employers’ organisations issue their comprehensive
agendas for the next government’s term 1998-2002, both separately, and as a
recommendation by the SER on socio-economic policies 1998-2002. Social
partners recommend the government to continue the success of the consultation
economy and to continue to actively involve the SER and the STAR in economic
decision making in order to increase the legitimacy of socio-economic policy.
The involvement of social partners is also conditional for good labour relations
and an efficient transformation of central policies to the decentral levels. There-
fore, the policy of declaring collective contracts legally binding for the whole
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sector or industry should not be abolished. The SER regards this policy as one
of the cornerstones of the highly effective consultation model. And without it,
Central Agreements in the STAR like ‘A new direction’ or ‘Agenda 2002’ are
meaningless. The new government’s policy platform should also adhere to the
recent recommendations by the SER, and should incorporate the continued
involvement of employers’ organisations and trade unions in the implementation
of social security benefits (SIB 6, 1998: 9, 10).
With respect to incomes policy, the SER recommends to continue the differen-
tiated and moderate developments in wage costs, and to allow for more flexibility
in both (the level of) wages and (the amount of) working hours. Special attention
should be devoted to keep older employees at work, to get more people from sub-
sidised, ‘additional’ jobs into ‘real’ jobs, and to get more people from unemploy-
ment and welfare benefits into a job, ‘additional’ or ‘real’ (SIB 5, 1998: 17-20).
The new government Kok II is a continuation of the ‘purple’ coalition of PvdA,
VVD and D66. Its policy platform includes the continuation of the previous
government’s (un)employment policies. But pressure on social partners, especially
on employers’ organisations is stepped up by the announcement of two new laws.
These will give employees a legal right to use a specific number of days per year
to take care of dependants, and to opt for part time work (Regeerakkoord 1998).
The government’s agenda for 1999 aims at more jobs, a continued linkage of
market and (semi-) public sectors, and a dynamic and sustainable economy. To
that effect, government expects social partners to implement a restrained in-
comes policy, aimed at differentiation and flexibility in wages, and to focus
specifically on education and training. In turn, the government will implement
an active labour market policy, reduce costs for employees, and continue to make
it more profitable for people on benefits to get low paid jobs and to keep older
employees at work. For employers, the government plans to reduce the number
of obsolete regulations (Miljoenennota 1999).
Trade unions issue different central figures for demanded wage rises. The FNV
demands 3.5% across the board. The CNV gives an ‘indication’ of 3.25% from
which affiliated unions may differ in both directions provided they can argue
their case. The MHP declines to issue a central demand, but announces that 3%
should be sufficient. Apart from the wage rises, both FNV and CNV also demand
central negotiations on labour intensity, education and training, and all forms of
temporary, sabbatical and other paid and unpaid leaves. The FNV also demands
a 4-day, 36-hour working week (SIB 10, 1998: 22; SIB 11, 1998: 26; FNV An-
nual Report 1999: 4).
Employers’ organisations foresee declining economic growth in 1999. They
announce that a 2% wage rise is enough. Their other main issue is more flexi-
bility in the labour market. Hiring, firing and paying should become both easier
and more differentiated (SIB 11, 1998: 26; SIB 1, 1999: 22).
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Central consultations in October 1998 consist of an exchange of views on the
new, continued ‘purple’ government’s policy platform, the general economic
situation and the socio-economic agenda for 1999. In November 1998, govern-
ment asks trade unions to exercise moderation in their wage demands since
economic forecasts for 1999 become more and more pessimistic (SIB 12, 1998:
22). In December 1998 talks continue, based on a series of working papers on:
- labour market policy;
- policy towards older employees;
- agreements on health and safety on the workplace;
- education and training;
- getting the unemployed on the labour market.
Trade unions, employers’ organisations and the government conclude a series of
agreements on these issues for implementation on the decentral level and agree
to continue their deliberations on their differences of opinion on social security
reform (SIB 10, 1998: 21; CNV Annual Report 1998: 17). All issues are finally
wrapped up in the Spring consultations in June 1999. As economic growth turns
out to be higher than expected, although mainly based on consumption and not
on exports, wages are not a big issue. Government and social partners agree that
more attention should be paid to:
- the erosion of profits;
- the deterioration of competitiveness, and;
- the declining growth of employment.
Agreements are struck for 1999 and 2000, concerning a number of issues:
- the shortage of qualified staff - social partners will be included in any
government policy to redress that problem;
- European employment policy - Europe will become a standing item on the agenda
of consultation between government, trade unions and employers’ organisations;
- childcare - the number of places will be increased considerably by the
government; the STAR will include the issue in its guidelines for decentral
collective negotiations;
- training for the long-term unemployed - government and social partners will
jointly provide sufficient training positions;
- employability - in 1998, government and social partners agreed upon a 10-point
programme; by the end of 1999 and evaluation will have to show the results;
- reintegration of people on disability benefits - the 1998 tripartite action
programme on this issue is reaffirmed;
- ethnic minorities - the government’s policy is aimed at halving the difference
in unemployment levels between the ethnic minorities and the Dutch; social
partners must contribute; employers by complying to the law registering how
many people from ethnic minorities companies employ and trade unions by
encouraging their representatives in the works councils to take initiatives in
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this matter (SIB 6, 1999: 25; SIB 7/8, 1999: 16).
Decentral negotiations proceed with some minor difficulties, especially in the
market sector. The average wage rise is some 2.7%. The number of contracts
containing clauses on individual arrangements for flexible retirement and
holidays steadily increases (SIB 7/8, 199: 18). Trade unions and employers’
organisations are satisfied with the results, although they agree that implemen-
tation of the more qualitative aspects of the ‘Agenda 2002’ are still lagging
somewhat behind (FNV Annual Report 1999: 9; VNO NCW Annual Report
1999: 2; STAR Annual Report 1999: 7).
Trade unions and employers’ organisations conclude a series of Central Agree-
ments with each other and with the government. These are both a re-affirmation
of previous bipartite and tripartite agreements, and the adoption of new policy
issues like childcare for negotiations on incomes policy. Decentral negotiations
proceed on the basis of these agreements and result in compromises with which
both parties are satisfied.
2000
The Kok II (PvdA, VVD, D66) government’s agenda for 2000 includes lower
taxes and higher child allowances to increase buying power of the lowest income
groups. Therefore, government welcomes the unanimous recommendation of the
SER not to increase the legal minimum wage (SIB 9, 1999: 16/17; SIB 12, 1999:
19). Government pledges to continue its policy of lowering taxes and other costs
to further a moderate incomes policy. The bottlenecks in the labour market are
still the large number of long-term unemployed and the high unemployment
among ethnic minorities. Government wants to continue to tackle these issues
together with social partners. Government also proposes to take over the whole
system of implementing social security benefits from employers’ organisations
and trade unions, in order to be able to activate the long-term unemployed and
people on disability benefits (SIB 3, 2000: 15, 16; Miljoenennota 2000).
Trade unions’ agendas hardly differ. The FNV does not issue a central figure for
wage rises. Contracts already concluded for 2000 show an average wage rise of
some 3%. For new contracts, the FNV states, the figure will certainly be not
lower. However, the FNV wants to concentrate on the combination of paid work
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and care, or private life in general. Child care has to be doubled, possibilities for
paid and unpaid leave greatly improved, and workers should get a much greater
say in working hours. For these issues, the FNV plans to use another 1.5%. The
CNV issues an ‘indicative’ figure for wage rises of 3%, which is, however, not a
central demand. The CNV also will focus on issues like work and care, labour
intensity, employability, and jobs for minorities (FNV Annual Report 1999: 4;
CNV Annual Report 1999: 16).
Employers’ organisations insist on a continuation of wage moderation, flexibili-
sation of the labour market, reorganisation of government finances, increasing
employment ratios, improving and modernising infrastructure, and moderni-
sation of social security. Any attempts by the government to legally impose the
possibility for workers to obtain paid or unpaid leave to care for dependants is
rejected (SIB 2, 2000: 11; VNO NCW Annual Report 1999: 12).
On the central level, the government sees consultations more and more as a
possibility for parties to inform each other of their views. Negotiations on wages
and other terms of employment take place on the decentral levels of branches,
industries and companies. Government trusts that trade unions and employers’
organisations will agree to a responsible incomes policy in 2000, and refrains
from making its customary appeal for wage moderation (SIB 11, 1999: 3, 18). 
However, at the end of 1999, employers’ organisations and trade unions halt
further consultations with the government in response to the government’s plans
to oust social partners from the new organisation to implement social security
benefits. Especially trade unions reject these plans, but employers’ organisations
express their solidarity with the unions’ views. In the end, relations are patched
up again with a compromise: the existing organisations that implement social
security benefits are to be reorganised into one new agency, but trade unions and
employers’ organisations remain involved in the implementation of benefits in
an advisory capacity (SIB 2, 2000: 10; SIB 3, 2000: 15, 16).
Decentral negotiations proceed without much difficulty as the economy is
booming. During the spring consultation of 21 June 2000, the government
concludes that present wage rises are within reasonable limits. However,
competitiveness of companies may be jeopardised in the long run, if wage
increases are not moderated. Average wage increases near the 4%, with a 2%
inflation rate (SIB 7/8, 2000: 26).
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On the central level, contacts between the government and trade unions and
employers’ organisations can be characterised as consultations in which points of
view are exchanged. Negotiations take place on the decentral level and proceed
without much difficulty as the economy is booming and government policy
boosts buying power of the lower paid.
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Samenvatting
Het Polder Model: Van Ziekte naar Mirakel?
Nederlands neo-corporatisme 1965-2000
1. Inleiding
In de Nederlandse en internationaal vergelijkende discussie over neo-corpor-
atisme neemt het geval Nederland al jaren een prominente plaats in. Eerst als
voorbeeldig en effectief model van neo-corporatisme gebaseerd op een geleide
loonpolitiek in de jaren vijftig. Vervolgens als een even voorbeeldig maar uit-
eindelijk volledig ineffectief model van neo-corporatisme gebaseerd op een vrije
loonpolitiek in de jaren zeventig en tachtig, dat internationaal bekendheid kreeg
onder de noemer ‘Dutch Disease’, of ‘Nederlandse ziekte’. En ten slotte weer als
een voorbeeldig en effectief model van neo-corporatisme in de jaren negentig: het
‘Polder Model’ dat een ‘economisch mirakel’ tot gevolg had.
Recent is echter gebleken dat het ‘economisch mirakel’ toch niet houdbaar was,
ondanks het veelgeprezen ‘Polder Model’. De economische groei kwam tot stil-
stand in 2002 en werd vervolgens negatief in 2003. De werkloosheid en het
financieringstekort namen weer sterk toe. Met het toenemen van de economische
problemen nam ook de kritiek op het ‘Polder Model’ toe.
De veranderende waardering van het geval Nederland vormt de achtergrond voor
deze studie naar het neo-corporatisme in Nederland tussen 1965 en 2000. De
veranderende waardering van het geval Nederland is mijns inziens een gevolg van
de matige toepasbaarheid van de gangbare concepten van neo-corporatisme op de
veranderingen en ontwikkelingen in Nederland. Meestal leidt het toepassen van
deze concepten op het geval Nederland tot niet meer dan een beschrijving van de
historische ontwikkelingen van het neo-corporatisme in Nederland, in plaats van
een verklaring van die ontwikkelingen.
Mijn invalshoek voor onderzoek naar en vergelijking van Nederland is gebaseerd
op een andere, meer op actoren gericht concept van neo-corporatisme als een
regeringsstrategie van conflictregulering. Dat concept wordt in mijn onderzoek
gebruikt om het Nederlandse inkomensbeleid te verklaren als de uitkomst van een
proces van onderhandelingen tussen vak- en ondernemersorganisaties, en tussen
de sociale partners en de regering.
Het eerste doel van mijn onderzoek was derhalve vast te stellen of deze benade-
ring van neo-corporatisme als een regeringsstrategie inderdaad in staat was een
plausibele verklaring te geven van het Nederlandse inkomensbeleid tussen 1965
en 2000. Vandaar de eerste onderzoeksvraag:
1. Kan neo-corporatisme, gedefinieerd als een regeringsstrategie van conflictre-
gulering een plausibele verklaring geven voor de vorming en uitvoering van
het Nederlandse inkomensbeleid tussen 1965 en 2000?
Het volgende doel van het onderzoek was vast te stellen of het Nederlandse
inkomensbeleid tussen 1965 en 2000 - als de gezamenlijke uitkomst van onder-
handelingen tussen vakbonden, ondernemersorganisaties en de regering - ook
effectief was, dat wil zeggen of het inkomensbeleid ook oplevert wat de
betrokken actoren wilden bereiken. Vandaar de tweede onderzoeksvraag:
2. Was het Nederlandse inkomensbeleid tussen 1965 en 2000 effectief in termen
van de agenda’s van de betrokken actoren?
2. Neo-corporatisme als regeringsstrategie
Het concept neo-corporatisme als regeringsstrategie van conflictregulering is
uitgewerkt op basis van een uitgebreide behandeling van Nederlandse en inter-
nationale literatuur over Nederland als een voorbeeld van neo-corporatisme. Mijn
belangrijkste bezwaar tegen de meeste conceptualiseringen van neo-corporatisme
in deze literatuur is dat er geen rekening gehouden kan worden met verande-
ringen. Neo-corporatisme is er, of het is er niet (meer). De mogelijkheid dat neo-
corporatisme kan veranderen of in de tijd kan variëren in intensiteit past vaak niet
in deze concepten. Evenmin de mogelijkheid dat neo-corporatisme ook meer of
minder succesvol kan zijn door de tijd heen. Pas recent wordt daar in onderzoek
meer rekening meegehouden.
Essentieel in mijn uitwerking van neo-corporatisme als een regeringsstrategie van
conflictregulatie zijn de relatieve autonomie en de wederzijdse instrumentalise-
ring van de betrokken actoren. Vakbonden en ondernemersorganisaties hebben de
keuze of ze wel of niet willen samenwerken, met elkaar en met de regering. De
regering heeft ook de keuze om een neo-corporatistische strategie te voeren of het
inkomensbeleid aan de sociale partners op te leggen. Aan de andere kant zijn de
drie actoren ook tot op zekere hoogte afhankelijk van elkaars bereidheid tot
samenwerking om de eigen doelen te behalen. Elke actor maakt daarom de eigen
samenwerking afhankelijk van de beleidsmatige mogelijkheden in combinatie
met de concessies van de andere actoren. Uiteindelijk moet echter de uitkomst
van de onderhandelingen goedgekeurd worden door het parlement.
385
Deze interdependentie van actoren kan mijns inziens het best begrepen worden
door een combinatie van de Rationele Keuzebenadering met het Nieuw Institu-
tionalisme: het Rationeel Institutionalisme. De Rationele Keuzebenadering gaat
er van uit dat alle actoren een kosten-baten rekening zullen opmaken van de
doelen die zij nastreven, in relatie tot de doelen die de andere actoren nastreven.
Zo’n kosten-baten rekening gaat er van uit dat de beleidsovereenkomsten omvat-
tend moeten zijn en nul-som uitkomsten moeten vermijden. Een neo-corporatis-
tische regeringsstrategie kan een dergelijke oplossing bevorderen door publieke
goederen te leveren - bijvoorbeeld sociale zekerheid - die bindend zijn voor alle
partijen, in ruil voor samenwerking die voor allen voordeling zal zijn - bijvoor-
beeld macro-economische stabiliteit door loonmatiging.
De Nieuw Institutionalismebenadering wijst op de beperkingen die binnen de
instituties aan de acties van de verschillende actoren worden opgelegd, maar ook
op de mogelijkheden die instituties bieden voor de acties van de betrokken
actoren. Die bewegingsruimte van de actoren is afhankelijk van de stijlen van
besluitvorming die actoren binnen de instituties hanteren. Instituties zijn daarmee
intermediërende variabelen geworden waarbinnen intenties en opties zo kunnen
worden afgeruild dat nul-som spelen uitzonderlijk blijven. Door het wederke-
rende proces van consultatie en onderhandeling wordt een ‘logica van accommo-
datie’ gestimuleerd, in plaats van een ‘logica van conflict’. Op die manier kunnen
maatschappelijke conflicten gebaseerd op belangentegenstellingen, als onderdeel
van dit proces van consultatie en onderhandelingen, toch leiden tot consensus
door samenwerking en het sluiten van compromissen.
De regering speelt een vitale rol in dit proces. In de neo-corporatistische arena
hebben alle actoren vergelijkbare lijstjes met behoeften en belangen (agenda’s).
Maar per definitie zullen die behoeften en belangen verschillen naar de prioriteit
die ze voor actoren hebben. Vooral de behoeften en belangen van vakbonden en
ondernemersorganisaties hebben vaak een sterk afwijkende rangorde. Dat bete-
kent dat de regering zal moeten bemiddelen en compromissen zal moeten bevor-
deren. Tegelijkertijd is de regering ook een actor met een vergelijkbare lijst van
behoeften en belangen met een zekere rangorde. Om tot overeenstemming te
geraken is het nodig te proberen elke actor’s lijst te herordenen op basis van
(potentieel) gedeelde belangen. Tijdens het proces van consultatie en onderhan-
delingen, met alle bijbehorende conflicten, wordt het duidelijk of deze herorde-
ning tot stand kan komen en een overeenkomst gesloten kan worden. Die over-
eenkomst moet ten slotte door het parlement gesanctioneerd worden. Of deze
overeenkomst in de practijk ook leidt tot de ‘beste’ uitkomst voor alle betrokken
actoren is een andere kwestie (zie hoofdstuk 6)
3. Onderzoeksopzet en operationalisering
In hoofdstuk 3 heb ik uiteengezet waarom de combinatie van een vergelijkende,
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‘cruciale’ case studie van Nederland tussen 1965 en 2000 een adequate onder-
zoeksopzet is om mijn twee onderzoeksvragen te beantwoorden. De Nederlandse
case studie bestaat uit een serie van 36 opeenvolgende onderzoeken naar de jaar-
lijkse vorming en uitvoering van inkomensbeleid en de effectiviteit daarvan
tussen 1965 en 2000. Deze opeenvolging van 36 onderzoeken binnen de Neder-
landse case studie zorgt er voor dat zowel de interne - en tot op zekere hoogte ook
de externe - validiteit wordt vergroot als dat variaties door de tijd heen zichtbaar
worden. 
De operationalisering van de Nederlandse case studie heeft betrekking op de
periode, de institutionele setting en op de actoren, alsmede op mogelijke regerings-
strategieën en stijlen van besluitvorming van vak- en ondernemersorganisaties.
De onderzoeksperiode is 1965 - 2000. De periode van de centraal geleide loon-
politiek tussen 1945 en, ruwweg, 1963 viel af omdat het door mij gehanteerde
concept van neo-corporatisme als een regeringsstrategie uitgaat van de relatieve
autonomie en wederzijdse instrumentalisering van de betrokken actoren.
De institutionele setting voor de jaarlijkse onderhandelingen over de vorming en
uitvoering van het inkomensbeleid bestaat uit de jaarlijkse centrale onderhande-
lingen tussen regering en sociale partners en tussen sociale partners onderling in
de Stichting van de Arbeid (STAR), de Sociaal-Economische Raad (SER), en
tijdens het Voor- en Najaarsoverleg. Voorts uit de twee wetten op de collectieve
arbeidsovereenkomst uit 1927 en 1937 die tot gevolg hebben dat het overgrote
deel van de werknemers in de marktsector onder een CAO valt. En ten slotte uit
de Wet op de Loonvorming uit 1970 die in 1986 werd aangepast. Vanaf 1987 kan
de overheid alleen bindend in het inkomensbeleid ingrijpen als er sprake is van
een nationale crisis die wordt veroorzaakt door externe factoren.91
De betrokken actoren zijn de regering en de centrale organisaties van werkgevers
en werknemers. De regering is de regerende coalitie. Daarbinnen is de Minister
van Sociale Zaken (en Werkgelegenheid) de eerstverantwoordelijke voor het
inkomensbeleid.
De centrale werknemersorganisaties zijn de Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging
(FNV), het Christelijk Nationaal Vakverbond (CNV) en de vakcentrale voor
Middelbaar en Hoger Personeel (MHP). FNV en CNV proberen over het alge-
meen hun inkomensbeleid te coördineren. Coördinatie van het inkomensbeleid
met de MHP komt bijna niet voor.92 De centrale ondernemersorganisaties zijn het
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91. Dat betekende overigens niet dat de regering vanaf dat moment niet meer betrokken was bij de jaar-
lijkse onderhandelingen over het inkomensbeleid. De regering bleef grote invloed uitoefenen op het
inkomensbeleid door middel van de verantwoordelijkheid voor belastingen, sociale zekerheids-
premies, het wettelijk minimumloon, en de vaststelling van de toegangscriteria voor de sociale
zekerheid, alsmede de hoogte van de uitkeringen (inclusief de pensioenen).
92. De nauwe samenwerking van deze drie vakcentrales tijdens de organisatie van de vakbondsdemon-
Verbond van Nederlandse Ondernemingen (VNO) en het Nederlands Christelijk
Werkgeversverbond (NCW) die op 31 december 1996 fuseerden. Ook daarvoor
werkten beide organisaties nauw samen wat betreft het inkomensbeleid. 
Ik heb vier ideaaltypische regeringsstrategieën onderscheiden en drie ideaaltypi-
sche stijlen van besluitvorming waarvan vakbonden en ondernemersorganisaties
gebruik kunnen maken. De vier regeringsstrategieën en drie stijlen van besluit-
vorming leveren samen een analyse-instrument op waarmee alle mogelijke stadia
in het proces van onderhandelen en alle mogelijke uitkomsten beschreven kunnen
worden (zie Appendix). Daarmee is dit analyse-instrument uitermate geschikt
voor het onderzoek naar onderhandelingsprocessen over inkomensbeleid, zowel
in de tijd als in verschillende landen.
Cel IC lijkt een neo-corporatistisch inkomensbeleid te representeren vanuit het
perspectief van de stijlen van besluitvorming. Maar het gaat hierbij om stadia in,
of uitkomsten van, het onderhandelingsproces die ook in pluralistische omstan-
digheden kunnen voorkomen. Het belangrijkste punt is dat de regering geen neo-
corporatistische intenties heeft en het inkomensbeleid geheel over laat aan sociale
partners. En die blijken tot overeenstemming te kunnen komen.
Cel IVC lijkt eveneens een neo-corporatistisch inkomensbeleid te representeren
vanuit het perspectief van de stijlen van besluitvorming. Maar de regering heeft
geen neo-corporatistische intenties en legt het eigen inkomensbeleid dwingend
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Het proces en de uitkomst van de jaarlijkse onderhandelingen over inkomensbeleid in
Nederland 1965 - 2000
Regeringsstrategie
Stijl van
besluitvorming
I = Passief II = Coöperatief III = Congruent IV = Leidend
A+A, B, C =
Confrontatie
(Chicken game)
IA:
Niet neo-
corporatistisch
IIA:
Neo-
corporatistisch
IIIA:
Neo-
corporatistisch
IVA:
Niet neo-
corporatistisch
B + B, C =
Onderhandelen
(Prisoners’
Dilemma)
IB:
Niet neo-
corporatistisch
IIB:
Neo-
corporatistisch
IIB:
Neo-
corporatistisch
IVB:
Niet neo-
corporatistisch
C + C  =
Probleem
oplossen
(Battle of the
Sexes)
IC:
Quasi
corporatistisch
IIC:
Neo-
corporatistisch
IIIC:
Neo-
corporatistisch
IVC:
Corporativistisch
Bron: hoofdstuk 3, Tabel 3.4.
stratie op 2 october 2004 tegen het sociaal-economische beleid van het kabinet Balkenende II was
een uitzondering.
op aan de sociale partners. Sociale partners zijn het ofwel eens met dat inko-
mensbeleid, of leggen zich zonder problemen neer bij dat beleid.
De neo-corporatistische uitkomsten in termen van regeringsstrategie zijn niet
noodzakelijkerwijs altijd succesvol in het bereiken van overeenstemming tussen
de betrokken actoren. Als het gaat om overeenstemming zijn er slechts vier
uitkomsten mogelijk. Als eerste een bipartite Centraal Accoord tussen sociale
partners. Als tweede een tripartiet Centraal Accoord tussen regering en sociale
partners. De derde uitkomst is dat er geen Centraal Accoord bereikt kan worden.
De laatste uitkomst is een door de regering opgelegd inkomensbeleid.
Met andere woorden, het analyse-instrument is uitputtend als een typologie: alle
mogelijke combinaties van regeringsstrategie en stijl van besluitvorming over tijd
en in verschillende landen kunnen worden beschreven. Maar de verschillende
categorieën sluiten elkaar empirisch niet uit. De vier uitkomsten waar het gaat om
overeenstemming over het inkomensbeleid kunnen bereikt worden via een scala
aan stadia en uitkomsten van het onderhandelingsproces over inkomensbeleid (zie
hoofdstuk 3 en Appendix).
Op basis van deze operationalisering van stijlen van besluitvorming heb ik vast-
gesteld dat een Polder Model dat de samenwerking tussen sociale partners bena-
drukt gelokaliseerd moet worden in de probleem oplossende stijl van besluitvor-
ming (C: Battle of the Sexes). Bovendien behoort de regeringsstrategie dan
neo-corporatistisch te zijn (coöperatief of congruent) aangezien de regerings-
strategie geacht wordt de samenwerking tussen de sociale partners te onder-
steunen en/of te faciliteren.
4. De belangrijkste onderzoeksresultaten van de Nederlandse case studie
In hoofdstuk 4 wordt een eerste antwoord gegeven op onderzoeksvraag 1:
Kan neo-corporatisme, gedefinieerd als een regeringsstrategie van conflictre-
gulering een plausibele verklaring geven voor de vorming en uitvoering van
het Nederlandse inkomensbeleid tussen 1965 en 2000?
Dat antwoord is bevestigend. Ja, neo-corporatisme, gedefinieerd als een rege-
ringsstrategie van conflictregulatie, biedt inderdaad een plausibele verklaring van
de vorming en uitvoering van het Nederlandse inkomensbeleid in een meerder-
heid van de 36 jaren tussen 1965 en 2000. Het neo-corporatistische inkomensbe-
leid bleek echter sterk te variëren door de tijd heen. Het neo-corporatistische
inkomensbeleid was veel prominenter aanwezig na 1982, maar het ‘Accoord van
Wassenaar’ was geen waterscheiding wat betreft regeringsstrategieën. De rege-
ringsstrategie was niet neo-corporatistisch van 1980 - 1986. De meeste neo-
corporatistische regeringsstrategieën na 1982 kwamen voor tussen 1987 en 2000.
Sociale partners werden gaande het proces van onderhandelen over het inko-
mensbeleid wat coöperatiever, vooral na 1982. Er was echter geen sprake van de
ontwikkeling van een ‘Polder Model’ na 1982. Ondanks de toename van het
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aantal neo-corporatistische strategieën van de regering vanaf 1987, bleef de
onderhandelende stijl van besluitvormen (B: Prisoners’ Dilemma) echter de
dominante stijl van besluitvorming van sociale partners. De probleem oplossende
stijl (C: Battle of the Sexes) kwam slechts zelden voor.
Neo-corporatistisch inkomensbeleid in Nederland tussen 1965 en 2000 was
typisch een combinatie van de coöperatieve regeringsstrategie (II) met de onder-
handelende stijl van besluitvorming (B: Prisoners’ Dilemma) van sociale partners.
5. Neo-corporatisme als een regeringsstrategie in Nederland 1965 - 2000
In hoofdstuk 5 wordt het bevestigende antwoord op onderzoeksvraag 1 in hoofd-
stuk 4 verder uitgewerkt en onderbouwd aan de hand van een analyse van vier
subperiodes: 1965 - 1973; 1974 - 1982; 1983 - 1992; en 1993 - 2000. Deze vier
subperiodes werden gebaseerd op een combinatie van politieke ontwikkelingen
in Nederland en externe economische schokken.
In de periode 1965 - 1973 nam de confrontatie (A: Chicken) tussen sociale part-
ners toe. Overeenkomsten over inkomensbeleid kwamen daardoor niet tot stand
en regeringen besloten daarom uiteindelijk het inkomensbeleid zelf aan sociale
partners op te leggen. In de periode 1974 - 1982 nam de confrontatie tussen
sociale partners af, maar verzandden onderhandelingen veelvuldig in patstel-
lingen (B: Prisoners’ Dilemma). Daarom besloten regeringen uiteindelijk het
inkomensbeleid zelf aan sociale partners op te leggen. In deze beide periodes
kwamen slechts drie Centrale Accoorden tot stand: 1965, 1970, 1977.
In de periode 1983 - 1992 nam de confrontatie (A: Chicken) tussen sociale part-
ners verder af. De onderhandelende stijl van besluitvorming (B: Prisoners’
Dilemma) leidde nu echter wel vaker tot overeenstemming tussen sociale part-
ners. In de jaren 1983 - 1986 concentreerde de regering zich vooral op de reductie
van het financieringstekort en liet de onderhandelingen over het inkomensbeleid
in de marktsector over aan sociale partners. De regeringsstrategie was de niet neo-
corporatistische, passieve strategie (I). Aangezien de marktsector en de publieke
sector door de regering met ingang van 1983 ontkoppeld waren, had de overeen-
stemming over het inkomensbeleid tussen sociale partners in deze jaren geen
negatieve gevolgen voor het financieringstekort van de overheid. De ontkoppeling
van beide sectoren was gebaseerd op het Centrale ‘Wassenaar’Acoord uit decem-
ber 1982 dat door de regering aan sociale partners was opgelegd (1983, 1984).
Vanaf 1987 was werkgelegenheid het centrale punt op de regeringsagenda. Om
overeenstemming met de sociale partners op dit punt te bevorderen veranderde de
regeringsstrategie van de niet neo-corporatistische passieve (I) naar de neo-corpo-
ratistische coöperatieve strategie (II). Dat resulteerde in drie Centrale Accoorden:
1987, 1990, 1991.
Ten slotte, in de laatste periode 1993 - 2000 , betekende de ad-hoc koppeling
tussen inkomens in de markt sector en in de (semi-) publieke sector, gevoegd bij
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de budgettaire discipline opgelegd door de Europese Monetaire Unie (EMU), in
de context van een economische opgang na 1995, dat niet neo-corporatistische
regeringsstrategieën geen optie waren. Regeringsstrategieën waren dus neo-
corporatistisch. Gevoegd bij weinig confrontatie (A: Chicken) tussen sociale part-
ners en een enkel geval van de probleem oplossende stijl van besluitvorming (C:
Battle of the Sexes) leidde dat in deze periode tot nog meer overeenkomsten dan
in de vorige periode: 1993, 1994, 1996-1999.
Ook in dit hoofdstuk kon de ontwikkeling van een ‘Polder Model’ empirisch niet
aangetoond worden. Ondanks de neo-corporatistische regeringsstrategieën vanaf
1987 (met uitzondering van 1992), bleef de dominante stijl van besluitvorming
van sociale partners de onderhandelende stijl (B: Prisoners’ Dilemma). Na 1987
leidde deze stijl in combinatie met neo-corporatistische regeringsstrategieën
binnen de gewijzigde institutionele en externe context echter tot overeenkomsten
tussen sociale partners, in plaats van tot patstellingen zoals in de periode 1974 - 1982.
6. Neo-corporatisme en de effectiviteit van inkomensbeleid
In hoofdstuk 6 wordt onderzoeksvraag 2 beantwoord:
Was het Nederlandse inkomensbeleid tussen 1965 en 2000 effectief in termen
van de agenda’s van de betrokken actoren?
De effectiviteit in termen van agenda’s werd vastgesteld op basis van twee indi-
catoren. In de eerste plaats de afgesloten Centrale Accoorden tussen vakbonden
en ondernemersorganisaties en/of tussen sociale partners en de regering. In de
tweede plaats de mate van overeenstemming tussen de wensen zoals geformuleerd
in de agenda’s van de betrokken actoren en de feitelijke uitkomsten (de ‘core’).
Over de gehele periode 1965 - 2000 was het Nederlandse inkomensbeleid in
termen van Centrale Accoorden slechts effectief in een minderheid van de 36 jaar.
Maar in elke periode was neo-corporatistisch inkomensbeleid inderdaad effec-
tiever dan niet neo-corporatistisch inkomensbeleid. In acht jaren was neo-corpo-
ratistisch inkomensbeleid echter niet effectief, terwijl omgekeerd in drie jaren een
niet neo-corporatistisch inkomensbeleid wel effectief was.
Het Nederlandse inkomensbeleid was met name niet effectief tussen 1965 en
1982. Effectief neo-corporatistisch inkomensbeleid kwam vooral voor na 1992.
Dat betekent echter niet dat er een ‘Polder Model’ was ontstaan, niet in de jaren
tachtig en evenmin in de jaren negentig. Het ‘Model’ van onderhandelen over
inkomensbeleid tussen 1965 en 2000 veranderde niet ingrijpend. Het ‘Model’
bestond uit de combinatie van een coöperatief neo-corporatistische regerings-
strategie (II) in combinatie met de onderhandelende stijl van besluitvorming van
sociale partners (B: Prisoners’ Dilemma).
Wat er wel veranderde was de effectiviteit van het ‘Model’ in termen van Centrale
Accoorden. De grotere effectiviteit van het inkomensbeleid in termen van
Centrale Accoorden na 1982 kan verklaard worden uit het gedrag van de actoren
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in de context van institutionele veranderingen als gevolg van macro-economische
ontwikkelingen en externe veranderingen (EMU).
Wat betreft de mate van overeenkomst tussen wensen en de feitelijke uitkomst (de
‘core) was het Nederlandse inkomensbeleid tussen 1965 en 2000 eveneens vaker
niet dan wel effectief. Hoewel een neo-corporatistische regeringsstrategie gecom-
bineerd met een Centraal Accoord op basis van min of meer ‘harde’ onderhande-
lingen (alternerend tussen confrontatie (A: Chicken) en onderhandelen (B: Priso-
ners’ Dilemma)) vaker leidde tot overeenstemming tussen wensen en feitelijke
uitkomst en daarmee de ‘core’ dicht benaderde, was dat evenzeer, zij het minder
vaak, het geval voor niet-neo-corporatistische regeringsstrategieën die door
‘harde’ onderhandelingen niet leidden tot een Centraal Accoord.
Het antwoord op onderzoeksvraag 2 is dus dat het Nederlandse inkomensbeleid
tussen 1965 en 2000 vaker niet dan wel effectief was, vooral tussen 1965 en
1982. Neo-corporatistisch inkomensbeleid was inderdaad vaker effectief dan niet
neo-corporatistisch inkomensbeleid, in het bijzonder na 1992. Maar er was geen
sprake van de ontwikkeling of opkomst van een ‘Polder Model’ in termen van een
probleem oplossende stijl van besluitvorming (C: Battle of the Sexes) gecombi-
neerd met een neo-corporatistische regeringsstrategie (coöperatief of congruent).
7. Neo-corporatisme en sociaal democratie
In hoofdstuk 7 heb ik de relatie tussen een neo-corporatistische regeringsstrategie
en de samenstelling van die regering onderzocht. De centrale vraag was of een
neo-corporatistische regeringsstrategie afhankelijk was van de deelname van een
sociaal democratische partij aan die regering. 
Mijn antwoord was, ten eerste, dat deelname van de PvdA aan coalitieregeringen
inderdaad een positief verschil maakt wat betreft het voorkomen van neo-corpo-
ratistische regeringsstrategieën, in het bijzonder na 1993 toen de PvdA de domi-
nante partij in de regering was die de Minister van Sociale Zaken leverde en
verantwoordelijk was voor het inkomensbeleid.
Ten tweede, dat de deelname van de PvdA aan coalitieregeringen ook een posi-
tief verschil maakte wat betreft de effectiviteit van neo-corporatistische rege-
ringsstrategieën in termen van Centrale Accoorden en het benaderen van de ‘core’
(de mate van overeenstemming tussen wensen en feitelijke uitkomsten). Rege-
ringsdeelname van de PvdA na 1993 leverde echter geen nieuw of een effectiever
Polder Model op in termen van Centrale Accoorden en benaderingen van de ‘core’.
Nadere beschouwing van de effecten van deelname van de PvdA aan coalitiere-
geringen op de effectiviteit van inkomensbeleid leverde het volgende beeld op.
Coalitieregeringen van PvdA en CDA voor 1994 waren of effectief wat betreft
neo-corporatistische regeringsstrategieën en Centrale Accoorden of effectief wat
betreft het benaderen van de ‘core’. Coalitieregeringen van PvdA en VVD na
1993 waren effectiever wat betreft (aantallen ) neo-corporatistische regerings-
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strategieën, maar niet wat betreft (aantallen) Centrale Accoorden of het (aantal)
benaderingen van de ‘core’. Sociaal democratische participatie in coalitierege-
ringen in Nederland tussen 1965 en 2000 was dus blijkbaar gunstig voor het
bereiken van een equilibrium tussen sociale partners: of door neo-corporatistische
regeringsstrategieën en Centrale Accoorden, of door het benaderen van de ‘core’.
8. Prestaties van het Nederlandse neo-corporatisme: de ‘Nederlandse Ziekte’
en het ‘Nederlandse Economische Mirakel’
In hoofdstuk 8 heb ik de ‘Nederlandse Ziekte’ en het ‘Nederlandse economische
mirakel’ vanuit vergelijkend perspectief besproken. Een specifiek ‘Nederlandse’
ziekte of economisch mirakel in termen van algemene prestaties kon niet vastge-
steld worden in de vergelijking met de landen van de Organisatie voor Economi-
sche Samenwerking en Ontwikkeling (OESO), de Europese Unie (EU) en met de
zeven andere kleine West-Europese neo-corporatistische landen (België, Dene-
marken, Finland, Noorwegen, Oostenrijk, Zweden en Zwitserland). 
Voorzover er een typisch ‘Nederlandse’ ziekte van lage prestaties tussen 1978 en
1985 te onderkennen valt, bestond deze uit een gemiddeld lagere economische
groei, een negatieve werkgelegenheidsgroei en, in mindere mate, een hogere
werkloosheid. Het typisch ‘Nederlandse’ economische mirakel van hogere pres-
taties tussen 1995 en 2000 bestond uit een gemiddeld (veel) hogere economische
en werkgelegenheidsgroei, een lagere werkloosheid, gecombineerd met een forse
teruggang in uitgaven ten behoeve van de verzorgingsstaat. Met name aan dit
laatste aspect van het ‘Nederlandse’ economische mirakel is nog weinig aandacht
besteed in vergelijkend onderzoek.
Ik heb ook de effectiviteit van inkomensbeleid in termen van Centrale Accoorden
en prestaties onderzocht. De vraag was of de ‘Nederlandse Ziekte’ inderdaad
gepaard ging met minder, en minder succesvolle neo-corporatistische regerings-
strategieën, en omgekeerd, of het ‘Nederlandse economische mirakel’ gepaard
ging met meer, en meer succesvolle neo-corporatistische regeringsstrategieën.
Dat bleek inderdaad het geval te zijn, en dat kan mede aanleiding hebben gegeven
aan de gedachte dat er een positieve relatie was tussen een nieuw Nederlands
‘Polder Model’ en het ‘Nederlandse economische mirakel’. Ik heb echter bear-
gumenteerd dat het niet het gedrag van de actoren was dat de prestaties bepaalde,
maar dat de macro-economische en externe (EMU) context en de veranderingen
in de institutionele context samen, het gedrag van de actoren bepaalden in de zin
van neo-corporatistische regeringsstrategieën, Centrale Accoorden en het bena-
deren van de ‘core’. Dat kan mede verklaren waarom de ‘core’ vaker werd bena-
derd voor 1983 dan na 1982 (de periode van het zogenoemde Polder Model) en
in de periode van het economisch ‘mirakel’ tussen 1995 en 2000.
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9. Samenvatting en conclusies
De onderzoeksresultaten op basis van de Nederlandse case studie en de interna-
tionale vergelijking hebben consequenties voor het Nederlandse ‘Polder Model’
en voor de conceptualisering van neo-corporatisme in internationaal vergelijkend
onderzoek, alsmede voor de ‘Nederlandse ziekte’, en voor het ‘Nederlandse
economische mirakel’.
Er is geen ‘Polder Model’
In hoofdstuk 4, 5, en 6 heb ik vastgesteld dat de onderzoeksresultaten geen on-
dersteuning opleveren voor het ontstaan van een ‘Polder Model’. Niet na 1982,
en evenmin in de jaren negentig. Vanuit het perspectief van regeringsstrategieën
zou een ‘Polder Model’ geïdentificeerd kunnen worden vanaf 1987. Vanaf 1987
was het inkomensbeleid in Nederland neo-corporatistisch, met uitzondering van
1992. Maar de belangrijkste stijl van besluitvorming van sociale partners was ook
vanaf 1987 de onderhandelende stijl (B: Prisoners’ Dilemma). Met andere woor-
den, ook al opereerden regeringen volgens een ‘Polder Model’, de sociale part-
ners beantwoordden dat niet met de corresponderende probleem oplossende stijl
van besluitvorming (C: Battle of the Sexes). Het Nederlandse neo-corporatisti-
sche ‘Model’ bestond uit de combinatie van de coöperatieve neo-corporatistische
regeringsstrategie (II) met de onderhandelende stijl van besluitvorming (B: Priso-
ners’ Dilemma) tussen sociale partners.
De mogelijke opkomst van een ‘Polder Model’ werd ook geanalyseerd vanuit het
perspectief van Centrale Accoorden. Het ‘Polder Model’ werd geacht te leiden tot
meer overeenstemming en overeenkomsten tussen sociale partners onderling en
tussen sociale partners en de regering. Na 1982 bleek het aantal Centrale
Accoorden inderdaad veel hoger te zijn dan voor 1983: 11 tegen 3. De Centrale
Accoorden na 1982 waren echter niet alle gebaseerd op neo-corporatistisch inko-
mensbeleid en niet al het neo-corporatistische inkomensbeleid leidde tot een
Centraal Accoord. Na 1982 resulteerden negen van de 13 neo-corporatistische
regeringsstrategieën in een Centraal Accoord. Omgekeerd was dat het geval met
twee van de vijf niet-neo-corporatistische regeringsstrategieën.
De mogelijke opkomst van een ‘Polder Model’ werd ook geanalyseerd vanuit het
perspectief van benadering van de ‘core’. En inderdaad leidden neo-corporatisti-
sche regeringsstrategieën en Centrale Accoorden vaker tot het benaderen van de
‘core’. Maar hetzelfde gold - zij het minder vaak - voor niet-neo-corporatistische
regeringsstrategieën die niet leidden tot een Centraal Accoord. Bovendien werd
de ‘core’ iets vaker benaderd voor 1983 dan na 1982.
De mogelijke opkomst van een ‘Polder Model’ werd ook geanalyseerd vanuit het
perspectief van regeringsdeelname van de PvdA. Sociaal democratische domi-
nantie in de regering na 1993 leidde niet tot een significante verhoging van de
effectiviteit van neo-corporatistische regeringsstrategieën in termen van Centrale
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Accoorden en benadering van de ‘core’. Dat betekent dat dominantie van de
PvdA in de regering na 1993 geen nieuw en evenmin een effectiever ‘Polder
Model’ tot gevolg had.
Samenvattend, ik heb vastgesteld dat noch vanuit het perspectief van regerings-
strategie, noch vanuit het perspectief van Centrale Accoorden en benadering van
de ‘core’, het bestaan van een ‘Polder Model’ empirisch kan worden aangetoond.
Dat betekent dat het belang dat sommige onderzoekers van het Nederlandse neo-
corporatisme hechten aan het ‘Accoord van Wassenaar’ uit 1982 mijns inziens
overdreven is. Het ‘Accoord van Wassenaar’ was geen waterscheiding.
Mijn onderzoeksresultaten ondersteunen die onderzoekers die wijzen op het flexi-
bele karakter van het Nederlandse neo-corporatisme tussen 1965 en 2000, in
combinatie met een centrale rol daar binnen voor de regering. Tussen 1965 en
2000 kwam er neo-corporatisme in Nederland voor, maar het varieerde zowel in
voorkomen als in effectiviteit. Die variatie vormde geen nieuw ‘Model’ na 1982
of in de jaren negentig. Tussen 1965 en 2000 was er weinig verandering in het
‘Model’ van onderhandelingen over inkomensbeleid in Nederland: een coöpera-
tieve neo-corporatistische regeringsstrategie (II) in combinatie met een onder-
handelende stijl van besluitvorming (B: Prisoners’ Dilemma) tussen sociale part-
ners. Wat dat betreft verschil ik van mening met onderzoekers die conflicten en
patstellingen tussen sociale partners gelijkstellen met minder of zelfs verdwijnend
neo-corporatisme. In mijn visie is een neo-corporatistische strategie van de rege-
ring geen garantie voor succes. Noch wat betreft de corresponderende stijlen van
besluitvorming van vakbonden en ondernemersorganisaties, noch wat betreft
overeenkomsten tussen sociale partners of tussen sociale partners en de regering.
Soms is het ‘Model’ effectief, soms niet, afhankelijk van de macro-economische,
externe en institutionele context die het gedrag van actoren beïnvloeden.
Neo-corporatisme als concept in internationaal vergelijkend onderzoek
Het concept van neo-corporatisme als een regeringsstrategie en de operationali-
sering daarvan in strategieën van de regering en stijlen van besluitvorming van
vakbonden en ondernemersorganisaties die in dit onderzoek gebruikt werden
maakten het mogelijk een plausibele verklaring te geven voor de vorming en
uitvoering van het inkomensbeleid in Nederland tussen 1965 en 2000. Het
gebruikte analyse-instrument was in staat alle mogelijke stadia tijdens het onder-
handelingsproces over inkomensbeleid, evenals alle mogelijke uitkomsten in
termen van inkomensbeleid te beschrijven. Wat dat betreft werkte het analyse-
instrument beter dan de meeste andere conceptualiseringen en operationalise-
ringen van neo-corporatisme. Die richtten zich vooral op de formele institutiona-
lisering van het proces van vormen en uitvoeren van inkomensbeleid en op
consensus over. Het voorkomen van instituties van overleg over inkomensbeleid
en/of consensus over dat inkomensbeleid binnen die instituties of als resultaat van
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die instituties, werden gebruikt als verklarende factoren voor neo-corporatisme.
Geen instituties, of geen consensus: geen neo-corporatisme.
Deze nogal statische conceptualiseringen van neo-corporatisme leidden, afhan-
kelijk van de periode waarop het onderzoek betrekking had, tot de conclusie dat
Nederland een hogere dan wel lagere score dan andere landen op even statische
als tijdloze schalen van neo-corporatisme had. De feitelijke vorming en uitvoe-
ring van het inkomensbeleid in Nederland tussen 1965 en 2000 in het onderhan-
delingsproces tussen sociale partners onderling en van sociale partners met de
regering, kon daarmee niet verklaard worden.
De conceptualisering van neo-corporatisme als een regeringsstrategie van
conflictregulering en de operationalisering in het door mij ontwikkelde analyse-
instrument kon zowel (de veranderingen in) de regeringsstrategie als in de stijl
van besluitvorming van vakbonden en ondernemersorganisaties beschrijven. Stra-
tegie en stijl van besluitvorming resulteerden in een bepaald inkomensbeleid in
een bepaald jaar. Dat inkomensbeleid was de uitkomst van het jaarlijkse proces
van consultatie en onderhandeling over inkomensbeleid in dat jaar. Mijn concep-
tualisering en operationalisering konden ook de effectiviteit verklaren van inko-
mensbeleid in termen van agenda’s en macro-economische prestaties. Mijn
onderzoek maakte duidelijk dat er niet zozeer een verandering in het Nederlandse
‘Model’ van neo-corporatisme heeft plaatsgevonden tussen 1965 en 2000, als wel
veranderingen in de effectiviteit van het bestaande ‘Model’. Deze veranderingen
in effectiviteit van het bestaande ‘Model’ konden verklaard worden door het gedrag
van de actoren die betrokken waren bij de vorming en uitvoering van het inko-
mensbeleid in Nederland tussen 1965 en 2000. Dat gedrag werd weer beïnvloed
door veranderingen in de macro-economische, externe en institutionele context. 
Met andere woorden, we zien in Nederland een proces van beperkte institutionele
veranderingen dat leidt tot veranderingen in zowel de onderwerpen als de reik-
wijdte van overeenkomsten over inkomensbeleid. Deze institutionele verande-
ringen worden meestal geïmplementeerd door de regering, zo nodig tegen de
wensen van één of van beide sociale partners in.
De betekenis van mijn conceptualisering en operationalisering van neo-corpora-
tisme als een regeringsstrategie voor internationaal vergelijkend onderzoek is
tweeledig. Allereerst, het door mij ontwikkelde analyse-instrument kan ook benut
worden voor een analyse van de vorming en uitvoering van inkomensbeleid in
andere landen en voor een internationale vergelijking van dat inkomensbeleid.
Een internationale vergelijking van inkomensbeleid, gebaseerd op mijn analyse-
instrument, kan bijdragen aan de vermindering van de methodologische
verschillen tussen het vergelijken van meerdere gevallen en het onderzoek naar
een enkel geval, door elementen van beide onderzoeksmethodes te combineren:
het vergelijken van meerdere gevallen, maar wel op basis van een gedetailleerde,
kwalitatieve beschrijving en analyse van die gevallen. Het nut van het gebruik van
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een meer dynamische operationalisering van neo-corporatisme wordt onder-
streept door de resultaten van ander recent internationaal vergelijkend onderzoek
naar neo-corporatisme.
Daarnaast kan dit analyse-instrument met enige aanpassingen ook benut worden
voor het onderzoek naar de vorming en uitvoering van beleid op andere terreinen
dan inkomensbeleid, zowel in Nederland, als in andere landen. Dat maakt ook een
internationale vergelijking van (de totstandkoming en uitvoering van) dat beleid
mogelijk. 
De ‘Nederlandse Ziekte’ en het ‘Nederlandse economische mirakel’
Een specifiek ‘Nederlandse’ ziekte of economisch mirakel in termen van alge-
mene prestaties kon niet vastgesteld worden in de vergelijking met de landen van
de OESO en de EU en met de zeven andere kleine West-Europese neo-corpora-
tistische landen. Voorzover er een typisch ‘Nederlandse’ ziekte van lage presta-
ties tussen 1978 en 1985 te onderkennen valt, bestond deze uit een gemiddeld
lagere economische groei, een negatieve werkgelegenheidsgroei en, in mindere
mate, een hogere werkloosheid. Het typisch ‘Nederlandse’ economische mirakel
van hogere prestaties tussen 1995 en 2000 bestond uit een gemiddeld (veel)
hogere economische en werkgelegenheidsgroei, een lagere werkloosheid, gecom-
bineerd met een forse teruggang in uitgaven ten behoeve van de verzorgingsstaat.
Aan dit laatste aspect van het ‘Nederlandse’ economische mirakel is nog weinig
aandacht besteed in vergelijkend onderzoek.
En hoewel de ‘Nederlandse ziekte’ inderdaad gepaard ging met minder, en min-
der succesvolle neo-corporatistische regeringsstrategieën, en omgekeerd, het ‘Ne-
derlandse economische mirakel’ met meer, en meer succesvolle neo-corporatisti-
sche regeringsstrategieën, was het niet het gedrag van de actoren dat de prestaties
bepaalde, maar de macro-economische en externe (EMU) context en de daaruit
voortvloeiende veranderingen in de institutionele context samen, die het gedrag
van de actoren bepaalden in de zin van neo-corporatistische regeringsstrategieën,
stijlen van besluitvorming en Centrale Accoorden en de resultaten daarvan in
termen van benaderingen van de ‘core’.
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